

CURRENT HISTORY

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF *The New York Times*

VOL. IV.
NO. 4


JULY—1916

PRICE
25 CENTS



Reduce Your Flesh

Wear my famous Rubber Garments a few hours a day and your superfluous Flesh will positively disappear.



ABDOMINAL BELT

This belt is a popular garment for reducing the abdomen and relieving the strain on the back. The same style garments that are made for women are also made for men.

Dr. Jeanne Walter's

**Famous Medicated
RUBBER GARMENTS
FOR MEN AND WOMEN**

Cover the entire body or any part. This safe and quick way to reduce by perspiration endorsed by leading physicians.

**Frown Eradicator . . . \$2.00
Chin Reducer 2.00
Neck and Chin Reducer 3.00
Brassiere 6.00
Abdominal Reducer . . 6.00**

Also Union Suits, Stockings, Jackets, etc., for the purpose of reducing the flesh anywhere desired. Invaluable to those suffering from rheumatism. Send for free illustrated booklet.

DR. JEANNE C. H. WALTER

Inventor and Patentee,
353 Fifth Avenue, New York
Cor. 34th Street, 3rd
door East.

CURRENT HISTORY

Vols. I, II, III. Each Vol. 1320 Pages
(Illustrated. Elaborately indexed.)

**First Eighteen Months of the War
6 Months' Period in Each Volume**

THESE volumes cover each six months' period of the war as no other publication, containing all the essential official utterances, diplomatic correspondence, and vital literature bearing on the subject by the most eminent writers of all nations.

All belligerents and all neutrals are fairly represented.

**Bound in leather, $\frac{3}{4}$ leather, cloth,
delivered at \$4, \$3.50, \$2.25 per
volume, respectively.**

Address

**CURRENT HISTORY
TIMES SQUARE NEW YORK**

UNIFORMS

FOR

Military Training Camps

United States Army

National Guard

Boys Brigade

Boy Scouts of America

SIGMUND EISNER

Red Bank, N. J.

*Official National Outfitter,
Boy Scouts of America.*

New York Office: 103 Fifth Ave.

The Proper Private School

for your children is perhaps the most important choice you have to make. You need the best guide in existence and that undoubtedly you will find every month in the

**Educational Directory
of
Harper's Magazine**

for it is in Harper's Magazine that you find the announcements of more private and preparatory schools and colleges than in any other publication—the widest, the best, and the most dependable selection.

Would you not like to have your own child go to school with children whose parents read Harper's Magazine?

Franklin Simon & Co.

PARIS
4 Rue Martel

Fifth Avenue, New York

LONDON
29 Jewin Crescent

Men's Furnishing Shop 16 West 38th St.

SEPARATE SHOP—A Step from Fifth Avenue



Men's Summer Furnishings

At Special Prices

75—Men's Silk Crepe Shirts, white ground with novelty stripes in various color combinations. 13½ to 17 neck. **4.50**

75—U. S. Army Service Stripe Scarfs, of silk repp in colors of ten branches of the U. S. Army. **1.00**

81 — Men's English Grenadine Scarfs, made in London for Franklin Simon & Co., in neat figures or pastel shades. **1.50**

75—Men's White Leather Belts with gilt buckle. Sizes 30 to 44. **1.00**

77—Men's Foulard Scarfs of finest quality silk foulard, made in London for Franklin Simon & Co., newest designs and colorings. **1.00**

79—Men's Two-piece Bathing Suits of pure worsted, in navy-and-white, navy-and-red, black-and-red. Sizes 34 to 44. **3.50**

**Prompt Delivery
Free**

*Anywhere in the
United States*

The Loeser Bookshop

Patronized by many critical Book lovers because it offers an efficient service in Books of almost all descriptions at prices often the lowest hereabout and always moderate.

*Every New Book of General Interest
Every War Book*

may be found in the comprehensive Loeser stocks. We have facilities for securing quickly and at the lowest prices Books not in the widest demand. The famous Loeser Book Service has long served many beyond the confines of New York.

*Mail Orders Throughout the United States and
Canada Will Be Promptly Filled
and Carefully Shipped.*

Consult us for Books which are needed to complete your libraries. We are prepared to furnish everything from single volumes to the most expensive Sets.

Frederick Loeser & Co.
BROOKLYN - NEW YORK

CURRENT HISTORY

A Monthly Magazine of The New York Times

Published by The New York Times Company, Times Square, New York, N. Y.

Vol. IV.—No. 4

July, 1916

25 cents a Copy
\$3.00 a Year

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
WORLD EVENTS OF THE MONTH Editorial Summaries	591
INTERPRETATIONS OF WORLD EVENTS An Editorial Survey	596
THE GREATEST NAVAL BATTLE By the Editor	601
Semi-Official Stories of Great Sea Fight	606
Kaiser and King Thank Their Naval Fighters	609
THE FATE OF LORD KITCHENER	611
GENERAL BRUSILOFF'S ACHIEVEMENTS By Charles Johnston	612
MEXICO'S THREAT OF WAR By the Editor	616
Text of Carranza's Note of May 22 By C. Aguilar	617
Text of American Note of June 20 By Robert Lansing	624
THE MAN AND THE MACHINE By Gilbert K. Chesterton	631
WAR EVENTS FROM TWO VIEWPOINTS:	
The Month's Developments: American View By Lieut. J. B. W. Gardiner	633
Progress at All Fronts: German View By H. H. von Mellenthin	637
A YEAR OF THE WAR IN ITALY By a Staff Contributor	641
AMERICA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Party Platforms on War Issues	646
THE INSIDE OF THE IRISH REVOLT By Arnold Bennett	648
THE BATTLE OF VERDUN IN DETAIL. II. By M. Ardouin-Dumazet	652
Half a Million Men in a Volcano By a French Captain	659
How the Battle of Verdun Began By a Combatant	660
WHY VERDUN? By Gabriel Hanotaux	663
The Iron Key to War and Peace By Henri Berenger	665
Germany and the Lorraine Iron Mines By Otto Hue	666
GERMAN WAR LOSSES THE GREATEST IN HISTORY By General Duryee	667
CREATING THE BRITISH ARMY By J. B. Firth	669
GERMAN IDEALISM By Benjamin Meade Bolton	673
THE THEORY OF NATIONALITIES By Dr. Conrad Bornhak	677
Prussian Scorn of Nationalities By Hilaire Belloc	682

Contents continued on next page.

Copyright, 1916, by The New York Times Company. All Rights Reserved. Entered at the Post Office in New York as second class matter.

Entered as second class matter at the Post Office Department, Canada.

CONTENTS—Continued

TRADE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE ALLIES	By Luigi Luzzatti	685
Britain's Trials to Come	By Dr. Arthur Shadwell	687
The German Peril After the War	By Archibald Hurd	689
Helfferich on Post-Bellum Trade	By Franz Hugo Krebs	690
The British Protectionists	By Arnold Bennett	692
"IF I WERE WILSON"	By Maximilian Harden	693
Are Americans Fair to Germany?	By Gottlieb von Jagow	701
How About British Militarism?	By Dr. Alfred F. M. Zimmermann	702
A HERO TALE OF THE RED CROSS	By G. S. Petroff	703
MAGAZINISTS OF THE WORLD ON THE WAR:		
PAGE		PAGE
"WE ARE NOT WINNING THIS WAR" 705	FLEMISH CULTURE IS NOT GERMAN	710
By Dr. E. J. Dillon	By L. Dumont-Wilden	
THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN CULTURE 707	THE POPE AND THE PEACE CONGRESS	711
By Professor Ernst Troeltsch	By Eugenio Valli	
HIGH COST OF LIVING IN GERMANY 708	TREND OF EVENTS IN ASIA MINOR	714
By Viscount d'Avenel	By Colonel K. Shumsky	
FRENCH 75s: THE GUNS THAT DE- FEND VERDUN 709		
By Stanley Washburn		
ENGLAND'S SEIZURE OF MAILS	By H. Wittmaack	716
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS	By Arthur James Balfour	719
American Note to Britain on Mail Seizures	By Robert Lansing	722
CABINET MINISTERS ON PEACE TERMS:		
PAGE		PAGE
PEACE ON A BASIS OF REAL FACTS 725	"BRITAIN WILL FIGHT IT OUT"	732
By Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg	By David Lloyd George	
GERMAN CHANCELLOR'S REICHSTAG SPEECH OF JUNE 5, 1916 728	PEACE THROUGH VICTORY ALONE	734
WHY PEACE TALK AT PRESENT IS IDLE 730	By Aristide Briand	
By Sir Edward Grey		
AN EMPIRE DAY MESSAGE	By Rudyard Kipling	735
AMERICA'S CREED OF WAR AND PEACE	By President Wilson	736
Wilson's Mediation Not Acceptable	By Lord Cromer	738
Our Foreign Policy in This War	By Secretary Lansing	739
WHEN THE CHANCELLOR SPEAKS	By Gilbert Hirsch	741
THE HORRORS OF TRENCH FIGHTING	By Romeo Houle	748
THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS	26 Cartoons, All Nations	761
PROGRESS OF THE WAR	Chronology to June 11	781

ROTOGRAVURE ILLUSTRATIONS


PAGE	PAGE
EARL KITCHENER OF KHARTUM <i>Frontis</i>	CANADIAN CHARGE AT YPRES 670
GREAT NORTH SEA BATTLE 591	INDOMITABLE FRANCE AT VERDUN 671
COMMANDERS IN NORTH SEA BATTLE 606	HOW VERDUN'S DEFENDERS LIVE 686
WARSHIPS SENT TO THE BOTTOM 607	"MATER DOLOROSA BELGICA" 687
GENERAL ALEXEI A. BRUSILOFF 622	A REALITY THAT RIVALS ROMANCE 718
ARMORED AUTOMOBILES 623	RUSSIAN TROOPS AT MARSEILLES 719
GENERAL LUIGI CADORNA 638	CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 734
BARON CONRAD VON HERTZENDORF 639	GENERAL LI YUAN-HUNG 735

EARL KITCHENER OF KHARTUM



Britain's Famous War Secretary, Who Perished With His Staff on the
Cruiser Hampshire, June 5, When on His Way to Russia
(Photo by Press Illustrating Co.)

GREAT NORTH SEA BATTLE, MAY 31, 1916



This Perspective Diagram, Drawn From Cabled Data, Is Intended to Show the Locale of the Battle Rather Than to Picture Its Events. The Cross Near the Orkneys Marks the Place Where Lord Kitchener Perished

(© 1916 New York Times Company.)

CURRENT HISTORY

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF THE NEW YORK TIMES

JULY, 1916

WORLD EVENTS OF THE MONTH

THE MEXICAN CRISIS

THE relations between the United States and Mexico are strained almost to the point of warfare as this issue of CURRENT HISTORY goes to press, (June 20.) On Sunday, June 18, President Wilson called out substantially all the State militia of the United States, to be sent to the Mexican border, "wherever and as fully as General Funston determines them to be needed." The Secretary of War, in transmitting the President's call, states that it "is wholly unrelated to General Pershing's expedition, and contemplates no additional entry into Mexico." At the same time the Secretary of the Navy has ordered additional warships, gunboats, and other craft on both the east and west coasts of America to Mexican waters.

On June 20 our reply to the request of General Carranza for the withdrawal of American troops from Mexico went forward. The note was a refusal to withdraw the troops. The message is long, containing about 6,000 words. It states that our armed forces will remain in Mexico until the Mexican Government so thoroughly polices the border that bandit raids into American territory become impossible; but it contains a reaffirmation of the friendly intentions of the United States toward the de facto Government of Mexico.

It is estimated that approximately 100,000 National Guardsmen will be mustered into the Federal service and be speedily sent to the frontier for patrol duty. The entire force at the disposal of General Funston will consist of about 35,000 regulars and 100,000 Guardsmen.

It is not likely that General Carranza will deliberately precipitate war, and the United States gives definite assurances that its forces are not being mobilized for aggression, but will be utilized for defense only. The danger, however, arises from the increasing excitement among the Mexicans. There is strong likelihood that their resentment will burst forth into some seriously hostile outbreak before the deliberate processes of diplomacy can adjust the crisis. It is evident that the patience of the United States Government is about exhausted, and little hope is felt that Carranza can restore order and maintain it. The firm steps that are now being taken by President Wilson will bring matters to a head, and before this magazine reaches its readers the question of forcible intervention (which will mean war) or of a permanent basis of friendly co-operation for the suppression of disorders will have been settled between the two countries.

* * *

PEACE PROSPECTS

PROSPECTS of peace were encouraging in April and early May, owing to the apparently pacific words of the German Chancellor and the evident latitude given by the censors to German newspapers in discussions of the subject. So definite did the possibilities appear that President Wilson's address at Washington before the League to Enforce Peace was expected by many to open the way for a formal offer of mediation. That tentative utterance, however, evoked positive opposition from the chief spokesmen of the Entente powers, which, in

turn produced emphatic protests from influential groups in Germany.

Then came the German advances at Verdun, the Austrian successes in the Trentino, and, most important of all, the great naval battle off the coast of Jutland, which was hailed by all Germany as a German victory. Assuming a new and defiant tone, Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg withdrew his former overtures and declared unqualifiedly that future proffers of peace must come from the Entente and would be entertained by Germany only on the basis of the "war map." In other words, Germany must be acknowledged to be in legal possession of the conquered territory of Belgium, France, Poland, Russia, and Serbia. Since then a great Russian offensive has swept westward into Austria, but all talk of peace is stilled for the present.

All the official utterances of this episode are printed in the present issue of *CURRENT HISTORY*. They throw an interesting light upon the very heart of the war situation. Since that indecisive naval battle both sides are more fiercely determined than ever to win. The unbridgeable chasm between them is indicated in the semi-official Cologne Gazette's comment upon the allied statement that the duration of the war depends on the will of the German and Austrian Emperors:

They (the English and French) do not know that, universally honored and loved though Emperor William and Emperor Francis Joseph are in their countries, their disappearance from the stage would have no influence at all upon the course of the war. * * * The two Central Powers are fighting for their lives against a limited liability company of robbers, assembled on a scale never previously known. They know that all that is dearest to them, the soil and the future of their Fatherland, is at stake, and so they will go on fighting until a result in accordance with their ideas has been reached.

* * *

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

THE naval battle off Jutland near the entrance to the Skagerrak is the outstanding maritime event of the entire war. Both belligerents claim a victory. The Germans acclaimed the battle as an overwhelming triumph, and the Kaiser sent congratulatory telegrams to the com-

manding officers and boasted that all the honors rested with the German fleet—that the entire Grand Fleet of Great Britain had been encountered and badly worsted. "The first big blow," he declared, "has been dealt the English fleet, whose tyrannical supremacy is shattered."

The German Chancellor declared that the battle was "a great victory," denied that the German fleet had fled, and asserted that the Germans, in greatly inferior numbers, had "defeated the entire Grand Fleet of Great Britain." In his first statement he said the German losses were 24,000 tons against 114,000 by the English, with a like proportionate loss of life, but the German losses were subsequently conceded by the Government to be in excess of 60,000 tons.

The British admiralty in the first official announcement specified its own losses and understated the German losses, (for which it was criticised at home,) but subsequently supplemented the first announcement with an official statement that the German losses had been greatly underrated in the first reports and that from the best information then obtainable they exceeded in weight and numbers the British losses. It is persistently insisted by England that two new battleships of the Hindenburg class and two dreadnought battle cruisers (one, the Lützow, is conceded by the Germans) were lost, notwithstanding the Imperial Admiralty's claims to the contrary. Germany, indeed, has been very reticent in giving details of its losses—in announcing the death of high naval officials the names of the vessels on which they served are omitted.

The relative strength of the two navies at the beginning of 1916 was as follows:

	—England.—		—Germany.—	
	Built.	B'd'g.	Built.	B'd'g.
Battleships	58	14	35	6
Battle cruisers. 9		1	4	3
Cruisers	47	..	9	..
Light cruisers..	65	20	43	6
Torpedo vessels. 25		1
Destroyers	201	36	133	12
Torpedo boats..	106	..	80	..
Submarines	69	27	24	14

Since these figures were compiled a

number of new ships have been added to both navies, and others have been laid down, probably a small percentage in excess by England.

There are 150,000 men in the English Navy, hence a loss of 6,104 dead or missing, 513 wounded—the latest British estimate—represents a trifle over 4 per cent.; the German casualties are given as 2,414 dead, 449 wounded, showing that the actual loss of men on both sides, compared to the whole, will make no difference in relative strength. As respects the tonnage loss, if the present English and German official claims are anywhere near the truth, it is about an even break, so far as the relative strength of the two navies is concerned.

The most important deduction to be drawn from the battle, without debating which was victor or which suffered the greater loss, is the fact that since the battle the English blockade of the North Sea has not relaxed—on the contrary, has tightened—and that the English fleet is again endeavoring to draw the Germans from their harbor.

* * *

A REMARKABLE HUMAN DOCUMENT FROM THE TRENCHES

CURRENT HISTORY surrenders considerable space to the narrative of an American barber who enlisted with the Canadian troops and spent over a year on the firing line in France and Belgium. His history has been investigated and the authenticity of all his service claims is officially confirmed, while his reputation in his home city entitles his personal statements to fullest credence. It is a bitter, gruesome tale he unfolds; war is stripped of its imagery and pomp; the depressing life within the trenches, the terrifying surroundings, the inevitable darkening of the spirit, the lust for human sacrifice—these reveal the abyss into which war hurls its victims. One turns from Roméo Houle's horrifying chapter with a sense of woe, which is only partly relieved by a corresponding surge of thankfulness that our nation has thus far avoided this frightful maelstrom.

AN ACCUSATION DISPROVED

ON Aug. 3, 1914, Herr de Schoen, the German Ambassador to France, handed the following document to M. Viviani, the French Premier:

The German military and administrative authorities have ascertained that a number of hostile acts have been committed on German territory by French military aviators. Some of the latter have violated the neutrality of Belgium, invading its territory. One sought to destroy works in progress at Wesel, others were perceived in the vicinity of Eiffel, and one threw bombs on the railroad station near Karlsruhe and at Nuremberg. I am directed and have the honor to inform your Excellency that in consequence of these aggressions the German Empire considers itself at war with France, due to the acts of this latter power.

Now comes a distinguished German, Professor Schwalde, director and editor in chief of the German Weekly Review of Medicine, who writes in that important German periodical, twenty-two months after this momentous charge was made by the German Government, the following words:

It is false that French aviators threw on Aug. 2, 1914, any bombs on Nuremberg. The Mayor of the city recently wrote to the General commanding the Third Bavarian Army Corps that he never had any knowledge of any bombardment of the stations of Nuremberg, Kissingen, or of Nuremberg-Ansbach before or after the declaration of war.

* * *

GENERAL HAIG'S WORK

THERE are definite signs, as this issue of CURRENT HISTORY goes to press, that a great English offensive in Flanders and France is about to begin. This fact makes interesting the official report for the five months, ended May 19, 1916, by General Sir Douglas Haig, British Commander in Chief in France. In this report engagements which in the press were designated as "fierce drives" are called "sharp local actions"—near Hooze, the Bluff, St. Eloi, Wulverghem, Hulluch, the Hohenzollern Redoubt, Kink, and Vermelles. The Canadians had several bloody encounters near Zillebeke, east of Ypres, which at first went against them, but they subsequently recovered much of the lost ground.

General Haig's report indicates that the English at that time defended a sec-

tor ninety miles long, reaching from the Belgian front, ten miles north of Ypres, down through La Bassée to the Roye Railway, south of the Somme, on a line opposite Amiens. There were 450,000 British soldiers on the firing line, fronted by 500,000 Germans. The English and French do not keep more than one-third of their forces exposed on a normally dormant front, hence it is safe to estimate the British at 1,350,000 men in the ninety miles on May 19, and they doubtless have since been reinforced. Opposite them are 800,000 Germans of all ranks, with 500,000 rifles and 3,000 guns, and with heavy reserves behind. It has been observed that the Germans have rebuilt the fortifications at Lille. Rochambeau, Maubeuge, Herson, La Fere, and Laon, while in the south they have three lines of defense to meet a possible offensive by the French in Champagne.

The heavy Russian drive in Russia is thought to have been timed for the long-expected advance by the British in France, and by the allied army from Saloniki. June and early July bid fair to be the bloodiest period of the war.

* * *

CHINA'S NEW PRESIDENT

THE death of Yuan Shih-kai, President of the Chinese Republic, which occurred on June 6, promises to be a blessing instead of a disaster to China. When Yuan Shih-kai was chosen President of the new Government in Peking his demonstrated abilities had earned him the title of the "strong man of China." His strength, however, began to wane as soon as his personal ambitions began to wax. When last year he metamorphosed the republic into a monarchy, declaring himself Emperor, a revolution broke out in the southern provinces of the country.

For nearly a year Yuan Shih-kai tried to subdue the rebellion, but its tide was irresistible, and province after province seceded from the Peking Government. Yuan then thought it wise to return to the republican form of government, which he did three months ago in a manifesto extraordinary in its self-humiliating tone. But it was already too late. The revolutionary leaders of the

South would have no more of him, and a conference called in Nanking for the purpose of effecting a compromise between the South and the North ended, without achieving its aim, on May 27.

All the members of the Cabinet then tendered their resignations to the President, but Yuan Shih-kai would not accept them. He offered to resign himself as soon as a new Government had been perfected. But before the world could test his sincerity death overtook him, and Li Yuan-hung, Vice President, succeeded him as President. Li Yuan-hung has the complete confidence of the South. As soon as he assumed office the rebel provinces began to come back to the Central Government, and peace in a reunited China seems now to be assured.

* * *

LESS DRINKING IN LONDON

WAR has brought a remarkable decline in drunkenness in London, due to the restricted hours and the anti-treating regulations. The following figures compiled by The London Telegraph show a wonderful change in the weekly average of convictions for drunkenness in the London district, containing a population of 7,000,000:

1909	881	1916—4 weeks' aver-
1910	946	age ending:
1911	1,075	January 30.....
1912	1,152	February 27.....
1913	1,259	March 26.....
1914	1,301	April 23.....
1915 (6 months) ..	1,084	May 21.....

The natural explanation would be that the falling off is due to the absence at the front of so large a proportion of men, but this is offset by the extra spending power of those at home; moreover, there has been a steady and perceptible increase in the sale of non-intoxicating ales at licensed premises.

* * *

THE FUTURE OF POLAND

SINCE the famous proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicholas, then Commander in Chief of the Russian armies, in regard to the restoration of Poland after the war, little has been said by Russian Government officials on the subject. This silence has added to the anxiety of the Poles and their friends

throughout the world. Recently, however, there is to be noticed a marked change in the attitude of the Russian Government toward the Polish question. Thus, a short time after M. Sturmer became Premier of Russia he declared to the Petrograd correspondent of *Le Journal*, Paris, that the program outlined by the Grand Duke will be executed in its entirety after peace is concluded in Europe. Sergius Sazonoff, Russia's Foreign Minister, in an interview with the correspondent of *The London Times*, has now spoken with his habitual fire on the Government's intentions as to the future of Poland. "That Poland will receive a just and equitable autonomy in the greatest degree, adjusted to its future life and its economic and industrial development," says M. Sazonoff, "is certain. The Poles and the friends of the Poles may, therefore, look to the Russians for the dawn of a new era and a period of unexampled development which will follow the inevitable successful conclusion of the war."

* * *

WAR A CURE FOR STRIKES

THERE is abundant evidence in Germany that war is the most efficient solvent of labor disputes yet known. The official figures of the Imperial Statistical Bureau at Berlin show that the year 1915 witnessed the smallest number of strikes and lockouts ever recorded. Only 11,639 persons took part in strikes, and only 1,227 were affected by lockouts in all Germany during that year, and the disputes were of very brief duration. The total time lost during seventeen months of war by 14,950 strikers was 930 5-6 working days, or an average of 5.57 days for each of the 167 disputes which occurred between employer and employee; during the twelve months of 1915 the average time lost per disagreement was 3.45 working days; the average in five years before the war was 34.16 days lost in each dispute. These data prove the close supervision over labor and industry maintained by the German authorities, a state of rigorous regulation not approached in any other belligerent or neutral country.

RANK AND FILE IN WAR

ARNOLD F. GRAVES, an English librettist, has reduced to doggerel a stirring narrative of British deeds in Flanders, which voices the spirit of the rank and file. A few extracts will indicate the attitude of the English fighting man toward the grimmest aspects of war. Of battle strategy he says:

A battle is a jumble-jumble,
A mixem-gatherum, rough and tumble;
And while you're fighting like a cat,
You don't know what the deuce they're at.

In describing the British advance after the German retreat from Paris, he says:

And now I'll tell you what we did
Old Cock-a-doodle-do to kid—
With one French army we changed places;
And when he found no longer traces
Of English troops upon his right,
He thought he'd licked us out of sight,
And clean across our front was trekking,
The country like a pirate wrecking.
He was a goose not to detain
The British troops behind the Seine,
Till he had joined his Forces so
As he could strike a knockout blow.

He pays his respects to the Kaiser in these words:

Satan himself to roast his soul
Forever in a sulphur bowl.
I'd like to stand beside t'ould joker
And stir him with a red-hot poker.

His "Soldier's Funeral" has a strong note all its own:

A soldier's Funeral is brave;
And when he's carried to the grave,
How fine you'd feel to be his son!
His bier borne stately on a gun;
No coaches, plumes, or hearses black,
He sleeps beneath the Union Jack,
Beneath the Flag for which he fought:
An honor never to be bought.
The gunners' nags their proud necks arch,
The band strikes up the funeral march,
And as they draw him down the street,
Wrapped in his royal winding-sheet,
Each passer stands and bares his head,
And says a prayer for him that's dead.

* * *

On May 23 the British Parliament voted its eleventh credit since the war began, the sum this time authorized being \$1,500,000,000. The following have been the votes since August, 1914: Three votes in the first year, aggregating \$1,810,000,000; six votes in the second year, (1915-16,) aggregating \$7,100,000,000; two votes in 1916, (Feb. 21 and May 23,) aggregating \$3,000,000,000; total during the war, \$11,910,000,000. In the fifty days ended May 23 the average rate of expenditure was \$24,100,000 a day. The new vote will meet the requirements only until the first week in August. The daily expenses have slightly declined, and are now estimated at \$23,750,000 a day.

Interpretations of World Events

Kitchener of Khartum

THE British Empire, as we know it, is extremely young. Only in 1858 did the wide realm of India come directly under the crown; a decade later the Dominion of Canada came into being; then came large spaces in East and West Africa. With the twentieth century came the constitution of the Australian Commonwealth. Almost at the same time the Boer republics were added to the empire, and, within a few years, incorporated in the Union of South Africa—like Canada and Australia, a splendid modern piece of constitution building. Since the beginning of the war there have been great accessions—Egypt, Southwest Africa, Eastern New Guinea, with further gains in sight. (Togoland and the Cameroons may go, it appears, to the huge colonial empire of France.)

Within the life-span of Kitchener, every change above recorded has taken place. Born in 1850, he was eight years old when modern India came into being, superseding the old East India Company. He saw the constitution-building of Canada when he was preparing to enter the army as an engineer. The whole development has taken place before his eyes. And at every point of the vast empire, at every point, at least, where disaster threatened, Kitchener's hand was felt, Kitchener's power was decisively shown. After early work in Palestine and then in Cyprus (just added by Disraeli to the empire) he cast in his lot with Egypt, which, with its huge back country, the Sudan, is now practically within the empire. From Egypt he went to South Africa, which has so proudly proved its reconciliation and its loyalty. From Africa he went to India, where likewise devotion to England has triumphed over all temptations to revolt; from India he went again to Egypt; then, in the last act of his imperial life, he undertook the defense, not of outlying possessions of the empire, but of the heart of the empire itself—

of that ancient England from which all the rest has sprung.

And this defense he prepared and perfected by calling for unprecedented sacrifices, asking England to give up the cherished tradition of a volunteer army; asking from the manhood of England the heavy sacrifice of long months of arduous military training, with the prospect of foreign service, of death on foreign soil, as the end of it. In some sense, and in a deep sense, England is paying this high price for the sake of France, since the British Isles and the wide spaces of the empire seem very well protected by the fleet; but, in the last analysis, the fate of England is bound up with the principles for which France is staking her life, and the future life of England requires the future power and liberty of France. It is the highest honor of Kitchener—the final honor added to many high honors—that he from the first saw the danger to the empire in the white light of reality, and that he had both the courage to call for the great sacrifices which that danger rendered necessary and the authority to inspire his countrymen with the will to sacrifice. No man can be compared with him in achievement for the empire, and therefore for the wide and ordered liberty that is the life-breath of the empire.

A Ruse of War

A STORY which reminds us of the battles of earlier centuries comes from the Galician front. The first successful blow against the Austrian lines, we are told, was made sure of success by a ruse. The Russians opened up a bombardment of the Austrians, of considerable violence, but not much more so than on previous occasions. After maintaining this for several hours, they suddenly stopped. The Austrians, expecting an attack, moved up their machine guns and bomb throwers and assembled their troops in the forward trenches. At some points even cavalry was concentrated close to the front. When the Rus-

sian aeroplane observers reported that the enemy positions were crowded with troops, the artillery opened again, this time with a destructive fire such as the Austrians had seldom been called upon to withstand. This storm of shells caused such slaughter and demoralization that when the attack by the Russians began they swept forward with comparatively little difficulty. We ought to be grateful for a story like that. It reminds us of more romantic, more imaginative days: of all the feints and ruses recorded by the annalists of old. It lets us see, too, that the Russians use in war the same powers of imagination and invention which went to the making of Turgenieff and Dostoevski and Tolstoy, to mention creators in one field alone. The outstanding thing about the English commanders, to take a point of contrast still among the Allies, seems to be that they lack imagination, and this seems to synchronize with a period of dry streams in English poetry and other writing. The only two men of imagination in England seem to be Lloyd George and Winston Churchill; and it seems impossible to keep Churchill at the front. But how refreshing to read of that Russian ruse, after plodding through the dull, mechanical, battering-ram strategy of the attack against Verdun!

Galicia and Bukowina

WHILE at Verdun the German Crown Prince is beating out the life of the Teutonic army against the impregnable defenses of the French, the eastern battle front has been the most brilliant and spectacular event of the last twelve months of the war, in the overwhelmingly swift advance of Russia through Volhynia toward Poland, through Podolia toward Galician Lemberg, and through the northern half of the Austrian crownland of Bukowina.

The southern two-thirds of the field of Russia's advance—Galicia with Bukowina—form a single geographical region, walled off from the rest of Austria and from Hungary by the high Carpathian Mountains. The division between Galicia and Bukowina is merely a line on the map; there is no natural or ethnical

boundary. This whole region, then, is in reality the drainage-valley of the great River Dniester, which flows across it from northwest to southeast. From the Carpathian valleys rivers flow down into it on the right; from Russian Podolia and Northern Galicia rivers flow (almost due south) into the Dniester on the left side. With its tributaries, the Dniester valley is an exact picture of a beech-leaf, the Dniester being the midrib of the leaf, while the tributaries are the veins. Hence, with the perpetual crossing of parallel streams—the Zlota Lipa, the Stripa, and the rest, each of which has its own rich life and its traditions—this is a hard field to fight over; it is a heartbreaking field to retreat over, with shaken and dislocated armies.

Consider the position of Czernowitz, the capital of Bukowina. Close to the west bank of the Pruth, it is reached, from the world beyond the Carpathians, by one railroad only, which comes down from the northwest, following the trend of the river valley. And now, while the Austrians have been stubbornly defending the outposts of Czernowitz to the east, the Russians, passing northwest of the city, have crossed the main stream of the Pruth some miles higher up, and have cut the railroad at Sniatyn, the one way of retreat for the Czernowitz garrison. This garrison, which had proclaimed the delaying strategy of the Russian force to the east of the city an Austrian triumph and a Russian "check," now finds itself bottled up by the cutting of the railroad, and faced with three alternatives: either to remain and be slowly pounded to pieces between two Russian forces, knowing that relief is hopeless; or to flee to the west, up the steep Carpathian valleys and passes, with Cossack horsemen at their heels, or to surrender, and join the growing Austrian "colony" within the Czar's dominions. A choice between disasters, with the added knowledge of the threatened revolt of Rumania from Teutonic leading, with the probable crushing of Bulgaria—which is already hastily shifting forces from Saloniki to the Danube—the possible surrender of bankrupt Turkey, and the breakdown of

the painfully built bridge to Bagdad and India. All together, an unpleasant outlook for the garrison of Czernowitz.

Two Points of Naval Tactics

IN the admirable narrative of the Battle of Jutland, published in Glasgow and included in this issue, two points stand out in a startling way. The first is this: The Germans could see the British distinctly outlined against a light yellow sky. The Germans, covered by a haze, could be very indistinctly made out by the English gunners. The hour accounts for that. It was nearly 5 in the afternoon, and the British ships, to the west of their adversaries, were sharply silhouetted against the sunset. The east was already gathering the evening gloom. It is a picturesque touch, a graphic word picture, and would be a fine point of color for a chiaroscuro battle painting. But it is something more. It is a revelation to us that, in these days of long-range guns (and the firing at Jutland began at twelve miles) it is as important to "get the light" of your adversary as it used to be, in the days of "wooden walls" and sailing warships, to "get the wind" of him.

Clearly, it is sound tactics for the English fleet, which will naturally hold the western station, to engage the German fleet in the early morning only, when the sky over the low coast-line of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein is lit up with the sunrise. Equally clearly, it is to the interest of the Germans to bring on a naval fight in the late afternoon. This they in fact did; showing that, as was pointed out in an article in a former issue, they pay close heed to "the psychology of the weather." Admiral Jellicoe and Admiral Beatty should learn by heart the German proverb: "Morgen Stunde hat Gold in Munde"—"Morning hour hath gold in mouth," and should insist on having the German warships clear cut against the gold of sunrise.

The second point we wish to call attention to has a strong and somewhat sinister significance. It is indicated in the following passage of the Glasgow narrative: Beatty immediately also turned right round sixteen points so as to bring

his ships parallel to the German battle-cruisers and facing in the same direction. Just before the turning point was reached, the Indefatigable sank, and the Queen Mary and the Invincible also were lost at the turning point, where, of course, the (German) High Seas Fleet concentrated their fire. The turning point—it is an astonishing phrase. So the English battle cruisers steamed around a fixed point, just as if they had been racing yachts rounding a buoy. And, "of course," the Germans were acute enough to notice this extraordinary fact, and "concentrate their fire" in the neighborhood of the imaginary buoy, in this way alone bringing about the high losses of the British fleet.

One calls to mind other facts. First, that the Lusitania was submarined while going over the identical course that she had habitually followed in time of peace; apparently fifty yards or so from the point she invariably passed, so that a fixed mine with a time-clock might almost have replaced the submarine, which had only to go to the "lane" the Lusitania always followed, and quietly wait for her. Second, that the Hampshire, on the fatal voyage which cost England the life of her greatest soldier, was announced as following the same course she had taken on several earlier trips between the Orkney Islands and the White Sea. Here, once again, it was simply a question of waiting by the roadside for the inevitable coming of the traveler.

There is, however, one compensating fact; for, in the Glasgow dispatch we are told that the Barham, Valiant, and Malaya turned short so as to avoid the danger spot where the Queen Mary and the Invincible had been lost. So far, good: but it irresistibly follows that, had the Queen Mary and the Invincible also turned short, they also would have been saved. The point deserves prayerful consideration by our own Admirals.

Beginning of the Austrian Debacle

FALLEN on evil days: on evil days fallen, and evil tongues"—some such phrase may well characterize the present fate of the aged Kaiser Franz Josef, now nearly 90, who, reigning since

1848, has suffered every dire disaster that can befall humanity. The proudest and haughtiest of men, he saw his age-old empire first beaten in war by upstart Prussia, then practically torn in two by the uprising of Hungary, then overshadowed by the brand-new Hohenzollern Empire, and finally tied to the chariot-wheel of the young, forceful power to the north. In his personal life he might stand as a central figure of the Greek drama of Nemesis, another Oedipus or Priam. His favorite brother was shot under the walls of Mexico; his favorite sister was burned to death in the dreadful fire at the Charity Bazaar in Paris; his son met a mysterious death, probably by his own hand; his wife was murdered. His grandnephew and heir was killed at Serajevo—and still the old man's pride was unbroken; haughtily, he sent his orders to the independent Kingdom of Serbia, haughtily he plunged all Europe into war, in satisfaction of that pride. And now comes the time to pay. In spite of famine and national bankruptcy, a supreme effort was made to smash the resistance of Italy, so long the victim of Austrian oppression; and it seemed, for a few days, that victory was coming there. From the Trentino, from the Cadore and Carnia sectors, came favorable news, only to be broken upon—as calamity came thick upon Job—by the news of ride disaster in the east, at the hands of Russia, whom Franz Josef defied in July, 1914. One-half of his army, it is announced, already destroyed or captured, surrendering in whole battalions and regiments at a time; and now, in the Trentino, also, fatal reverses. It is impossible not to feel a certain pity for the decrepit, hard, implacable old man whose pride is bringing his empire and himself to ruin.

The Sorrows of King Constantine

CABLES from Athens reveal the position of King Constantine of Greece as being in the last degree difficult, not to say perilous. The course in which he has steered the Hellenic ship of state, under the inspiration, it is supposed, of the Hohenzollern Princess whom he married, is showing itself to be pregnant

with disaster. On May 27, as a result of a "deal" with the Teutonic Powers—that is, with his brother-in-law, Kaiser Wilhelm—King Constantine directed the officers of his army to give up to the Bulgarians, led by German officers, Forts Rupel, Dragotin and Spatovo, in the Struma valley, due north of the centre of the British position at Saloniki. In two directions came an instant reaction: the Allies blockaded his ports, and the Athenian population rose against him, openly protesting that he had sold Greek interests to the Germans, and had allowed the detested Bulgarians to occupy the sacred soil of Greece. For the act of his officers, the King is immediately responsible, since he is Commander in Chief of the army, and his Minister, Skouloudis, is governing without a Parliament and without the pretense of holding a Parliamentary majority. It is openly charged that the party in Athens which is supporting "the right of the crown" thus to deal with the fate of the Greek Nation is directed and paid by Germany. But the woes of Constantine do not end here. The blockade of the Allies was accompanied by the request that he should at once demobilize his army, and this he has been compelled to do, while it was in fact through the army that he had maintained his unconstitutional position for many months. He is now left in the air. Naturally, the only course left open was to fly; so he has fled to Larissa; never, perhaps, to return. Finally, the cost of keeping the army mobilized has bankrupted Greece, and the Teutons cannot help her, while the Allies, in view of Constantine's ambiguous policy, will not.

Russia's Naval Force in the Black Sea

THE rapidity with which Russia can drive westward toward her historic goal, Constantinople, from her Erzerum-Trebizond base very largely depends on her naval force in the Black Sea. In the approach to Trebizond, and in the taking of Trebizond itself, the land forces were effectively supported by the navy; and, as the road westward to Constantinople practically runs along the sea shore, the navy can co-operate at

every step of the way, besides keeping the water route open for the arrival of supplies and munitions from Southern Russia. It is, therefore, important to know just what naval forces Russia disposes of there. At the outbreak of the war Russia had, in the Black Sea, (and locked up in the Black Sea, by a treaty which forbade them to pass the Bosphorus,) seven battleships of a certain age, five of which were in sufficiently good shape to engage in active, offensive operations; these five, running from 9,000 to 13,000 tons displacement, have a primary battery of 12-inch guns; there are also two protected cruisers, displacing 6,700 tons, and with a speed of twenty-two knots; these larger ships were supplemented by two dozen destroyers, ranging from 350 to 1,100 tons, and from twenty-six to thirty-one knots; and there were, in addition, a dozen torpedo boats of from 100 to 250 tons; to these should be added eight or ten submarines, some of which were fitted out for mine-laying. Besides these somewhat antiquated boats, the larger of which date from before the Russo-Japanese war, there were in construction, at Sebastopol or Nikolaieff, a group of much more modern and powerful ships; three dreadnoughts of the type of the Imperatritsa Mariya, displacing 23,000 tons, making twenty-one knots, and carrying twelve 12-inch guns; two swift cruisers displacing 6,800 tons, of the Admiral Lazareff type; nine new torpedo-boat destroyers and six submarines. It seems certain that two of these new dreadnoughts, the Imperatritsa Mariya and the Emperor Alexander III. or the Imperatritsa Ekaterina, are already in commission, and probably also one of the new cruisers; very probably also the five destroyers, and two or three of the new submarines. Russia is also well equipped with scout ships and hydro-aeroplanes in the Black Sea. It is evident, then, that the Russian land forces, marching by way of Sinope to Constantinople, along the very road traversed by Xenophon's Ten Thousand, will have effective backing so far as sea power is concerned.

Problem of the Austrian Generals

PETROGRAD dispatches announced, in the middle of June, that in the preceding fortnight the Russian troops had captured some 160,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers "and one General." There is something mysterious in the combination. For the captures are equivalent to four full army corps, which would have, to begin with, four Generals commanding corps; then twice as many Generals commanding divisions, (half corps;) and yet twice as many Generals of brigade, (half divisions;) or twenty-eight Generals in all. One was captured. Where are the twenty-seven? It will be remembered that, when Przemyśl capitulated, in the early Spring of 1915, several Generals were captured, besides the commander of the fort; practically the full complement of division and brigade commanders. A dispatch from Petrograd suggests a solution: The small number of commanding officers captured in proportion to the number of soldiers is attributed by military experts to the confusion existing in the Austrian armies, due to the suddenness and energy of the Russian drive. It shows, it is argued, that the officers lost control of the men and abandoned them to their fate at critical moments. If this be so, and otherwise the mystery remains insoluble, then the name of the "one General captured," who did not "leave his men to their fate," should be given to the world, and added to the war's roll of honor. For anything more unsoldierly than the conduct of a general officer (or, indeed, any officer) who abandoned his men to their fate, while he himself made a "strategical withdrawal," it would be difficult to imagine. If there be in reality any such spirit in the Austro-Hungarian Army, the extraordinary totals announced by the Russian General Staff become more explicable. It will be remembered that, when Przemyśl surrendered, there were stories of officers lounging in hotels, while their men starved in the trenches. Let the name of the "one General" be given to the world.

The Greatest Naval Battle

Narrative of the Historic Engagement in the North Sea Between German and British Fleets

WHETHER the North Sea battle of May 31 shall go down in history as the Battle of Jutland or as the Battle of the Skagerrak may depend upon the outcome of the war and the nationality of the dominant historian, but under any name it will be known to future generations as the greatest naval engagement thus far in modern history, as judged by lives lost, tonnage engaged, and values destroyed. Yet it was an indecisive battle, calling, perhaps, for a still greater one to follow.

For nearly two years the British Grand Fleet had been watching in the mists of the North Sea for a chance to engage the German High Seas Fleet, which lay secure in the Baltic behind the mine fields and coast defenses of Heligoland and the Kiel Canal. The world had almost ceased to expect the great naval battle which had been looked for daily in the early weeks of the war. Suddenly, in the afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, a British battle cruiser squadron under Admiral Sir David Beatty, scouting about seventy-five miles off the Danish coast and the entrance to the Skagerrak, sighted a part of the German High Seas Fleet approaching in battle array. It was in command of Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer, with Vice Admiral Hipper in charge of the German cruiser squadron.

BOTH EAGER TO FIGHT

Without hesitation on either side the titanic struggle was joined, the first shots being exchanged at a distance of twelve miles. Soon the whole German fleet came in sight, and the British cruiser squadron, built for speed, and not intended for direct conflict with the heavier battleships, found itself for a time out-matched, but did not flinch.

Calling by wireless for Admiral Jellicoe's Grand Fleet, then several hundred miles away to the northwest, Admiral Beatty on his flagship *Lion* and Admiral H. A. L. Hood on his flagship *Invincible*

led the attack upon the enemy. Fortunately for them, they were supported by four new superdreadnoughts, which figure in the dispatches as "the Elizabeths." They were the *Queen Elizabeth*, *Warspite*, *Barham*, and *Malaya*, four of the five monsters launched last year, ships of 27,500 tons displacement, heavily armored, and carrying fifteen-inch guns. Being only a few miles away, they were soon in the fight, and played an important part in it, though greatly outnumbered by the dreadnoughts of the German fleet.

A TEMPEST OF DEATH

Throughout the waning afternoon and the long northern evening the battle raged amid a hurricane of sound, as the two fleets steamed swiftly in battle formation past each other, most of the time at a distance of eight miles—a comparatively short range for high-power guns—each vessel pouring forth an endless stream of great explosive shells aimed with the deadly skill of modern instruments of precision. A shell plunged through the steel armor of the swift battle cruiser *Queen Mary*, her magazine exploded, and the splendid ship, almost the latest of its class, buckled up and sank like a stone with its thousand men. The *Indefatigable* went next, in much the same way, and a little later the *Invincible*, with gallant Admiral Hood and his crew of 750 men, was sent to the bottom.

The armored cruiser *Warrior* was helpless and rapidly being pounded to pieces by the concentrated fire of several heavy German ships when the *Warspite* dashed in, circled around it, took the brunt of the attack, and saved the crew of the *Warrior*, though that vessel sank on the way to port. It is not strange that the Germans refused later to believe that the *Warspite* itself escaped after what it passed through.

In the German fleet also brave men were giving up their lives. The battle

cruiser *Lützow*, a match for the *Queen Mary* in size and power, was among those that never returned to Kiel. So were the battleship *Pommern* and three smaller cruisers. The *Frauenlob*, struck by a torpedo in the night, went down in ten minutes with all but eight of its crew.

The tide of battle favored the Germans until 6 o'clock in the evening, when Admiral Jellicoe and the heavy dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet arrived and turned the odds of weight and metal in favor of the British. For nearly four hours the British battle cruisers had held their own against superior strength.

With the arrival of the main British fleet the Germans gradually withdrew toward their base, keeping up a running fight, until Admiral Jellicoe thought it unwise to follow further in the direction of the enemy's mine fields. Through the remainder of the night the "mosquito fleets" of both navies—the frail but deadly little destroyers whose stings are torpedoes—harassed the enemy and did further damage by dint of heroic risks and lavish sacrifice of their own lives.

The next day the German fleet returned to its base claiming a victory, and the British fleet returned to its station near the Orkneys, also claiming a virtual victory, holding that its loss of fourteen vessels and 6,000 men was counterbalanced by a corresponding amount of damage done to the enemy. The battle of words that followed is thus far as indecisive as the fight off the Skagerrak, as it is impossible to tell whether one or both sides may not still be concealing losses. The damage admitted in official reports at the present writing is as follows:

ADMITTED LOSSES—BRITISH

Name.	Ton- nage.	Per- sonnel.*
<i>Queen Mary</i> (battle cruiser).....	27,000	1,000
<i>Indefatigable</i> (battle cruiser).....	18,750	800
<i>Invincible</i> (battle cruiser).....	17,250	750
<i>Defense</i> (armored cruiser).....	14,600	755
<i>Warrior</i> (armored cruiser).....	13,550	704
<i>Black Prince</i> (armored cruiser).....	13,550	704
<i>Tipperary</i> (destroyer).....	1,850	150
<i>Turbulent</i> (destroyer).....	1,850	150
<i>Shark</i> (destroyer).....	950	100
<i>Sparrowhawk</i> (destroyer).....	950	100
<i>Ardent</i> (destroyer).....	950	100
<i>Fortune</i> (destroyer).....	950	100

Name.	Ton- nage.	Per- sonnel.*
<i>Nomad</i> (destroyer).....	950	100
<i>Nestor</i> (destroyer).....	950	100
BRITISH TOTALS		
Battle cruisers.....	63,000	2,550
Armored cruisers.....	41,700	2,163
Destroyers	9,400	900
Fourteen ships.....	114,100	5,613

ADMITTED LOSSES—GERMAN

Name.	Ton- nage.	Per- sonnel.†
<i>Lützow</i> (battle cruiser).....	26,600	1,200
<i>Pommern</i> (battleship).....	13,200	729
<i>Wiesbaden</i> (cruiser).....	5,600	1,450
<i>Frauenlob</i> (cruiser).....	2,715	264
<i>Elbing</i> (cruiser).....	5,000	1,450
<i>Rostock</i> (cruiser).....	4,900	373
Five destroyers.....	5,000	1,500
GERMAN TOTALS		
Battle cruisers	39,800	1,929
Cruisers	18,215	1,537
Destroyers	5,000	500
Eleven ships.....	63,015	3,966

*Few survivors. †Many survivors. ‡Estimated.

The Germans reported the destruction of the British superdreadnought *Warspite* and battleship *Marlborough*, but these vessels, though damaged, were later announced by the British Admiralty to be safe in port. The British insisted, on the other hand, that the German dreadnoughts *Hindenburg* and *Westfalen* were sunk, besides one submarine and several additional destroyers. These losses are denied by the Germans. The official reports on both sides, given below, contain many irreconcilable statements, and are largely concerned with attempts to estimate the losses of the enemy. The German official figures for the human losses on both sides are as follows:

TOTAL LOSSES OF MEN

BRITISH	
Dead or missing	6,104
Wounded	513
Total	6,617

GERMAN	
Dead or missing.....	2,414
Wounded	449
Total	2,863

LOSS IN MONEY VALUE

(Rough estimate.)

British	\$115,000,000
German	63,000,000
Total	\$178,000,000

GERMAN OFFICIAL REPORT

The first German Admiralty report of the battle was issued on Thursday, June 1, and reads as follows:

Berlin, June 1, 1916.

During an enterprise directed to the northward our high sea fleet on May 31 encountered the main part of the English fighting fleet, which was considerably superior to our forces.

During the afternoon, between Skagerrak and Horn Riff, a heavy engagement developed, which was successful to us, and which continued during the whole night.

In this engagement, so far as known up to the present, there were destroyed by us the large battleship *Warspite*, the battle cruisers *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable*, two armored cruisers, apparently of the *Achilles* type; one small cruiser, the new flagships of destroyer squadrons, the *Turbulent*, *Nestor*, and *Alcaster*, a large number of torpedo-boat destroyers, and one submarine.

By observation, which was free and clear of objects, it was stated that a large number of English battleships suffered damage from our ships and the attacks of our torpedo-boat flotilla during the day engagement and throughout the night. Among others, the large battleship *Marlborough* was hit by a torpedo. This was confirmed by prisoners.

Several of our ships rescued parts of the crews of the sunken English ships, among them being two and the only survivors of the *Indefatigable*.

On our side the small cruiser *Wiesbaden*, by hostile gunfire during the day engagement, and his Majesty's ship *Pommern*, during the night, as the result of a torpedo, were sunk.

The fate of his Majesty's ship *Frauenlob*, which is missing, and of some torpedo boats, which have not returned yet, is unknown.

The High Sea Fleet returned today (Thursday) into our port.

BRITISH OFFICIAL REPORT

The first report of the British Admiralty was issued a day later, and is as follows:

London, June 2, 1916.

On the afternoon of Wednesday, the 31st of May, a naval engagement took place off the coast of Jutland.

The British ships on which the brunt of the fighting fell were the battle cruiser fleet and some cruisers and light cruisers, supported by four fast battleships. Among these the losses were heavy.

The German battle fleet, aided by low visibility, avoided a prolonged action with our main forces. As soon as these appeared on the scene the enemy returned to port, though not before receiving severe damage from our battleships.

The battle cruisers *Queen Mary*, *Indefatigable*, and *Invincible*, and the cruisers *Defence* and *Black Prince* were sunk.

The *Warrior* was disabled, and after being towed for some time had to be abandoned by her crew.

It is also known that the destroyers *Tipperary*, *Turbulent*, *Fortune*, *Sparrowhawk*, and *Ardent* were lost, and six others are not yet accounted for.

No British battleships or light cruisers were sunk.

The enemy's losses were serious. At least one battle cruiser was destroyed and one was severely damaged. One battleship is reported to have been sunk by our destroyers.

During the night attack two light cruisers were disabled and probably sunk.

The exact number of enemy destroyers disposed of during the action cannot be ascertained with any certainty, but must have been large.

Later this further statement was published:

Since the foregoing communication was issued a further report has been received from the Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet stating that it has now been ascertained that our total losses in destroyers amount to eight boats in all.

The Commander in Chief also reports that it is now possible to form a closer estimate of the losses and the damage sustained by the enemy fleet.

One dreadnought battleship of the *Kaiser* class was blown up in an attack by British destroyers and another dreadnought battleship of the *Kaiser* class is believed to have been sunk by gunfire. Of three German battle cruisers, two of which are believed were the *Derfflinger* and the *Lützow*, one was blown up, another was heavily engaged by our battle fleet and was seen to be disabled and stopping, and the third was observed to be seriously damaged.

One German light cruiser and six German destroyers were sunk, and at least two more German light cruisers were seen to be disabled. Further repeated hits were observed on three other German battleships that were engaged.

Finally, a German submarine was rammed and sunk.

A SECOND STATEMENT

The Chief of the German Admiralty Staff issued this secondary statement on June 3:

In order to prevent fabulous reports, it is again stated that in the battle off Skagerrak on May 31 the German high sea forces were in battle with the entire modern English fleet.

To the already published statements it must be added that, according to the official British report, the battle cruiser *Invincible* and the armored cruiser *Warrior* were also destroyed.

We were obliged to blow up the small cruiser *Elbing*, which, on the night of May 31, June 1, owing to a collision with other German war vessels, was heavily damaged, and

it was impossible to take her to port. The crew was rescued by torpedo boats, with the exception of the commander, two other officers, and eighteen men, who remained aboard in order to blow up the vessel. According to Dutch reports they were later brought to Ymuiden on a tug and landed there.

"GERMAN ACCOUNTS FALSE"

The British Admiralty's next statement, dated June 4, impugns the truth of the German report in these terms:

The Grand Fleet came in touch with the German High Seas Fleet at 3:30 on the afternoon of May 31. The leading ships of the two fleets carried on a vigorous fight, in which the battle cruisers, fast battleships, and subsidiary craft all took an active part.

The losses were severe on both sides, but when the main body of the British fleet came into contact with the German High Seas Fleet, a very brief period sufficed to compel the latter, who had been severely punished, to seek refuge in their protected waters. This manoeuvre was rendered possible by low visibility and mist, and, although the Grand Fleet were now and then able to get in momentary contact with their opponents, no continuous action was possible. They continued the pursuit until the light had wholly failed, while the British destroyers were able to make a successful attack upon the enemy during the night.

Meanwhile, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, having driven the enemy into port, returned to the main scene of the action and scoured the sea in search of disabled vessels. By noon the next day, June 1, it became evident that there was nothing more to be done. He returned, therefore, to his bases, 400 miles away, refueled his fleet, and in the evening of June 2 was again ready to put to sea.

The British losses have already been fully stated. There is nothing to add to or subtract from the latest account published by the Admiralty. The enemy losses are less easy to determine. That the accounts they have given to the world are false is certain, and we cannot yet be sure of the exact truth. But from such evidence as has come to our knowledge, the Admiralty entertains no doubt that the German losses are heavier than the British, not merely relatively to the strength of the two fleets, but absolutely.

There seems to be the strongest ground for supposing that included in the German losses are two battleships, two dreadnought battle cruisers of the most powerful type, two of the latest light cruisers, the Wiesbaden and Elbing; a light cruiser of the Rostock type, the light cruiser Frauenlob, nine destroyers, and a submarine.

To this was added the following on June 6:

An official statement given out in Berlin today, signed "Fleet Command," claims the British lost the Warspite, Princess Royal,

Birmingham, and Acasta in the action of May 31. This is claimed on the evidence of British sailors picked up by German ships.

This is false. The complete list of British losses is as published.

The German Admiralty, in an official statement issued on June 2, stated that, among other casualties, a British submarine was sunk in the course of the battle during the afternoon and night of May 31.

All British submarines at sea on that date have now returned. It must, therefore, be assumed, if any importance is to be attached to the German official statement, that the submarine sunk was an enemy submarine. This vessel should be added to the list of German losses stated in the British Admiralty communiqué of June 4.

LUETZOW AND ROSTOCK

An official German statement admitting the loss of the Lützow and Rostock was issued June 8. The losses of the British are again said to have been heavier than admitted by them. The official writer continues:

It is asserted, for instance, that the German fleet left the battlefield and that the English fleet remained master of the battlefield. With regard to this it is stated that by repeated, effective attacks of our torpedo-boat flotillas during the battle on the evening of May 31, the English main fleet was forced to turn around, and it never again came within sight of our forces. In spite of its superior speed and reinforcement by an English squadron of twelve vessels, which came up from the southern North Sea, it never attempted to come again into touch with our forces to continue the battle or attempt in conjunction with the above-mentioned squadron to bring about the desired destruction of the German fleet.

The English assertion that the English fleet in vain attempted to reach the fleeing German fleet in order to defeat it before reaching its home points of support is contradicted by the alleged official English statement that Admiral Jellicoe, with his Grand Fleet, already had reached the basin of Scalpa Flow, in the Orkneys, 300 miles from the battlefield, on June 1.

Numerous German torpedo-boat flotillas sent out after the day battle for a night attack toward the north, and beyond the theatre of the day battle, did not find the English main fleet in spite of a keen search. Moreover, our torpedo boats had an opportunity of rescuing a great number of English survivors of the various sunken vessels.

As further proof of the fact, contested by the English, of the participation of their entire battle fleet in the battle of May 31, it is pointed out that the British Admiralty report too announced that the Marlborough had been disabled. Furthermore, one of our submarines on June 1 sighted another of the Iron

Duke class heavily damaged steering toward the English coast. Both mentioned vessels belonged to the English main fleet.

In order to belittle the great German success the English press also traces the loss of numerous English vessels largely to the effect of German mines, submarines, and airships. Regarding this, it is especially pointed out that neither mines, which, by the way, would have been just as dangerous to our own fleet as to that of the enemy, nor submarines were employed by our High Seas Fleet. German airships were used exclusively for reconnaissance on June 1.

The German victory was gained by able leadership and by the effect of our artillery and torpedo weapons.

Until now we have refrained from contradicting many of the alleged official English assertions regarding the German losses. The latest assertion, again and again repeated, is that the German fleet lost not less than two vessels of the Kaiser class, the Westfalen, two battle cruisers, four small cruisers, and a great number of torpedo-boat destroyers. Moreover, the British indicate that the Pommern, which we reported lost, is not the ship of the line of 13,000 tons from the year 1905, but a modern dreadnought of the same name. We state that the total loss of the German high sea forces during the battle of May 31-June 1 and the following time are: One battle cruiser, one ship of the line of older construction, four small cruisers, and five torpedo boats. Of these losses, the Pommern, launched in 1905; the Wiesbaden, Elbing, Frauenlob, and five torpedo boats already have been reported in official statements. For military reasons, we refrained until now from making public the losses of the vessels Lützow and Rostock.

In view of the wrong interpretation of this measure, and, moreover, in order to frustrate English legends about gigantic losses on our side, these reasons must no longer be regarded. Both ships were lost on the way to the harbor, to be repaired after attempts to keep the badly damaged vessels afloat had failed. The crews of both, including all the severely wounded, are safe.

While the German list of losses is herewith closed, there are positive indications at hand that the actual British losses were materially higher than admitted. It has been established by us on the basis of our own observations and of what has been made public, as well as from statements of British prisoners, that, in addition to the Warspite, the Princess Royal and Birmingham were destroyed. According to reliable reports, the dreadnought Marlborough also sank before reaching harbor.

The high sea battle of the Skagerrak remains a German victory, which it already was even if the conclusions were based solely on the losses of ships admitted officially by the British. The total loss of 69,720 tons of German warships stands against that of 117,750 tons for the British.

CHIEF OF THE ADMIRALTY STAFF.

JELlicoe TO HIS MEN

In a message to the men of the British fleet, given out officially on June 12, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe declared that the glorious traditions handed down by generations of gallant British seamen had been most worthily upheld, and that he was more proud than ever of commanding a navy manned by such officers and men. He added:

Weather conditions that were highly unfavorable robbed the fleet of the complete victory expected by all ranks. Our losses were heavy. We miss many most gallant comrades. But although it is difficult to obtain accurate information as to the enemy's losses, I have no doubt we shall find they certainly were not less than our own. Sufficient information already has been received for me to make that statement with confidence.

Mr. Asquith also spoke in a similar vein on June 14 in an address celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of his election to the House of Commons:

Owing to the rashness of the enemy we were allowed to see another and more stirring, dramatic aspect of the navy's qualities a fortnight ago. The naval action of May 31 was worthy of the best and most treasured traditions of the British Navy. The Germans were driven back into their ports without so much as making an effort to grapple with the main body of our Grand Fleet, and had the temerity to claim what really was a rout as a complete victory. A couple more such victories and there will be nothing left of the German Navy worth speaking about. The truth is slowly leaking out, and its full extent is not yet realized or appreciated. Our command of the seas, so far from being impaired, has been more firmly and unshakably established.

GERMANY'S REPLY

To Jellicoe's assertion that Germany's losses were as great as those of Britain the Admiralty at Berlin retorted on June 15 with the following definite figures:

Against this we point out the comparison of losses officially published on the 7th, showing a total loss in tonnage of German war vessels of 60,720, against the British loss of 117,150, where only those English vessels and destroyers were taken into account whose losses until now have been officially admitted on the English side.

According to statements of English prisoners, further vessels were sunk, among them the dreadnought Warspite.

No other German vessels were lost than those made public. They are the Lützow,

Pommern, Wiesbaden, Frauenlob, Elbing, Rostock, and five torpedo boats. This shows that the human losses to the English in the battle were considerably greater than the German.

While from the English side the officer losses announced were 343 dead or missing and 51 wounded, our losses in officers, engineers, sanitary officers, paymasters, ensigns, and petty officers, are 172 dead or missing and 41 wounded.

The total losses among the English crews as far as published by the Admiralty are 6,104 dead or missing, 513 wounded. On the German side the losses are 2,414 dead or missing, 449 wounded.

During and after the battle our vessels rescued 177 English, while up to now no German prisoners from this battle are known to be in English hands. The names of the English prisoners will be communicated to the British Government in the usual manner.

British Semi-Official Story of Great Sea Fight

Thus far the best informal British account of the battle of Jutland in detail is that which appeared in The Glasgow Herald and which evidently has official authority behind it.

FIRST PHASE, 3:30 P. M., May 31.—Beatty's battle cruisers, consisting of the Lion, Princess Royal, Queen Mary, Tiger, Inflexible, Indomitable, Invincible, Indefatigable, and New Zealand, were on a southeasterly course, followed at about two miles distance by the four Queen Elizabeths.

Enemy light cruisers were sighted and shortly afterward the head of the German battle cruiser squadron, consisting of the new cruiser Hindenburg, the Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Lützow, Moltke, and possibly the Salamis.

Beatty at once began firing at a range of about 20,000 yards, (twelve miles,) which shortened to 16,000 yards (nine miles) as the fleets closed. The Germans could see the British distinctly outlined against the light yellow sky. The Germans, covered by a haze, could be very indistinctly made out by our gunners.

The Queen Elizabeths opened fire on one after another as they came within range. The German battle cruisers turned to port and drew away to about 20,000 yards.

Second Phase, 4:40 P. M.—A destroyer screen then appeared beyond the German battle cruisers. The whole German High Seas Fleet could be seen approaching on the northeastern horizon in three divisions, coming to the support of their battle cruisers.

The German battle cruisers now turned right round 16 points and took station in front of the battleships of the high fleet.

Beatty with his battle cruisers and sup-

porting battleships, therefore, had before him the whole of the German battle fleet, and Jellicoe was still some distance away.

The opposing fleets were now moving parallel to one another in opposite directions, and but for a master manoeuvre on the part of Beatty the British advance ships would have been cut off from Jellicoe's grand fleet. In order to avoid this and at the same time prepare the way so that Jellicoe might envelop his adversary, Beatty immediately also turned right around 16 points, so as to bring his ships parallel to the German battle cruisers and facing in the same direction.

As soon as he was around he increased to full speed to get ahead of the Germans and take up a tactical position in advance of their line. He was able to do this owing to the superior speed of our battle cruisers.

Just before the turning point was reached, the Indefatigable sank, and the Queen Mary and the Invincible also were lost at the turning point, where, of course, the High Seas Fleet concentrated their fire.

A little earlier, as the German battle cruisers were turning, the Queen Elizabeths had in similar manner concentrated their fire on the turning point and destroyed a new German battle cruiser, believed to be the Hindenburg.

Beatty had now got around and headed away with the loss of three ships, racing parallel to the German battle cruisers. The Queen Elizabeths followed behind, engaging the main High Seas Fleet.

COMMANDERS IN NORTH SEA BATTLE



Admiral Horace Hood, Who
Went Down With the Invincible
(Photo © Underwood & Underwood.)



Admiral Sir David Beatty, Com-
mander of Squadron That Bore
the Brunt of the Fighting
(© American Press Association.)




Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Com-
mander in Chief of the British
Fleet
(© Elliott & Fry.)



Admiral von Capelle, Successor
to Admiral von Tirpitz as Head
of the German Navy


WARSHIPS SENT TO THE BOTTOM



The Hampshire, British Armored Cruiser, Sunk by a Mine Off the Orkneys
With Lord Kitchener and Staff
(Photos from Underwood & Underwood.)



The Pommern, German Battleship, 13,200 Tons



The Queen Mary, British Battle Cruiser, 27,000 Tons

Third Phase, 5 P. M.—The Queen Elizabeths now turned short to port 16 points in order to follow Beatty. The Warspite jammed her steering gear, failed to get around, and drew the fire of six of the enemy, who closed in upon her.

I am not surprised that the Germans claim her as a loss, since on paper she ought to have been lost, but as a matter of fact, though repeatedly straddled by shell fire with the water boiling up all around her, she was not seriously hit, and was able to sink one of her opponents. Her Captain recovered control of the vessel, brought her around, and followed her consorts.

In the meantime the Barham, Valiant, and Malaya turned short so as to avoid the danger spot where the Queen Mary and the Invincible had been lost, and for an hour until Jellicoe arrived fought a delaying action against the High Seas Fleet.

The Warspite joined them at about 5:15 o'clock, and all four ships were so successfully manoeuvred in order to upset the spotting corrections of their opponents that no hits of a seriously disabling character were suffered. They had the speed over their opponents by fully four knots, and were able to draw away from part of the long line of German battle-ships, which almost filled up the horizon.

At this time the Queen Elizabeths were steadily firing at the flashes of German guns at a range which varied between 12,000 and 15,000 yards, especially against those ships which were nearest them. The Germans were enveloped in a mist, and only smoke and flashes were visible.

By 5:45 half of the High Seas Fleet had been left out of range, and the Queen Elizabeths were steaming fast to join hands with Jellicoe.

I must now return to Beatty's battle cruisers. They had succeeded in out-flanking the German battle cruisers, which were, therefore, obliged to turn a full right angle to starboard to avoid being headed.

Heavy fighting was renewed between the opposing battle cruiser squadrons, during which the Derfflinger was sunk;

but toward 6 o'clock the German fire slackened very considerably, showing that Beatty's battle cruisers and the Queen Elizabeths had inflicted serious damage on their immediate opponents.

Fourth Phase, 6 P. M.—The Grand Fleet was now in sight, and, coming up fast in three directions, the Queen Elizabeths altered their course four points to the starboard and drew in toward the enemy to allow Jellicoe room to deploy into line.

The Grand Fleet was perfectly manoeuvred and the very difficult operation of deploying between the battle cruisers and the Queen Elizabeths was perfectly timed.

Jellicoe came up, fell in behind Beatty's cruisers, and, followed by the damaged but still serviceable Queen Elizabeths, steamed right across the head of the German fleet.

The first of the ships to come into action were the Revenue and the Royal Oak with their fifteen-inch guns, and the Agincourt, which fired from her seven turrets with the speed almost of a Maxim gun.

The whole British fleet had now become concentrated. They had been perfectly manoeuvred, so as to "cross the T" of the High Seas Fleet, and, indeed, only decent light was necessary to complete their work of destroying the Germans in detail. The light did improve for a few minutes, and the conditions were favorable to the British fleet, which was now in line approximately north and south across the head of the Germans.

During the few minutes of good light Jellicoe smashed up the first three German ships, but the mist came down, visibility suddenly failed, and the defeated High Seas Fleet was able to draw off in ragged divisions.

Fifth Phase, Night.—The Germans were followed by the British, who still had them enveloped between Jellicoe on the west, Beatty on the north, and Evan Thomas with his three Queen Elizabeths on the south. The Warspite had been sent back to her base.

During the night our torpedo boat destroyers heavily attacked the German

ships, and, although they lost seriously themselves, succeeded in sinking two of the enemy.

Co-ordination of the units of the fleet was practically impossible to keep up, and the Germans discovered by the rays of their searchlights the three Queen Elizabeths, not more than 4,000 yards away. Unfortunately they were then able to escape between the battleships and Jellicoe, since we were not able to fire, as our own destroyers were in the way.

So ended the Jutland battle, which was fought as had been planned and very

nearly a great success. It was spoiled by the unfavorable weather conditions, especially at the critical moment, when the whole British fleet was concentrated and engaged in crushing the head of the German line.

It was an action on our part of big guns, except of course for the destroyer work, since at a very early stage our big ships ceased to feel any anxiety from the German destroyers. The German small craft were rounded up by their British opponents and soon ceased to count as an organized body.

German Semi-Official Narrative

A semi-official account of the battle of the Skagerrak, issued in Berlin on June 5, gives a very different version of certain aspects of the fight, especially of the number of vessels engaged on both sides:

THE German High Seas Fleet had pushed out into the North Sea in the hope of engaging portions of the English fleet, which had recently been repeatedly reported off the Norwegian south coast. At 3:15 o'clock in the afternoon, some seventy miles off the Skagerrak, some small cruisers of the Calliope class were sighted. Our cruisers at once pursued the enemy, which fled northward at highest speed.

At 5:20 o'clock our cruisers sighted two enemy columns to the west, consisting of six battle cruisers and a great number of small cruisers. The enemy passed toward the south, and our ships, approaching to nineteen kilometers, opened very effective fire on south-southeastern courses. During the battle two English battle cruisers and one destroyer were sunk.

After half an hour's fighting heavy enemy reinforcements, later observed to be five vessels of the Queen Elizabeth class, were sighted to the north. Soon afterward the German main force entered the fight, and the enemy at once turned north.

The British commander, driving his ships at full speed, attempted to evade

our extremely effective fire by taking an echelon formation. Our fleet followed at top speed the movements of the enemy. In the course of this period of the fighting one cruiser of the Achilles or Shannon class and two destroyers were sunk, while a number of other vessels suffered heavy damage.

The battle against superior forces lasted until darkness fell. Besides numerous light detachments, at least twenty-five British battleships, six battle cruisers, and four armored cruisers engaged sixteen German battleships, five battle cruisers, six older ships of the line, and no armored cruisers.

After dark our flotillas opened a night attack. During this attack several cruiser and torpedo boat engagements occurred, resulting in the destruction of one battle cruiser, one cruiser of the Achilles class, probably two small cruisers, and at least ten destroyers. Six of the latter, including the new destroyer leaders, the Turbulent and the Tipperary, were destroyed by the leading vessels of our High Seas Fleet.

The British squadron of older battleships, which hurried up from the south, did not arrive until Thursday morning, after the conclusion of the battle, and returned without taking any part in the fighting or coming within sight of our main force.

Kaiser and King Thank Their Naval Fighters

In an address at Wilhelmshaven on June 6 Emperor William congratulated the sailors of the German Navy on their achievement in the North Sea in the following terms:

WHENEVER in past years I visited my fleet at Wilhelmshaven I always rejoiced from the depths of my heart at the sight of the growing fleet and the growing harbor. I looked with satisfaction upon the young crews drawn up in the drill shed, ready to take the oath. Many thousands of you I have seen eye to eye with your supreme commander when taking the oath. He reminded you of your duty, your task, but above all of the fact that when the German fleet went to war it would have to fight against gigantic odds.

This consciousness has become a tradition with the fleet, as it has been with the army from the time of Frederick the Great. Prussia, as well as Germany, has always been surrounded by superior enemies. Therefore it was possible to forge our nation into one mass, which hoarded up in itself endless forces ready to let loose when necessity demanded.

When the great war came envious enemies suddenly attacked the Fatherland. The army, by desperate fighting against powerful foes, slowly conquered them one after another. But the fleet waited in vain for a real fight. In numerous individual encounters the navy clearly demonstrated its heroic spirit, but was forced to wait month after month for a general battle.

Repeated efforts were made to bring the enemy out, but they proved fruitless until the day finally came last week when the gigantic fleet of Albion, ruler of the seas since Trafalgar was fought 100 years ago, appeared in the open, surrounded by a nimbus. Instantly our fleet engaged this superior British armada, and with what result? The English fleet was beaten. The first big blow was dealt the English fleet, whose tyrannical supremacy was shattered.

The news electrified the world and caused unprecedented jubilation every-

where that German hearts beat. Your success in the North Sea fight means that you have added a new chapter to the history of the world. God Almighty steeled your arm and gave you clear eyes to accomplish this.

I, standing here today as your supreme War Lord, thank you from the bottom of my heart. As the representative of the Fatherland I thank you, and in the name of my army I bring you its greetings because you have done your duty unselfishly and only with the one thought that the enemy must be beaten.

At a time when the enemy is slowly being crushed before Verdun and when our allies have driven the Italians from mountain to mountain, you add new glories to our cause. The world was prepared for everything, but not for the victory of the German fleet over the English. The start which you have made will cause fear to creep into the bones of the enemy. What you have done you did for the Fatherland, that in the future it may have freedom of the seas for its commerce. Therefore I ask you to join me in three cheers for our dearly beloved Fatherland.

On the occasion of King George's birthday, June 3, Admiral Jellicoe sent him the heartfelt good wishes of the Grand Fleet, to which the English King replied:

I am deeply touched by the message you have sent in behalf of the Grand Fleet. It reaches me on the morrow of a battle which once more displayed the splendid gallantry of the officers and men under your command.

I mourn the loss of the brave men, many of them personal friends of my own, who have fallen in their country's cause. Yet even more do I regret that the German High Seas Fleet, in spite of its heavy losses, was enabled by misty weather to evade the full consequences of the encounter.

They always professed a desire for a battle, for which, when the opportunity arrived, they showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the enemy im-

mediately after the opening of a general engagement robbed us of the opportunity of gaining a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday amply justify my confidence in the valor and efficiency of the fleet under your command.

GEORGE R. I.

The German Emperor sent this message to Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, former Minister of the Navy (recently succeeded by von Capelle):

After visiting my fleet, which returned victoriously from a heavy battle, I feel I must again declare to you my imperial thanks for what you have performed in my service in the technical domain and the domain of organization. Our ships and weapons upheld themselves brilliantly in the battle in the North Sea. It is also for you a day of glory.

To Grand Admiral von Koester, former commander of the German Navy, the Kaiser sent this message:

From the fleet flagship, the old fleet chief, my imperial salutations. You laid the foundation for the careful employment of all weapons and the tactical training of the fleet. Building on your work and cultivating the spirit implanted by you, your successors have further developed the fleet to a living war instrument that stood so brilliantly its trial fire. The consciousness of having sowed such seed must be a great source of gratification to you.

[The German Emperor has promoted Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer, commander of the German fleet in the engagement of May 31, to be a full Admiral. Scheer had assumed temporary command when the late Admiral von Pohl was forced to resign on account of illness. Vice Admiral Hipper has been awarded the Order Pour le Mérite, and war decorations of various kinds have been bestowed upon officers and men who distinguished themselves in the battle.]

Germany's Only Direct News Connection with the American Continents

Since the outbreak of the war, when all German cables were cut, the wireless station at Sayville, L. I., has been the sole means of communication—free from British censorship—between Germany and the United States. The Sayville station works direct with the station at Nauen, just outside of Berlin, daily, except for frequent static interruptions. Since the plant was seized by the Federal Government no commercial business has been permitted. The dispatches are confined to Government and official communications, a portion of which are the German war bulletins furnished daily to The Associated Press. The plant is now inclosed by a great fence with only one gate, and is guarded by a platoon of United States soldiers, and all matter is censored by an American officer, although the operators are Germans.



Fate of Lord Kitchener

FIELD MARSHAL LORD HORATIO HERBERT KITCHENER, the British Secretary of State for War, perished with his staff off the West Orkney Islands on June 5 by the sinking of the British cruiser Hampshire, which struck a mine and went down fifteen minutes later. The entire crew was also lost except twelve men—a warrant officer and eleven seamen—who were found half dead from cold and exhaustion on a raft washed ashore the following day.

Earl Kitchener was en route to Russia at the request of the Russian Government. He intended to land at Archangel and visit Petrograd, expecting to be back in London by June 20. He was accompanied by Hugh James O'Beirne, former counselor of the British Embassy at Petrograd; O. A. Fitzgerald, his military secretary; Brigadier Gen. Ellershaw, and Sir Frederick Donaldson, all of whom were lost. Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial Staff, had taken over the duties of the office during his absence, and at this writing is still in charge. It is reported that the office of Secretary of War has been tendered to David Lloyd George, Minister of Munitions.

The tragic death of Earl Kitchener created a profound sensation throughout the world. It was not until a week later that the details of the tragedy became known. Leading Seaman Rogerson, one of the twelve survivors, described Lord Kitchener's last moments as follows:

Of those who left the ship and have survived I was the one who saw Lord Kitchener last. He went down with the ship. He did not leave her. I saw Captain Savill help his boat's crew to clear away his galley. At the same time the Captain was calling to Lord Kitchener to come to the boat, but owing to the noise made by the wind and sea Lord Kitchener could not hear him, I think.

When the explosion occurred Kitchener walked calmly from the Captain's cabin, went up the ladder and on to the quarterdeck. There I saw him walking quite collectedly, talking to two of the officers. All three were wearing khaki and had no overcoats on.

Kitchener calmly watched the preparations

for abandoning the ship which were going on in a steady and orderly way. The crew just went to their stations, obeyed orders, and did their best to get out the boats, but it was impossible. Owing to the rough weather no boats could be lowered. Those that were got out were smashed up at once. No boats left the ship. What people on the shore thought to be boats leaving were rafts.

Men did get into the boats as these lay in their cradles, thinking that as the ship went under the boats would float. But the ship sank by the head, and when she went she turned a somersault forward, carrying down with her all the boats and those in them.

I do not think Kitchener got into a boat. When I sprang to a raft he was still on the starboard side of the quarterdeck talking with the officers. From the little time that elapsed between my leaving the ship and her sinking, I feel certain Kitchener went down with her and was on deck at the time she sank.

Of the civilian members of his suite I saw nothing. I got away on one of the rafts, and we had a terrible five hours in the water. It was so rough that the seas beat down on us and many men were killed by the buffeting. Many others died from the piercing cold. I was quite numbed, and an overpowering desire to sleep came upon us. To keep this away we thumped each other on the back, for the man who went to sleep never woke again.

When men died it was just as though they were falling asleep. One man stood upright for five hours on the raft with the dead lying all around him. One man died in my arms.

As we got near the shore the situation grew worse. The wind was blowing on shore. The fury of the sea dashed our raft against the rocks with tremendous force. Many were killed in this way, and one raft was thrice overturned. I don't quite know how I got ashore, for all the feeling was gone out of me. We were very kindly treated by the people who picked us up. They said it was the worst storm they had had for years.

The British Admiralty on June 15 issued the following official statement:

From the report of the twelve survivors of the Hampshire the following conclusions were reached:

As the men were going to their stations before abandoning the ship Lord Kitchener, accompanied by a naval officer, appeared. The latter said: "Make way for Lord Kitchener." Both ascended to the quarterdeck. Subsequently four military officers were seen there, walking aft on the port side.

The Captain called Lord Kitchener to the fore bridge near where the Captain's boat was hoisted. The Captain also called Lord

Kitchener to enter the boat. It is unknown if Lord Kitchener entered it or what happened to any boat.

The Hampshire was proceeding along the west coast of the Orkneys. A heavy gale was blowing and seas were breaking over the ship, which necessitated her being partly battened down. Between 7:30 and 7:45 P. M. the vessel struck a mine and began at once to settle by the bows, heeling over to starboard before she finally went down, about fifteen minutes after.

Orders were given by the Captain for all hands to go to their established stations for abandoning ship. Some of the hatches were opened and the ship's company went quickly to their stations. Efforts were made, with-

out success, to lower some of the boats. One of them was broken in half and its occupants were thrown into the water.

Large numbers of the crew used lifesaving belts and waistcoats, which proved effective in keeping them afloat. Three rafts were safely launched and, with about fifty to seventy men on each, got clear. It was daylight up to about 11. Though rafts with these large numbers of men got away, in one case, out of seventy men aboard, only six survived. The survivors all report that the men gradually dropped off, even died aboard the rafts from exhaustion and exposure to cold. Some of the crew must have perished in trying to land on the rocky coast after such a long exposure. Some died after landing.

General Brusiloff's Achievements

Written for CURRENT HISTORY

By Charles Johnston

[See map of Russian front on Page 635].

DURING the first week of June General Alexei Brusiloff began and carried forward one of the most brilliant feats of the war, accomplishing something that has been deemed almost impossible, a swift, successful offensive against the strongest modern intrenched lines. He operated on a front over a hundred miles long, against trenches which, at many points, were defended by a dozen or more lines of barbed wire entanglements; trenches which lay one behind the other, sometimes ten or twelve in number, defended by strong Austrian artillery—and all along, the Austrians have had the heaviest guns in the war—and held by six or seven hundred thousand men; lines further strengthened by the two great fortresses of Lutsk and Dubno, which, with Rovno, formed the famous "Volhynia triangle," comparable to the group of French defenses that link Verdun and Toul.

Not only did General Brusiloff sweep these bristling obstacles out of existence, capturing in ten days 115,000 men of the enemy forces, killing or wounding, in all probability, twice as many more, (or 345,000 in all put out of action,) taking enormous quantities of war ma-

terial, (guns, machine guns, shells, cartridges, trench mortars, barbed wire, enough to supply a modern army,) but he further drove the enemy back, at some points as much as thirty miles, along a front of over 100 miles—in striking contrast to the static situation at Verdun, where, to repeat the somewhat grim pleasantry of a French officer, "ground is bought in small lots and the prices are high."

Roughly speaking, General Brusiloff's battle line stretched from the southeast corner of Russian Poland to the northeast corner of Rumania; running, at the beginning of the drive, through the Russian "governments" of Volhynia and Podolia, a thin slice of each having been held by the invaders; but, as the drive progressed, passing forward into Galicia, sweeping around Brody, menacing Tarnopol and Lemberg, and, to the south, enveloping and in all probability effectively occupying Czernowitz, the oft-disputed capital of the Austrian Crownland of Bukowina, "land of the beech trees." As his left wing rests on Rumania it cannot be turned, or even effectively menaced, without involving Rumania in the war; his right wing joins very strong Russian forces under

General Evert, one of the leaders in the first Russian victory over the Austrian army of General Dankl.

Exactly in what way General Brusiloff has accomplished this military miracle, tearing to pieces over a hundred miles of the strongest modern trenches of the "steel and concrete" type, is still his secret. But we can already see this: Like the French attack in Champagne on Sept. 25 last, he first concentrated a tremendous weight of gunfire on selected points, pouring in "hurricanes" of shells; he then followed this up with astonishing infantry rushes, the men being provided with planks and scaling ladders to help them across what the artillery had left of the barbed wire; and then, as soon as a first foothold was won in the enemy trenches, following this up instantly with fresh hurricanes of shells and new infantry drives, keeping this process up without interruption day and night. This he was able to do because he had, first, quite unlimited supplies of shells, and, next, because he had, what the French have not had, unlimited supplies of men. For Russia in the last few months has added to her fighting forces some 4,000,000 young men between the ages of 19 and 22, while there are several millions available in the twenties and early thirties. It is the younger men, it would appear, that General Brusiloff is using in his "rushes"; and in this kind of work no fighting man has ever stood higher than the Russian soldier.

But, after we have counted guns and men, there remains the third factor, and the greatest—military genius reinforced by military science; the power to divine the weak point and the golden hour for attack, (the Austrians were celebrating the Skagerrak fight when he attacked;) the power to co-ordinate, to have ample reserves ready and on the spot at the critical instant, and, most of all, the moral driving force to set the whole machine in motion and to keep it moving at top speed.

Having ripped up the curtain of Teuton defenses, General Brusiloff (who is, by training, a cavalry officer) brought back into modern warfare an element that seemed at one time to have grown

obsolete; he developed widely extended and swiftly executed cavalry movements that seem to have accounted for a very large proportion of the captures, both in men and guns. The details of his strategy remain to be made known, but it seems certain that General Brusiloff has demonstrated that the whole system of modern defensive (developed first along the line of the Aisne, in the second half of September, 1914) can be torn out of the ground, and that cavalry can still attack, sweeping down even on modern artillery and batteries of machine guns; attack with complete success and bring the batteries in as a trophy.

It would be a complete mistake to think of this brilliant achievement of General Brusiloff as a kind of lucky accident or a happy extemporization. It is neither. He is completing work begun in the first week of the war, along lines he had laid down many months earlier; he is doing again now, in the late Spring and early Summer of 1916, practically the same thing that he did, and did brilliantly, in the late Summer and early Autumn of 1914, over the same ground; but he is doing it now with tried and ripened experience, with a high reputation already assured, with supreme command over this whole sector of the war, with immensely greater forces of men and supplies of artillery; and, this must not be forgotten, against a weakened and harassed foe, behind whom, in the home countries, are famine and desperation.

General Brusiloff is now fighting over ground which he very brilliantly covered in the first weeks of the war. Austria had sought war with Serbia already in 1913, and had then been held back by her ally, Italy; Austria had already prejudged the case against the Serbians in July, 1914, determining in advance not to accept any concessions, however complete, from Serbia, but to force the gallant little kingdom into war; Austria, therefore, was the first of the nations to mobilize, not only against Serbia to the south, but also, in Galicia, against Russia. There were three Austrian armies in Galicia at the end of July, each about

300,000 men—two active, under General Dankl and General Auffenberg, and a third, held in reserve, under the Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, the heir apparent to the throne of the Hapsburgs. General Dankl struck northward into Russian Poland, toward Lublin and Kholm, where he was held in check by Russian forces under General Ivanoff, General Evert, and General Plehve. General Auffenberg moved northeastward toward the famous Volhynia triangle—Lutsk, Dubno, Rovno. But he did not get across the frontier. Already, on Aug. 11, Russian cavalry made a demonstration against Brody, the first Austrian town across the Galician frontier, and this advance guard was rapidly followed by two Russian armies, under General Ruzsky and General Brusiloff, who began to rain blows on Auffenberg's head.

Shortly before the beginning of the war General Brusiloff had been given command of the Twelfth Army Corps, stationed at Vinnitza in Podolia, a little town on the river Bug, and connected by rail with Tarnopol, Halicz, and Lemberg in Galicia. At that time General Ruzsky was in command of the Kieff military district in which Vinnitza is; General Ruzsky therefore commanded the Russian army of the right, while General Brusiloff commanded the army of the left. Moving practically on the same line, they came into touch with Auffenberg on Aug. 23, and on Aug. 26-27 made a furious, concerted attack against his entire front, General Ruzsky moving against Lemberg, while General Brusiloff advanced toward the ancient historic city of Halicz, some sixty or seventy miles further south. They attacked the two cities about the same time, carrying them by storm on Sept. 2; and thus, since this was a week before the decision at the Marne, winning the first great success for the Entente armies. Both Generals were thanked by the Russian Emperor and decorated.

Then came the forward sweep up to and around Przemysl, the Russians enveloping the enormous fortress and pressing their adversaries back against the Carpathians. It was evident even then that Russia lacked adequate artil-

lery and ammunition; otherwise Przemysl would have been taken by storm. It held out, however, standing a not very vigorous siege, and finally surrendering in the Spring, surrendering only after efforts had been repeatedly made for its relief, Austria sending men up in masses through the Lupka Pass, where the railroad from Hungary crosses the Carpathians.

General Brusiloff had fought his way steadily westward, keeping the centre of his army almost continuously on the same line, due west from where he had crossed the frontier, at Woloczysk. His headquarters were now close to the little town of Baligrad, fifteen or twenty miles from the Lupka Pass. From this point he planned and delivered a killing blow against the Austrian reinforcements that were coming down from the pass, and the smashing of this relieving force was what practically determined the fall of Przemysl, with nearly 120,000 Austrian troops. It was a decisive victory for the Russians, but a victory of bayonets rather than artillery.

During the long months of the white Winter, 1914-15, General Brusiloff fought his way toward and into the three Carpathian passes—the Dukla to the north, the Uzsok in the centre, the Lupka to the south; and his long, fierce contest in the snow against ice-covered precipices and buttresses of rock anticipated many of the most daring exploits of the Italian Alpini in the Trentino, Cadore, and Carnia in the Winter of 1915-16. Both in the Carpathians and in the Caucasus the Russians showed that they are magnificently at home, even up to their breasts in snow.

General Brusiloff was wearing down General von Linsingen's resistance and threatening a descent upon the wide Hungarian plains, when to the north, on his right, came the event which reversed and almost neutralized his whole campaign. General Mackensen, who is apparently a soldier of genius, showing far more ability than any other commander on the Teuton side, made his first famous attack on the Dunayetz River, east of Cracow, with what we are now familiar with as "hurricane

fire." Then, just at the most dangerous moment, it was discovered that Russia was short of shells. Her enormous supply, accumulated before the war, was depleted; difficulties with China made Japan slow in sending forward, along the Manchurian and Siberian Railroad, the shells that she was producing; the White Sea was frozen; the allied fleets had hammered in vain at the gate of the Dardanelles; Russian factories, dislocated, depleted of men by the mobilization, supplied ammunition only in dribbles; but Mackensen's strategy demanded, to counter it, shells in vastly greater quantities.

General Ruzsky, the victim, it was said, of cancer, had been withdrawn to undergo an operation; General Ivanoff, the defender of Lublin, had taken his place. So, with cold steel, the Russians held back, so far as was possible, Mackensen's hurricane attack, with the hottest and heaviest fire the war had yet seen, though it has since been greatly exceeded by both sides at Verdun. And, in times to come, it may appear that this very hammering was the making of the Russian Army. But at the time there was only disastrous

retreat, the giving up of Przemyśl, of Lemberg; then of Warsaw, Lublin, Vilna. General Brusiloff retreated, holding his army splendidly together and never for a moment losing his splendidly courageous serenity; retreated, still fighting hard for a foothold on Austrian soil, but at last recrossing the frontier into Russia, still almost on the same east and west line.

And now his tide has turned. He is in supreme command. He has huge, fresh armies of young, exultant troops, who never even consider death; he has enormous supplies of guns and ammunition; he has the enthusiastic trust of his sovereign and his nation; he has military genius, ripe experience, a religious faith in his mission. Behind him lie the inexhaustible resources of the vast Russian Nation. Before him stretch the lands of the enemy—Galicia, with Lemberg and Halicz to be won once more; Bukowina to the south, Russian Poland to the north, and, beyond these, Transylvania, Hungary, Silesia. He has begun magnificently. With magnificent resources and a magnificent opportunity he will, perchance, go far.

What This War Means to France

By E. HENRY LACOMBE.

It would not be surprising to find that in the conglomerate mass of people which has been swept into the United States from every quarter of the globe there is no intelligent appreciation of what this war means to the people of France. What it does mean, to all of them, is best expressed by the farewell of the Breton mother, a sailor's widow, to her only son, a boy of 18. I have read it in no periodical here, but it is known the length and breadth of France.

Théodore Botrel, "*Chansonnier des Armées*," has embalmed it in verse, and it is sung by poilus in the trenches and on the march.

Noticing that her big boy was restless and unhappy, and divining the cause—a conflict of duties—she said to him unasked: "*Embrasse moi et vas-en, pour la France. Elle est ta mère, mon enfant, quand moi, je ne suis que ta p'tite maman.*"

There are millions of people yet in this country who can appreciate what a spirit this signifies and hail it with reverence and sympathy. God grant that should a day of bitter trial come to us there may be enough left of such a spirit here to save us as, please God, it will save France.

Mexico's Threat of War

Events That Have Produced Strained Relations With the Carranza Government

REAL war between Mexico and the United States seems an imminent possibility as this issue of **CURRENT HISTORY** goes to press. President Wilson has called for the mobilization of the available militia of all the States, totaling about 100,000 men, and the hostile preparations of the Carranza forces, which have been in progress for several weeks, are being accelerated. It is announced that the American militia are to be used at present only to guard the frontier, but their coming will release the regular army regiments on the border for active service in Mexico—and General Carranza has given formal warning that further movements of American troops into Mexico for any purpose will be opposed by armed force!

The situation is serious because each country holds that its fundamental rights are being violated. Mexican bandits continue almost daily to invade American soil and murder or rob our citizens. The de facto Government of Mexico is unable to stop the outrages, yet it resents the presence of American troops on Mexican soil, demands their withdrawal, and threatens war if the raiders are hunted down by our soldiers.

Events have been traveling toward the present crisis for more than a month. During the conference at El Paso between General Scott and General Obregon in the early days of May it seemed as though a satisfactory understanding had been reached, by which order would be maintained through the co-operation of Mexican and American armies on their respective sides of the border. But at that moment came a raid by Mexican bandits upon the citizens and garrison of Glenn Springs, a town in the Big Bend region of Texas, in which several Americans were killed and others carried into captivity. A punitive expedition was sent after them, and the episode became

typical of the events that have since made it impossible to agree on any plan compatible with American responsibility and the demands of the Carranza Government.

Under date of May 22 General Carranza sent a long note to the Washington Government protesting that no agreement had ever been made authorizing the protracted presence of American soldiers on Mexican soil. The presence of our troops at El Pino, sixty miles south of the boundary, was the immediate basis for that protest. The Big Bend raid was the cause of the expedition in question. Since then there have been two other crossings of American troops into Mexican territory, each time for the punishment of a new depredation which the Carranzistas had failed to prevent.

President Wilson answered Carranza's note on June 20, covering its many points in a message of some length. The full text of both notes, reproduced in this issue of **CURRENT HISTORY**, furnishes a fairly complete history of the subject from both points of view.

In the intervening month the situation was steadily growing worse. Every few days it was aggravated by the news that another band of Mexican outlaws had crossed the Rio Grande in the night, attacked and killed citizens or soldiers, and fled after losing one or more of their number. Twice within one week at different points a dead bandit was found to be wearing the uniform of a Carranza soldier. Public sentiment on the American side of the river, along the whole stretch of frontier between Columbus, N. M., and Brownsville, Texas, became deeply stirred, and at the same time anti-American sentiment grew more intense in Mexico.

On the night of June 16 fifty bandits crossed the line at San Benito, Texas, and attacked the town. They were repulsed by a detachment of the Twenty-

sixth Infantry under Colonel Bullard, and were pursued into Mexico by Lieutenant Newman and Major Anderson with troopers of the Third Cavalry. In reporting that these forces had left on a "hot trail" General Funston added: "I anticipate fighting." This expectation was based on the fact that at about the same time Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing, at his temporary headquarters near Namiquipa, Chihuahua, had received a telegram from General Jacinto Trevino, commander of the Carranza Army of the North, warning him that if any further movement of the American forces already in Mexico were made toward the south, east, or west it would be regarded as a hostile act and resisted by the forces of the de facto Government. It added that if any more troops crossed the border into Mexico they would be attacked.

The particular fighting which General Funston anticipated for the San Benito expedition was avoided by a compromise. After Major Anderson had dispersed the bandits near San Pedro he returned to the American side, having received the promise of General Alfredo Ricaut, head of the Carranzista garrison at Matamoros, to capture and punish the bandits himself. But while in the act of returning the American troops were fired upon, and one of their assailants—in Carranza's uniform—was killed.

The railways in Mexico have been seized, bridges have been destroyed, and other preparations made by the Carranzista forces to oppose the further passage of American troops. General Obregon, Minister of War, has sent out an order

calling upon all Mexicans to enlist under the flag against foreign invaders.

On June 18 President Wilson called out the militia through the Governors of all the States, and Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, announced the fact in the following words:

In view of the disturbed conditions on the Mexican border, and in order to assure complete protection for all Americans, the President has called out substantially all the State militia, and will send them to the border wherever and as fully as General Funston determines them to be needed for the purpose stated.

If all are not needed an effort will be made to relieve those on duty there from time to time so as to distribute the duty.

This call for militia is wholly unrelated to General Pershing's expedition, and contemplates no additional entry into Mexico, except as may be necessary to pursue bandits who attempt outrages on American soil.

The militia are being called out so as to leave some troops in the several States. They will be mobilized at their home stations, where necessary recruiting can be done.

It is expected that practically 100,000 men, all drilled during the past year by regular army officers, will be fully mobilized by the beginning of July and ready for service on the border. Both Governments meanwhile are trying to hold the difficult situation within the realm of diplomacy. The chief danger of a serious clash is in the impulsive acts of armed Mexicans if they undertake to interfere with General Pershing's scouting operations, which naturally must continue in all directions, despite the threatening telegram in which General Trevino undertook to dictate the movements of American troops.

Full Text of the Carranza Note

Mexico, D. F., May 22, 1916.

Mr. Secretary:

I AM instructed by the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, in charge of the executive power of Mexico, to address your Excellency the following note:

1. The Mexican Government has just been informed that a group of American troops, crossing the international boundary, has entered Mexican territory and is at the present time near a place called El Pino, located about sixty miles south of the line.

The crossing of these troops effected again

without the consent of the Mexican Government gravely endangers the harmony and good relations which should exist between the Governments of the United States and Mexico.

This Government must consider the above action as a violation of the sovereignty of Mexico, and therefore it requests in a most urgent manner that the Washington Government should consider the case carefully in order to definitely outline the policy it should follow with regard to the Mexican Nation.

In order to afford a clear understanding of

the basis of the request involved in this note, it becomes necessary to carefully review the incidents which have occurred up to the present time.

REVERTS TO VILLA RAID

2. On account of the incursion at Columbus, N. M., by a band led by Francisco Villa on the morning of March 9, 1916, the Mexican Government, sincerely deploring the occurrence, and for the purpose of affording efficacious protection to the frontier, it advanced its desire that the Governments of the United States and Mexico should enter into an agreement for the pursuit of bandits. The above proposal was made by the Government of Mexico guided by the precedent established under similar conditions obtaining in the years 1880 to 1884, and requested, in concrete, a permission for Mexican forces to cross into American territory in pursuit of bandits, under a condition of reciprocity which would permit American forces to cross into Mexican territory, if the Columbus incident would be repeated in any other point of the frontier line.

As a consequence of this proposal made in the Mexican note of March 10 the Government of the United States, through error or haste, considered that the good disposition shown by the Mexican Government was sufficient to authorize the crossing of the boundary, and to that effect, without awaiting the conclusion of a formal agreement on the matter, ordered that a column of American forces should cross into Mexican territory in pursuit of Villa and his band.

3. The American Government, on this account, made emphatic declarations, assuring the Mexican Government that it was acting with entire good faith and stating that its only purpose in crossing the frontier was to pursue and capture or destroy the Villa band that had assaulted Columbus; that this action did not mean an invasion of our territory, nor any intention to impair Mexican sovereignty, and that as soon as a practical result should be obtained the American troops would withdraw from Mexican territory.

MEXICO NOT NOTIFIED

4. The Mexican Government was not informed that the American troops had crossed the frontier until March 17, at which time it was unofficially known, through private channels from El Paso, that the American troops had entered into Mexican territory. This Government then addressed a note to the Government of the United States stating that, inasmuch as the precise terms and convictions of an agreement which should be formally entered into between both countries for the crossing of troops had not been stipulated, the American Government should not consider itself authorized to send the expedition.

The Washington Government explained the sending of such expedition, expressing its regret that a misinterpretation had occurred in regard to the attitude of the Mexican Gov-

ernment concerning the crossing of American troops over the boundary line in pursuit of Villa, but that this had been done under the impression that the previous exchange of messages implied the full consent of the Mexican Government, without the necessity of further formalities.

The American Government explained also that its attitude was due to the necessity of quick action, and stated that it was disposed to receive any suggestions the Mexican Government would wish to make in regard to the terms of a definite agreement covering the operations of troops on either side of the boundary.

5. Both Governments then began to discuss the terms of an agreement in accordance to which the reciprocal crossing of troops should be arranged, and to this end two projects from the Mexican Government and two counterprojects from the American Government were exchanged. During the discussion of this agreement the Mexican Government constantly insisted that the above-mentioned crossing should be limited within a zone of operations for the troops in foreign territory, that the time the troops should remain within it, the number of soldiers of an expedition and the class of arms they should pertain to should be fixed.

The Government of the United States objected to the above limitations, and when at last the American Government submitted the last counterdraft, accepting them in part, it stated, nevertheless, that while agreeing to sign the agreement, the latter would not apply on the Columbus expedition.

FIRST WITHDRAWAL REQUEST

6. This attitude of the American Government brought forth the Mexican note of April 12, in which, deferring the discussion of the agreement, since the latter was not to apply to the Columbus case, the Mexican Government requested the American Government to withdraw its troops, since the stay of them was not based on any agreement, and the expedition was then unnecessary, inasmuch as the Villa bandits had been dispersed and reduced to impotency.

7. While the American Government was delaying its reply to the aforesaid note of April 12, and took no action to withdraw its troops, it was considered convenient that military commanders of both countries should meet in some point of the frontier to review the military aspect of the situation and endeavor through this channel to arrive at a satisfactory solution, which on the part of Mexico consisted in the withdrawal of American troops from its territory.

To this end Generals Hugh L. Scott and Frederick Funston, representing the American Government, and General Alvaro Obregon, Secretary of War and Marine, representing Mexico, met, at Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, where they held a series of conferences within an open spirit of cordiality. During these conferences full explanations and data

were exchanged concerning the military situation on the frontier.

As a result of these conferences a draft of a memorandum was submitted to the approval of the Washington and Mexican Governments in accordance with which General Scott declared that the destruction and dispersion of the Villa band had been completed, and, therefore, the American Government was decided to begin the withdrawal of its troops under the promise that the Mexican Government would endeavor to maintain efficacious guard on the frontier against new incursions similar to that at Columbus.

CONDITION WAS REJECTED

8. The Mexican Government refused to approve that sort of agreement, because it was stated in it, besides, that the American Government could suspend the withdrawal of its troops if any other incident should occur which would serve to change the belief of the Washington Government in the ability of the Mexican Government to protect the frontier.

The Mexican Government could not accept this condition to suspend the withdrawal, because the evacuation of its territory is a matter entirely affecting the sovereignty of the country, which should at no time be subjected to the discretion of the American Government, it being possible on the other hand that another incident might occur which would give the indefinite stay of the American troops in Mexican territory a certain color of legality.

9. General Scott, General Funston, and General Obregon were discussing this point, when on the 5th of the present month of May a band of outlaws assaulted an American garrison at Glenn Springs, on the American side, crossing the Rio Grande immediately after to enter into Mexican territory via Boquillas.

10. On this account, and fearing that the American Government would hasten the crossing of new troops into Mexican territory in pursuit of the outlaws, the Mexican Government instructed General Obregon to notify the United States that the crossing of American soldiers on this new account would not be permitted to enter into Mexico, and that orders had already been given to all military commanders on the frontier to prevent it.

11. When the attitude of the Mexican Government became known Generals Scott and Funston assured General Obregon that no movement of American troops had been ordered to cross the frontier on account of the Boquillas incident, and that no more American soldiers would enter into our territory.

This assurance, which was personally made by Generals Scott and Funston to General Obregon when the conferences were about to be adjourned, was reiterated by General Scott himself in a later private conversation he had with Licenciado Juan Neftali Amador, Sub-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who had had the opportunity to take part in the conferences between the American and the Mexican military commanders.

FEAR OF NEW INCURSION

12. On account of the same incident of Glenn Springs, or Boquillas, fearing that the various bands of outlaws which are organized or armed near the frontier might repeat their incursions, and with a view to procuring an effective military co-operation between American and Mexican forces, this Government suggested through its representative, General Obregon, to Generals Scott and Funston, representing the United States, the convenience of reaching an understanding on a military plan of distribution of troops along the frontier in order that an effective watch could be kept over the whole region, and avoiding in this way, so far as possible, the recurrence of similar assaults. The Mexican Government showed by this action not only its good faith and good wishes, but also its frank willingness to arrive at an effective co-operation with the Government of the United States to avoid all further sense of friction between the two countries.

This plan for the distribution of American and Mexican forces in their respective territories along the frontier was proposed as a means to prevent immediately any new difficulty, and always with the idea of arriving later at the celebration of an agreement for the reciprocal crossing of troops, as long as the abnormal conditions exist in our territory.

13. The conferences between Generals Scott, Funston, and Obregon adjourned on May 11 without reaching any agreement concerning the unconditional withdrawal of the American troops. General Scott insisted in the form of the memorandum concerning the conditional withdrawal of the American forces, but did not take into consideration the plan proposed by the Mexican Government for the protection of the frontier by means of detachments along the same.

LEFT TO THE CAPITALS

Under these conditions it was left for the Governments of Washington and Mexico to conclude the arrangements initiated during the conferences of Ciudad Juarez and El Paso. Up to that time no complication had occurred on account of the new Boquillas incident, and all the assurances given by Generals Scott and Funston led us to suppose that the above incident would not bring about new difficulties.

14. The Mexican Government, however, has just been informed that 400 men of the Eighth Regiment of the American Army are in Mexican territory, having crossed the line in the direction of Boquillas approximately between the 10th and 11th of May, and are at present near a place called El Pino, about sixty miles south of the frontier. This fact was brought to the attention of the Mexican authorities by the commander himself of the American troops which crossed the frontier, who gave advice to the Mexican military commander at Esmeraldo, Sierra Mojada, by a communication in which he informed him that he crossed the frontier in pursuit of the

band of outlaws which had assaulted Glenn Springs, and in accordance with an agreement existing between the American and the Mexican Governments regarding the crossing of troops, and with the consent of a Mexican Consular official in Del Rio, Texas, to whom the commander alleged to have informed of the entry of his expedition.

15. The Mexican Government cannot assume that an error has been committed a second time by the American Government ordering the crossing of its troops without the consent of the Government of Mexico. It fails to understand also that a commander of troops of the United States Army would enter into Mexican territory without the due authority from his superiors, and believing that he could secure permission for the crossing of his troops from a Consular agent.

The explanation given by the American Government in regard to the crossing of troops at Columbus has never been satisfactory to the Mexican Government; but the new invasion of our territory is no longer an isolated fact and tends to convince the Mexican Government that something more than a mere error is involved.

16. This latter act of the American forces causes new complications for the Mexican Government in the possibility of a satisfactory solution and increases the tenseness of the international situation between both countries.

CHARGES AN INVASION

The Mexican Government cannot consider this last incident except as an invasion of our territory, made by American forces against the expressed will of the Mexican Government, and it is its duty to request, as it does, the American Government to order the immediate withdrawal of these new forces and to abstain completely from sending any other expedition of a similar character.

17. The Mexican Government understands its obligation to protect the frontier; but this obligation is not exclusively its own, and it expects that the American Government, which is subject to an equal obligation, will appreciate the material difficulties with which this task is met, inasmuch as the American troops themselves, notwithstanding their number and in spite of the fact that their attention is not shared by other military operations, are physically unable to effectively protect the frontier on the American side.

The Mexican Government has made every effort on its part to protect the frontier without disregarding, on the other hand, the considerable task of pacification which is being performed in the rest of the country, and the American Government should understand that if now and then any lamentable incursions into American territory committed by irresponsible bands of outlaws might occur, this should be a case of pecuniary reparation and a reason to adopt a combined

defense, but never a cause for the American authorities to invade our national territory.

The incursion of bands of outlaws into American territory is a deplorable incident, to say the least, but in no way can the Mexican Government be made responsible for them, inasmuch as it is doing everything possible to prevent them. The crossing of regular American troops into Mexican territory, against the express will of the Mexican Government, does constitute an act of which the American Government is responsible.

18. The Mexican Government, therefore, believes that the time has come for it to insist with the American Government that in withdrawing at once the new Boquillas expedition it should abstain in the future from sending new troops. In any case, the Mexican Government after having made clear its unwillingness to permit the crossing of new American troops into Mexican territory, will have to consider the latter as an act of invasion of its territory, and therefore it will be forced to defend itself against any group of American troops which may be found within it.

19. With reference to the troops which are now interned in the State of Chihuahua on account of the Columbus incident, the Mexican Government is compelled to insist on their withdrawal.

The Mexican Government understands that, in the face of the unwillingness of the American Government to withdraw the above forces, it would be left no other recourse than to procure the defense of its territory by means of arms, but it understands at the same time its duty to avoid as far as possible an armed conflict between both countries; and, acting in accordance with Article 21 of the treaty of Feb. 2, 1848, it considers it its duty to resort to all means of a peaceful character to find a solution of the international conflict in which both countries are involved.

20. The Mexican Government considers it necessary to avail itself of this opportunity to request the American Government to give a more categorical explanation of its real intentions toward Mexico. To this end it hopes that in speaking with entire frankness its words may not be interpreted as tending to wound the sensibility of the American Government; but that it finds itself in the condition to set aside all diplomatic euphemism, in order to express its ideas with entire frankness. If in the expression of the grievances hereinafter mentioned the Mexican Government makes use of the most perfect frankness, it is because it considers its duty to convey the most perfect clearness to the mind of the Government and the people of the United States concerning the Mexican point of view.

PROTESTS OF FRIENDSHIP

21. The American Government has for some time been making protests of friendship to Latin-American countries, and it has availed itself of all possible efforts to convince the

same that it is its desire to respect their sovereignty absolutely.

With respect to Mexico especially, the American Government has stated on various occasions that it has no intention to intervene in any way in its internal affairs and that it wishes to leave our country to decide by itself its difficult problems of political and social transformation. It is still reasoned when, on account of the Columbus expedition, the American Government, through the voice of its President, has made the declaration that it does not intend to interfere in the affairs of Mexico nor to invade it, that it does not desire to acquire a single inch of its territory, and that it will in no way impair its sovereignty.

The Washington Government and its representatives on the frontier have also expressly declared that it is not the will of the American people to go into war or have an armed conflict with Mexico.

Summing up all of the above, and judging from the official declarations which have been made for some time past by the Washington Government, there should appear to be an honest purpose on the part of the Government and people of the United States not to launch into a conflict with Mexico.

22. The Mexican Government, however, regrets to remark that the acts of the American military authorities are in absolute conflict with the above statements, and therefore finds itself constrained to appeal to the President, the Department of State, the Senate, the American people to the end that once and for all time the true political tendency of the United States toward Mexico be defined.

23. It is equally necessary that on this account the Government of the United States should define in a precise manner its purposes toward Mexico, in order that the other Latin-American nations may be able to judge the sincerity of such purposes and be able to appreciate the proper value of the protests of amity and fraternity which have been made to them during many years.

24. The American Government, through the voice of its own President, stated that the punitive expedition from Columbus would withdraw from Mexican territory as soon as the bands of the Villa outlaws could have been destroyed or dispersed. More than two months have elapsed since this expedition entered into Mexican territory; Generals Scott and Funston declared in Ciudad Juarez that the Villa band has been entirely dispersed, and, knowing this, the American troops are not withdrawn from the territory of Mexico.

The American Government is convinced and has accepted the fact that no military task is now left for the Columbus expedition, and nevertheless the promise made by President Wilson that the forces would withdraw as soon as the purpose which caused them to go in would have been reached has not been complied with.

The causes of any internal political order which may exist not to withdraw the American troops from Mexican territory, however justified they may appear, cannot justify the above attitude, but on the contrary they accentuate the discrepancy between the protests of respect to the sovereignty of Mexico and the actual fact that on account of reasons of internal policy of the United States a status should be maintained which is utterly unjust with regard to the Mexican Republic.

25. The American Government stated that its purpose in causing the American troops to enter Mexico was only to defend the frontier against probable incursions. This statement, however, is in conflict with the attitude assumed by the same American Government in discussing the agreement concerning the reciprocal crossing of the frontier, because while the Mexican Government maintained that said agreement should limit the zone of operations of the troops of one and the other country, as well as the time which the expeditions should last, the number of soldiers and the arm to which they should belong, the American Government constantly eluded these limitations. This attitude of the American Government, which is the one expecting to have frequent occasion to cross the frontier on account of incursions of outlaws, is clearly indicating the purpose of having power to enter Mexican territory beyond the limit which the necessities of defense could require.

26. The Columbus punitive expedition, as it has been called, had not, according to the statements of President Wilson, any other purpose than to reach and punish the band of outlaws which had committed the outrage, and it was organized under the supposition that the Mexican Government had given its consent to it. Such expedition, however, has had a character of such clear distrust toward Mexico and of such absolute independence, that it cannot justly be considered as anything but an invasion made without the consent, without the knowledge, and without the co-operation of the Mexican authorities.

It was a known fact that the Columbus expedition crossed the frontier without the consent of the Mexican Government. The American military authorities have carried this expedition into effect without awaiting for the consent of the Government of Mexico, and even after they were officially informed that this Government had not given its consent for it, they nevertheless continued it, causing more troops to cross the line without informing the Mexican authorities of this fact.

The expedition has entered and operated within Mexican territory without procuring the co-operation of the Mexican authorities. The American military authorities have always maintained complete secrecy regarding their movements without informing the Mexican Government about them, such as they would have done if they really had tried to obtain co-operation. This lack of advice and

agreement was the cause of the clash which occurred in Parral between American forces and Mexican citizens.

In conclusion, the Columbus expedition has been carried into effect without any spirit of harmony, but, on the contrary, under a spirit of distrust with respect to our authorities, as our co-operation was not only unsought, nor were we informed with regard to military operations affected, besides the expedition was organized, carrying artillery and infantry forces.

Now, then, the protests of friendly co-operation made by the American authorities are not in keeping with the use of infantry and artillery exclusively destined to be employed against the regular Mexican forces.

If the Columbus expedition had taken place with the consent of the Mexican Government and its co-operation had been sought, the use of artillery and infantry would have been considered an insult to the Mexican authorities because of the supposition that they might feloniously assault the American forces which would have entered Mexico in pursuit of a common enemy confiding in the friendship of the former. Nevertheless, it is preferable to interpret this act as a proof that the American forces entered into Mexican territory without the consent of the Mexican Government, and, therefore, ready to repel any aggression on the part of regular Mexican forces who were ignorant of their presence.

"A HOSTILE EXPEDITION"

All of the above facts demonstrate that there has been a great discrepancy between the protests of sincere friendly co-operation on the part of the American authorities and the actual attitude of the expedition, which, on account of its distrust, its secrecy regarding its movements and the arms at its disposal, clearly indicated that it was a hostile expedition and a real invasion of our territory.

27. The American Government has stated on different occasions that the Columbus expedition had no other object than to pursue and destroy the Villa bandits, and that as soon as this would be accomplished the expedition would be withdrawn. The facts, however, have shown that the intention of the American Government was not the same during the conference at Ciudad Juarez and El Paso. It cannot be explained otherwise that General Scott should have insisted so emphatically on the signing of a memorandum stating that the American forces would not finish their withdrawal, if any other incident occurred which would mortify the belief of the American Government in the ability of the Mexican Government to protect the frontier.

The conclusion to be drawn from this inconsistency of General Scott regarding the signing of this memorandum is that the Columbus expedition entered into Mexico promising to withdraw as soon as it should have destroyed

the Villa band, but that it is the purpose to make use of it afterward as an instrument to guarantee the protection of the frontier.

28. The American Government justly desires that the frontier should be protected. If the frontier should be properly protected against incursions from Mexico there would be no reason then for the existing difficulty. The American Government knows of the difficulties obtaining in the protection of a frontier line in which there are no natural facilities to aid in its defense, and, notwithstanding its immense resources, the American Government itself has not been able to render an effective protection along a line of more than 2,000 kilometers to be guarded.


The Mexican Government proposed that the military chiefs in charge of the troops in one and the other country should discuss a plan of cantonments along the boundary line, and, notwithstanding the protestations of the American Government of its desire to solve its difficulties with Mexico, General Scott did not approve the above plan of cantonments, which is the only thing rational and the only plan that could be carried into effect without involving the sovereignty or territory of one or the other country. The American Government prefers to keep its troops inactive and idle within the territory of Mexico, instead of withdrawing them to post them along the frontier in accord with Mexican authorities who would do likewise on their side. By this action the American Government gives room for the supposition that its true intention is to keep the troops it already has interned in Mexico anticipating that it may make use of them later for future operations.

CHARGES BAD FAITH

29. The American Government has on all occasions declared its desire to help the Constitutional Government to complete the work of pacification and its desire that this task should be carried into effect within the least time possible. The true attitude of the American Government in relation with these desires appears to be entirely incongruous, inasmuch as for some time back it has been doing things indicating that it does not only render any assistance to the work of pacification of Mexico, but that, on the contrary, it appears to place all possible obstacles to the execution of this task. As a matter of fact, without considering the great number of diplomatic representations made under the pretext of protection to American interests in Mexico, which are constantly embarrassing the task of the new Government, whose intention it is to reorganize the political, economic, and social conditions of the country on a new basis, there is a great number of facts which cause the influence of the American Government to be felt against the consolidation of the present Government of Mexico.

The decided support given at one time to Villa by General Scott and the Department of State itself was the principal cause for

GENERAL ALEXEI A. BRUSILOFF




Commander of Russian Armies on Southwest Front, Who Has Broken
Through the Austrian Lines and Invaded Galicia

ARMORED AUTOMOBILES



A British Armored "Scout" Near the French Front
(Photo by Underwood & Underwood.)



A Group of Italian Armored Cars of a New Type, With Two Gun
Turrets
(From an Official Photograph.)

the prolongation of civil war in Mexico for many months. Later on the continuous aid which the American Catholic clergy has rendered to the Mexican Catholic clergy, which is incessantly working against the Constitutionalist Government, and the constant activities of the American interventionist press and business men of that country, are, to say the least, an indication that the present American Government does not wish or is unable to prevent all the works of conspiracy against the Constitutionalist Government carried into effect in the United States.

30. The American Government claims constantly from the Mexican Government an effective protection of the frontiers, and, nevertheless, the greater number of the bands which take the name of rebels against this Government is provided and armed, and perhaps also organized, on the American side under the tolerance of the authorities of the State of Texas, and, it may be said, even of the Federal authorities of the United States. The leniency of the American authorities toward such bands is such that in the majority of cases the conspirators, who are well known, and wherever they have been discovered and imprisoned, are released under insignificant bonds, permitting them to continue in their efforts.

Mexican emigrants, who are plotting and organizing incursions on the American side, have now more facilities to cause injury than before, because knowing that any new difficulty between Mexico and the United States will prolong the stay of American troops, they endeavor to increase the occasions for a conflict and friction.

31. The American Government claims to help the Constitutionalist Government in its task of pacification and urges that such a work be done within the least time possible, and that the protection of the frontiers be effected in the most efficacious way. And nevertheless, on various occasions, the American Government has detained shipments of arms and ammunition purchased by the Mexican Government in the United States, which should be employed to hasten the task of pacification and to more efficaciously protect the frontier. The pretexts given to detain the shipment of munitions consigned to this Government have always been futile and never have we been given a frank reason; it has been said, for example, that the munitions were embargoed because it was not known who the owner might be, or because of the fear that they might fall into the hands of Villista bands.

The embargo of war material consigned to the Mexican Government can have no other interpretation than that the Government of the United States wishes to protect itself against the emergency of a future conflict, and therefore it is endeavoring to prevent arms and ammunition which might be used against American troops from reach-

ing the hands of the Mexican Government. The American Government would have the right to take this precaution against such emergency, but in that case it ought not to say that it is endeavoring to co-operate with the Mexican Government, and it would be preferable to give out a more frank statement concerning its procedure.

The American Government either desires to decidedly and frankly help the Mexican Government to re-establish peace, and in this case it ought not to prevent the exportation of arms, or the true purposes of the American Government are to get ready so that in the case of future war with Mexico the latter may find itself less provided with arms and ammunition. If this is the case, it would be preferable to say so.

In any case, the embargo on arms and ammunition consigned to the Mexican authorities, under the frivolous pretext of preventing these arms and ammunition from falling into the hands of Villista bands, is an indication that the actual acts of the American military authorities are entirely in conflict with the purposes of peace of the American Government.

The Mexican Government cannot wish war with the United States, and if this should occur it would undoubtedly be as a consequence of a deliberate purpose of the United States. For the time being the above precautionary acts of the American Government indicate that there is a purpose of preparedness for such emergency, or that, which is the same, the beginning of hostility on the part of the United States toward Mexico.

32. In conclusion, the New York American authorities, alleging that they act at the suggestion of a neutral peaceful society, have ordered the detention of several parts of machinery which the Mexican Government was forwarding to Mexico for its ammunition factory. It could not be conceived that this machinery could be used before several months after it had reached its destination. This action of the American Government, tending to prevent the manufacturing of munitions in a remote future, is another clear indication that its true purposes toward Mexico are not peaceful, because while millions and millions of dollars' worth of arms and ammunition are being daily exported for the European war without peace societies becoming impressed by the spectacle of that war, the New York authorities are showing exceedingly marked interest in seconding the purposes of the above-mentioned humanitarian societies whenever it is a matter of exporting to Mexico any machinery for the manufacture of arms and ammunition.

Mexico has the indisputable right just like the United States and all other nations in the world to provide for its military necessities, especially so when it is confronting so vast a task as that of insuring the pacification of the interior of this country; and the action of the Government of the United States in detaining machinery destined for the manufact-

ure of ammunitions is indicative either that the United States wishes to place obstacles to its complete pacification, or that this action is one of the series carried into effect by the American authorities as a matter of precaution in case of a projected war with Mexico.

33. All of the above-mentioned circumstances indicate that the true purpose of the military authorities of the United States are in absolute contradiction with the continuous protestations of amity of the American Government toward Mexico.

34. The Mexican people and Government are absolutely sure that the American people do not wish war with Mexico. There are, nevertheless, strong American interests and strong Mexican interests laboring to secure a conflict between the two countries. The Mexican Government firmly desires to preserve peace with the American Government, but to that effect it is indispensable that the American Government should frankly explain its true purposes toward Mexico.

It is indispensable that the above contradiction between the protests of amity on the part of Washington and the acts of distrust and aggression on the part of American military authorities should be brought to an end.

The Mexican Government and people, there-

fore, are anxious to know what they should expect, and they want to be sure that the expressions so many times made by the Government of the United States should be really in keeping with the sincere desires for peace between the two countries, a friendship which should exist not only in declarations, but crystallize in deeds.

The Mexican Government, therefore, formally invites the Government of the United States to cause the situation of uncertainty between the two countries to cease and to support its declarations and protests of amity with real and effective action which will convince the Mexican people of the sincerity of its purposes. This action, in the present situation, cannot be other than the immediate withdrawal of the American troops which are now in Mexican territory.

In complying with the instructions of the First Chief, I avail myself of this occasion to offer your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) C. AGUILAR,
Secretary.

*His Excellency Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State of the United States of
America, Washington, D. C.*

Text of the American Government's Answer to Carranza

THE United States Government, through Secretary Lansing, sent a firm reply on June 20 to General Carranza's note of May 22, flatly rejecting his demands. It stated plainly that the de facto Government had not done its part in preventing the depredations upon our border, and that American troops would not be withdrawn until it showed its willingness and power to stop the outrages. The discourteous tone of Carranza's note was rebuked, and the determination of the United States, as well as our essential good-will, were made clear. The document left the responsibility for the next step with the Carranza Government.

The full text of the American note is as follows:

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Foreign Relations of the de facto Government of Mexico.

Department of State,
Washington, June 20, 1916.

SM: I have read your communication, which was delivered to me on May 22, 1916,

under instructions of the Chief Executive of the de facto Government of Mexico, on the subject of the presence of American troops in Mexican territory, and I would be wanting in candor if I did not, before making answer to the allegations of fact and the conclusions reached by your Government, express the surprise and regret which have been caused this Government by the discourteous tone and temper of this last communication of the de facto Government of Mexico.

The Government of the United States has viewed with deep concern and increasing disappointment the progress of the revolution in Mexico. Continuous bloodshed and disorders have marked its progress. For three years the Mexican Republic has been torn with civil strife; the lives of Americans and other aliens have been sacrificed; vast properties developed by American capital and enterprise have been destroyed or rendered non-productive; bandits have been permitted to roam at will through the territory contiguous to the United States and to seize, without punishment or without effective attempt at punishment, the property of Americans, while the lives of citizens of the United States, who ventured to remain in Mexican territory or to return there to protect their interests, have been taken, in some cases barbarously taken, and the murderers have neither been apprehended nor brought to jus-

tice. It would be difficult to find in the annals of the history of Mexico conditions more deplorable than those which have existed there during these recent years of civil war.

It would be tedious to recount instance after instance, outrage after outrage, atrocity after atrocity, to illustrate the true nature and extent of the widespread conditions of lawlessness and violence which have prevailed. During the past nine months in particular, the frontier of the United States along the lower Rio Grande has been thrown into a state of constant apprehension and turmoil because of frequent and sudden incursions into American territory and depredations and murders on American soil by Mexican bandits, who have taken the lives and destroyed the property of American citizens, sometimes carrying American citizens across the international boundary with the booty seized.

STATEMENT OF OUTRAGES

American garrisons have been attacked at night, American soldiers killed, and their equipment and horses stolen. American ranches have been raided, property stolen and destroyed, and American trains wrecked and plundered. The attacks on Brownsville, Red House Ferry, Progreso Post Office, and Las Peladas, all occurring during September last, are typical. In these attacks on American territory, Carranzista adherents and even Carranzista soldiers took part in the looting, burning, and killing. Not only were these murders characterized by ruthless brutality, but uncivilized acts of mutilation were perpetrated. Representations were made to General Carranza, and he was emphatically requested to stop these reprehensible acts in a section which he has long claimed to be under the complete domination of his authority.

Notwithstanding these representations and the promise of General Nafarrete to prevent attacks along the international boundary, in the following month of October a passenger train was wrecked by bandits and several persons killed seven miles north of Brownsville, and an attack was made upon United States troops at the same place several days later. Since these attacks, leaders of the bandits well known both to Mexican civil and military authorities, as well as to American officers, have been enjoying with impunity the liberty of the towns of Northern Mexico. So far has the indifference of the de facto Government to these atrocities gone that some of these leaders, as I am advised, have received not only the protection of that Government, but encouragement and aid as well.

Depredations upon American persons and property within Mexican jurisdiction have been still more numerous. This Government has repeatedly requested in the strongest terms that the de facto Government safeguard the lives and homes of American citizens and furnish the protection which inter-

national obligation imposes, to American interests in the northern States of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora, and also in the States to the south.

For example, on Jan. 3, troops were requested to punish the bands of outlaws which looted the Cusi mining property, eighty miles west of Chihuahua, but no effective results came from this request. During the following week the bandit, Villa, with his band of about 200 men, was operating without opposition between Rubio and Santa Ysabel, a fact well known to Carranzista authorities. Meanwhile a party of unfortunate Americans started by train from Chihuahua to visit the Cusi mines, after having received assurances from the Carranzista authorities in the State of Chihuahua that the country was safe and that a guard on the train was not necessary. The Americans held passports or safe conducts issued by authorities of the de facto Government. On Jan. 10 the train was stopped by Villa bandits, and eighteen of the American party were stripped of their clothing and shot in cold blood, in what is now known as the "Santa Ysabel massacre." General Carranza stated to the agent of the Department of State that he had issued orders for the immediate pursuit, capture, and punishment of those responsible for this atrocious crime, and appealed to this Government and to the American people to consider the difficulties of according protection along the railroad where the massacre occurred. Assurances were also given by Mr. Arredondo, presumably under instructions from the de facto Government, that the murderers would be brought to justice, and that steps would also be taken to remedy the lawless conditions existing in the State of Durango.

MASSACRE UNPUNISHED

It is true that Villa, Castro, and Lopez were publicly declared to be outlaws and subject to apprehension and execution, but so far as known only a single man personally connected with this massacre has been brought to justice by Mexican authorities. Within a month after this barbarous slaughter of inoffensive Americans, it was notorious that Villa was operating within twenty miles of Cusihuiriac and publicly stated that his purpose was to destroy American lives and property. Despite repeated and insistent demands that military protection should be furnished to Americans, Villa openly carried on his operations, constantly approaching closer and closer to the border. He was not intercepted nor were his movements impeded by troops of the de facto Government and no effectual attempt was made to frustrate his hostile designs against Americans. In fact, as I am informed, while Villa and his band were slowly moving toward the American frontier in the neighborhood of Columbus, N. M., not a single Mexican soldier was seen in this vicinity. Yet the Mexican authorities were fully cognizant of his movements, for on March 6, as General Gavira publicly an-

nounced, he advised the American military authorities of the outlaw's approach to the border, so that they might be prepared to prevent him from crossing the boundary.

THE COLUMBUS RAID

Villa's unhindered activities culminated in the unprovoked and cold-blooded attack upon American soldiers and citizens in the town of Columbus on the night of March 9, the details of which do not need repetition here in order to refresh your memory with the heinousness of the crime. After murdering, burning, and plundering, Villa and his bandits, fleeing south, passed within sight of the Carranzista military post at Casas Grandes, and no effort was made to stop him by the officers and garrison of the *de facto* Government stationed there.

In the face of these depredations, not only on American lives and property on Mexican soil, but on American soldiers, citizens, and homes on American territory, the perpetrators of which General Carranza was unable or possibly considered it inadvisable to apprehend and punish, the United States had no recourse other than to employ force to disperse the bands of Mexican outlaws who were with increasing boldness systematically raiding across the international boundary.

The marauders engaged in the attack on Columbus were driven back across the border by American cavalry, and subsequently, as soon as a sufficient force to cope with the band could be collected, were pursued into Mexico in an effort to capture or destroy them. Without co-operation or assistance in the field on the part of the *de facto* Government, despite repeated requests by the United States, and without apparent recognition on its part of the desirability of putting an end to these systematic raids, or of punishing the chief perpetrators of the crimes committed, because they menaced the good relations of the two countries, American forces pursued the lawless bands as far as Parral, where the pursuit was halted by the hostility of Mexicans, presumed to be loyal to the *de facto* Government, who arrayed themselves on the side of outlawry and became in effect the protectors of Villa and his band.

JUSTIFIED IN OUR ACTION

In this manner and for these reasons have the American forces entered Mexican territory. Knowing fully the circumstances set forth, the *de facto* Government cannot be blind to the necessity which compelled this Government to act, and yet it has seen fit to recite groundless sentiments of hostility toward the expedition and to impute to this Government ulterior motives for the continued presence of American troops on Mexican soil. It is charged that these troops crossed the frontier without first obtaining the consent or permission of the *de facto* Government. Obviously, as immediate action alone could avail, there was no opportunity to reach an agreement (other than

that of March 10-13, now repudiated by General Carranza) prior to the entrance of such an expedition into Mexico if the expedition was to be effective. Subsequent events and correspondence have demonstrated to the satisfaction of this Government that General Carranza would not have entered into any agreement providing for an effective plan for the capture and destruction of the Villa bands.

While the American troops were moving rapidly southward in pursuit of the raiders, it was the form and nature of the agreement that occupied the attention of General Carranza, rather than the practical object which it was to obtain—the number of limitations that could be imposed upon the American forces to impede their progress, rather than the obstacles that could be raised to prevent the escape of the outlaws. It was General Carranza who suspended through your note of April 12 all discussions and negotiations for an agreement along the lines of the protocols between the United States and Mexico concluded during the period 1882-1896, under which the two countries had so successfully restored peaceful conditions on their common boundary.

It may be mentioned here that, notwithstanding the statement in your note that "the American Government gave no answer to the note of April 12," this note was replied to on April 14, when the department instructed Mr. Rodgers by telegraph to deliver this Government's answer to General Carranza.

Shortly after this reply the conferences between Generals Scott, Funston, and Obregon began at El Paso, during which they signed on May 2 a project of a memorandum ad referendum, regarding the withdrawal of American troops. As an indication of the alleged bad faith of the American Government, you state that though General Scott declared in this memorandum that the destruction and dispersion of the Villa band "had been accomplished," yet American forces are not withdrawn from Mexico. It is only necessary to read the memorandum, which is in the English language, to ascertain that this is clearly a misstatement, for the memorandum states that "the American punitive expeditionary forces have destroyed or dispersed many of the lawless elements and bandits * * * or have driven them far into the interior of the Republic of Mexico," and, further, that the United States forces were then "carrying on a vigorous pursuit of such small numbers of bandits or lawless elements as may have escaped."

The context of your note gives the impression that the object of the expedition being admittedly accomplished, the United States had agreed in the memorandum to begin the withdrawal of its troops. The memorandum shows, however, that it was not alone on account of partial dispersion of the bandits that it was decided to begin the withdrawal of American forces, but equally on account of

the assurances of the Mexican Government that their forces were "at the present time being augmented and strengthened to such an extent that they will be able to prevent any disorders occurring in Mexico that would in any way endanger American territory," and that they would "continue to diligently pursue, capture, or destroy any lawless bands of bandits that may still exist or hereafter exist in the northern part of Mexico," and that it would "make a proper distribution of such of its forces as may be necessary to prevent the possibility of invasion of American territory from Mexico." It was because of these assurances and because of General Scott's confidence that they would be carried out that he stated in the memorandum that the American forces would be "gradually withdrawn."

It is to be noted that, while the American Government was willing to ratify this agreement, General Carranza refused to do so, as General Obregon stated, because, among other things, it imposed improper conditions upon the Mexican Government.

CARRANZA'S WORD NOT KEPT

Notwithstanding the assurances in the memorandum, it is well known that the forces of the de facto Government have not carried on a vigorous pursuit of the remaining bandits, and that no proper distribution of forces to prevent the invasion of American territory has been made, as will be shown by the further facts hereinafter set forth. I am reluctant to be forced to the conclusion which might be drawn from these circumstances that the de facto Government, in spite of the crimes committed and the sinister designs of Villa and his followers, did not and does not now intend or desire that these outlaws should be captured, destroyed, or dispersed by American troops or, at the request of this Government, by Mexican troops.

While the conferences at El Paso were in progress, and after the American conferees had been assured on May 2 that the Mexican forces in the northern part of the republic were then being augmented so as to be able to prevent any disorders that would endanger American territory, a band of Mexicans, on the night of May 5, made an attack at Glenn Springs, Texas, about twenty miles north of the border, killing American soldiers and civilians, burning and sacking property, and carrying off two Americans as prisoners. Subsequent to this event, the Mexican Government, as you state, "gave instructions to General Obregon to notify that of the United States that it would not permit the further passage of American troops into Mexico on this account, and that orders had been given to all military commanders along the frontier not to consent to same."

This Government is of course not in a position to dispute the statement that these instructions had been given to General Obregon, but it can decisively assert that General Obregon never gave any such notification to

General Scott or General Funston, or, so far as known, to any other American official. General Obregon did, however, inquire as to whether American troops had entered Mexico in pursuit of the Glenn Springs raiders, and General Funston stated that no orders had been issued to American troops to cross the frontier on account of the raid, but this statement was made before any such orders had been issued and not afterward, as the erroneous account of the interview given in your note would appear to indicate.

Moreover, no statement was made by the American Generals that "no more American troops would cross into our territory." On the contrary, it was pointed out to General Obregon and to Mr. Juan Amador, who was present at the conference, and pointed out with emphasis, that the bandits de la Rosa and Pedro Vino, who had been instrumental in causing the invasion of Texas above Brownsville, were even then reported to be arranging in the neighborhood of Victoria for another raid across the border, and it was made clear to General Obregon that if the Mexican Government did not take immediate steps to prevent another invasion of the United States by these marauders, who were frequently seen in the company of General Nafarrete, the Constitutionalist commander, Mexico would find in Tamaulipas another punitive expedition similar to that then in Chihuahua.

OUR TROOPS AUTHORIZED

American troops crossed into Mexico on May 10, upon notification to the local military authorities, under the repudiated agreement of March 10-13, or in any event in accordance with the practice adopted over forty years ago, when there was no agreement regarding pursuit of marauders across the international boundary. These troops penetrated 168 miles into Mexican territory in pursuit of the Glenn Springs marauders, without encountering a detachment of Mexican troops or a single Mexican soldier.

Further discussion of this raid, however, is not necessary, because the American forces sent in pursuit of the bandits recrossed into Texas on the morning of May 22, the date of your note under consideration—a further proof of the singleness of purpose of this Government in endeavoring to quell disorder and stamp out lawlessness along the border.

EL PASO CONFERENCES

During the continuance of the El Paso conferences, General Scott, you assert, did not take into consideration the plan proposed by the Mexican Government for the protection of the frontier by the reciprocal distribution of troops along the boundary. This proposition was made by General Obregon a number of times, but each time conditioned upon the immediate withdrawal of American troops, and the Mexican conferees were invariably informed that immediate withdrawal could not take place, and that, therefore, it was

impossible to discuss the project on that basis.

I have noted the fact that your communication is not limited to a discussion of the deplorable conditions existing along the border and their important bearing on the peaceful relations of our Governments, but that an effort is made to connect it with other circumstances in order to support, if possible, a mistaken interpretation of the attitude of the Government of the United States toward Mexico. You state in effect that the American Government has placed every obstacle in the way of attaining the pacification of Mexico, and that this is shown by the volume of diplomatic representations in behalf of American interests which constantly impede efforts to reorganize the political, economical, and social conditions of the country; by the decided aid lent at one time to Villa by American officers and by the Department of State; by the aid extended by the American Catholic clergy to that of Mexico; by the constant activity of the American press in favor of intervention and the interests of American business men; by the shelter and supply of rebels and conspirators on American territory; by the detention of shipments of arms and munitions purchased by the Mexican Government, and by the detention of machinery intended for their manufacture.

ANSWER TO CHARGES

In reply to this sweeping charge, I can truthfully affirm that the American Government has given every possible encouragement to the de facto Government in the pacification and rehabilitation of Mexico. From the moment of its recognition it has had the undivided support of this Government. An embargo was placed upon arms and ammunition going into Chihuahua, Sonora, and Lower California, in order to prevent their falling into the hands of the armed opponents of the de facto Government. Permission has been granted from time to time, as requested, for Mexican troops and equipment to traverse American territory from one point to another in Mexico in order that the operations of Mexican troops against Villa and his forces might be facilitated.

In view of these friendly acts, I am surprised that the de facto Government has construed diplomatic representations in regard to the unjust treatment accorded American interests, private assistance to opponents to the de facto Government by sympathizers in a foreign country and the activity of a foreign press as interference by the United States Government in the domestic politics of Mexico. If a denial is needed that this Government has had ulterior and improper motives in its diplomatic representations, or has countenanced the activities of American sympathizers and the American press opposed to the de facto Government, I am glad most emphatically to deny it.

It is, however, a matter of common knowledge that the Mexican press has been more

active than the press in the United States in endeavoring to inflame the two peoples against each other, and to force the two countries into hostilities. With the power of censorship of the Mexican press, so rigorously exercised by the de facto Government, the responsibility for this activity cannot, it would seem, be avoided by that Government, and the issue of the appeal of General Carranza himself, in the press of March 12, calling upon the Mexican people to be prepared for any emergency which might arise, and intimating that war with the United States was imminent, evidences the attitude of the de facto Government toward the publications.

REASON FOR STOPPING MUNITIONS

It should not be a matter of surprise that, after such manifestations of hostile feeling, the United States was doubtful of the purpose for which the large amount of ammunition was to be used which the de facto Government appeared eager to import from this country. Moreover, the policy of this de facto Government in refusing to co-operate, and in failing to act independently in destroying the Villa bandits, and in otherwise suppressing outlawry in the vicinity of the border, so as to remove the danger of war materials, while passing southward through this zone, falling into the hands of enemies of law and order, is, in the opinion of this Government, a sufficient ground, even if there were no other, for the refusal to allow such materials to cross the boundary into the bandit-infested region. To have permitted these shipments without careful scrutiny would, in the circumstances, have been to manifest a sense of security which would have been unjustified.

HOSTILITY OF COMMANDERS

Candor compels me to add that the unconcealed hostility of the subordinate military commanders of the de facto Government toward the American troops engaged in pursuing the Villa bands and the efforts of the de facto Government to compel their withdrawal from Mexican territory by threats and show of military force instead of by aiding in the capture of the outlaws, constitute a menace to the safety of the American troops and to the peace of the border. As long as this menace continues and there is any evidence of an intention on the part of the de facto Government or its military commanders to use force against the American troops instead of co-operating with them, the Government of the United States will not permit munitions of war or machinery for their manufacture to be exported from this country to Mexico.

As to the shelter and supply of rebels and conspirators on American territory, I can state that vigorous efforts have been and are being made by the agents of the United States to apprehend and bring to justice all persons found to be conspiring to violate the laws of the United States by organizing to oppose with arms the de facto Government of Mexico. Political refugees have undoubtedly

sought asylum in the United States, but this Government has vigilantly kept them under surveillance, and has not hesitated to apprehend them upon proof of their criminal intentions, as the arrest of General Huerta and others fully attests.

THE REAL SITUATION

Having corrected the erroneous statements of fact to which I have adverted, the real situation stands forth in its true light. It is admitted that American troops have crossed the international boundary in hot pursuit of the Columbus raiders, and without notice to or the consent of your Government, but the several protestations on the part of this Government by the President, by this department, and by other American authorities, that the object of the expedition was to capture, destroy, or completely disperse the Villa bands of outlaws or to turn this duty over to the Mexican authorities when assured that it would be effectively fulfilled, have been carried out in perfect good faith by the United States. Its efforts, however, have been obstructed at every point: First, by insistence on a palpably useless agreement, which you admit was either not to apply to the present expedition or was to contain impracticable restrictions on its organization and operation; then by actual opposition, encouraged and fostered by the de facto Government, to the further advance of the expedition into Villa territory, which was followed by the sudden suspension of all negotiations for an arrangement for the pursuit of Villa and his followers and the protection of the frontier; and, finally, by a demand for the immediate withdrawal of the American troops. Meantime, conditions of anarchy in the border States of Mexico were continually growing worse. Incursions into American territory were plotted and perpetrated. The Glenn Springs raid was successfully executed, while no effective efforts were being made by General Carranza to improve the conditions and to protect American territory from constant threat of invasion.

UNREASONABLE DEMANDS

In view of this increasing menace, of the inactivity of the Carranza forces, of the lack of co-operation in the apprehension of the Villa bands, and of the known encouragement and aid given to bandit leaders, it is unreasonable to expect the United States to withdraw its forces from Mexican territory, or to prevent their entry again when their presence is the only check upon further bandit outrages and the only efficient means of protecting American lives and homes—safeguards which General Carranza, though internationally obligated to supply, is manifestly unable or unwilling to give.

In view of the actual state of affairs as I have outlined it above, I am now in a position to consider the conclusions which you have drawn in your note under acknowledgment from the erroneous statements of fact which you have set forth.

Your Government intimates, if it does not openly charge, that the attitude of the United States is one of insincerity, distrust, and suspicion toward the de facto Government of Mexico, and that the intention of the United States in sending its troops into Mexico is to extend its sovereignty over Mexican territory, and not merely for the purpose of pursuing marauders and preventing future raids across the border. The de facto Government charges by implication which admits of but one interpretation, that this Government has as its object territorial aggrandizement even at the expense of a war of aggression against a neighbor weakened by years of civil strife. The Government of the United States, if it had had designs upon the territory of Mexico, would have had no difficulty in finding during this period of revolution and disorder many plausible arguments for intervention in Mexican affairs.

Hoping, however, that the people of Mexico would through their own efforts restore peace and establish an orderly Government, the United States has awaited with patience the consummation of the revolution.

RECOGNITION OF CARRANZA

When the superiority of the revolutionary faction led by General Carranza became undoubted, the United States, after conferring with six others of the American republics, recognized unconditionally the present de facto Government. It hoped and expected that that Government would speedily restore order and provide the Mexican people and others, who had given their energy and substance to the development of the great resources of the republic, opportunity to rebuild in peace and security their shattered fortunes.

This Government has waited month after month for the consummation of its hope of expectation. In spite of increasing discouragements, in spite of repeated provocations to exercise force in the restoration of order in the northern regions of Mexico, where American interests have suffered most seriously from lawlessness, the Government of the United States has refrained from aggressive action and sought by appeals and moderate though explicit demands to impress upon the de facto Government the seriousness of the situation and to arouse it to its duty to perform its international obligations toward citizens of the United States who had entered the territory of Mexico or had vested interests within its boundaries.

In the face of constantly renewed evidence of the patience and restraint of this Government in circumstances which only a Government imbued with unselfishness and a sincere desire to respect to the full the sovereign rights and national dignity of the Mexican people would have endured, doubts and suspicions as to the motives of the Government of the United States are expressed in your communication of May 22, for which I can imagine no purpose but to impugn the good faith of this Government, for I find it hard

to believe that such imputations are not universally known to be without the least shadow of justification in fact.

PROOFS OF GOOD FAITH

Can the *de facto* Government doubt that, if the United States had turned covetous eyes on Mexican territory, it could have found many pretexts in the past for the gratification of its desire? Can that Government doubt that months ago, when the war between the revolutionary factions was in progress, a much better opportunity than the present was afforded for American intervention, if such had been the purpose of the United States as the *de facto* Government now insinuates? What motive could this Government have had in refraining from taking advantage of such opportunities other than unselfish friendship for the Mexican Republic?

I have, of course, given consideration to your argument that the responsibility for the present situation rests largely upon this Government.

In the first place, you state that even the American forces along the border whose attention is undivided by other military operations "find themselves physically unable to protect effectively the frontier on the American side." Obviously, if there is no means of reaching bands roving on Mexican territory and making sudden dashes at night into American territory it is impossible to prevent such invasions unless the frontier is protected by a cordon of troops. No Government could be expected to maintain a force of this strength along the boundary of a nation with which it is at peace for the purpose of resisting the onslaughts of a few bands of lawless men, especially when the neighboring State makes no effort to prevent these attacks. The most effective method of preventing raids of this nature, as past experience has fully demonstrated, is to visit punishment or destruction on the raiders. It is precisely this plan which the United States desires to follow along the boundary without any intention of infringing upon the sovereign rights of her neighbor, but which, although obviously advantageous to the *de facto* Government, it refuses to allow or even countenance.

LIVES MUST BE PROTECTED

It is, in fact, protection to American lives and property about which the United States is solicitous, and not the methods or ways in which that protection shall be accomplished. If the Mexican Government is unwilling or unable to give this protection by preventing its territory from being the rendezvous and refuge of murderers and plunderers, that does not relieve this Government from its duty to take all the steps necessary to safeguard American citizens on American soil. The United States Government can not and will not allow bands of lawless men to establish themselves upon its borders with liberty to invade and plunder American territory with impunity, and, when pursued, to seek

safety across the Rio Grande, relying upon the plea of their Government that the integrity of the soil of the Mexican Republic must not be violated.

The Mexican Government further protests that it has "made every effort on its part to protect the frontier," and that it is doing "all possible to avoid a recurrence of such acts." Attention is again invited to the well-known and unrestricted activity of De la Rosa, Ancieto Piscano, Pedro Vino, and others in connection with border raids, and to the fact that, as I am advised, up to June 1, De la Rosa was still collecting troops at Monterey for the openly avowed purpose of making attacks on Texan border towns, and that Pedro Vino was recruiting at other places for the same avowed purpose. I have already pointed out the uninterrupted progress of Villa to and from Columbus, and the fact that the American forces in pursuit of the Glenn Springs marauders penetrated 168 miles into Mexican territory without encountering a single Carranzista soldier. This does not indicate that the Mexican Government is doing "all possible" to avoid further raids; and if it is doing "all possible," this is not sufficient to prevent border raids, and there is every reason, therefore, why this Government must take such preventive measures as it deems sufficient.

It is suggested that injuries suffered on account of the bandit raids are a matter of "pecuniary reparation," but "never the cause for American forces to invade Mexican soil." The precedents which have been established and maintained by the Government of the Mexican Republic for the last half century do not bear out this statement. It has grown to be almost a custom not to settle depredations of bandits by payments of money alone, but to quell such disorders and to prevent such crimes by swift and sure punishment.

A PARAMOUNT OBLIGATION

The *de facto* Government finally argues that "if the frontier were duly protected from incursions from Mexico, there would be no reason for the existing difficulty." Thus the *de facto* Government attempts to absolve itself from the first duty of any Government, namely, the protection of life and property. This is the paramount obligation for which Governments are instituted, and Governments neglecting or failing to perform it are not worthy of the name. This is the duty for which General Carranza, it must be assumed, initiated his revolution in Mexico, and organized the present Government, and for which the United States Government recognized his Government as the *de facto* Government of Mexico. Protection of American lives and property, then, in the United States is first the obligation of this Government, and in Mexico, is, first, the obligation of Mexico, and, second, the obligation of the United States.

In securing this protection along the common boundary, the United States has a right

to expect the co-operation of its neighboring republic; and, yet, instead of taking steps to check or punish the raiders, the de facto Government demurs and objects to measures taken by the United States. The Government of the United States does not wish to believe that the de facto Government approves these marauding attacks, yet, as they continue to be made, they show that the Mexican Government is unable to repress them. This inability, as this Government has had occasion in the past to say, may excuse the failure to check the outrages complained of, but it only makes stronger the duty of the United States to prevent them, for if the Government of Mexico cannot protect the lives and property of Americans, exposed to attack from Mexicans, the Government of the United States is in duty bound, so far as it can, to do so.

REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW

In conclusion, the Mexican Government invites the United States to support its "assurances of friendship with real and effective acts," which "can be no other than the immediate withdrawal of the American troops." For the reasons I have herein fully set forth, this request of the de facto Government cannot now be entertained. The United States

has not sought the duty which has been forced upon it of pursuing bandits who, under fundamental principles of municipal and international law, ought to be pursued and arrested and punished by Mexican authorities. Whenever Mexico will assume and effectively exercise that responsibility, the United States, as it has many times before publicly declared, will be glad to have this obligation fulfilled by the de facto Government of Mexico. If, on the contrary, the de facto Government is pleased to ignore this obligation and to believe that "in case of a refusal to retire these troops there is no further recourse than to defend its territory by an appeal to arms," the Government of the United States would surely be lacking in sincerity and friendship if it did not frankly impress upon the de facto Government that the execution of this threat will lead to the gravest consequences. While this Government would deeply regret such a result, yet it cannot recede from its settled determination to maintain its national rights and to perform its full duty in preventing further invasions of the territory of the United States and in removing the peril which Americans along the international boundary have borne so long with patience and forbearance. Accept, &c.

ROBERT LANSING.

The Man and the Machine

By Gilbert K. Chesterton

The Famous English Essayist

AMONG the fairy tales in which we formerly indulged is one which we are luckily losing in the deadly disillusionment of war. It may be called the legend of the Teutonic Race; or, the fairy tale of the two-golden-haired brothers. These two blonde and beautiful persons, the Englishman and the German, were twins in some prehistoric perambulator and were destined to embrace again at some far-off family party, having only been separated in the interval by the one being occupied in annexing the whole of the earth and the other the whole of the sea. Other groups and institutions, such trifles as the Roman Empire, the French Revolution, the melting pot of America, and what can only be called the continent of Russia—these things did not exist at all, except as things to be annexed. It is legitimate, I think, to be proud of having really artistic dreams; and it has no dis-

advantages, except that in order to dream we must sleep. And we awoke when the knife was at our throat. When we sought for our brother we saw the face of a stranger, and looked into the eyes of a savage.

The truth is that no two men, neither of them literally black nor literally naked, could well be more different than the two types which have come to stand for England and for Germany. It is the islander against the inlander, the amateur against the specialist, the eulogist of a liberty falling into laxity against the eulogist of a discipline driven to terrorism, the heir of a ruined Roman province against the chief of a half-baked and hardly baptized tribe, the wanderer whose winnings have all been at the ends of the earth against the plodder who has laid field to field, and taken his provinces from his nearest neighbors. The perception of

this contrast is no mere recoil due to the war; it has long been apparent to those who preferred European history to Teuton mythology. Its solidity can be proved by the fact that the contrast holds in the weaknesses as in the merits of England.

That Prussianized Germany is supremely efficient is indeed widely asserted and often taken for granted. When I remarked elsewhere on the spiritual insanity of modern Germany, a critic ruefully expressed the wish that the German rulers would bite some of our own. I am far from saying that the German rulers may not bite somebody; one never can tell where true scientific progress may lead. But I am prepared to maintain that in the plain test of positive battle, their biting has been much less effective than General Joffre's nibbling.

German discipline seems to be the science of repeating a mistake. It would really seem as if the concentration of the mind on mechanical triumphs made the mind itself mechanical. The essence of all machinery is recurrence. But though the engine must repeat itself to be a success, if the engineer always repeats himself he will be a bore. The wheel is always returning and beginning again; but we do not want the coach to be always going back and starting again. Nowadays it does not seem so much to be the North Germans who make a machine that repeats itself; it is rather the machine that makes them repeat themselves. The fanciful might think they had really found perpetual motion, the impossibility—which has passed into a proverb; and that they had found it, like so many things mysteriously forbidden, a disaster for the sons of men.

Those who talk as if the English tradition of liberty or looseness were an un-mixed weakness are perpetually reminding us of the fiasco of Gallipoli. The English abandoned the effort against Gallipoli. The Germans have not abandoned the effort against Verdun. To them it will probably appear a paradox, but it is a very solid truism, that the Germans have therefore suffered a

much more crushing defeat than the English.

But there is a much wider area in which the truth is supremely true and supremely important. I mean, of course, the English tradition of a liberal adaptability in the problems of colonies and dependencies. Here again a mere jingo optimism merely swamps the honest objectivity of the claim we can really make. England has done many things which I, as an Englishman, deplore or detest; she has done some things which all Englishmen deplore or detest. But what is strictly and scientifically true about England is this, that wherever the English influence is present, men feel that it has something which I can only call the flexibility of a living thing. The vital point is not that these things were done; it is that they were done and undone; that the men who made the mistake were alive enough to see the mistake. The strength of the Prussian, not by our account, but by his own account, lies in his inflexibility; and there are not wanting at this moment advocates of panic and persecution to urge this foreign fad upon the Government of England.

The truth is that amnesty and compromise have been for England a strength in the very strongest sense—that most athletic type of strength that goes with activity. A wooden leg is not stronger than a living leg, because it does not flinch and draw back when it steps on a thorn. The strength of the English influence has been that at the extremest limits of its sprawling limbs it has been at least alive, and knew the nature of what it touched. People complained of it, but they also complained to it; for they knew it had strength enough to move and mend. But the wooden leg is planted firmly in Belgium today; and we shall not waste our time in complaining to a wooden leg. We shall do so the less because the wooden leg is in truth adorned and completed by a wooden head; and the whole is one huge wooden idol carved like Hindenburg, which the limbs of living men shall lift and cast into the fire.

War Events From Two Viewpoints

In order that no phase of the truth may be overlooked CURRENT HISTORY offers two expert interpretations of the military events of the month, one written from the German, the other from the American point of view.

[AMERICAN VIEW]

The Month's Military Developments From May 15 to June 15, 1916

By J. B. W. Gardiner

Formerly Lieutenant Eleventh United States Cavalry

[See map of Italy on Page 643]

THE month ended June 15 has produced some of the most surprising incidents of the great war.

These are the naval battle in the North Sea, the Austrian attack against the Italian positions in Trentino, and the Russian offensive against the Austrian positions from the Pripet Marshes to Bukowina.

As to the naval battle, its facts and figures are set forth fully elsewhere. There now seems to have been very little difference between the respective casualties. The great difference in the naval resources of the Allies and the Central Powers, however, makes such conditions a German defeat. If it were a German victory, Germany needs but few more such to be eliminated from consideration as a naval power.

It is clear that the battle of Verdun is not going in a way that tends to instill confidence in the German mind, either at home or on the firing line. Possibly, also, the Balkan nations are commencing to wonder whether the world's verdict on the German possibilities is not, after all, a mistaken one. There have been rumblings from the Reichstag for some time over the progress, or rather the lack of progress, of events. The German people were led to believe great things of the Verdun attack. The failure of these things to materialize has caused, first, surprise, and now apparently some little resentment. It was necessary that something be done to draw public attention from Verdun and focus the public gaze

on some more spectacular happening. The sudden naval engagement in the North Sea supplied that need.

An intelligent reference to the situation created in Italy's fortunes by the attack of Austria in Trentino requires a brief preface of the general Italian plan. The original plan was for an offensive on only one front, that of the Isonzo. The entire western and northern Austro-Italian border is heavily buttressed with almost impassable mountains, the Isonzo front alone being open and offering the necessary elemental prospects of success. In Trentino, however, these mountains are penetrated by several valleys, which, if left open, would have nullified any attempt to operate against the Isonzo line, by providing a very ready passage for Austrian troops, who would then take the Isonzo line in the rear. The Italians, therefore, at the very beginning, attempted to close these gaps as a measure of defense on the Isonzo line. In this defensive operation in Trentino they advanced some distance up the principal valleys, until they were at the gates of Rovereto and Riva and were seriously threatening both cities. At this point, however, they were content to rest and spend all their energies on the eastern front. For some months there had been almost absolute quiet in this field, which was the situation when the Austrian offensive started.

The Austrian move was dictated by a very ambitious plan to invade Northern Italy, penetrate beyond the mountain

barrier into the plains, seize the railroad lines crossing these plains and running to Venice, take this latter city itself, and paralyze the entire Isonzo operation. As an incident to this success, the entire Italian line in the north of Italy would be taken in the rear and would either have to retire south of the railroad or be captured through being cut off. The area embraced by the Austrian attack can best be roughly described as a right-angle triangle, the base of which is a line forty miles due east of Borghetto and whose altitude is thirty miles due north along a line drawn from the point thus reached. The hypotenuse of this triangle will thus approximate the boundary between Austria and Italy. The object of the attack was, as noted, the control of the railroads crossing the northern Italian plain. There are two such roads serving the Isonzo front, one passing through Brescia, Verona, Vicenza, and Treviso, and the other through Mantua and Padua. The latter is the more important, as it reaches the more important industrial centres and depots of Lombardy and Piedmont. It is apparent that if the Austrians could take the more northern of these lines the Isonzo front would be imperiled, and if they took both it would be completely cut off.


The two principal exits from the Alps to the northern Italian plain are the Val Lagarina, which is the valley of the Adige, and the Val Sugana, which is the valley of the Brenta. These carry the two main roads and the only railroads of this part of the Trentino country. One, if not both, must be in Austrian hands before it can be said that they have done anything seriously to hamper the Italian operations. The critical points in the two valleys are Valstagna, in the Val Sugana, and Borghetto, in the Val Lagarina, as from these points south the character of the country begins to change from the altitudinous Alps to the plains below. The Austrians drove the Italians back on an average of about ten miles over the entire front, taking position after position in the most difficult country imaginable, and captured a great number of men and quantities of material. They advanced with the towns

of Arsiero and Asiago as their immediate objectives to within about five miles of either place. The importance of these places, particularly Asiago, relates only to the Val Sugana. From Asiago to Valstagna is but seven miles. A successful fight for the latter town would give the Austrians complete control of the Val Sugana and turn the entire Italian position in this valley.

It is to be noted that the Austrian success was made possible by a very heavy and entirely unexpected concentration of men and heavy guns, utilized to their utmost ability by an attack in which surprise was the dominating characteristic. To this feature of surprise and to their heavy artillery the Austrians owe the measure of success they have so far attained. As they advance, however, owing to the extremely difficult nature of the terrain, the transportation of guns and munitions becomes an operation increasingly difficult. This shows itself in the fact that for several weeks now the Austrians have been halted almost in place.

The indications are that the Austrian blow has spent its force and that the Italians are taking the offensive. If this is so the Austrians have but little to show for their effort. They have reconquered a small amount of territory and have, indeed, carried the war to Italian soil. They have also captured a large number of prisoners and a number of guns. The only loss that the Italians will feel, however, is the loss in artillery, which may well prove serious. Judging from present indications, the Austrian effort is a plan that died a-borning, and that as an offensive movement it is purely local in character and effect.

The feature of the month has been the inauguration of a great Russian offensive, which has taken in the entire front from the Gulf of Riga to Czernowitz, on the Pruth. This movement has created great surprise in the minds of all followers of the war. In the first place, the Russian march through the Caucasus and along the Black Sea seemed so pregnant of important possibilities that Russia was expected to devote most of her energies to that campaign. In the



BATTLE LINE OF GREAT RUSSIAN DRIVE IN VOLHYNIA AND GALICIA, SHOWING STAGE OF PROGRESS ON JUNE 15, 1916.

second place, it has only been a few weeks since an offensive on the southern part of the western front was begun and crushed. Finally, it was not considered that Russia had had sufficient time to recoup her losses in men and material incident to the terrific drubbing she received from Germany last Summer.

The time for such a movement was, it is true, propitious. Austria is known not to have any too many men. She has called to the colors her 1918 class and has already warned the 1919 class. The Russians hold almost as many Austrian prisoners as the Germans do Russian prisoners. Owing to the calamities that overtook her in the early days of the war, her losses have been out of all proportion to Germany's, or even to Russia's. When the offensive against the Italian Trentino was started it was but natural, therefore, to wonder where Austria obtained the men. Her reserves were certainly not ample for the purpose, and

even if they were it would not seem a very wise policy to use them in such an enterprise. They could not have been taken from the Isonzo front, as the Austrian forces there were under constant pressure from the Italians and the front could not be weakened without giving the Italians free passage of the river at the Gorizia bridgehead. The only other place the men could have come from was that section of the Russian line between the Pripet Marshes and the Bessarabian frontier. And as the Russian offensive progresses it is becoming evident that this is where they did come from.

Apparently the Austrians, having beaten Russia back, felt that the enemy would not strike there soon again. But Russia did strike, and struck with tremendous impact, which broke the Austrian lines as they had not been broken since the first months of the war, when Russia conquered all of Galicia. In vain did Austria call for German assistance.

The Germans were firmly hooked at Verdun. They had been pouring troops into the Verdun area since February, and France would not let her go. Moreover, Russia was active also in the Dvinsk sector, and Germany did not dare weaken this front for fear that the Russians would break through here. Consequently Austria has had to fight the fight alone, with such meagre help as the Germans in the Poliesse region could give.

Conjecture as to the Russian object is unnecessary. The direct object of the attack is certain—the railroad centres, first of Kovel and then of Lemberg. The Russian movement was admirably planned, the time selected with unerring reasoning, the strategy perfect in conception. In the first days of the attack Kovel was apparently deemed the all-important point. Accordingly, the full force of the Russian blow struck first at Volhynia. The Volhynian triangle is the crux of the entire situation in this section. Lutsk and Dubno fell into Austrian hands early last Fall. With them went most of the area included in the triangle. Along the Ikwa and the Styr ran the Austrian lines in heavily intrenched positions. But in one June week both of the western fortresses fell, and the Russians were overrunning the entire triangle, capturing prisoners by the thousands. In the south, on the west bank of the Sereth River, the Russians also drove forward, but it seemed that their object was merely to prevent any transfer of troops to the threatened section. As matters have developed, however, the Austrian lines here also were weak, and have been driven back in some places to the Stripa, and in some places across it and almost to Zlota Lipa. Czernowitz, the capital of the Austrian crown land of Bukowina, is almost completely surrounded and cut off, the bridgeheads of the Dniester to the north are all forced and in Russian hands. At this writing the Russians are fighting within three miles of the city. Unless the force of the Russian attack is suddenly spent, it seems that nothing can prevent the fall of the city.

In the north, west of Volhynia, the

Russians have advanced to within less than twenty miles of Kovel and are still pushing rapidly forward. As they move west their progress will be seriously retarded by the fact that the lines of communication of the Austrians become shorter, and their troops, because of Austro-German control of the railroads, can be shifted much more quickly. But the speed of the Russian attack has carried them far beyond the last line of Austrian intrenchments, and the Austrians are not being given the opportunity to prepare new ones. They are being rapidly pursued by the Cossacks, who have taken great masses of war material of all kinds.

Because of the rapidity of their advance, however, the Russian lines are becoming very irregular and somewhat broken. Their consolidation will take some little time. At the same time, the Austrian position is very precarious. Deep salients are being created in their lines about Kovel, so that the flank of their line further north is being vitally affected. If Kovel falls the entire line, at least as far north as Pripet, will have to fall back, as it is dependent on the railroad running through Kovel for supplies.

The extent of the Russian success cannot yet be determined. They have captured so far about 150,000 prisoners and have completely disrupted the entire system of Austrian defense. At least one-third of the entire Austrian force in this section has been put out of action, and each day Russia reports thousands of additional prisoners. The Germans have attempted to relieve the situation by an attack along the Dwina, but the Russians, without diminishing the force of their blow against Austria, have answered with a heavy attack in the Lake Narosc region to the south. In ten days the Russians have retaken many more times the area that Germany has taken about Verdun since February, have taken five times the number of prisoners, though operating in a much more difficult territory and on a much more extended front.

In other theatres but little has happened of interest. The Germans are

still keeping up their attacks at Verdun, but their progress is to them painfully slow. The only change in the situation worthy of note is the fall of Fort Vaux. This may prove to be the turning point in the Verdun fighting, as it may enable the Germans little by little to outflank the entire French main position on the ridge of Louvemont. What the German object is in persisting in these attacks for a small fortified area is still a mystery. No military conception is yet apparent that offers a reasonable ex-

planation. The Russian endeavor in the Near East is apparently at a standstill, only local engagements of minor importance having taken place during the month. This, however, is not unnatural, in view of the Russian operations further west. In summarizing the month's operations it may be said that at no time since the Marne have the prospects of the Allies been so bright. Russia's rejuvenation, as thorough as it has been unlooked for, has changed the whole face of things.

[GERMAN VIEW]

Progress at All the Battle Fronts

Written for CURRENT HISTORY

By H. H. von Mellenthin

Foreign Editor New York Staats-Zeitung

[See war maps on Pages 635 and 643]

OVERSHADOWING all the month's military developments stands the great naval battle off the coast of Denmark, which history will regard as a crucial test of strength. It is one of the most significant events of this war, the greatest in the history of modern naval warfare, the clash of a centuries-old claim, based upon many successes, with a "Future Upon the Water." And herein lies the world-historic importance of the sea fight of May 31—that it signified the dusk—the *Götterdämmerung*—of an antiquated claim and the dawn of a new future.

The battle at the Skagerrak did not succeed in hauling from the topmast of Britain's naval power the glory-crowned colors that have through centuries fluttered above all seas; but it wound the sprouting green of the German oak around the iron cross on black-white-and-red, the German navy's ensign. Claims and counterclaims have been made as to the losses, as determined by the figures of tonnage. The losses, however, can only determine the fighting strength that is left on either side; they cannot nullify the verdict of history.

The sea battle off the Skagerrak con-

stitutes one of the greatest events in the history of modern naval warfare, because the course, result, and effects of this battle put naval warfare under an entirely new perspective, create new rules of tactics, and lead to an evolutionary phase of the whole naval situation.

PHASES OF THE BATTLE

The battle took the following course:

- (a) The taking of positions by the opposing fleets.
- (b) The battle in the afternoon of May 31.
- (c) The attempt of the British cruiser squadron to cut off the German fleet from its base.
- (d) The continuation of the battle during the night from May 31 to June 1.

The British main fleet had been concentrated off the Orkney Isles for a proposed raid on the German coast. This home fleet consisted of units of the four battleship squadrons, the three cruiser squadrons, the light cruiser squadron, the destroyer flotilla, and the submarine flotilla. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was in chief command; Vice Admiral Beatty commanded the cruiser squadron. The itinerary first led the British fleet in the direction of the Skagerrak, the object

being later to take a southern course toward the German coast, the main base of the German fleet, and to attack Heligoland and Wilhelmshaven.

The excellent reconnoissance work of the German Navy had reported both the British naval concentration off the Orkney Isles and the subsequent approach of the hostile warships. The German High Seas Fleet, Admiral Scheer in chief command and Rear Admiral Hipper in charge of the cruiser squadron, left Wilhelmshaven, gathered the mosquito flotillas patrolling the waters around Heligoland, steamed out to meet the enemy, met him in the afternoon of May 31 between Horn's Riff and the Skagerrak, and opened battle at a distance of 11 kilometers.

At this comparatively short distance the battle was bound to dissolve soon into separate running actions. Neither side attempted to destroy the enemy at long distance before the smaller cruisers and torpedo craft could approach. All the weapons of naval warfare took a hand soon after the opening of the battle, and its course and result were determined by all weapons.

In the artillery engagement at short distance the medium calibres and the marksmanship as well as dexterity of manoeuvring proved great assets upon the German side. The comparatively short distance at which this stage of the battle was fought constituted a hindering element for the participation of the dreadnoughts and their big-calibre guns.

The first phase of the afternoon battle had entered into the seventh hour when Vice Admiral Beatty undertook to place his cruiser squadron between the German fleet, and its base. This was a tactical mistake, for the extension of the battle line—between points respectively 40 and 135 kilometers from the Jutland Coast—should have been sufficient to prove to him the futility of such an attempt.

The first official communications of the British Admiralty denied that on the English side any battleships participated in the afternoon fighting. This version was later corrected by London: Upon the arrival of the battleships, it was then stated, the Germans hastily took to re-

treat. With the settling of dusk the fourth phase (d) of the battle began. It lasted far into the night. This phase was, from the military standpoint, the most interesting and instructive. It brought the almost exclusive action of the torpedo craft.

It was, one English version puts it, as if, after an effective artillery initiation and preparation, infantry went forth to attack. It was the liveliest running action of the whole fight. In the first two phases marksmanship and clever manoeuvring were decisive; now personal courage and integrity counted. It was as in the open battlefield, where the man proves his full worth and individual qualities count.

LESSONS OF THE BATTLE

1. The legend of the British Navy's immunity from attack, and of its inviolability, has been shattered. The claim that Britannia, unchallenged, rules the waves has been rendered untenable.

2. With the Skagerrak battle was brought into being a Verdun of the sea. For, as at Verdun, so in the naval fight off Jutland's coast, the bearing-down strategy, the strategy that aims at defeating the enemy in the open, has taken the lead. What trench warfare is on land, submarine warfare is on water, both in purpose and tactics. As in the trenches, the opponent is to be worn down and out, so utter exhaustion is to be brought about at sea by the submarines. But the ultimate and final decision, attained only by the destruction of the opponent's military strength, falls, as on land, also on the sea—in open battle.

3. The course and result of the Skagerrak battle have given the lie to the dreadnought school and the submarine school. The former sees in the "one-calibre" ship and in the increase of calibre the decisive weapon for the destruction of the opponent. The latter would revolutionize, through the medium of the submarine, the whole scheme of tactics in naval warfare, and would place the scene of the decision under water.

Belying such claims and theories of these two schools, the recent sea fight demonstrates that the decision is not

GENERAL LUIGI CADORNA



Commander in Chief of the Italian Armies, Who Has Checked the Great Austrian Offensive in the Alps
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood.)

BARON CONRAD VON HERTZENDORF



The Austrian Commander Who Directed the Powerful Offensive
Against the Italians in the Trentino
(Photo © by Universal Press Syndicate.)

determined by any one particular weapon, but that it is rather attained by the employment of all offensive weapons.

The sea fight off Jutland did not accord the heaviest artillery, the 38-centimeter guns, the rôle of the decisive factor. The "bigger-than-the-other" tactics, which prompted the gigantic construction program of the dreadnought and superdreadnought battleships, did not assert itself, inasmuch as the course and the result of the battle were determined at, and by, shorter distances.

On the basis of the official accounts of both sides, and with the aid of the statistical data given in the *Taschenbuch der Kriegsflootten* by Captain Lieut. B. Weyer, the losses of both sides are seen to have been:

On the German side, 60,720 tons.

On the British side, 117,150 tons.

But these figures prove nothing. Success in the Skagerrak battle depended upon quite different factors. The means of power by which England maintains her world dominion are mostly unreal. The prestige of the British name and the myth of the inviolability and immunity from attack of the English fleet form the clasps that hold the world empire together. Whatever claims and counter-claims may be cited to prove victory or defeat for one or the other side, one result, that which is epoch-making, is irrefutable—the mistaken theory about England's world rule. The myth is disposed of.

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

Since the initiation of the Russian offensive on June 3, the situation on the southeastern front has again become the centre of interest in the European war. The offensive was launched along a line beginning north of the Pripet and extending southward to the Bessarabian frontier, a distance of 250 miles.

The immediate objectives are Lemberg, capital of Galicia, in the west, and Kovel in a north-northwestward direction. The fighting is over the possession of the following important railway lines: The Lutsk-Kovel-Brest-Litovsk railway; the Dubno-Brody-Lemberg railroad, and the sector Tarnopol-Krasno, which there meets the Brody-Lemberg line.

The distance from Dubno to Lemberg is 140 kilometers; from Buczacz to Lemberg, 135 kilometers; from Tarnopol to Lemberg, 120 kilometers; from Lutsk to Kovel, 60, and thence to Brest-Litovsk, 120 kilometers.

At the time this review is concluded the military situation on the southeastern front has developed as follows:

1. Volhynian Front.—The Russians have occupied the fortresses of Lutsk and Dubno, and to the north and south have crossed the River Styr. They have been halted and even driven back, however, by the Austro-Hungarians at Kolki, where the crossing of the Styr, in the direction of Kovel, had been forced.

2. Galician Front.—After crossing the River Sereth the Russians occupied Buczacz, and in dense masses pushed toward Przewloka, but were beaten back there by the army of the Bavarian General, Count von Bothmer.

3. Bukowina Front.—This has always been the most vulnerable spot in the entire southeastern battle line. Czernowitz, which the Russians in the previous course of the war captured several times, fell with the occupation by the Russians of Zaleszczyki, Horodenka, and Okna.

Simultaneously, a Russian forward movement was launched against the positions to the north of Baronovitchi, a sector of the front held by the Bavarian Prince Leopold. Seven times the attackers stormed against the German "trench front," which begins in that region and extends further northward as far as the Dwina. Seven times the Muscovite masses were thrown back.

It was scarcely necessary for the Austro-Hungarian high command to announce officially that the Russian official reports concerning numbers of prisoners taken are grossly exaggerated. To believe those enormous Russian figures would be to assume that the Austro-Hungarian troops stood in dense masses on top of one another. The official Vienna statement says further that the losses of the Russians are between two and three times as large as the Austrian. That is plausible when one considers that the Russians are attacking en masse on a very long front.

The further development of this Russian offensive will depend upon the answers to two questions: When will sufficient reinforcements have arrived on the Teutonic side, and how long can the "forward" strategy of General Brusiloff, with its waste of human material and ammunition, keep up? Such waste has spelled disaster to every previous Russian offensive.

The Austro-German lines southwest of Kovel are holding; the Teuton resistance here becomes more stubborn hourly. Here it is, however, that General Brusiloff must pierce the Teuton lines and drive them beyond Kovel, thus placing himself in control of the entire railway system serving the Teuton southern wing. The further the Russians advance in the south and the stronger the Austro-German forces become in the north, the more perilous becomes the position of the Russian left wing, for it exposes itself more and more to the menace of a flanking attack from the north which might accomplish what was tried in vain in the great 1915 drive—the complete envelopment and capture of a whole Russian army.

ON THE ITALIAN FRONT

The happenings in the Italian theatre of war do not at all indicate that the "long-distance" effect of the Russian offensive is making itself felt in the necessity to draw Austro-Hungarian forces from the South Tyrolean frontier. The principal fighting goes on at present in the area between Arsiero and Asiago. East of Asiago the attackers have extended their front beyond Ronci, have stormed Monte Meletta, and have advanced as far as Stoccareddo. To the southeast of Asiago they have taken possession of the hostile positions on the Monte Lemerle, south of Gesuna.

Monte Meletta dominates the Brenta Valley, through which runs the Trent-Venice railway. Ronci lies only a few kilometers from the station of Vallzuga. This advance in an eastward direction from Asiago purposes cutting off the Italians from the vital line of communication eastward. As soon as this purpose is achieved the retirement of all the Ital-

ian forces further east in the Val Sugana will become imperative. Moreover, the road leads through the Frenzela Valley and the Brenta Valley to Bassano, where the Venetian plain begins, and further to Citadella, on the great line Vincenza - Citadella - Castellofranco - Treviso-Venice.

Not only the military but also the intended political "long-distance" effect of the Russian offensive upon the developments on the Italian front and the situation in Italy have failed. It did not even save the Salandra Cabinet, despite the retired Premier's explicit reference to this Russian offensive.

PROGRESS AT VERDUN

The Verdun campaign is hastening toward its conclusion. On the right bank of the Meuse the inner enceinte of forts already has been taken under German fire. After the capture of Vaux Fort the German lines to the west of the fort extend to Thiaumont farm, with Hill 321, southward to the village of Fleury and Fort Souville, and southeastward to Fort Tavannes. The latter lies south of the Metz-Verdun railway, and forms the easternmost fortification of Verdun. Between this ring and the fortress proper there are only Forts Belleville and St. Michel and the detached works of Douaumont, (not to be confused with the fort of the same name long since in German hands.)

At the same time the operations west of the Meuse continue. Chattancourt, the key to the line Esnes-Fort de Bois Bourrus-Fort de Marre, is under the Crown Prince's heavy artillery fire. The Fort de Marre forms the fortification nearest to Verdun proper from the northwest. From the line Esnes-Hill 310-Bourrus Wood the advance will proceed southward as far as the Verdun-Paris railway.

The forward movements east and west of the Meuse proceed at an even pace; in other words, as soon as a success has been gained on one bank, the line is straightened out by a subsequent advance on the other. The definite fall of Verdun will be forced from the northeast and northwest.

A Year of the War in Italy

[Written for CURRENT HISTORY by a Staff Contributor]

IT has been said that of all the immensely varied and widespread battlefields of the world war—and they stretch from the Gulf of Finland in the north to the south of Africa, from the English Channel to the Yellow Sea of China, with sea fights even more remote—the Italian battle front is the most beautiful and full of romance. It is also, unless, perhaps, we except the frozen peaks and passes of the Caucasus, in which Russian troops often fought up to their breasts in snow, by far the most difficult; immensely long, stretching in a jagged line 400 miles from end to end, it is, for the most part, immensely high also; every half dozen miles there are summits running up to seven or eight or even ten thousand feet. The battle is being fought along an international boundary running among the Alps, and the boundary has been made to run from mountain summit to mountain summit, along precipices and lofty ridges of gaunt, barren, or snow covered rock. Only at two points—the valley leading down to the northern end of the Lake of Garda, and the coast land where the Isonzo River enters the Gulf of Trieste—does the Austro-Italian battle front come anywhere near to sea level; and, along the Isonzo, the actual battle line now runs along the verge of the Carso, which is a huge, desolate bastion of rock.

Italy is fighting to bring under her standard (the tricolor of red, white, and green) the territory which lies on the further side of this precipitous wall of rock, territory for the most part only less barren and precipitous than the rugged boundary wall itself. Save for three cities—Trent, Gorizia, Trieste—the stakes would hardly be worth the contest. But it is, with Italy, a point of honor and nationalism; and for her nationalism Italy is paying high. She seeks to reunite to her territory these three cities, each of which is overwhelmingly Italian in population and tradition—and, with them, to gain a few more little towns and

villages, a few Alpine valleys and much barren rock. For ten months Italy wrangled with Austria over these towns and villages; then, on Sunday, May 23, 1915, set on fire by the burning eloquence of Gabriele D'Annunzio, she declared war, nominally against Austria alone; but legally, as the Leipsic courts have just decided, against Germany also.

It has been openly said that Italy really protracted the negotiations with Austria in order to prepare more thoroughly for war, in order to train her men and to lay up the immense stores of munitions that modern war requires. But at last she felt prepared, and on Monday, May 24, her troops rushed forward at chosen points all along the jagged, lofty line, seizing advantageous posts and passes, from the southern corner of Switzerland to the Isonzo. Italy's Alpinists with their light mountain guns, a force created and trained with a view to this very kind of fighting, struggled, high in the air, against the Tyrolean sharpshooters, mountaineers as skillful, as hardy, as brave; and to this frontier Austria also brought large bodies of Slavonic troops, whose fidelity in fighting against their Slavonic cousins in the east was more than doubtful.

In the early Summer of 1915 the Italian Alpini fought their way from the Stelvio Pass, which leads into Eastern Switzerland and the Engadine, up the glacial peaks of the Ortler, which rises nearly 13,000 feet above the Italian plains; a little further south, half way between the corner of Switzerland and Lake Garda, they scaled Mount Adamello, some 12,000 feet; on the other side of the southward-pointing Trentino wedge, in the battle zone called the Cadore sector, they rushed through the lovely little city of Cortina, with its mountain roads leading westward to Bolzano (Bozen) and northward to Bruneck, and thence to the Brenner Pass, the great highway, some 4,400 feet high, which leads from Italy to the Tyrol; they swarmed across the

mountain wall into the Daone Valley, immediately to the west of Lake Garda, and south of Mount Adamello; they seized Monte Altissimo, (which, in spite of its name, is not "the highest" peak, though it measures well over 6,000 feet;) they captured Ala, on the River Adige, about half way between the Italian frontier and Rovereto, (which is a name softened from the old Roman, Roboretum, "the oak wood";) Monte Maggio, and the territory between the Chiesa and the Brenta, which flows past Borgo through the Val Sugana, the great road to the central and ardently desired City of Trent.

The work of trench-building is here replaced by the more arduous task of hewing positions out of bare rock, and hence the extraordinary difficulty and extreme slowness of the Italian advance. In the Trentino, the most westerly of the four Italian battle zones, (Trentino, Cadore, Carnia, Isonzo,) the Alpini occupied the southern end of the Val Giudecaria, to the west of Lake Garda; the southern end of Val Lagarina, to the east of the lake; the eastern end of the Val Sugana, up to Borgo; and a very thin slice of rock, joining the Trentino sector to Cadore.


The Cadore sector lies right along the western end of the Carnic Alps, from Monte Cristallo, (some 10,000 feet high,) across the peaks of Tre Cime, Monte Popera, Monte Croce, to Monte Peralba, none of them much lower than Monte Cristallo; from the frontier a sea of peaks extends southward toward the Venetian plain; another sea of peaks extends northward toward the Hohe Tauern in Tyrol. As early as August, 1915, the Alpini had made some headway here, in brilliant, perilous work among the precipices, with the result that, when the first snows of Autumn fell, the three rock citadels, the Einser, the Elfer, and the Drei Zinnen, had been won and fortified against the Austrians.

Taking Cortina as their base, the Italians fought their way up the Valle d'Ampezzo, just west of Monte Cristallo, until they won Ospitale, the little town through which the curiously angular road leads northward to the Puster Thal and Bruneck. In September they succeeded,

by daring rock work, in gaining possession of Monte Coston. Then the snow began to fall on the heights. During the first period of soft snow, military operations became almost impossible, even for the hardy and skillful Alpini, but, as the snow hardened, and the use of skis became possible, some incredibly daring achievements were carried out, for example, on the north slopes of Monte Adamello, (which lies, as we have said, about half way between the Lake of Garda and Switzerland,) and on the Presanella, immediately to the north of Adamello, to which the Alpini made their way through the Tonale Pass.

The battle sector of Carnia, which lies between the Cadore and the Isonzo sectors, is, if possible, more barren, rugged, desolate than the Cadore sector itself. It lies wholly along the backbone of the Carnic Alps, which separate the very mountainous regions of Northern Venetia from the Austrian valleys of the Zeglia (or Gail) and the Save. Here the battle line has all along clung very close to the international boundary, being, for the most part, just north of it, so that the Italians have some slight (but very slight) advantage. At about Pontafel, where the railroad from Venice to Vienna crosses from Italian to Austrian territory, the Carnia sector merges into the Isonzo sector; and in this fourth and last sector, which contains the richest prizes, there has been the severest fighting, conforming more to the general features of armed conflict, and less resembling chamois hunting.

The Isonzo Valley, widening to the south, allows the warm southern airs of Italy to penetrate far northward from the Gulf of Trieste; so that Gorizia, in the neck of the valley, has for centuries been famed as a Winter resort, and, in Spring, a place where peaches ripen earlier than anywhere else in the Austrian Empire. It is, indeed, the centre of a great fruit garden, almost Californian in climate, in products, in vegetation. Gorizia itself lies about a high rock, on which is perched the ancient citadel-fortress of the Dukes of Gorizia and Gradisca; it is the centre of a ring



MAP OF WHOLE ITALIAN FRONT, SHOWING SCENE OF RECENT AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE TRENTINO.

of hills, and much of the ring is still in Austrian hands; so that, though Italian guns have for several months commanded Gorizia, Italian troops have found it either impossible or at least inexpedient to penetrate there.

On the railroad from Udine, on the Italian side, in the centre of the Friul country which rejoices in a Romanic tongue of its own, somewhat nearer to Latin than is Italian, to Gorizia, the first station on the Austrian side of the frontier, is Cormons, which lies at the southern verge of the hills that descend gradually from the Carnic and Julian Alps to the Venetian plain; Cormons was captured, soon after the beginning of the war, by General Count Cadorna's forces, and has since served as a basis of operations against Gorizia.

It may be said that, as regards Gorizia, the effort of the Italian command seems to have been rather to exercise a steady pressure, such as would compel Austria to keep considerable bodies of troops there, than to take the City of Gorizia by storm, at the cost of very heavy Italian losses. The strategy of Count Cadorna is, therefore, to be viewed rather as a part of the whole plan of the Quadruple Entente than as a separate aggressive, designed immediately to win territory for Italy. One would say that the purpose of Italy is to divert troops from other Entente fronts, counting on the peace negotiations rather than on actual fighting to restore the territory of Unredeemed Italy. At any rate, after thirteen months of war, Italy has advanced only a few miles toward Trent, only a few miles toward Gorizia, only a few miles toward Trieste—the three real prizes of the war. There has been pretty constant artillery fighting on all four frontiers, but, from the nature of the regions, there have been few infantry charges.

The valley of the Isonzo is bounded, on the east by the curious Carso (or Karst) plateau, which is one of the most deso-

late and forbidding regions in Europe. A lofty plateau of grayish limestone, the Carso was once heavily wooded, and fairly fertile, where clearings were made in the forests. But the trees were recklessly cut down and carried away; and, as the rains began to beat directly on the very thin layer of soil that covered the whitish limestone rock, the water swept the soil away, leaving the rock entirely bare. So that, even in Summertime, the Carso plateau looks as if it were covered with dirty snow. In the limestone, however, it is possible to excavate trenches such as are seen on the other fronts, and very severe trench warfare has been going on here for months, the Italians gradually making their way, first up the front of the great rock bastion, then eastward and southward, along its surface.

The battle line reaches the sea just eastward of Monfalcone, which is only about twelve miles from Trieste. Trieste is the greatest prize of the Italian campaign, a fine harbor, and rich commercial city, almost wholly inhabited by Italians; and, with the whole peninsula of Istria, and, indeed, much of the Dalmatian coast, rich in remains of the great past of the Roman Empire. Pola and Fiume are Italian cities of Istria, only less important and less coveted than Trieste itself.

Three of the four Italian war sectors are, as we have seen, along the backbones of high mountain ridges; and the snow, in the Winter of 1915-16, fell thicker and deeper than in other years. As a result, the higher passes are only now, at the beginning of July, beginning to be passable for any one but an Alpino on skis, so that ordinary warfare is practically impossible. The Isonzo front alone is enjoying the early warmth of Summer, and it will soon be exceedingly hot across the desolate Carso.

Such, then, along the four sectors, was the general position, after a year's warfare, when the recent powerful Austrian drive began.

The Austrian Offensive Against Italy

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the ending of Italy's first year of war against Austria, which from its beginning had been for Austria a continuous defensive campaign, with loss of some territory and prestige, the Hapsburg Monarchy suddenly inaugurated a powerful offensive movement, which for a time bade fair to overwhelm the Italian forces along the whole western Alpine front.

The full seriousness of this counter-offensive was discovered by the Italians on May 17, when the Austrian troops began plowing through the Ledro and Lagarina Valleys—also into the zone between the Terragnolo and Upper Astico Valleys—and began a fierce artillery attack on the Isonzo front. The Italians fell back from nearly every advanced position in the region of Southern Tyrol, while the Austro-Hungarians pursued their advantage with furious artillery and infantry attacks along the entire Trentino front. It is estimated that the Austrians employed over 2,000 guns of heavy calibre in the initial preparation, and the weight of metal thrown is said to have been heavier, considering the length of time and the extent of the sector, than at any other front during the entire war—except at Verdun. It is estimated that 360,000 reinforcements were brought from Galicia and the Balkans, and that when the drive began the Austrians had at least 750,000 men.

The plan of campaign was skillfully laid, and with such secrecy that the Italians were not fully aware of what

was happening until they had lost many of the outposts conquered through a whole year's sacrifices of blood and treasure.

For ten days the Austrian drive showed no signs of weakening. The Italians continued to retreat with a loss of over 30,000 prisoners and 298 cannon. The Austrians recovered many strategic points in the Sugana Valley, including Monte Baldo, Monte Fiara, Monte Priafora, Punta Cordin, and penetrated into Italian territory in the region of Asiago and Arsiero. It was not until May 25, about 10 days after the offensive was launched, that the Italians were able to meet the invaders with strength and determination. Finally their counterattacks began to tell, and the Austrians slowly fell back or were prevented from further advances. At the beginning of June the great Russian offensive was launched in Bukowina and Galicia, with such overwhelming results that the Austrians were compelled hastily to abandon the Italian campaign and endeavor to stay the onslaught at the East.

Meanwhile Italy had been stirred to the centre by the events in the high Alps, resulting in the fall of the Ministry. At this writing a coalition Government is being formed. Apparently the Italians have entirely recovered command of the military situation, and are winning back some of the lost territory. It is understood that they will soon begin a new and more serious offensive all along the front.



America's International Relations

Party Platforms on War Issues

P LATFORM declarations on the war and international relations by the two great political parties, as adopted at the respective National Conventions, were as follows:

REPUBLICAN PLANKS

[Adopted June 8, 1916]

In 1861 the Republican Party stood for the Union. As it stood for the union of States, it now stands for a united people, true to American ideals, loyal to American traditions, knowing no allegiance except to the Constitution, to the Government, and to the flag of the United States. We believe in American policies at home and abroad.

We declare that we believe in and will enforce the protection of every American citizen in all the rights secured to him by the Constitution, treaties, and the law of nations, at home and abroad, by land and sea. These rights, which, in violation of the specific promise of their party, made at Baltimore in 1912, the Democratic President and the Democratic Congress have failed to defend, we will unflinchingly maintain.

We desire peace, the peace of justice and right, and believe in maintaining a straight and honest neutrality between the belligerents in the great war in Europe. We must perform all our duties and insist upon all our rights as neutrals, without fear and without favor. We believe that peace and neutrality, as well as the dignity and influence of the United States, cannot be preserved by shifty expedients, by phrasemaking, by performances in language, or by attitudes ever changing in an effort to secure groups of voters.

The present Administration has destroyed our influence abroad and humiliated us in our own eyes. The Republican Party believes that a firm, consistent, and courageous foreign policy, always maintained by Republican Presidents in accordance with American traditions, is the best, as it is the only true way to preserve our peace and restore us to our rightful place among the nations. We believe in the pacific settlement of international disputes and favor the establishment of a world court for that purpose.

We reaffirm our approval of the Monroe Doctrine, and declare its maintenance to be a policy of this country essential to its present and future peace and safety, and to the achievement of its manifest destiny. * * *

Such are our principles, such are our purposes and policies. We close as we began. The times are dangerous, and the future is fraught with peril. The great issues of the day have been confused by words and

phrases. The American spirit, which made the country and saved the Union, has been forgotten by those charged with the responsibility of power. We appeal to all Americans, whether naturalized or native born, to prove to the world that we are Americans in thought and in deed, with one loyalty, one hope, one aspiration. * * *

DEMOCRATIC PLANKS

[Adopted June 16, 1916]

AMERICANISM.—The part that the United States will play in the new day of international relationships which is now upon us will depend upon our preparation and our character. The Democratic Party therefore recognizes the assertion and triumphant demonstration of the indivisibility and coherent strength of the nation, as the supreme issue of this day, in which the whole world faces the crisis of manifold change. It summons all men, of whatever origin or creed, who would count themselves Americans to join in making clear to all the world the unity and consequent power of America.

This is an issue of patriotism. To taint it with partisanship would be to defile it. In this day of test, America must show itself, not a nation of partisans, but a nation of patriots. There is gathered here in America the best of the blood, the industry, and the genius of the whole world, the elements of a great race, and a magnificent society to be melted into a mighty and splendid nation.

Whoever, actuated by the purpose to promote the interest of a foreign power, in disregard of our own country's welfare or to injure this Government in its foreign relations or cripple or destroy its industries at home, and whoever, by arousing prejudices of a racial, religious, or other nature, creates discord and strife among our people so as to obstruct the wholesome process of unification, is faithless to the trust which the privileges of citizenship repose in him and disloyal to his country.

We, therefore, condemn as subversive of this nation's unity and integrity, and as destructive of its welfare, the activities and designs of every group or organization, political or otherwise, that has for its object the advancement of the interest of a foreign power, whether such object is promoted by intimidating the Government, a political party, or representatives of the people, or which is calculated and tends to divide our people into antagonistic groups, and thus to destroy that complete agreement and solidarity of the people, and that unity of sentiment and national purpose so essential to the perpetuity of the nation and its free institutions.

We condemn all alliances and combinations of individuals in this country of whatever nationality or descent, who agree and conspire together for the purpose of embarrassing or weakening our Government or of improperly influencing or coercing our public representatives in dealing or negotiating with any foreign power. We charge that such conspiracies among a limited number exist, and have been instigated for the purpose of advancing the interests of foreign countries to the prejudice and detriment of our own country. We condemn any political party which, in view of the activity of such conspirators, surrenders its integrity or modifies its policy.

PREPAREDNESS.—Along with the proof of our character as a nation must go the proof of our power to play the part that legitimately belongs to us. The people of the United States love peace. They respect the rights and covet the friendship of all other nations. They desire neither any additional territory nor any advantage which cannot be peacefully gained by their skill, their industry, or their enterprise; but they insist upon having absolute freedom of national life and policy, and feel that they owe it to themselves, and to the rôle of spirited independence which it is their sole ambition to play, that they should render themselves secure against the hazard of interference from any quarter, and should be able to protect their rights upon the seas or in any part of the world. We, therefore, favor the maintenance of an army fully adequate to the requirements of order, of safety, and of the protection of the nation's rights, the fullest development of modern methods of seacoast defense, and the maintenance of an adequate reserve of citizens trained to arms and prepared to safeguard the people and territory of the United States against any danger of hostile action which may unexpectedly arise, and a fixed policy for the continuous development of a navy worthy to support the great naval traditions of the United States, and fully equal to the international tasks which the United States hopes and expects to take a part in performing. The plans and enactments of the present Congress afford substantial proof of our purpose in this exigent matter.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.—The Democratic Administration has throughout the present war scrupulously and successfully held to the old paths of neutrality and of the peaceful pursuit of the legitimate objects of our national life, which statesmen of all parties and creeds have prescribed for themselves in America since the beginning of our history. But the circumstances of the last two years have revealed necessities of international action which no former generation can have foreseen. We hold that it is the duty of the United States to use its power, not only to make itself safe at home, but also to make secure its just interests throughout the world, and both for this end and in the interest of humanity, to assist the world in securing

settled peace and justice. We believe that every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under which it shall live; that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy from other nations the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon, and that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression or disregard of the rights of peoples and nations, and we believe that the time has come when it is the duty of the United States to join with the other nations of the world in any feasible association that will effectively serve these principles, to maintain inviolate the complete security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations.

The present Administration has consistently sought to act upon and realize in its conduct of the foreign affairs of the nation the principle that should be the object of any association of the nations formed to secure the peace of the world and the maintenance of national and individual rights. It has followed the highest American traditions. It has preferred respect for the fundamental rights of smaller States, even to property interests, and has secured the friendship of the people of these States for the United States by refusing to make a more material interest an excuse for the assertion of our superior power against the dignity of their sovereign independence. It has regarded the lives of its citizens and the claims of humanity as of greater moment than material rights, and peace as the best basis for the just settlement of commercial claims. It has made the honor and ideals of the United States its standard alike in negotiation and action.

PAN-AMERICAN CONCORD.—We recognize now, as we have always recognized, a definite and common interest between the United States with the other peoples and republics of the Western Hemisphere in all matters of national independence and free political development. We favor the establishment and maintenance of the closest relations of amity and mutual helpfulness between the United States and the other republics of the American continents for the support of peace and the promotion of a common prosperity. To that end we favor all measures which may be necessary to facilitate intimate intercourse and promote commerce between the United States and her neighbors to the south of us, and such international understandings as may be practicable and suitable to accomplish these ends.

We commend the action of the Democratic Administration in holding the Pan-American Financial Conference at Washington in May, 1915, and organizing the International High Commission, which represented the United States in the recent meeting of representatives of the Latin-American republics at Buenos Aires, April, 1916, which have so greatly promoted the friendly relations between the people of the Western Hemisphere.

The Inside of the Irish Revolt

By Arnold Bennett

Noted English Novelist and Publicist

I N common with a majority of the Sinn Feiners themselves, I was considerably startled by the Irish rebellion. Just before it occurred I had been studying the everlasting Irish question, and this sanguinary revolt did not seem to agree with the conclusions I had drawn. As soon as the firing was over and men's souls calmed down a little I sought to inform myself as to the realities behind the tragic and tawdry theatrical display. I need not detail my inquiries. It suffices to say that I was fortunate. In no quarter was my desire for information balked. I obtained new facts, but the important result of the inquest in my own mind was a rearrangement of the old facts into their proper perspective.

The revolutionary movement was not pure Sinn Fein. The problem of Ireland, and in particular the problem of Dublin, with its unsurpassed slums, is not purely a problem of interracial politics. The chief sources of discontent are not political, but social. Connolly commanded the late rising, and Connolly was a disciple of Larkin. Larkin has said, and said often, that he would not give a fig for home rule if he could insure a minimum wage of £1 a week for all workers. Therein he showed his sense and a true appreciation of values. Again there are, or were, in Ireland sundry personalities who for political crimes, including homicide, had suffered severe punishment under British law. They needed revenge. These three types, labor

insurgent, unadulterated Sinn Fein, and apostle of vengeance, had often quarreled, but finally they coalesced under the stimulus of a common end and made rebellion. Connolly represented the first type, MacNeil the second, and Clarke, the old Fenian, the third. The directing element was the labor element, not the Sinn Fein element.

In its constitution the rebel organization was autocratic to the point of Prussianism. Discipline was absolutely rigid. The executive consisted of a very small handful of men who knew everything; the rank and file knew nothing, and their sole privilege was to obey. It is quite clear, from the admissions of deported rebels, that when they fell in on Easter Monday they had no adequate idea of what awaited them. They

expected a brief and showy demonstration in force, and no more. They went to their assigned posts, and immediately the leaders began to use their rifles, thus committing the rank and file irrevocably to the adventure. The rank and file could not go back home, or even pause for reflection, and the rank and file were very young. They were pathetically young. The mass of those deported are of sophomore age.

Now, the autocratic principle is always the principle of secret societies. It is the principle, for example, of the Clan-na-Gael. It is, indeed, essential to secrecy. It works excellently provided the autocrats be wise and the slaves abject. In



ARNOLD BENNETT

the Irish case neither condition was fulfilled. The leaders were gullible and rash, and many of the slaves had such objection to Prussian ideas that they seceded before the culminating event.

The explanation of the very rapid development of the rebellion is twofold. It lies both in internal causes and in external causes. The main internal causes were as follows:

First, the vigor and success of the recruiting campaign in Ireland, which had aroused jealousy and fear in the councils of sedition. Ireland's general loyalty to the Allies was in part the origin of her misfortune.

Second, mistrust of the Nationalist Parliamentary Party on account of its enthusiastic official support of the British War Government and of its consent to postponing home rule.

Third, fear of conscription for Ireland—an absurd fear.

Fourth, the influence of the younger priests, and especially of those who spring from the laboring class and are implacable on the subject of labor grievances, very legitimate grievances.

The external causes were the Clan-na-Gael in the United States and support promised through the Clan-na-Gael and through other minor channels by the German Government.

The Clan-na-Gael is an interesting and rather human society, so far as I have ascertained. Its autocrats completely exclude respectability. They will have no truck with that quality. Its funds are drawn partly from members' subscriptions and partly from Germany. All subsidies are paid direct to a small secret executive. Accounts are not furnished to members. That graft on a mighty scale is unknown to the Clan-na-Gael appears to me improbable. Still, subscribers and foreign Governments occasionally demand something for their money, and at such periods the Clan-na-Gael has set about to do something. No doubt it does as little as it can because its existence depends on the continuance of the Irish problem. It was and is terrifically opposed to the Home Rule act for the reason that home rule would put an end to the Irish problem.

The Clan-na-Gael was delighted and greatly invigorated when the Irish Volunteers were formed in answer to the Ulster Volunteers of Carson, and when the Irish Volunteers split into two unequal parts, the loyal majority following Redmond, the Clan-na-Gael was still more delighted. It nursed the irreconcilable remnant with literature and with arms and generally luxuriated in Irish domestic strife.

It openly discussed the project of using the Volunteers against Britain, whether home rule became law or not. In *The Gaelic American* of June 6, 1914, it was suggested that the Volunteers should be officered from the Sixty-ninth Regiment of New York.

When the war broke out the grandiose scheme of the German-Irish propaganda was initiated in the United States. American citizens were wont to encounter it viva voce in front of the newspaper offices and in hotels, subways, and trolley cars. In spite of the extreme multiplicity of its agents and of the majestic indifference of the British Government to pro-ally American newspapers, the scheme failed, but it cost a lot of money.

In August, 1915, the Clan-na-Gael was obviously hard up and its supporters were obviously discontented. The executive seem to have got an imposing grant from Germany. They collected heartily also from their members. A defense-of-Ireland fund was started and a collecting card sent out. The phraseology of this card, which I have seen, leaves not the slightest doubt as to the object of the fund. The collection was not a success, and much of the German money apparently vanished in graft. What remained was used against the Allies.

After the Irish race convention held in New York in March of this year a new appeal was made, in which occur the following words:

"Not only must the organization be made great in numbers, but in material resources. It must be put in a position successfully to grapple with the great problem which it has been called into existence to solve by giving Ireland the help which she so badly needs in this hour of

her great danger and of her opportunity."

And there was a noticeable voyaging of certain Irish-Americans between the United States and England, Ireland, and Germany. Then came Casement, Easter-tide, and the rising.

The rising failed, but it did to a certain small extent accomplish a diversion of military energy and a disturbance of the warlike concentration which Germany hoped for. Germany bluffed the rebels in a manner characteristically cynical. Even the modern German rifles which she promised turned out to be obsolete Russian rifles. The price, in addition to money paid by Germany, for this transient success was a heavy price. It was the complete loss of all Irish sympathy.

With regard to the actual outbreak, it is established that as late as Easter Saturday the component parts of the rebel leadership were actually at variance as to the advisability of a revolt, the pure Sinn Fein element, under MacNeil, arguing from the Casement fiasco and the arms fiasco, was against an immediate insurrection, but the highly truculent and rash labor element under Connolly bore down MacNeil on the Sunday evening and the rebellion was ordained.

The lack of premeditation accounted for the first facile success. It also accounted for the rapidity of the collapse. The state of mind of the leaders was such that they actually tried to obtain guidance in tactics from British officers whom they made prisoners! Perhaps only in Ireland could a thing so richly humorous happen.

The British soldiers had a mixed reception. In one house they would receive cakes and ale, and in the next bullets. The majority of citizens were markedly sympathetic; the minority virulent and treacherous in the extreme. Upon occasion the methods of the soldiers may have been summary, but their behavior was incomparably superior to that of the insurrectionary bands. To say this is not necessarily to accuse the true Sinn Feiners themselves of frightfulness. It must be remembered that the dregs of Dublin were joyously abroad, and that these dregs were con-

siderable. They reveled in riot and were not overcareful of their own lives.

As for the responsibility of the British Government, it is gradually being ascertained. Broadly, it was neither more nor less than the historic responsibility inherited from hundreds of years of Anglo-Saxon unimaginativeness. One may say that Birrell, like other Secretaries for Ireland, paid in his person for England's atrocious vagaries in the eighteenth century and the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century.

But the Irish problem is not primarily the result of bad government; it is the result of incompatibility of temperament between two races whom geography has inseparably bound together. Evidence before the Royal Commission shows that the Government could not squelch the Irish Volunteers because they could not squelch Carson's Volunteers without bloodshed, so one may go back and back into time. Ulster is such and the rest of Ireland is such that home rule could not have been put into practice without bloodshed. The British Government was bound to hope against hope that bloodshed might be avoided. The immediate Governmental mistake was in overestimating the common sense of the rebel organization. If it had learned the lesson of history it would have had more soldiers in Dublin, and bloodshed would have been not avoided but probably postponed until after the war.

The execution of the rebel leaders aroused adverse comment. One cannot foresee the verdict of history, but it is certain that much less than 1 per cent. of the rebels have been shot, and I think an assaulted Government has rarely shown greater magnanimity in a more dangerous crisis. Mankind will progress and the time will come when cold-blooded homicide will be as repugnant to the majority as it is now to the minority, and will cease to form a part of the machinery of justice; but at present the structure of social order is ultimately based on cold-blooded homicide.

If ever there was a rebellion in which the leaders led and the rank and file were kept in ignorance, the Easter rising in Ireland was that rebellion. It was not a

popular rising—it was artificial, it was fostered from without. The responsible leaders were autocrats. They knew just what they were risking and that their success might signify the saving of Germany from defeat. By no means all the leaders were Irish patriots, and even the alleged pacifists among them wanted armed rebellion. Thus the late Sheehy Skeffington, whose pacifism strangely has been accepted as axiomatic by all the British newspapers, speaking at the centenary banquet of the John Mitchel Club, appealed at great length for money

to buy arms with which to fight the British Government when the time came. He is dead; I greatly regret the manner of his death; but a pacifist he was not.

The executions are now over. The political prospects of Ireland are brighter. Good may come out of evil. Racial temperaments, however, will remain, and geography will not alter. The arguments for and against any kind of home rule are tremendous, and therefore the millennium is probably not at hand.

(Copyright, 1916, by The New York Times Co.)

Ireland and the Kaiser

By JOHN McF. HOWIE

At the beginning of the war THE NEW YORK TIMES published an account of a meeting at Celtic Park under the auspices of the Ancient and Honorable Order of Hibernians. Resolutions of sympathy for the Germans were passed and cabled to the Kaiser. A parade was indulged in, headed by a large band. A German flag was unfurled, and the band played "Die Wacht am Rhein." The lines written at that time are here offered as equally apropos of the recent uprising in Ireland:

There's trouble in ould Oireland,
And in ould Europe, too;
The Kaiser's foightin' England,
We now know phwat to do.
We feel the call to arms,
For our country, yours and mine;
So we'll paste Ould England in the nose
And sing the "Wacht am Rhein."

We've suffered many a long, long year,
From Oppression's weary load;
We've felt the tyrant's heavy hand,
Been tortured by his goad.
But now the sky is all serene,
Our hearts are light, well nigh, Sir,
For it's "Raus mit Faugh a Ballagh,"
And it's up wid "Hoch der Kaiser."

Men's faces pale when Clan Nha Ghael
Or "Fenian" names we sphoke, Sir;
And now our hearts are beatin' high
To see Ould England broke, Sir.
We needn't suffer anny more
John Bull's sarcastic sallies;
Now we can sing, "T'ell wid the King"
Und "Deutschland über Alles."

Our bagpipes blow a warlike blast
To summon one and all, Sir,
We're ready for the redcoats now,
We'll answer to the call, Sir.
Our whisky must go overboard,
No Dublin stout shall cheer, Sir;
Down wid historic old Potheen,
And up wid lager beer, Sir.

Now down wid France, now down wid Spain,
Now down wid Russia too, Sir;
Now down wid Italy and Greece,
The Orange and the Blue, Sir.
Up wid the good ould Irish flag,
Unfurl it in the sky, Sir;
Tuh 'ell wid everybody else,
Here's t' Oireland and the Kaiser!



[SECOND INSTALLMENT]

The Battle of Verdun

An Authoritative French Account Based On Official Records

By M. Ardouin-Dumazet

Military Editor of Le Temps and Le Figaro

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY]

THURSDAY, April 6.—The battle about Verdun, which seemed to be ending in disconnected attacks, suddenly took a new lease of life. The object was to search out a weak point, or to satisfy German opinion, which has for so long been expecting an important success. On Sunday, (April 9,) that is to say, fifty days after the inception of the undertaking, which has brought our enemy such a serious discomfiture, a general offensive surpassing in dimensions that of February was let loose along the whole front from the Forest of Montfaucon, near Avocourt, to the ridges of the Meuse, near Vaux. This is a battle line of nearly 25 kilometers, (15½ miles,) that is, comparable to that of the battle of Champagne.

The struggle was developed especially on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, between the forest and Cumières. An interval of 5 kilometers, (3 miles,) including a wide stretch of meadows, across which the river unrolls its meanderings, and the river bend of Champneuville separated that zone from Vacherauville, to which the Poivre Ridge sinks down; the latter was equally the scene of very active fighting, in the direction of Douaumont. It may be said, therefore, that there were two battles, the more violent developing to the west. We shall follow them separately, recalling the events which preceded the new offensive.

WEST OF THE MEUSE

We ended the preceding installment of this narrative by saying that a German attack against Haucourt had been repulsed on April 4. A new attempt, preceded by the usual bombardment, took place on the following day (Wednesday,

April 5) at nightfall, and was continued all night long on the sector included between Avocourt and Béthincourt. The enemy sent in very heavy forces. The assaults against Béthincourt were stopped by our fire, in spite of the furious fighting of the battalions thrown against the village. In the centre of the battle line, Haucourt was attacked with especial violence. Ceaselessly driven back with enormous losses, the enemy constantly returned to the charge. In the middle of the night he finally succeeded in gaining a footing amid the ruins of the village; but we remained on the outskirts and, from the neighboring heights, dominated the hollow in which Haucourt lies hidden.

On the Avocourt side the initiative of the struggle remained with us. After bombarding the part of the wood held by the Germans, our troops, leaping from the recently won redoubt, carried by assault the zone called Bois-Carré, ("the square wood.") The following day (Thursday, April 6) was employed by the enemy in pushing the bombardment of Béthincourt; then, toward the south, the villages of Esnes and Montzéville were bombarded. When night fell, having increased the violence of the preliminary artillery struggle, the enemy launched an attack between Béthincourt and Le Mort Homme, on the line marked by the road from Cumières. Near 265-Meter Hill the enemy penetrated a first-line trench, the greater part of which we were able to recover by a counterattack.

Friday, April 7.—The attacks were resumed with renewed fury. When their heavy guns seemed to have cleared the approaches of Haucourt to a distance of 2 kilometers (1¼ miles) to the east, in

the direction of Béthincourt, a formidable assault was attempted; but our cannon and machine guns succeeded in smashing the enemy masses, which were compelled to withdraw to their trenches, leaving the ground strewn with dead bodies. During this combat the German shells covered Le Mort Homme and Cumières. The attempt was renewed during the night on the same front; repeated attacks failed. To the east, at the southern outlet from Haucourt, between the village and a point marked 287, two small works were, however, taken from us.

Saturday, April 8.—The day was marked only by artillery fire. While the enemy directed his fire from Béthincourt to Cumières, our artillery took as its target the German batteries in the Cheppy Wood and in the zone comprised between Malancourt and Montfaucon, where enemy forces were massed. There were still more considerable forces behind Montfaucon, toward Nantillois, at the end of one of the field railways connected with the line from Sedan. Our heavy batteries reached this point.

BETHINCOURT EVACUATED

Our command foresaw the grand offensive which was to be let loose on the morrow, Sunday, (April 9,) and met it with such resources that the Germans had already discounted their success. During the night (Saturday-Sunday, April 8-9) the salient formed by Béthincourt in advance of our lines was evacuated without the Germans seeming to be aware of it; at least, they made no attempt to interfere with the movement. After this evacuation we had a less twisted line, which therefore offered no exposed point of approach.

Sunday, April 9.—Throughout the whole day the enemy renewed his assaults without succeeding in shaking our defensive. His attempts were especially furious between Le Mort Homme and Cumières. The assailants, setting out from the cover offered by the Corbeaux and Cumières Woods, came on in close formation, offering a target for our gusts of shells and for the bullets of our machine guns. After a series of efforts as vain as they were frequent, the Germans

were compelled to withdraw, leaving the ground covered with hundreds of corpses. It was in this sector that their losses were most important. The elements launched against Le Mort Homme suffered equally.

Not less violent was the attack on the sector comprised between the Avocourt Wood and the Forges stream, down the river from Haucourt. At all points it was met by the tenacious resistance of our soldiers, and this attack also was broken. On the skirt of the Avocourt Wood a German detachment succeeded at one time in gaining a foothold in our trenches; it was quickly dislodged.

The day was, therefore, a check for the enemy along the whole front. At night a new attack on Le Mort Homme permitted the Germans to penetrate our front-line trenches along a front of 500 meters (550 yards) at a cost of heavy losses.

Monday, April 10.—On the night following, the bombardment was resumed with great violence, being particularly directed against 304-Meter Hill. This cannonade was continued throughout April 10, growing in intensity until noon, at which time an attack was launched, which extended from Haucourt to Béthincourt. In spite of the fury of the assault the enemy was compelled to retire, leaving the ground covered with his dead. Between Le Mort Homme and Cumières, where he attacked with even greater fury, all his attempts failed.

They were renewed in the evening, with the aid of sprays of flaming liquids, which were unable to force us to give up Le Mort Homme. When the enemy masses came out from the Corbeaux Wood they were stopped short by our gun and rifle fire. At the extreme right of our line certain small elements of trenches were occupied by the enemy.

Tuesday, April 11.—On this day there was no infantry attack but cannon thundered incessantly from Le Mort Homme to Cumières, preparing a new attempt for the next morning.

Wednesday, April 12.—The little Caurettes Wood, situated to the south of the road from Le Mort Homme to Cumières, was assaulted; in spite of the employ-

ment of flaming liquids, the enemy was stopped and everywhere repulsed.

EAST OF THE MEUSE

On the right (east) bank of the Meuse, during the week April 6-12, the enemy made a considerable effort at first only on the Poivre Ridge. It will be remembered that this long backbone with denuded sides extends for almost 3 kilometers (1¾ miles) from the approaches of Louvemont as far as the Meuse, above the goose foot formed by the roads from Vacherauville. On this side, a little wood covers the slope above the river and descends to a ravine in which the spring of Saint Martin has its source.

On Thursday, April 6, an intense bombardment was directed against our lines, the prelude of an infantry attack, which was expected to develop great violence. But our guns intervened with so much precision that the enemy did not venture forth from his cover. Then he remained quiet until April 9. On that day, in spite of a powerful artillery preparation, the assaulting masses were no more successful in their effort to come forth. During the night a very lively engagement was fought in the little wood beside the spring of Saint Martin, and during the whole of the next day the bombardment continued.

Further to the east, the positions which we had reoccupied in the Caillette Wood, to the south of the Douaumont front, were assaulted on Wednesday, April 5; the enemy was compelled to withdraw after suffering heavy losses. On the following day, April 6, we resumed the struggle with the bayonet, driving our enemies back on a front of 500 meters (550 yards) and to a depth of 200 meters, (220 yards;) a counterattack failed to drive us out of the trenches we had regained.

On the following days we continued step by step to gain ground in the communicating trenches. On April 9 the contest begun on the Poivre Ridge was extended as far as the approaches to Vaux; at no point was the enemy able to carry out the assault. On April 10 several attempts against the Caillette Wood were repulsed. During the night an attack, preceded by jets of burning

liquids and directed against trenches which we had gained the day before in the approaches to the village of Douaumont, cost the aggressors a sanguinary check, after which the Germans furiously resumed the bombardment of the region of Douaumont and Vaux, while the cannonade was continued against our positions on the hills.

The enemy had not given up the hope of capturing Douaumont, the Caillette Wood, and the approaches of Vaux. On Tuesday, April 10, he resumed the bombardment with renewed vigor, following up the rain of giant shells with furious gusts of lachrymal or asphyxiating shells. Taking for granted that our trenches were either abandoned or filled only with dying men, the enemy launched a strong attack from Douaumont to Vaux. Certain of our communication trenches were invaded, but an immediate counter-attack drove out the Germans, who left a hundred prisoners in our hands.

The inspiring Order of the Day addressed to his troops by General Pétain, who is so reserved in his expressions, bears witness to the importance of the German check on Sunday, April 9:

April 9 is a glorious day for our armies. The furious assaults of the soldiers of the Crown Prince were broken everywhere; the infantrymen, the artillerymen, the sappers, the airmen of the second army, vied with one another in heroism.

Honor to all!

Doubtless the Germans will attack again; let every one work and watch in order to gain the same success as on yesterday.

Courage. * * * We shall get them!

The period April 13-19 was, on the contrary, marked by only one serious attack, and it was quite local in character.

A FURIOUS ATTACK

At the beginning of this period the reports recorded a moderate activity in the batteries between the Meuse and Douaumont.

Thursday, April 13.—On the evening of this day the fire became heavier in preparation for a small attack to the south of Douaumont, which was completely repulsed. Beginning from this moment the gun fire became hotter and hotter.

Friday, April 14; Saturday, April 15.—In spite of this heavy and long-con-

tinued fire, our infantry on the evening of April 15 delivered a vigorous offensive against the German trenches at Douaumont. The official report did not lay much stress on this affair, which must have been hot, nevertheless, as we took 200 prisoners and occupied certain trench elements.

Sunday, April 16; Monday, April 17.—On these two days artillery fire continued; the German guns had as their principal objective the south of the Haudromont Woods, which cover the ridges and slopes, seamed with ravines, of a valley which opens on the Meuse toward Bras, at the foot of the last slopes of the Poivre Ridge. On April 17 the bombardment was accentuated.

Tuesday, April 18.—In the morning the fire became furious, from the Meuse near Bras to Douaumont. The Poivre Ridge, whose culminating point, 342 meters, (1,121 feet,) is some 150 meters (492 feet) above the water level of the Meuse; the Haudromont Woods to the north of the valley, the Chaufour Wood to the south, whose edge approaches Douaumont, were covered with shells, which steadily increased in numbers until 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

Then the attack was let loose. The first information was that at least two divisions had been launched in the assault against this front of 4 kilometers, (2½ miles;) the second information announced the presence of regiments belonging to five different divisions. These troops, gathered from different army corps, re-formed, completed, had been brought together in two divisions of three brigades each, or twelve regiments, equal to an army corps and a half. It was, therefore, a very great effort; the assaulting mass comprised about 35,000 men, who presented themselves before our lines—lines that might be thought to have been crushed by the prodigious artillery fire; but the moment the masses appeared our barring fire opened upon them, cannon and machine guns tearing bloody rents in their ranks. At the two ends of the Poivre Ridge, near the Meuse and the Haudromont Wood, the attack had been more furious; there, especially, were their dead heaped up. Along this

whole front of 4 kilometers the enemy was thus repulsed, but on our right the Germans succeeded in penetrating our first-line trench to the south of the Chaufour Wood. A counterattack drove them out of a part of it.

These events between the Meuse and the Woivre coincided with an almost continuous gun fire against the ridges of the Meuse. Moulainville, situated below the fort of that name, which protects on the southern side the entrance into the ridges of the railway and of the road from Conflans, and Haudiomont, where the road from Metz enters the hills to reach Verdun, were made especial targets. An attack was being prepared on this side; movements of troops were announced in Woivre; our cannon, installed on the approaches of the road from Pont-à-Mousson to St. Mihiel, reached convoys between Nonsard and Essey, in the valleys of La Machine and Le Rupt du Mad. In the same quarter, at the foot of the ridges, massing enemy troops were dispersed.

Wednesday, April 19.—The enemy at last attempted an infantry operation against our positions of Les Eparges; it was driven out of the only trench which it succeeded in reaching.

BATTERING MORT HOMME

During the whole week it might have been thought that important events would take place on the west (left bank) of the Meuse, but no infantry movement took place, in spite of the persistence and violence of the gun fire. On Wednesday, April 12, numerous indications suggested the preparation for an assault at the close of the day. Our artillery then opened fire on the enemy trenches and the troops signaled as massing in the Maiancourt Wood. This gun fire resulted in preventing the formation of the assaulting columns; the Germans on the first line did not leave their trenches.

Up to Wednesday, April 19, the whole conflict was confined to an artillery duel, the enemy's fire at times being directed with extreme intensity against the little Caurettes Wood, between Cumières and Le Mort Homme, 304-Meter Hill, and even our second lines, without doubt

from Montzéville to the Bourrus Wood. While answering the fire of our adversaries, our batteries also carried their action beyond them. The Corbeaux Wood, the passages of the Forges stream, the roads which spread out from Mont-faucon and lead to the attacked front, felt the effect of our projectiles.

During the next few days the fighting about Verdun continued, but with longer intervals, on less extended fronts, and with diminished fury, although preceded by extremely violent bombardments.

On the right (east) bank of the Meuse there was only one attack; two took place on the left (west) bank. None of them allowed the Germans to realize the smallest gain of ground, while several actions on our part won us communication trenches which strengthened our lines. Progress of this kind was made to the northwest of the pond at Vaux and to the south of the Haudromont Wood, between Douaumont and Bras.

Thursday, April 20.—The attack which we repulsed was directed on the evening of April 20, from the Thiaumont farm, to the southwest of Douaumont, up to the pond at Vaux. After the usual furious bombardment, the enemy masses succeeded in getting a first footing in a part of our lines; instantly counterattacked, the assailants were driven out and pressed back upon their own positions.

Friday, April 21; Saturday, April 22.—On Saturday, Easter eve, another movement was in preparation, but the assaulting troops perceived in the trenches were so vigorously cannonaded by our batteries that it was necessary to withdraw them to the rear.

On the left (west) bank of the Meuse the enemy continued to show greater activity; he did not abandon the hope of forcing our front on Le Mort Homme, and the increasing activity of our artillery in the region of Avocourt might be taken to indicate an attempt on that side. But we did not leave the enemy at liberty to move freely. A part of the trenches carried by him on April 10 on Le Mort Homme was retaken and, to the north of the Caurettes Wood, we reoccupied a trench.

These rectifications of our line were fortunate; we made 150 prisoners.

The Germans responded by a violent bombardment. Then, in the night of Friday-Saturday, April 21-22, they attacked the northern slopes of Le Mort Homme; gaining an entry at one time into our trenches, they were driven out again. At the same time they sprayed flaming liquids into our shelter to the north of the Caurettes Wood, and sketched an attack which was swiftly repulsed.

Sunday, April 23.—The Germans renewed their efforts between Le Mort Homme and the valley of Esnes, without any greater success.

Monday, April 24.—After this check the enemy resumed the bombardment of Le Mort Homme, which led up, on the afternoon of Easter Monday, April 24, to new assaults. These were three times repulsed.

AN AGGRESSIVE DEFENSE

Tuesday, April 25; Wednesday, April 26.—While continuing to act on the defensive, we took measures to scatter disturbance over the enemy's centres of troop formation and supply. Our long-range guns reached the communication roads, while our airmen dropped bombs on the cantonments and railway stations.

Thursday, Friday, Saturday, April 27-29.—The physiognomy of the "siege of Verdun"—as the Germans say, although they have not even got near it, threatening it only on a front of 14 miles, while on the remaining 30 miles of the periphery no attack has taken place—has continued unchanged. Or, rather, it has been altered to the detriment of the Germans themselves, who have been pressed back on the narrow sector of Le Mort Homme-Cumières, the object of their efforts.

It was on Saturday, April 29, that we attacked the enemy positions to the north of Le Mort Homme. Our soldiers captured trenches and communicating trenches on a front of 1,000 meters, (1,094 yards,) and to a depth of 300 to 600 meters, (330 to 660 yards.)

Sunday, April 30.—The same success crowned an attack to the north of Cumières.

Monday, May 1.—The loss of these trenches, the winning of which had cost such tremendous efforts, led the Germans to attempt, on May 1, ferocious attacks, preceded by the usual bombardment. To the north of Le Mort Homme two German regiments, successively sent forward, suffered enormous losses under our fire. To the north of Cumières the assault was three times repeated and as often broken.

Tuesday, May 2; Wednesday, May 3.—On May 3, to the northwest of Le Mort Homme, a brilliant assault allowed us to carry new German positions and to take a hundred prisoners.

On the right (east) bank of the Meuse the enemy bombarded our positions almost incessantly, from the Poivre Ridge to Vaux. A first attack on the slopes of Vaux fort had been repulsed; a second, between Haudromont farm and Thiaumont farm, was not allowed to develop, the enemy, while still in his trenches, having been subjected to a very accurate artillery fire. Then the bombardment was resumed, preceding a violent movement against our trenches to the west of the Thiaumont farm, in the direction of the Nawé Wood. In spite of the use of flaming liquids, the Germans were not able to force us from our shelters and, as soon as they appeared, they were cut down by our fire. An attack against Douaumont and Vaux was no more successful.

In this same sector, on May 1, we ourselves took the offensive against the German positions to the southeast of the Douaumont fort, a zone in which we held the Caillette Wood and Vaux pond. Our soldiers, launched against a German trench, carried it on a front of 500 meters, (550 yards.)

More and more the events of the war are concentrated around Verdun, the enemy ceaselessly bringing new troops to resume his attack.

INCREDIBLE SHELL FIRE

During the period May 4-10 his principal effort was directed against the French positions on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, from Le Mort Homme to 304-Meter Hill. But the bombardment which has progressively reached a

violence hitherto unknown, it is said, in this series of battles in which artillery has attained to a concentration of fire never before believed possible—this bombardment has been extended from Cumières as far as the wood of Avocourt, more than 8 kilometers, (5 miles.) This fire was at times interrupted or extended by the enemy, to allow of assaults which he carried out with growing fury, without succeeding in forcing our positions; hardly even obtaining slight successes, which were as quickly neutralized by our counterattacks. If the Germans have not brought into action effectives comparable to those of the closing days of February, they have nevertheless sent forward great masses, and have demanded from them efforts and sacrifices proportionately greater.

On May 2 and 3 we took the offensive, not with the intention of pushing back the enemy, but in order to rectify our lines. On May 2, while the Germans were directing an intense artillery fire on the Avocourt sector, our troops carried out an assault on the German trenches to the northwest of Le Mort Homme, that is, against 265-Meter Hill. These trenches were brilliantly carried by us, 100 prisoners and four machine guns falling into our hands, while the Germans suffered heavy losses from our shells. During the whole night (May 3-4) our soldiers continued to advance from one communicating trench to another, organizing the ground as they went forward.

Thursday, May 4.—The enemy directed an attack on these newly won trenches, but it was immediately broken. In the evening of May 4, after artillery preparation of extreme violence, 304-Meter Hill, until then only bombarded, was assaulted by strong German contingents; these were repulsed, but our front trench was invaded in some places. A German division composed of fresh troops had made the assaults; it suffered crushing losses.

Friday, May 5.—The enemy, after attempting to repair this check, resumed the bombardment more furiously than ever. Large calibre and asphyxiating shells fell in unheard-of numbers. The whole region was torn up, and rendered untenable; it became necessary to evac-

uate a part of the trenches on the north slope, facing Haucourt; but the waves of assault were not able to organize themselves, our artillery covering with projectiles the ground on which the enemy intended to form.

Saturday, May 6.—During the night of May 5-6 the Germans attempted to carry the small wood which, to the north and northwest, covers the edge of the plateau of 304-Meter Hill; a counterattack with the bayonet was sufficient to push them back within their lines.

The bombardment did not cease. It was instead resumed with such fury that officers who had taken part in the first battles of Verdun said that they had never seen such gun fire. The shell fire was continued day and night.

ATTACK IN ESNES RAVINE

Sunday, May 7.—An attack was begun, conducted by three divisions constituted of fresh troops, who had not yet taken part in the fighting at Verdun; 304-Meter Hill seemed at first directly threatened. But this was only a feint. The main weight of the attack was carried forward swiftly, in a powerful effort along the bottom of the valley of the Esnes rivulet, between this hill and Le Mort Homme, which faces it. Another assault was directed to the west, near the road from Esnes to Haucourt. On this front, which comprises four kilometers, (2½ miles,) the attacking regiments came forward like a waterspout, believing that our resistance had been broken by their gun fire. But our batteries had been able to hold their ground; machine guns barred the way; several times the German onrush crumbled before our shells and rifle bullets. After suffering frightful losses the enemy was compelled to retire; he had succeeded in getting a foothold in a small communicating trench at the bottom of the valley. All night long the struggle continued, the Germans arriving with fury before our lines, where our fire mowed them down.

Monday, May 8.—In the morning a counterattack completed our success; we retook the communicating trench which had been taken from us. However, the bombardment continued against the Avocourt Wood; during the day the

enemy attempted a new attack, this time taking as their objective 287-Meter Hill, a long ridge which descends toward Haucourt, between the Forges stream, which takes its rise at the west end of the hill, and a dry ravine. The assailants were not even able to reach our trenches; our cannon and machine guns stopped them as soon as they showed themselves.

The Germans were not sparing of their assaults against 304-Meter Hill. During the whole night of May 8-9 they rained shells upon it.

Tuesday, May 9.—At 3 o'clock in the morning the Germans attempted a new surprise attack, which was equally fruitless, as was a second attempt during the afternoon.

Wednesday, May 10.—Yet another attack was made against the approaches of 287-Meter Hill; it was repulsed and left a number of prisoners in our hands.

On the right (east) bank of the Meuse, from May 2 to May 6, there was only the usual artillery duel; this gained vigor on the night of May 6-7, and grew to a vigorous bombardment of our trenches connecting the Haudromont Wood with the approaches of Douaumont Fort. On May 7 an infantry attack developed, carried out by a division; the onrush was such that on the west, that is to the south of the Haudromont Wood, our first-line trenches were entered on a front of 500 meters, (550 yards.) The enemy paid very dearly for this success, which was, besides, very short-lived, as, on the following night, a series of counterattacks drove him out of most of the ground gained. During the night of May 8-9 we completed the recapture of these lines in the neighborhood of Thiaumont farm.

On Wednesday, May 10, a small offensive action carried out by our troops on the western slopes of Le Mort Homme allowed us to occupy enemy trench elements, and to capture two machine guns and about 100 men.

Thursday, May 11; Friday, May 12.—On Thursday, at Le Mort Homme, and on Friday, to the southeast of Haucourt, that is, toward 287-Meter Hill, we widened our positions by local actions.

Saturday, May 13.—On their side, on three occasions, on May 10, 12, and 13,

the Germans tried to get close to our lines; they failed at 287-Meter Hill and on 304-Meter Hill.

Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, May 14-16.—During the following days enemy action was confined to bombardment, directed particularly against 304-Meter Hill and Avocourt Wood. On May 16 a German attack in this direction was quickly stopped; as was also an attack with grenades against Le Mort Homme.

On the east bank of the Meuse several attempts were made against our positions between Haudromont Wood and the Vaux Pond. On May 11, at 2 o'clock in the morning, the Germans assaulted the wooded zone situated to the west of the pond; our soldiers drove them back with the bayonet and with grenades. On the following day, May 12, after a prolonged bombardment of all our lines on this front, two successive attacks against our trenches to the southeast of Douaumont Fort were repulsed with serious loss to the enemy. He returned to the charge during the night, to the west of the Thiaumont farm.

Wednesday, May 17.—The attack was repeated in the morning; our barrier fire was sufficient to throw the enemy back, and in this direction his effort was ended.

On the ridges of the Meuse, to the south of the Vaux region, besides the artillery struggle nothing was announced except the check of a strong reconnaissance toward Les Eparges, and the success of an attack by our troops against a point, not precisely indicated, between Les Eparges and St. Mihiel. It might be supposed that the enemy was massing troops in the plain, as our long-range guns fired on enemy detachments to the southeast of Thiaucourt.

Our airmen were also active. On the night of May 16-17 our air squadrons dropped bombs on several enemy bivouacs at Damvillers and Wille-Devant-Chaumont, to the north of Vaux; on the railway station at Briulles, whence the military railway to Nantillois and Montfaucon branches off; and on the villages of Nantillois and Romagnes-sous-Montfaucon.

Half a Million Men Fighting Like "Madmen in a Volcano"

By a French Staff Captain

With the beginning of the fourth month of fighting at Verdun the deadlock changed to the most terrific pitched battle in history. Fully half a million men were engaged altogether, without a respite from slaughter for several days. Following are the impressions of an eyewitness:

VERDUN has become a battle of madmen in the midst of a volcano.

Whole regiments melt in a few minutes, and others take their places only to perish in the same way. Between Saturday morning (May 20) and noon Tuesday (May 23) we estimate that the Germans used up 100,000 men on the west Meuse front alone. That is the price they paid for the recapture of our recent gains and the seizure of our outlying po-

sitions. The valley separating Le Mort Homme from Hill 287 is choked with bodies. A full brigade was mowed down in a quarter hour's holocaust by our machine guns. Le Mort Homme itself passed from our possession, but the crescent Bourrus position to the south prevents the enemy from utilizing it.

The scene there is appalling, but is dwarfed in comparison with fighting around Douaumont. West of the Meuse, at least, one dies in the open air, but at Douaumont is the horror of darkness, where the men fight in tunnels, screaming with the lust of butchery, deafened by shells and grenades, stifled by smoke.

Even the wounded refuse to abandon the struggle. As though possessed by devils, they fight on until they fall sense-

less from loss of blood. A surgeon in a front-line post told me that, in a redoubt at the south part of the fort, of 200 French dead fully half had more than two wounds. Those he was able to treat seemed utterly insane. They kept shouting war cries and their eyes blazed, and, strangest of all, they appeared indifferent to pain. At one moment anesthetics ran out owing to the impossibility of bringing forward fresh supplies through the bombardment. Arms, even legs, were amputated without a groan, and even afterward the men seemed not to have felt the shock. They asked for a cigarette or inquired how the battle was going.

Our losses in retaking the fort were less heavy than was expected, as the enemy was demoralized by the cannonade—by far the most furious I have ever seen from French guns—and also was taken by surprise. But the subsequent action took a terrible toll. Cover was all blown to pieces. Every German rush was preceded by two or three hours of hell-storm, and then wave after wave of attack in numbers that seemed unceasing. Again and again the defenders' ranks were renewed.

Never have attacks been pushed home so continuously. The fight for Cemetery

Hill at Gettysburg was no child's play, nor for Hougoumont at Waterloo, but here men have been flung 5,000 at a time at brief intervals for the last forty-eight hours. Practically the whole sector has been covered by a cannonade, compared to which Gettysburg was a hailstorm and Waterloo mere fireworks. Some shell holes were thirty feet across, the explosion killing fifty men simultaneously.

Before our lines the German dead lie heaped in long rows. I am told one observer calculated there were 7,000 in a distance of 700 yards. Besides they cannot succor their wounded, whereas of ours one at least in three is removed safely to the rear. Despite the bombardment supplies keep coming. Even the chloroform I spoke of arrived after an hour's delay when two sets of bearers had been killed.

The dogged tenacity needed to continue the resistance far surpasses the furious élan of the attack. We know, too, the Germans cannot long maintain their present sacrifices. Since Saturday the enemy has lost two, if not three, for each one of us. Every bombardment withstood, every rush checked brings nearer the moment of inevitable exhaustion. Then will come our recompense for these days of horror.

How the Battle of Verdun Began

By a Combatant

This article in the *Paris Matin* of May 10 created a stir, and other papers were forbidden to quote from it. The next day the French Government published an official denial of its main point. The text of this denial appears at the end of the present translation.

"General Pétain was able to save a particularly delicate situation."—Official citation in the Order of the Day.

A CERTAIN number of facts are now available to throw at least a little light upon the beginnings of the battle still raging at Verdun. There is, for instance, the mention of General Pétain in the official dispatches, in which it was stated that he "was able to save a delicate situation." There is, besides, the replacing of General Langle de Cary, who commanded the central group of armies (of which the Verdun army forms a part) by this same General Pétain.

Nor is the public ignorant of the fact that General de Castelnau, in his capacity as Major General, [second to Joffre,] hastened to the Meuse as soon as the wide character of the German attack became known, and took measures on his personal initiative which brought about the French "restoration."

In what respect was the situation "delicate"? What were the responsibilities assumed in the circumstances? Certain details on these points have already been ascertained; we wish to add some new ones.

It will be remembered that the whole

month of February had been marked by a series of local offensives made by the Germans against the entire line of our front from the sea to the Vosges—*except the Verdun sector*. There was a manifest tactical policy in this, intended to cause us to make changes in the region where the real attack was to be made, and to hinder us from concentrating our reserves to stop it. The fact is that General Pétain's army, which our Commander in Chief was reserving for the honor of this vital blow, was nowhere near Verdun, and that it could not be conveyed there until the battle had already been going on several hours.

Nevertheless, several military leaders had seen to it that the German strategy did not circumvent them. For several weeks they had been announcing that the blow of the enemy would strike precisely upon the banks of the Meuse, where no action seemed to be contemplated. They based their predictions upon very serious information, according to which great preparations had long been in progress behind the German front in this sector, whole divisions and even new army corps being concentrated there, and a formidable quantity of heavy artillery and munitions accumulated.

Two currents of opinion then prevailed in our General Staff. Some of the officers held that Verdun was going to be the actual objective chosen by the Germans; the others persisted in refusing to regard that eventuality as probable. Our front, which then ran to the top of the Caures Woods, was held chiefly by territorial and African troops. As General Herr, who at that time commanded the whole intrenched camp of Verdun and its outposts, called for reinforcements, the Twentieth Corps, then resting in the Mailly camp, was placed at his disposal, but was not dispatched to the scene.

These were the conditions when the attack of Feb. 21 took place. For thirty-six hours the army did not realize all the gravity of the case. It was only when the folding back of our lines became accentuated—we were fighting with three divisions (60,000 men) against five army corps (200,000 men)—and when we had to rectify our front beyond Samogneux,

Beaumont, and Ornes that the situation appeared in its true light. What was to be done? It appeared impossible to oppose an adequate dike to the German flood, because no such dike was ready, and time was lacking to improvise it. It must not be forgotten, either, that no new railroad track had been laid in the region of Verdun, and that—since the Germans were at St. Mihiel—we possessed, in all and for all, only one single railway to transport everything to our stronghold. Besides, at the end of February the Meuse was in flood, and the crossing of bridges accessible to the heavy projectiles of the enemy was becoming precarious.

A decision, believed to be one of prudence, was prepared—the *evacuation of the whole of the right bank of the Meuse*. The screen of troops fighting on the first line had no other mission than to resist while retreating and thus retard the enemy as much as possible, in order to permit the withdrawal of the rest of our forces and, if possible, our supplies to the other bank of the Meuse.

These orders had already been received when General de Castelnau arrived at Verdun. He saw, he judged, and, of his own initiative, possessing as Major General the delegated powers of the Generalissimo, he decided to reverse the plan that had been decreed, and to hold his ground, cost what it might, against the enemy on the plateau of Douaumont. Thus Verdun would be saved. The task offered immense difficulties, and General Pétain was commissioned to perform it.

The first act that had a decisive influence on subsequent events was the utilization of automobile trucks for the transport of troops and munitions. Four thousand seven hundred trucks were taken from the neighboring armies and these, running day and night without interruption, established between Bar-le-Duc and Verdun the "endless pulley" system that saved the day. It was by grace of these trucks that the Twentieth Army Corps, brought by railway from Mailly to Bar-le-Duc, could be transferred in twelve hours from Bar-le-Duc to the plateau of Douaumont. The transfer was begun Feb. 24 at 7 o'clock in the

evening. The next morning at 10 that army corps was taking part in the battle. The same trucks in the days immediately following assured the transport of the whole army of General Pétain, and, throughout the two and a half months of the battle thus far they have never ceased to carry the provisions, the munitions, the fresh troops, the returning wounded, the evacuated battalions, and the units relieved at the front.

But, though General de Castelnau had taken it upon himself to modify the orders first given, these orders had already begun to be executed at certain points. The development of the battle of Verdun in the last days of February appears particularly confused because the counterorders of General de Castelnau could not reach all the units in time; some of them acted on the original orders, even after the whole general plan had been changed. We cannot now, for reasons easy to understand, reveal the reverses that resulted from this state of things. * * *

This article called forth from the Ministry of the Interior the following communiqué:

At no moment of the Verdun battle has the high command given orders with

a view to the retreat of the French troops to the left bank of the Meuse.

On the contrary, from the morning of Feb. 23, General Langle de Cary instructed the troops of the right bank that the occupation of every point, even after it had been overrun, of every position even completely surrounded, must be maintained at any price, and that there must be only one order, "Hold on."

On the 24th, in the evening, the General in Chief gave the order to hold the front between the Meuse and Woevre by employing all means at the disposal of the army. He also directed General de Castelnau to Verdun.

The next morning, Feb. 25, while on his way, General de Castelnau confirmed by telephone to General Herr that in conformity with the orders of the General in Chief the positions of the right bank of the Meuse ought to be held at any cost.

Finally, on the evening of the same day the General in Chief sent to General Pétain on his taking up his command the following order: "I have ordered yesterday, the 24th, that the right bank of the Meuse to the north of Verdun be held. Any commander who gives an order to retreat will be brought before a court-martial."

How Different Nationalities Act in Battle

As to the qualities and characteristics of the various non-Teutonic soldiers of Europe, German army officers speak interestingly and not without generosity. The French soldier is gallant, nervous, and very brave, only it is difficult to make him return a second or third time into the same fire. The English fighter is dogged and individually resourceful. The Italian, though ferocious in assault, is discouraged by failure. He goes on one impulse and hates to repass his own dead for a second charge. That is how a German sees three of his adversaries. As to a fourth, he volunteers nothing, but if he is pressed, he will add: "The Russian is terrible."

The meaning of that assertion develops slowly, with many hesitations. It is not that the individual Russian soldier is particularly terrible. No, that is not what he means to say. The Russian cannot be singularized. You have to think of Russians, infinite in plurality, a slow-moving, ominous, imposing mass. They come in lines ten and twelve deep, heedless and heavy, so controlled by their own momentum that they cannot stop. They will go anywhere, into anything, again and again, as if they did not know how to be afraid. "The only thing you can do," says the German officer, "is to slaughter them and pray that you will have ammunition enough to keep it up."

Why Verdun?

By Gabriel Hanotaux

Of the Paris Figaro and the French Academy

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY]

THE obstinacy of the offensive at Verdun gives increasing proof each day of the importance which the Germans attach to that enterprise. It is desirable that the French soldier, the "soldier of Verdun," should be informed fully of the causes of this desperation, for thus he will be convinced more deeply each day that he is fighting not only for ground and the honor of victory, but that he is defending, at the price of his blood, the very life of his native land.

Each minute of these long months and each clod of that earth represents a unit of our national existence. By each act, by each moment of suffering, our soldiers are preparing in advance the conditions of an advantageous and liberating peace. They are at this very moment the creators of the future. With cannon shots, with rifle shots, with bayonet thrusts, with grenade blows, they are destroying, rag by rag, the "grand German plan." The Kaiser has decided to risk his highest stakes upon this card; he has intrusted to his troops at Verdun the supreme ambition of Germany. If this attack fails, the whole Pan-Germanist scheme crumbles and its body will soon measure the earth. The monster will no longer have any other hope than that of prolonging the phases of its death agony.

From the beginning of the war the German plan has aimed principally at Verdun. If the Crown Prince has been placed at the head of the assailants, it is because the decisive victory was reserved for him. The movement in Belgium was meant to turn the flank of the adversary, but to conquer him the Germans counted especially—in accordance with the principles of the elder Moltke—upon the offensive of the centre.

It is in harmony with the energy of the German leaders to group their fighting

units and employ them in mass formation against the enemy, in order to break his principal force. Now, the principal force of the French Army from the beginning has been in the east, and it is still that frontier which popular instinct calls the "iron frontier." Of that force Verdun is the apex; it is the tooth penetrating into the live flesh of the enemy. Without Verdun the German army advancing on Paris could have no free communication with Germany. Without Verdun there could be no sure protection for Metz. Ever since the ancient treaty that divided up the heritage of the sons of Charlemagne, Verdun has been the point around which all the history of France and Germany has pivoted: Verdun is the name that one finds again and again on all the pages of our history.

Geographically Verdun presents two incomparable advantages for the German offensive. It commands the Valley of the Meuse. As some one had said, Verdun is the "hinge" between the eastern and northern provinces. We have no other way of liberating our country from German servitude than to hold on until death to this corner of earth; otherwise there is no longer any line of communication between Lille and Nancy. To allow the line of the Meuse to be crushed in would be to erase from our history the battle of the Catalanian Fields, the battle of Valmy, our eternal defense on the Argonne, and, finally, the battle of the Marne, which is only a repetition of its glorious predecessors.

This geographic interest is rounded out, as we now know—thanks to the luminous writings of M. Engerand—by an economic interest no less powerful and no less agonizing. Germany cannot remain mistress of the world's metal industries unless she can keep and extend her possessions of mineral ores in the

French province of Briey and the neighboring regions. We have the statement of the German metal workers that Germany could not continue the present war if she no longer controlled the iron ore of Lorraine, technically known as minette. We have a statement from German experts declaring that so long as these mines are under the cannon of Verdun the economic and military destiny of Germany remains precarious and exposed to French domination. We are in a position to affirm that one of the chief reasons for the war has been the desire to conquer the Briey basin and seize the strategic key of that immense wealth—in a word, Verdun!

If the French soldier knows all this he will understand why he is fighting, and why, in defending that ground, he is defending both the heart and the breastplate of his fatherland.

Strategically the reiterated determination of the Germans to conquer at this point in order to obtain "their" victory may be gathered also from their own avowals. In the first part of the war the plan was to capture Verdun, and it was because Verdun did not fall that the German Army had to substitute the war of trenches for the war of manoeuvres. We can believe their own statements on this subject. One of their historians (Gottlob Egelhaaf) wrote:

"If the Crown Princes of Bavaria and Prussia had been in a position to take Verdun in August-September, 1914, and thus to pierce the line of the Meuse, the German armies would have broken through to Paris in a single movement. But the Princes remained nailed at Verdun * * * and so the supreme commander had to decide to withdraw the right wing of the German Army. The Germans retired, then, from the Marne as far back as the Aisne. Because

Verdun could not be taken, it appeared necessary to change the plan of the war."

Is it clear? Do we need any higher or more striking proof? If so, who does not recall the telegram addressed by the Kaiser to the Landtag of Brandenburg, in which he celebrated the taking of Verdun, which he believed to be an accomplished fact:

"I rejoice greatly in the new and grand examples of Brandenburg vigor and fidelity even unto death which the sons of that province have furnished in the last few days, in the course of their irresistible assault upon the powerful fortress of our chief enemy."

He really thought—and it was repeated a hundred times after him in Germany—that the taking of Verdun was the end of the war, a decisive German victory. And that is why the desperate resistance of our soldiers, "the French victory of Verdun," has been and will be for him and his followers the supreme disillusionment.

This is why our magnificent corps of Generals, and our army, now responding so nobly to their appeals, realize that at Verdun, as on the Marne, we must conquer or perish. General Joffre gave us the key to these unanimous sentiments when he made known his telegram, sent at the time of his famous order of the day on the Marne:

"The evening of the same day, the 25th, the Commander in Chief sent to General Pétain, then taking command, the following order: 'Yesterday, the 24th, I gave orders to hold the right bank of the Meuse, north of Verdun. Any commander who shall give an order to retreat will be court-martialed.'"

Compare the two telegrams, that of the Emperor and that of the General, and you can judge which is the hand that is engraving history.



The Iron Key to War and Peace

By Henri Berenger

Member of the French Senate

Further data on the crucial value of the French iron mines seized by Germany are furnished by Senator Berenger in Le Matin:

THERE is no reason to be astonished that Germany, from the very beginning of the war, has sought to maintain possession of the Basin of Briey, which represented 90 per cent. of our iron production, and that the attack on Verdun has been for the purpose of confirming and perpetuating this possession.

To understand all the tragedy of our problem it is necessary to know that it is precisely the Basin of Briey which is the battlefield for the sovereignty of iron between Germany and France. The Basin of Briey lies between Verdun and Metz, like a gigantic key of the war, thrown at equal distance from these two fortresses of the Lorraine frontier.

From this fact may not one perceive the interest which the Germans have in taking Verdun—an interest equal to that which we should have in retaking Metz?

Certain reliable figures, collected before the war and since the war began, will impart to all Frenchmen the truth.

Before the war Germany produced annually 28,000,000 tons of iron, of which 21,000,000 tons came from that part of the Basin of Briey which had been annexed to Germany since 1870-71.

France produced annually 22,000,000 tons of iron, of which 15,000,000 tons came from the part of the Basin of Briey which had remained French.

Since the war began France, having lost the Basin of Briey through invasion, has been almost exclusively furnished with iron from England and America.

Germany, on the contrary, having occupied at the same time the Basin of Briey in France and in Luxemburg, has put in operation nearly all the great furnaces there and thus adds to her 28,000,000 tons, before the war, the 15,000,000 tons of our basin and the 6,000,000 of

the Basin of Luxemburg—that is 28 plus 15 plus 6, making 49,000,000 tons of iron for herself and her allies.

If we recall that in Germany, thanks to the Rhenish foundries, 100 tons of pig iron produce 92 tons of steel, Germany has at her disposition about 45,000,000 tons of steel for military and naval appliances of all sorts.

Far from having realized against Germany the essential brockage, which would be the brockage of the iron, the prime material in this war, we have, on the contrary, left her in possession of 90 per cent. of our French production of iron and of 80 per cent. of the national production of steel we had before the war.

The artless proof of what I set forth here has been for some time furnished by German documents which the Comité des Forges de France [Committee of the Foundries of France] has published in its circulars Nos. 655, 666, and 3,287.

Here, notably, is what one may read since May 20, 1915—just a year ago—in the "Confidential Memorandum on the Conditions of Future Peace" which was addressed to von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of the Empire, by the six great industrial and agricultural associations of Germany:

If the production of pig iron and steel had not been doubled since August, 1914, the continuation of the war would have been impossible. At present the mineral of Briey furnishes from 60 to 80 per cent. of the appliances made from iron and steel. If this production be disturbed the war will be practically lost.

Once masters of Verdun the Germans will be able to believe themselves masters of the indefinite continuation of the war, because the Basin of Briey incloses in the totality of its subsoil more than 3,000,000,000 tons of iron.

On the other hand, if we remain masters of Verdun and again, by our armies, become masters of Metz, we shall, by the same stroke, put an end to the war, because we shall have taken from Germany

21 plus 15 plus 6, amounting to 42,000,000 tons of iron of the 49,000,000 tons which the empire contains—that is to say, nine-

tenths of her total production of steel, the entire key to her production of war material.

Germany and the Lorraine Iron Mines

By Otto Hué

Socialist Member of the Reichstag

Confirmation of the statement that Germany would not have steel enough to continue the war if it were to lose control of the rich mines east of Verdun is furnished by the following extract from an article in the Metallarbeiter-Zeitung, the weekly organ of the German Metal Workers' Union:

IN Alsace-Lorraine a great ore mining and iron and steel making industry has developed in a period of time so brief as to remind us of conditions in the United States. In 1872 only twenty mining concessions were granted, the ore output amounted to only 990,000 tons, and the pig iron production to but 220,000 tons. In 1878-79 along came the process for the extraction of phosphorus, named after its inventors, Thomas and Gilchrist, and already in 1882 there were 230 mining concessions granted in Alsace-Lorraine, and the production of ore soon reached 2,000,000 tons, although the work of smelting at the point of production developed more slowly, because the construction of big smelting plants required more time and money than that necessary for the opening of the mines, the greater part of which was then close to the surface.

It is sufficiently well known that the Thomas-Gilchrist process raised the Lorraine-Luxemburg iron ore, (minette,) which contained too much phosphorus for the older Bessemer process, to the rank of a most profitable ore with one blow. This is the base for a development of the mining, iron, and steel industry in Alsace-Lorraine unparalleled in Europe. The production of minette ore jumped from 2,150,000 tons in 1885 to 21,130,000 tons in 1913. Of the round 19,000,000 tons of pig iron smelted within the limits of the German Tariff Union (Germany

and Luxemburg) in 1913 some 33 per cent. came from Lorraine and Luxemburg. The outbreak of the war interrupted the increased use of the big new smelters in the imperial territories—Hagendingen, for example. The balance of our production of pig iron and crude steel began to swing more toward the southwest corner of Germany.

Of the production of iron ore within the district covered by the tariff union in 1913, which amounted to almost 36,000,000 tons, 21,100,000 came from Lorraine and 7,300,000 from Luxemburg. Therefore the minette district alone produces 80 per cent. of our domestic output of iron ore. It is true that we exported 2,610,000 tons of iron ore in 1913, nearly all of which went to Belgium and France, but we imported 3,800,000 tons (principally minette) from there in exchange, especially because the mixing of French with German minette makes a better smelting combination. Furthermore, we received 4,550,000 tons of iron ore from Sweden and 3,630,000 tons from Spain, besides smaller quantities from Russia, Algeria, Tunis, Norway, &c.

In the main, however, these ores, which are generally richer and consequently cost more to extract, go to a few of the big smelters of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia that assured themselves of favorable conditions through long-term contracts, as with Sweden, for instance. Of the 34,000,000 tons of iron ore worked up in German smelters and foundries in 1913 some 23,250,000 tons came from the interior of the empire, and as of that only about 7,000,000 tons were produced outside of Alsace-Lorraine, a simple calculation shows that already in 1913 some 70 per cent. of the German iron ore used came from Lorraine.

German War Losses the Greatest in History

GENERAL JACOB EUGENE DURYEE, a veteran of the American civil war, has prepared a study which shows that the German casualties in the present war exceed the war losses in Europe and America for the entire eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

His study shows that in the battles of the eighteenth century there was a total of 1,865,700 men engaged, of whom 316,450 were killed or wounded; in the battles of the nineteenth century there were 7,315,912 men engaged and 1,088,641 killed or wounded, making a total for both centuries of 9,181,612 men, with casualties of 1,405,091. He quotes the British official estimate of German losses, published in *THE NEW YORK TIMES* of May 11, showing casualties of 2,822,079, concluding that in the twenty-one months since August, 1914, the Germans have lost 1,084,000 more men than were lost by all the nations of Europe and America in the battles of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In none of the battles General Duryee takes into consideration were there less than 75,000 men engaged, the lowest on the list being the battle of Orthez, in 1814, with 77,000 men engaged. The greatest number in any battle, exclusive of the present war, was at Leipsic in 1813, when 440,000 men fought. In the four great battles of the nineteenth century—Leipsic, Wagram, Borodino, and Bantzen—there were all together 1,373,000 men engaged. In the eighteenth century there was only one battle fought in which there were as many as 200,000 fighters, the battle of Malplaquet, in 1709.

In comparison with the many battles in the present war, in which many hundreds of thousands face each other, General Duryee shows that of the fifteen great battles of the civil war in none were as many as 200,000 engaged. The battle of Fredericksburg in 1862 with

190,000 men and the battle of Chancellorsville with 192,000 in 1863 were the largest in the number of men engaged. The losses in these battles, however, were smaller than in others in which fewer men were engaged, notably Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Spottsylvania, and the Wilderness. The bloodiest battle fought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was Leipsic, when 92,000 were killed or wounded of the 440,000 engaged. The greatest battle on this continent was Gettysburg, where 37,000 were killed and wounded of 163,000 engaged. The bloodiest battle was Chickamauga, where 35,100 of the 128,000 engaged were killed or wounded.

General Duryee gives a list of the sixteen great battles of the eighteenth century, as follows:

Name and Date.	Men Engaged.	Killed and Wounded.
Blenheim, 1704.....	116,000	31,000
Ramillies, 1706.....	122,000	11,600
Oudenard, 1708.....	170,000	20,000
Malplaquet, 1709.....	200,000	34,000
Dettingen, 1743.....	97,000	9,350
Fontenoy, 1745.....	90,000	13,000
Prague, 1757.....	124,000	22,000
Kollin, 1757.....	87,000	19,000
Leuthen, 1757.....	111,000	16,000
Breslau, 1757.....	110,000	11,700
Zorndorf, 1758.....	84,700	32,000
Hochkirch, 1758.....	132,000	14,000
Zullichau, 1759.....	113,000	31,000
Torgau, 1760.....	106,000	24,000
Castiglione, 1796.....	90,000	17,000
Total	1,752,700	305,650

General Duryee lists the following as the great battles of the nineteenth century, many of which seem skirmishes when compared with the great struggles now going on in Europe:

Name and Date.	Men Engaged.	Killed and Wounded.
Hohenlinden, 1800....	106,000	14,500
Austerlitz, 1805.....	148,000	25,000
Jena, 1806	98,000	17,000
Eylau, 1807.....	133,500	42,000
Heilsburg, 1807.....	169,000	22,000
Friedland, 1807.....	142,000	34,000
Eckmeihl, 1809.....	145,000	15,000
Aspern, 1809.....	170,000	45,000

Name and Date.	Men Engaged.	Killed and Wounded.
Wagram, 1809.....	370,000	44,000
Talavera, 1809.....	109,000	15,500
Salamanca, 1812.....	91,000	15,000
Borodino, 1812.....	263,000	75,000
Baptzen, 1813.....	300,000	24,900
Vittoria, 1813.....	143,000	10,000
Leipsic, 1813.....	440,000	92,000
Orthez, 1814.....	77,000	6,050
Le Rotherie, 1814.....	120,000	12,500
Laon, 1814.....	112,000	9,000
Ligny, 1815.....	159,000	24,000
Toulouse, 1814.....	90,000	10,550
Waterloo, 1815.....	170,000	42,000
Alma, 1854.....	86,000	9,100
Inkerman, 1854.....	83,700	13,787
Magenta, 1859.....	108,000	11,000
Solferino, 1859.....	295,000	31,500
Shiloh, 1862.....	98,000	21,000
Seven Pines, 1862.....	90,000	11,165
Gaines Mills, 1862.....	90,000	13,000
Malvern Hill, 1862.....	150,000	8,300
Second Manassas, 1862.....	127,000	22,000
Antietam, 1862.....	128,000	23,582
Fredericksburg, 1862.....	190,000	16,971
Chickamauga, 1863.....	128,000	35,100
Chancellorsville, 1863.....	192,000	24,000
Gettysburg, 1863.....	163,000	37,000
Chattanooga, 1863.....	99,000	8,500
Stone River, 1863.....	80,712	18,500
Spottsylvania, 1864.....	150,000	25,000
Cold Harbor, 1864.....	168,000	11,700
Wilderness, 1864.....	179,000	26,000
Koenigratz, 1866.....	417,000	26,894
Worth, 1870.....	135,000	18,642
Vionville, 1870.....	168,000	32,800
Gravelotte, 1870.....	320,000	30,000
Plevna, 1877.....	115,000	19,000
Total	7,315,912	1,088,641

General Duryee gives the following list of German casualties as taken from official British compilations reported in THE NEW YORK TIMES:

Losses of German Empire up to May 1, 1915: Killed or died of wounds, 664,552; missing, 197,094; severely wounded, 385,515; wounded, 254,627; slightly wounded, 1,023,212; total, 2,525,000. This does not include prisoners, those who died of sickness, or those wounded who remained with units, the grand total being 2,822,079.

LATER BRITISH ESTIMATE

According to a British official tabulation of the German casualty lists, Germany had lost 2,924,586 soldiers up to the end of May, of which 734,412 were killed. This does not include losses in naval engagements or in the colonies. The German figures for the month of May alone, as compiled by the British authorities, were 22,471 dead, 72,075 wounded, and 7,961 prisoners and missing, making a total of 102,507. The ing, making a total of 102,507.

The grand totals as indicated above are:

Dead	734,412
Wounded	1,851,652
Prisoners and missing.....	338,522

Total 2,924,586

A Comparison That Shows the Huge Cost of the War

Edmond Thery, a French economist, has compiled statistics showing that the present belligerents have already spent more than twice as much as the total cost of all the preceding wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He says in substance:

The fifteen years of war waged by Napoleon increased the public debt of France by 588,000,000 francs, while the Crimean war alone cost the republic 1,660,000,000. Great Britain spent 1,550,000,000 in the Crimean, while that war cost Austria 343,000,000, and Turkey and Sardinia together 642,000,000 francs. France spent 650,000,000 francs on the Mexican war, and 853,000,000 in the conflict against Austria for the liberation of Italy.

Prussia in her wars against Denmark and Austria spent about 2,000,000,000 francs, while the German States and France together spent about 15,000,000,000 on the war of 1870, including 5,000,000,000 francs indemnity paid by France to Germany. The war of 1877-78 against Turkey cost Russia about 2,700,000,000 francs, while she spent 6,300,000,000 in the war with Japan, as against 4,500,000,000 spent by Japan.

The total from the beginning of 1801 up to August, 1914, amounts to about 65,000,000,000 francs, or less than one-half of what the belligerent powers have already expended on the present conflict.

Creating the British Army

Story of Lord Kitchener's Achievements Leading Up to Military Compulsion

[Condensed for CURRENT HISTORY from an article by J. B. Firth in The London Telegraph, published a short time before Kitchener's death]

THE Military Service bill will mark the definite commencement of a new era for the British Army. Military necessity has driven Great Britain to conform to the Continental model, because she was required to raise armies on a Continental scale. Having raised them, she must maintain them. Voluntarism sufficed for the former; after a gallant effort it has proved unequal to the latter duty.

Lord Kitchener is to be congratulated most heartily upon a wonderful achievement. These armies are of his raising. He must have passed through some very anxious months during the several phases of the recruiting problem. But he has always presented to the public a calm and imperturbable front. From the outset Lord Kitchener showed a sound prescience of the magnitude and duration of the struggle, and the best monument of his tenure of the Secretaryship of State for War is the size and quality of the British Army of today.

When the news came of the definite failure of the original French offensive, which necessitated the perilous retreat of the British Army from Mons, all idea must have vanished of limiting the British military contribution to the maintenance of 160,000 men in France. Great Britain had to throw all in that she possibly could, and to do so she must raise armies as never before in her long history. There was only one man who could do it. There was only one man whom the country would have trusted to do it. That was Lord Kitchener. The nation called him to the War Office. He went there on Aug. 6, and the very next day Parliament sanctioned the addition of 500,000 men to the regular establishment, and Lord Kitchener issued his first appeal for 100,000 recruits. There was

a magic in the name of Lord Kitchener all through that wonderful Autumn of 1914. He had the complete confidence of the Government and the unquestioning obedience of the entire people. If at any moment down to the battle of the Marne, when the tide of retreat was stayed and the Germans were thrown back to the Aisne, Lord Kitchener had appealed to the country to accept compulsory service, there are those who think that it would have been accepted without serious demur.

Lord Kitchener made his first statement on the army in the House of Lords on Aug. 25, 1914, saying incidentally:

While India, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are all sending us powerful contingents, the territorials are replying with loyalty to the stern call of duty which has come to them with such exceptional force. Sixty-nine battalions have, with fine patriotism, already volunteered for service abroad, and when trained and organized in the larger formations will be able to take their places in the line. The 100,000 recruits for which, in the first place, it has been thought necessary to call have already been practically secured. * * * The empires with which we are at war have called to their colors almost their entire male population. The principle we on our part shall observe is this, that while their maximum force undergoes a constant diminution, the reinforcements we prepare shall steadily and increasingly flow out until we have an army in the field which in numbers, not less than in quality, will not be unworthy of the power and responsibilities of the British Empire.

It would be much too long a story to describe in detail the ebbs and flows of the tide of recruiting:

Aug. 28.—Another 100,000 called for. The age limit raised to 35.

Sept. 10.—The Prime Minister asked the House of Commons to sanction the raising of a second half million, and said that 439,000 had already joined, not counting territorials. On one day alone, Sept. 3, no fewer than 33,204 recruits came in.

Sept. 11.—The response was still so good that the height was raised to 5 feet 6 inches.

Sept. 15.—It was announced that 501,580 recruits had been obtained—from England, 396,751; from Scotland, 64,444; from Ireland, 20,419, and from Wales, 19,966.

A most unfortunate impression was created that the military authorities were getting not only more men than they could at once equip—that was obvious—but more than they actually required. The result was a sharp drop, and at the end of October it was necessary to reduce the minimum height to 5 feet 4 inches and raise the age to 38. All through the Winter the situation remained much the same. Officially, satisfaction was expressed; privately it became known that Ministers were growing rather anxious. People began to discuss seriously whether compulsion would not be found necessary. A bombardment of an east coast watering place, a Zeppelin raid, a heavy casualty list, a particularly frightful example of German frightfulness might cause the tide to flow with greater vigor for a time, but the great wave of enthusiasm which, in a marvelously short time, had raised one service battalion after another for all the more famous regiments had largely spent itself. When on May 18, 1915, Lord Kitchener appealed for yet another 300,000, the age limit was raised to 40, and the minimum height reduced to 5 feet 2 inches.

By this time the nation had begun to realize the serious economic results which flowed from the heroic efforts made to repair our military unpreparedness. Money had been poured out like water. For the equipment of the new armies—or Kitchener's army, as it was popularly called—everything was lacking, and everything had to be found in a hurry. Manufacturers, not merely in this country, but in all parts of the world—especially the United States—were deluged with orders for supplies of every conceivable sort. And as the manufacturing districts of France were also largely in the hands of the enemy, our ally, too, required to be provided with vast quantities of raw material. So, too, with Russia, Serbia, and later on with Italy. The British fleet kept the seas open, and Great Britain became more and more the workshop of the Allies at the very mo-

ment when her main industries were crying out for labor to replace the men who had left their trades to join the colors. Voluntaryism is a magnificent ideal, and it was voluntaryism which filled the ranks of Kitchener's army and replenished the territorial battalions. Probably there was not a single expert at the War Office who had ever supposed before the war that pure voluntaryism could raise, say, two million men, or that without a measure of direct general compulsion nearly four million men would answer the call. But that a very heavy price had to be paid for the recruitment of thousands of skilled men, who could best have served their country by remaining at work, only began to be realized in the Spring of 1915.

It began to be whispered that the army was short of ammunition. Then rumor took more definite shape, and the shortage was declared to be most serious in high-explosive shells. But this may be said, that even at that time the whole of the available resources had been laid under contribution, and gigantic orders had been given. It was the deliveries which were woefully behindhand. The Liberal Government fell; the Coalition was formed, and its first act, after the establishment of a new Ministry of Munitions under Mr. Lloyd George, was to introduce and pass a National Registration bill, with its pink forms for men of military age, which was regarded as the first tentative—but unavowed—commitment in the direction of compulsion. "Steps will be taken," said Lord Kitchener, "to approach with a view to enlistment all possible candidates for the army, unmarried men to be preferred before married men, as far as may be." The recruiting problem had become very serious, though even as late as July 28 Mr. Asquith said that "recruiting was highly satisfactory," and in August the Government appointed a committee, presided over by Lord Lansdowne, to consider the best means of making use of the National Register. Its utility had been somewhat compromised by the large number of trades which had been placed on the starred list. On Sept. 15 it was stated that the total number of men who were serving or had served in

CANADIANS IN THE FIERCE FIGHT AT YPRES



From a Painting by W. B. Wollen Which Attracted Much Attention in the Recent Exhibit of the Royal Academy at London
(Photo by Henry Dixon & Son.)

THE SPIRIT OF INDOMITABLE FRANCE AT VERDUN



In This Remarkable War Painting, Entitled "The Fight for the Ravine," the French Artist, M. Simont, Has Depicted a Desperate Struggle to Hold Le Mort Homme

the army and navy was "not far short of three millions," and Mr. Asquith spoke of recruiting having been at a fairly steady figure for thirteen months. But on the same day Lord Kitchener in the House of Lords acknowledged that the Government's "anxious thought had been accentuated and rendered more pressing by the recent falling off in numbers." This was the first clear official intimation that the state of recruiting was bad. A series of recruiting rallies throughout the country was attempted, but with most disappointing results, and the appointment of Lord Derby as Director General of Recruiting on Oct. 6 was in itself a confession that the old methods had yielded their full results, and could yield no more.

The shadow of compulsion was by this time plainly visible. It was no secret that the question had been raised in the Cabinet or that Ministers were sharply divided. Mr. Lloyd George had openly proclaimed himself a convert to compulsion. The Labor Recruiting Committee, while still resolutely opposed to compulsion, issued a striking manifesto declaring their conviction that 30,000 recruits a week were required to maintain at full strength the armies in the field, and calling on trade unionists to rally to and save the voluntary system. Their effort, however, was soon merged in the scheme put forward by Lord Derby, to which compulsionists and anti-compulsionists alike agreed to give a fair and honest trial. The two main features of the scheme were (1) the differentiation between single and married, and (2) the classification of recruits in groups according to their age. After a fairly promising opening the campaign suddenly fell flat. It was only saved from utter failure by the now famous pledge of the Prime Minister that the attested married men should not be called up if any considerable number of single men refrained from offering themselves, until other means had been taken to bring these single men into service. Even so, it was not until the last few days before the time appointed for closing the lists that the great rush came, when in four days—Dec. 10 to 13—no fewer than 1,070,478 presented

themselves for attestation. The following results are taken from Lord Derby's report:

Grand total of men of military age..	5,011,441
Attested, enlisted, and rejected....	2,829,263

Total remaining.....	2,182,178
Single men attested.....	840,000
Of these were starred.....	312,067

Unstarred attested	527,933
Reduced by deductions to.....	343,386
Married men attested.....	1,344,979
Of these were starred.....	449,808

Unstarred attested	895,171
Reduced by deductions to.....	487,676
Unstarred single men unaccounted for	651,160
Immediate enlistments.....	275,031
Attestations, total	2,246,630

Grand total	2,521,661
-------------------	-----------

It was admitted that the figure of 651,160 unstarred single men unaccounted for could not be declared a negligible figure, and the Prime Minister's pledge, therefore, became operative, and called for a measure of compulsion to bring in the unattested single men. In order to emphasize the need of men to repair the wastage of war, the following table of British losses, sustained down to Dec. 9, 1915, was published about this time:

FLANDERS AND FRANCE

	Killed.	W'nd'd.	Miss.	Total.
Officers	4,829	9,943	1,699	16,471
N.C.O.'s & men..	77,473	241,359	52,685	371,517
Total				387,988

DARDANELLES

Officers	1,667	3,028	350	5,045
N.C.O.'s & men..	24,535	72,781	12,194	109,510
Total				114,555

OTHER THEATRES OF WAR

Officers	871	694	100	1,665
N.C.O.'s & men..	10,548	10,953	2,518	24,019
Total				25,684
Total	119,923	338,758	69,546	528,227

The passing of the Military Service bill provoked a serious crisis in the Parliamentary Labor Party, and also in the labor world outside. The small Independent Labor Party was stubbornly opposed to compulsion, and received the support of a number of other labor members. Special labor congresses were called to discuss the whole position as created by

the new bill, and at each there was a large adverse majority against the measure. But in the last critical division the conference determined by a narrow majority not to carry its protest to the point of actual resistance, and the upshot of the matter was that the three Labor Ministers remained in the Coalition Government. The January measure of compulsion was expressly limited to the fulfillment of the Prime Minister's pledge. It only applied to the unattested single men of military age. Meanwhile, the groups of the attested single men were yielding such exceedingly meagre results that one proclamation speedily followed another, till all the single groups had been warned of their approaching call. And then, to the extreme surprise of the attested married men, a proclamation was issued warning the early groups of the date on which they would be required. This was before the process of compulsion had actually been applied to the unattested single men, and a strong agitation at once sprang up among those who complained that the pledge had not been kept in the spirit. Undoubtedly they had a genuine grievance to the extent that they were called up considerably earlier than they had been led to expect, but this was due, as Lord Kitchener frankly admitted, to military necessity, and also to the too generous classifications of reserved occupations.

Meanwhile the shortage in the battalions at the front threatened to grow more serious. The military authorities again began to press upon the Government the urgent necessity of making immediate provision for the near future. Thereupon the old divisions of opinion manifested themselves anew, and after some weeks of delay Mr. Asquith startled the House of Commons just before the Easter adjournment by announcing that, if the differences could not be adjusted, there was a danger of a break-up of the Cabinet, which all agreed would be a "national disaster." But at their very next meeting the Cabinet agreed upon a compromise, and it was arranged that Parliament should sit in secret session, at which

the confidential memoranda and figures which the Cabinet had been considering should be laid before the two houses. This was done, and with eminently satisfactory results, for it reconciled the vast majority of the House of Commons to the necessity of accepting a scheme of immediate and general compulsion. All males between the ages of 18 and 41 are now subject to military service. All distinction between married and single is swept away, and the special financial obligations of the married recruits are to be met, as far as possible, by reasonable and adequate grants from the public purse.

The new Military Service act is designed to make sure that in the supreme crisis of this war there shall be no lack of men. It is said that a single fresh division thrown in at the end of the first battle of Ypres on either side would have won a decisive victory. All through this war Great Britain has been handicapped by an insufficient number of trained divisions. It is the purpose of the Government and of the War Office to make sure that there shall at least be enough at the close.

Much might have been said of the million-sided activities which have accompanied the growth of the British Army—of the wonderful recruiting fervor of the Autumn of 1914; of the incredible labors required to equip such masses of men; of the establishment of the new arsenals; of the conversion of practically the whole engineering capacity of the country to the task of producing guns and munitions of war; of the magnificently loyal part which labor on the whole has played; of the courage and devotion shown by the women of Great Britain in the hour of need. All have contributed their essential aid toward building up the new British Army.

It is a great achievement. If there is one man more than another who has kept cool and collected through all these anxious months, and in spite of all difficulties has gone on building up the splendid fabric whose foundations he laid with such foresight, it is Lord Kitchener. He has wrought wonders.

German Idealism

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By Benjamin Meade Bolton

HERETOFORE when nations have been aroused as the Germans are today they have usually followed the leadership of some dominant personality who appeared to them to be the embodiment of their hopes and ambitions. The great wars of the past are even called by the names of the great Generals who led them. But the present conflict will scarcely go down in history as the war of any one man, for every one is now convinced that this is no Kaiser's war, as was sometimes claimed in the beginning of the conflict, but a people's war as far as the German Nation is concerned. Whether the war has been fomented by the Kaiser, the junkers, and the munition manufacturers or no, there can be no doubt but it now is an expression of the martial spirit of the folk.

The Germans believe, at any rate, that the war is for an ideal, and this ideal has not been exemplified to them by any one individual. It has developed and crystallized out of the teachings of many minds, past and present. This idealism has become a dominant passion; it has needed no one great teacher to spread it as the different cults have been spread. It has acted as an all-pervading ether, infusing itself throughout the whole people.

The Germans also believe that this idealism has placed Germany today in the front rank of civilization, and that to it is due all her wonderful progress and development, intellectual and material. It has led them with one accord to enter upon a conflict with the rest of mankind to force upon an unwilling world their conception of what is best for the destiny of the race. They have come to believe that they represent, as a nation, the highest attainment in intellect, in morals,

and in material and artistic things to which man has ever reached, and some even believe that, unretarded, this idealism will lead to man's domination of heaven itself, as is shown by a quotation from Schelling given below.

The leaders of German thought have long been teaching man's superiority to his environment. That, although he is a product of nature, he is, nevertheless, capable of becoming immeasurably higher than his origin, and that by his devotion to duty and by the full exercise of his energies he has it in his power to shape the progress of the world.

This idealism, which has been fraught with such tremendous consequences, has been recently stated by Professor Francke as "Unconditional submission to duty, salvation through ceaseless striving of will, the moral mission of aesthetic culture." To these Professor John Dewey adds, "an Ideal, a Mission, a Destiny." Professor Dewey also makes the comment that they aspire to combine "with supreme discipline in the outer world of action supreme freedom in the inner world of thought." Professor Francke says: "The State is the manifestation of the divine on earth, an organism uniting in itself all spiritual and moral aspirations."

In Westermann's Monatsheften for February, 1916, Professor Budde has published an illuminating article on German idealism. He says: "It is the fundamental thought in the contemplation of the world (Weltanschauung) which is called idealism that man, although he has sprung from nature, is nevertheless something more than a mere being of nature. On the contrary, in him is a new revelation of truth, with him appears a new world which lends him a

NOTE.—Dr. Benjamin Meade Bolton is a native of Virginia. He attended the University of Heidelberg, 1883-4; Gottingen, 1884-6; Berlin, 1886. He has held professorships in Johns Hopkins and other American colleges, and is well known in scientific circles as a biologist and bacteriologist. He has given close study to philosophical subjects and has been interested in cognate questions relating to Germany.

peculiar dignity and greatness, and presents high aims to his activities. In this way man is liberated from the consequences of nature's happenings, and is lifted up into the realm of freedom in which it is possible for him to shape his life in untrammelled spontaneity, and thus also to wrest from the world of experience an inner personal independence and to act upon it in an elevating and ennobling manner. * * * Especially characteristic of German idealism is precisely this action out of the realm of freedom upon the world of experience filled with its manifold contradictions."

This freedom of which Professor Budde writes is not the freedom of lawlessness. Not the freedom of the pioneer in the wild forest. Not the privilege of escape from duty. It is a subjective freedom, but man attains to its highest exercise only by contact with the world upon which he impresses his will and from which he must extort all that is possible. He must force from her by his "will to power" all that he can. He must exert his energies continuously and strenuously. He must surmount one difficulty only to attack another. Striving is an end in itself. Stress and strain bring development.

German idealism is thus in striking contrast to the Hindu idealism, which aims at a suppression of striving after the things of the world. To the Hindu the world is merely a dreadful figment of man's imagination, and the highest goal is the attainment of a state in which man's soul is unaffected by this nightmare. In order not to add to the horrors of the dream, man should do nothing to cause pain or suffering to any living being, man or animal; but while he sorrows with others in their pain, he must regard his own sufferings with indifference. He must attain to Nirvāna, a placid indifference to his own individual pleasures or pain.

But to the German idealism the world is not "a tent where takes his one-day's rest a Sultan to the realm of death address." On the contrary, the world is a busy workshop. Not a pottery where man molds soft clay, but a sculptor's workroom where man hews with hard

blows of the chisel the image from the resisting stone. Life is no phantom caravan coming from nowhere, proceeding no whither. Life is constant striving and seeking with definite aims and purposes. Man is not a ball cast down upon the field rolling "left or right as strikes the player." Man himself is the player, he strikes the ball. Man comes upon earth not to sit and watch an idle passing show, he is here to dominate the world and to shape its destinies. He must let nothing interfere with his progress, but if need be he must ruthlessly trample upon all opposition. In comparison with this ideal, Professor Dewey says: "That the French and the English should have *specific* objects in view, particular advantages to gain and disadvantages to avoid, seems to many highly instructed Germans * * * something peculiarly base."

German idealism is also in strong contrast to Greek idealism. According to the Greek philosophy the world is a beautiful and perfect work of art, and man's aim is to cultivate himself to an appreciation of this truth. The world itself needs no improvement, is incapable of improvement, only man's capacity for appreciation of the world is limited, and needs to be developed. Man cannot change the world, which moves in ever-repeating cycles according to immutable laws. A cycle ends in a cataclysm in which all is destroyed, or rather all disappears as in a mist. A new cycle begins by the reassembling of the dissociated elements. The same course is pursued as in the former cycle. The same objects as before appear, and after ages and ages the same cataclysm overtakes the world, and then there is a renewal of the cycle. This was at least one Greek conception. Man in this case is merely one of the elements of the cosmos. He can not by taking thought add to nor subtract from the inevitable repetition of history. As a clock runs its course, and finally runs down and has to be wound up and started over, so the world passes through its phases, stops, and is started all over again.

The difference between the Hindu idealism and the Greek idealism on the

one hand, and the German idealism on the other, is stated by Professor Budde as follows:

"In the idealism of India, which proclaims the whole world with its restless, senseless activities to be a world of visions upon which the human heart may not depend, there is no interaction with the world. It declares all attempt to conquer the world through intelligence as futile, it is vain to try to elevate humanity by any appeal to the lessons taught by the world's history. In Greek idealism the world is a wonderful work of art, a masterly cosmos whose contemplation promises the purest happiness. It is true that here also the individual must climb to the height of this contemplation, but 'the world as a whole needs no alteration. With unerring rhythm of rising and falling, the life of the whole runs here from eternity to eternity.' Here also no history results, no universal historic work. In German idealism, on the contrary, appears a world of freedom and of deeds, a world of independent subjectivity, founded upon itself and having no relation to outside help. Man can develop this to its full extent only when he comes into relation with the world around him as he finds it, and absorbs from it as much as he can. This involves a mighty struggle. Thus German idealism is not only an idealism of thought, but an idealism of deed."

Perhaps the two most definite conceptions in German idealism are duty and freedom, duty consisting in continuous, strenuous activity, freedom, but not irresponsibility in a subjective world. This subjective world is above and vastly superior to the objective upon which it impresses itself, and which it modifies and molds and remolds according to a deliberate plan and system. There have been many weighty exponents of the ideal of duty and freedom in this sense. Emanuel Kant was its chief exponent. Professor Budde quotes Euchen as saying: "He (Kant) above all others created the spiritual atmosphere in which German idealism gained its peculiar shape and its overpowering strength. Kant is for us Germans the teacher and prophet of

duty. * * * But Kant is also at the same time the teacher and prophet of freedom. But freedom is to him not the casting aside of restraint, nor the shaping of one's life according to one's individual choice; but consists in the selection of rational aims and thus an unconstrained union with a self-selected law.

"Schiller was heart and soul in harmony with Kant's doctrine of freedom. He also proclaimed the superiority of man to all the mechanism of nature, and demands of the human being an awakening of a proud self-consciousness, representing as he does in himself the essential factors in freedom's realm."

From this conception of duty it follows that there must be performance. So that German idealism is not only an idealism of thought, but it is also an idealism of deed. Fichte is the chief exponent of the idealism of deed. He taught that action is greater than thought. That it seizes upon thought and tears it violently with itself. It converts thought itself into action, "an appropriation, a metamorphosis, a mastery of circumstances."

Praises of German idealism have been very loudly sung by its many standard bearers. Two examples quoted from Schelling and from Schleiermacher by Professor Budde will serve to show the admiration, almost idolatry, with which it is regarded. Schelling calls the Germans: "This folk from whom proceeded the revolution in Middle European thought, whose mental energies have brought forth the greatest discoveries, who have given laws to heaven itself, and delved more deeply than all others into the secrets of the world. The folk to whom nature has given an unerring perception of truth, and implanted a thirst for the knowledge of first causes more deeply than in any other race." Schleiermacher wrote at the time when Germany lay bleeding and crushed after the catastrophe of Jena: "Never can I come to the point of doubting the Fatherland, I believe in it too firmly for that; for I know full well that it is a chosen tool and folk of God. It is possible that for a while all our efforts will be vain, and that for us will come a hard and oppres-

sive period. But the Fatherland will certainly soon rise up triumphant."

Never in its history has the German folk been so profoundly aroused as at the present, and they are actuated by an idealism which "seeks to convert all life into a continuous deed, and to demonstrate their convictions."

Professor Euchen, in a book addressed to the soldiers at the front, says in closing: "If idealism of thought and idealism of deed have been fused together in a

solid union with us, then there lies before our folk a glorious future, and all the burden of the present war becomes lightened if it brings us to the portal of such a future."

They may be deceived. It may be that the war has been fomented by the Kaiser and the junkers for selfish ends, that the munition manufacturers have led the people by the nose. But there can be no doubt that the war now is an expression of the martial spirit of the folk.

"Belgians Under the German Eagle"

THE most comprehensive statement that has yet been made of what Belgium has suffered under German rule and of the attitude of the people toward it is offered in Jean Massart's "Belgians Under the German Eagle," (E. P. Dutton & Co.,) which has been translated by Bernard Miall. The author is one of the Vice Directors of the Royal Academy of Belgium. His method has been to take indisputable German documents and from these to show what the Germans did, and then, by massing, analyzing, and comparing them, "to derive a few indications as to our enemies' manner of thinking."

In this introduction he tells with considerable detail how their conquerors have endeavored to keep from the Belgians all news of happenings in Belgium or elsewhere, except such as could be found in German newspapers. He tells with evident zest the means the Belgians have taken to outwit these many prohibitions by the smuggling in of newspapers and the secret circulation of typewritten extracts and articles from foreign journals. The German hand is heavy upon those caught making or circulating these extracts. Nevertheless, M. Massart says, "there are in Brussels alone fifteen of these secret sheets, each of which has its public of subscribers. From time to time our oppressors scent out one of these typewriting establishments, but some other

devoted person immediately continues the business."

The two chapters devoted to the international aspect of the Belgian invasion make a thoroughgoing exhibit of the evidence. These chapters are illuminated with many incidents, by means of which the author endeavors to prove the German purpose and to show that their actions were not the outcome of temporary necessity. The chapter on "Violations of The Hague Convention" takes up extensively the variety and results of those infractions still existing in the occupation of Belgium as well as those committed during its invasion. "The German Mind Self-Depicted," which fills half the book, offers many pages of quotations, extracts, incidents, all going to paint the blackest kind of a picture of German intellect and morals. "Treachery and untruthfulness," M. Massart comments in one place, "are the chief weapons employed by our enemies." The German attempt to organize industry in Belgium, which he describes at length, moves him to many sarcasms. After pages of the plainest speaking and most specific accounts that have yet been given of cruel and bestial behavior on the part of German troops, both men and officers, he remarks: "A man amuses himself as he can—or, to put it more plainly, according to his mentality." The book is written in a spirit of defiant contempt toward the invaders.

The Theory of Nationalities

By Dr. Conrad Bornhak

Professor of Public Law at the University of Berlin

[Adapted for CURRENT HISTORY from a recent article by Dr. Bornhak in *Die Grenzboten*, a Berlin magazine, ridiculing the Allies' political theory of nationalities]

WHEN, a century ago, the great rearrangements of the map of Europe were made by the last council of the States of the Holy Roman Empire, by Napoleon, and by the Congress of Vienna, no attention whatever was paid to the so-called principle of nationalities. Countries and nations were juggled without any consideration for historical, lingual, or national unities. For more than a decade, up to the Congress of Vienna, the inhabitants of some countries had changed masters every few years as it pleased the arbitrary will of the great Corsican. It was the main task of the diplomats who assembled at Vienna to attempt to bring about a condition of permanency, although few believed that the end could be achieved and that the new arrangement would endure for any length of time. The claims of many small States received but scant attention from the congress, and dissatisfaction was general. Revolution succeeded revolution until the steadily weakening police power of the Holy Alliance collapsed with the revolutions of July, 1830. The liberation from Napoleon's yoke had not brought with it the desired relief.

The reason was simple. National aspirations were nowhere adequately recognized by the Congress of Vienna. Italy, for instance, even yearned for a return of the Napoleonic conditions. The Congress had merely re-established the old traditional dynastic régimes. Against these the revolutionaries asserted the new principle of nationalities as the only relief from conditions they found intolerable. The old dynastic principle was to be thrown overboard and new States were to be built up on the principle of racial, lingual, and historical unity. The various divisions of such units, hitherto split up into different States or subject to for-

eign rule, were to be bound together into self-governing nations.

Singularly enough, the proponents of this theory ascribed its origin as a political doctrine to the great Corsican, despite the fact that he had tossed countries and nations about according to his imperious will. That the theory of nationalities never entered his mind is obvious. France itself never appeared as an ethnic unity or a national State to him, but only as the nucleus for a universal empire, all the component parts of which, no matter what their history or language, were to be subject to the autocratic rule of his own dynasty. But for all that, the principle of nationalities had its source and origin in none other than Napoleon — contradictory as the statement may seem. The Emperor's tyrannous rule reacted on the oppressed and suffering people. The sense of national identity awakened in them and that dream of cosmopolitanism that had swayed and vitiated the eighteenth century faded away. The petty rivaling States learned the necessity of co-operation, of combining interests and forces, to gain a national existence. Napoleon created the national sense by his very efforts to crush it.

Against this growing national consciousness the dynastic régimes set up by the Vienna Congress were pitted. The task of preserving the Holy Alliance, although he was not the author of it, fell upon Metternich.

The basic purpose of all that subtle statesman's complicated policy was the safeguarding of the Austrian Empire, child of the Vienna Congress, and created altogether with a view to the most advantageous natural boundaries. The State was a conglomeration of races and languages, and its preservation depended upon the avoidance of clash between the

various nationalities. So Metternich sought to block and hinder the national constitutional movements in Germany and Italy, lest the contagion affect Austria and cause the divergent nations of the empire to assert their individuality and try to set up independent Governments. The conditions in the empire sprawling along the Danube forced Metternich to oppose the principle of nationalities and fight against constitutionalism.

But again, as with Napoleon, these were strengthened by opposition. An even greater result was now achieved. For these two principles, at first opposed, now united to meet the common enemies of conservatism and absolutism. In both Germany and Italy the Liberals saw clearly the necessity for national unity in order to muster their full strength against their enemies. In Italy, for instance, up to 1820 the constitutional movements in Sicily, Naples, and Piedmont had been distinctly local affairs and in no wise related. But Austria's efforts to suppress these movements showed the leaders that they could achieve their ends only by joining forces and interests.

The same thing was happening in Germany. When the Vienna Congress set up the Rhenish Confederacy the various States were created arbitrarily, and the spirit of petty local antagonism, of provincial individualism, was encouraged. Metternich, as leader of the Bundestag, fostered these jealousies and bickerings. The liberals of South Germany fought against this, and took up as their battle cry: "Through unity to liberty!"

But this ideal was not realized. Even as late as 1848 the principle of jealous nationality governed the various revolutionary movements in Germany as well as in Italy, and the leaders evinced no desire to merge the various small States into large united groups. When the representatives of the various German States assembled in St. Paul's at Frankfort-on-the-Main, the spirit of separatism swayed their action. The strongest and most firmly established State, Prussia, afforded a nucleus about which the other States might have

grouped themselves in a united German Nation. Unfortunately this consolidation was impossible. The spirit of separatism was too strong for the evolution of a broad national policy. In Italy, although the expulsion of Austria from Lombard-Venetia and the union of the latter territory with Sardinia was regarded as the elementary condition of liberty, liberal constitutionalism on the basis of non-union was the ruling doctrine. The nearest approach to a united Italy conceived of was a loose confederacy of the Italian States under a Papal Presidency. The development of the constitutional State based upon the union of small districts having a broad national unity, although each distinguished by local characteristics, was hindered by the regard paid to such petty differences.

In the conditions in Italy Napoleon III. found a potent weapon for his diplomatic conflict with Austria. The new French Emperor was the first sovereign who consciously based his foreign policy on the theory of nationalities, although Thiers warned him that Italian unity would inevitably bring about German unity, a result as undesirable for his purposes as Italian unity was necessary. His motives were not altogether unselfish. To Napoleon III. the principle of nationalities was merely the means of uprooting the rule of Austria in Italy and planting in its place the rule of France supported by Lombardian and Sardinian vassal States. Napoleon never thought of a complete Italian union, and as soon as this tendency manifested itself strongly he devoted the remaining years of his reign to efforts to save the remnants of the Papal States. The support of the French clericals was indispensable to the maintenance of his throne and the dissolution of the Papal States would have alienated the clericals.

On the other hand, the encouragement he had given the spirit of nationalism in Italy tied his hands in dealing with Germany. Thiers's prediction was justified by events. The tendency to unity was growing beyond the Rhine. Napoleon even gave unwitting aid to this. In the peace of Prague he insisted, in accordance with the ethnological principle, on

the restoration (subject to a future plebiscite) of the predominantly Danish portions of Northern Schleswig to Denmark. Viewed with the knowledge of the swelling tide of the movement for German unity, that was but a petty political trick. Indeed, the Emperor's foreign policy was driven on the rocks by the very spirits he had conjured to guide it. It met with least approval from the French themselves and brought in its train consequences that proved most distasteful to them.

To the three rulers who evoked, opposed, and favored it, the spirit of nationalism proved an enemy. Its realization, although imperfect, in Germany and Italy had direful consequences for Napoleon III.

Almost coincident with this development in Western Europe, nationalism began to play a rôle in Eastern Europe, in the Balkan provinces of the crumbling Turkish Empire. Hellenes, Rumanians, and Slavs were called upon in the name of their history or of their lingual and national associations, to liberate themselves from the rule of the Porte. But here, again, the slogan of ethnology was simply a handy device for the foreign policy of another great European power, Russia. A strange paradox! The power which had annihilated Poland and stripped her of every vestige of independence, the power that regarded the Ukrainians as merely a part of the Russian people, now felt called upon to free the various nationalities in the Balkan portions of the Turkish Empire!

The real purpose of the Czar's policy, the acquisition of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, (where no Russians or Slavs dwelt!) was a downright mockery of nationalism. Not a whit disturbed by this inconsistency, Russia calmly set up the stalking horses of Pan-Slavism and the necessity for the political unity of all communicants of the Orthodox Church. They were, to an extent, necessary, and in all respects convenient. Pan-Slavism justifies the incorporation of the Ukrainians and the Poles into Russia, and makes the Czar lord protector of the Balkan States. Of course, Pan-Slavism would hardly justify the assimilation of Greeks

and Rumanians, but in regard to them the holy Orthodox Church would indeed cover a multitude of sins!

The Balkan countries, inspired by preachments of nationalism and with the sanction of Russia, waged the first Balkan war for freedom from the Ottoman yoke. Russia had merely reserved for herself the right to pluck the choicest fruit—Constantinople. That the development of nationalities was not the real object was plain to be seen. And Russia, like Napoleon III., found nationalism a two-edged tool, and was soon forced to discard it. Bulgaria, as a powerful Slav State right at the gates of Constantinople, would have been Turkey's best bulwark against Russia. So Bulgaria had to be enfeebled, in the face of encouragements given the principle of nationalities. That was the purpose of the second Balkan war, waged by her former confederates against Bulgaria. In the racial Babel of the Balkans separation based on ethnic or lingual boundaries is absolutely impossible. But even so, there is no other excuse for the handing over of the great bulk of the Macedonian Bulgars to Serbia but that the latter was the more servile vassal of Russia.

In the first Balkan war against Turkey the Balkan League had only to prove its fitness. Its main task, which was to come later, was, in alliance with Russia, and again in the name of the ethnological principle, to crush Austria, that loosely thrown together State of all sorts of nationalities. It was a pity that, owing to the second Balkan war against Bulgaria, the tool was broken before it could be used for the main object, and that all attempts to mend it were frustrated by Serbo-Bulgarian enmity. Russia was forced to content herself with the Serbs and Montenegrins, and to rely on other powerful allies.

The world war began with protestations from belligerent after belligerent of firm belief in the principle of nationalities—the principle of liberating the small oppressed nations.

It would have been simpler to begin at home; no war was necessary to apply this principle. England had ample opportunity in Ireland, India, and with the

Boers in South Africa; Russia might have taken this principle as her guide in dealing with the Finns, the Poles, and the Ukrainians; Serbia with the Macedonians. However, "upright men think of themselves but last."

Russia purposed to assert the principle of nationalities only against the Central Powers. In order to attain that end, she contemplated the restoration of Poland under the Muscovite hegemony. According to that, she could claim Western Galicia and the semi-Polish portions of Prussia, while Eastern Galicia, since it was inhabited by the Ruthenes, was obviously naturally and irresistibly Russian. Pan-Slavism justified all the elements in this plan that could not be justified by nationalism. The Ukrainians, therefore, were to be considered as Russians and the Poles as Slavs. On the other hand, since nationalism and Pan-Slavism would not fit the case, the fact that millions of Germans were settled in the Baltic provinces was totally ignored.

Dismemberment of Austria in the south was to take place in the interests of the liberation of nations. The area inhabited by Serbs, Croats, and even Slovenes was intended for Greater Serbia under "Peter the Mighty." Serbs and Croats are of the same nationality, it is true, but both religion and alphabet separate them and have been the cause of bitter enmity for years.* This enmity has been mitigated—and that only slightly—by their common hatred of the Magyars. But the Roman Catholic Croats have a profound contempt for the Greek Church Serbs, and would never have submitted to the domination of the latter. The Slovenes are of a totally different nationality, without any racial or lingual ties with the Serbo-Croats.

But the emptiness of the shibboleth is shown most strikingly in the rewards promised other Balkan States. If Rumania entered the war on the side of Russia, euphemistically described as "showing good-will," she was to be awarded Transylvania; this district, al-

though the majority of its inhabitants are Rumanian, yet had many Saxons and Magyars among its population. The Russians claimed Bukowina, and the Serbs the Banate, although both territories were regarded as unsettled problems as long as negotiations concerning an alliance were pending. On the other hand, in exchange for Transylvania Rumania would have been forced to cede Moldavia up to the Sereth (with the capital of Jassy) and the Dobrudja to the Russians, who had already arrived at an understanding with England on this point. The result would have been to cut Rumania off from the sea altogether. And the territories claimed by Russia are inhabited by a motley crowd of all sorts of nationalities—except Russians!

Last of all Italy came forward in the name of holy egotism, and in the name of the principle of nationalities called upon Austria to cede the Irredenta, that land still unredeemed that was necessary for the consummation of Italy's national unity. For Italy to demand this of Austria was somewhat one-sided. The work of redemption might well have begun at Nice, Corsica, or Malta. But Italy's demands on Austria far exceeded the principle of nationalities. Not to speak of the Al Brennero border, the Italian Ministry had the assurance during the official negotiations preceding the declaration of war to demand that the boundary lines of the Italian domain in Tyrol should be those laid down by Napoleon I. in 1811, and should include the town of Bozen, which is German to the core. Austria even agreed to an Italian occupation of the "Dodekan" in the Greek Archipelago, and of the Albanian port of Valona, and was also willing to declare her disinterestedness in Albania.

The Italian demands began with the liberation of districts which were claimed as actually Italian in the terms of the principle of nationalities, but very soon it became evident that her Ministers had an eye for the natural frontiers which they considered to lie in the north near the Brenner. That decision, from a geographical point of view, is comprehensible. But how the demands made of Albania and the Greek Archipelago were

*The Croats are Roman Catholics and use the Latin script; the Serbs belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church and use the Cyrillic alphabet.

to be justified passes comprehension. In fact, if the demands made by Italy in the name of nationalities had been satisfied, the most monstrous outrage would have been committed on alien nationalities, on Germans, Serbs, Albanians, and Greeks.

Of course, Alsace-Lorraine was to be returned to France as a prize of victory, again by token of the ethnological principle. The assertion was that the two provinces really belonged to France; that the peace of Frankfort had torn them from her, and that that peace was null and void. So Joffre, *sans façon*, proclaimed outside the Mulhouse schoolhouse the reunion of Alsace-Lorraine with France. Not even a plebiscite—to which France on other occasions had attached so much importance—was to be taken. No one saw fit to mention the fact that only 10 per cent. of the inhabitants of the province, most of them along the Lorraine border, are a French-speaking people. The other 90 per cent. number about one and one-half millions, and speak German. They are Alemans and Franks. To them the union of Alsace-Lorraine with France for the sake of a few thousand Frenchmen would mean a monstrous violation of the principle of nationalities.

And lest a humorous and satirical aspect be wanting to that solemn ethnic principle, the future conditions of peace were to include the neutralization of the Kiel Canal; the area north of it was to be handed back to Denmark. Probably the idea was that all Schleswig and the northern part of Dithmarshen were inhabited by Danes.

Last of all, England declared war for the protection of Belgium, or, generalizing, as became the fashion later, in defense of all the smaller nationalities. Here, too, the ethnic principle is raised. The ethnologists seem to forget that from their own point of view a Belgian Nation never existed, nay, that the creation of the Belgian Nation, from first to last, was a contradiction in itself.

No other war, except the first Balkan war, has ever yet been started so consciously on all sides in the name of ethnology. The reason was simple. To assert the principle of nationalities meant

to threaten the dismemberment of Austria as a State of varied nationalities, and Austria was one of the two great powers against which the war was waged from the outset. That the principle of nationalities was everywhere but a pretext is equally obvious. To carry out the objects of the war, as Russia, England, France, Italy, and their smaller allies had in mind, would everywhere mean an outrage to alien nationalities. But thereby the ethnic principle seems to have surpassed the summit of its historical mission.

It is the nature of every ideal that it cannot be fully realized in this world of realities, but is at all times beset with difficulties, has its wings clipped, and in the end is forced to make a compromise with the practical world. Thus, in modern history, there has never been a State that fully realized the ethnic ideal—a State which united the whole nation in a racial or linguistic sense, and united only that particular nation or ethnic unity in a national existence. Some States have approached this ideal somewhat closely, others have been far from it. Very remote were such States as Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium, and the ethnic conditions of the United States and the great colonial empires are chaotic.

Nevertheless, when modern States at the beginning of modern history were just beginning to emerge, the principle of nationalities proved to be a powerful State-shaping force. The Italian and German movement for political union and the liberation of the Balkans testify to that. But the very power of the force had in it the potentialities for abuse at the hand of an ambitious foreign policy. Napoleon III. speculated heavily in the ethnic principle and lost. The Quadruple Entente is doing the same today and losing. It was an abuse to assert the ethnic principle merely as a pretext for conquest. A victory of the four confederates would mean an abuse of that very principle in whose name the war is waged.

Germany's peace terms will probably not be guided by the principle of nationalities. They will not rest on illusion or delusion.

Austria and Turkey, the two great race

mixtures among the nations, stand firmer than ever today, thanks to the war. Their dismemberment would be an unpromising undertaking indeed.

The German purpose in the war is alone a guarantee for the future.

"We must obtain and fight for all possible guaranties and safeguards so that none of our enemies, either single or allied, will again venture on a passage of arms," the German Imperial Chancellor declared in a speech which he made on May 28, 1915. If that object is supported by the ethnic principle in the Balkans, Flanders, or elsewhere, well and good. But Germany's only object in this war is security for the future.

However, experience proves that ideas which have fallen in disuse in Europe are taken up beyond the seas. May be

that this war will spread the ethnic idea outside of Europe. There is a mighty stir among the nationalities in India, Egypt, Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, and among the Mohammedan tribes that are subject to the Czar. All those national movements are just like Russian Pan-Slavism, supported by an underlying idea which outgrows the ethnic principle in the political interest of the State. "Asia for the Asiatics" is a slogan with which the Japanese world-power (that invoked England's aid for the conquest of Kiao-Chau) menaces Eastern Siberia, the British and French possessions in Further India. The Allies have only to wait to see who will be the first to be victimized by the Far Eastern bird of prey.

Spirits are easily conjured up, but exorcised with difficulty.

Prussian Scorn of Nationalities

By Hilaire Belloc

As an interesting pendant to the foregoing article by Dr. Bornhak we present Mr. Belloc's strongly British view of the same subject, as expressed in Land and Water:

ONE might summarize the whole thing by saying that the old European tradition of national rights stood out clearly at the beginning of the war as a main issue between the combatants, but that developments taking place in the course of the war confused it until it became, in the month of May, 1916, entirely obscured.

Now I would suggest that the future of the war, particularly as the Central Empires begin to feel the material and obvious effects upon the map and in their pockets and their resources and their armies of that defeat which they have already potentially suffered, will revive this matter of nationality and will perhaps end by leaving it as clear as it was in the beginning.

This accident we shall largely owe to the stupidity of the enemy. Let us con-

sider how he has dealt with the matter to his hand.

Belgium, he might claim, was but a very modern artificial State divided into a Flemish-speaking and a Teutonic-speaking population, and further divided on the question of religion, and yet again divided by the great quarrel between the proletariat and the capitalist. The enemy has done nothing to take advantage of any of these points in his favor. He has impartially destroyed the monuments of the one portion of Belgium as of the other. The violation, the tortures, and the burnings have proceeded from a general desire to feel great at the expense quite as much of those who speak Flemish as of the Walloons. He has further, which is especially foolish of him, shown an utter lack of thoroughness in this as in his other experiments in terror.

When he has found that his actions adversely affected neutral opinion, especially American opinion, he has apologized for them and restricted the

activity of his agents, then foolishly allowed their activity to break out again. The whole thing here has been on the same model as the incredibly stupid bombardment of the Cathedral of Rheims. There was no conceivable reason for that outrage at its beginning save to show to the French that Prussia was perfectly ruthless, and therefore to be feared. To prove this, Prussian gunners were ordered to destroy the national monuments to which the French were chiefly attached. They dropped shell in conformity with their orders upon the Cathedral of Rheims, which was at the moment being used as a hospital, and was flying, I believe, a huge Red Cross flag. When they had ruined the glass and burned the roof and destroyed a certain number of statues attached to the building they ceased their efforts, apparently in surprise at the way in which they had been received by the civilized world. But the enemy did not cease them altogether. From time to time he would launch a shell in the direction of the cathedral in order to do a little more damage. He did himself the maximum of moral harm with the minimum of effect. And he is still at it. The Cathedral of Rheims is a target at a range of a little over 6,000 yards from the foremost of his guns. It is larger than Westminster Abbey and is not concealed by tall surrounding buildings of any sort. He cannot plead error. It is sheer fatuousness. It is the alternative emotion that men pass through when they do not quite know on what platform they stand—and so it has been in Belgium and in Eastern France. There is no guarantee that the long period of repose through which some districts have passed may not at any moment be followed by another outburst of violence.

In Poland there has been another history. Poland was occupied in connection with the great advance against the Russian armies. The military object of that advance was clear—it was the destruction of the Russian armies by envelopment. It failed altogether. Its attempt was only possible through the lack of munitionment from which the Russians suffered, but, on the other hand,

the Austro-Germans were correspondingly tied by their heavy artillery, and on six successive occasions six successive plans for the envelopment of a great portion of the Russian forces failed. When the effort was exhausted, Poland as a whole was occupied by the enemy's armies and evacuated by the Russian armies. The race and the people had suffered enormously. They had already been divided between three powers—the Prussians, the Russians, and the Austrians—of whom they hated the Prussians by far the most. With the Russians they had a long hereditary quarrel, only somewhat softened in modern times. Their situation under Austrian rule was by far the best.

One might have thought that Austro-German armies appearing in the country with such a historical foundation for their rule would have taken immediate advantage of what was but an accidental result of their failure to destroy the Russian forces. One might have imagined that they would have consolidated this moral opportunity by some sort of statecraft, however clumsy, as they did the material opportunity by the establishment of their trenches. Nothing of the sort. There has been a perpetual change of plan in their dealings with the Polish and Jewish population, so far as the Prussians were concerned; and the Prussians were more and more the masters. They seemed unable to decide whether they would consolidate or whether they would merely bully the miserable remains of the population. Whatever be the situation of the Polish peasants now subject to Austrian rule alone, it is certain by every account we receive that the Polish and Lithuanian population under Prussian rule has suffered from the unstable policy of the Prussian commanders as no other district in Europe has suffered. It continues to suffer even in the simple matter of victualing. Prussia cannot make up its mind whether it is better to leave memories of starvation among these people or to see them fed.

What is happening in the Balkans exactly we do not know. Accounts are confused. But so much is certain that

the wise playing of the Serbians against the Bulgarians has not been attempted. There has been nothing but the crude overrunning of the Serbian districts, accompanied with every form of torture and barbarity. It has been a sort of revenge taken against a thing which proved at last much weaker than the power which was exasperated by its former resistance. There has been no trace of statesmanship in the matter. Only of hatred.

Now the sum total of these blunders would seem to be this: So long as the Central Empires can maintain their extended lines and can govern by merely military rule the populations within those lines the national questions remain obscure. But the moment a shifting of the lines begins, the moment the military grasp ceases to be sufficiently firm to maintain so vast an extent of territory, there will be no moral result left in support of the Austro-German cause.

Bohemia wished to be Slav, but never wished to be attached to any Slav group.

Catholic Southern Slavs in Croatia had their difference with the Orthodox Serbians of the same race. The Rumanian population subject to Magyar rule was largely Uniate and garrisoned, geographically, as it were, by German settlers and Magyar colonies.

Of all these opportunities no advantage has been taken.

With the first shaking of the line now covering the Austro-Hungarian monarchy every one of those national riddles will again present itself for solution.

In the case of the Germans the matter

is differently but much more intensely true. When the Russians reappear in Lithuania and in Poland the age-long quarrel between them and the Western Slav will exist, no doubt, but it will be accentuated in no way by a new feeling produced in the course of the war in favor of the Germans. It will almost certainly be the other way. And there is no conceivable standing ground now—as there might so well have been a few months ago—for divided opinion in Belgium at the moment of a general retirement. That retirement will produce nothing at all but a sensation of relief.

In the mere mechanics of the war this factor of national feeling will have very little effect. The nations are too highly mobilized, their manhood too completely employed, for civilian opinion to count in the field as it counted in the old wars of professional armies. But it remains true that the settlement of Europe after the war will be adverse to the Central Powers in a fashion that it might not have been if they had used the few months of their unexpected territorial expansion (as much unexpected by them as by us, and as little connected with their victory as their defeat) wisely and upon a consistent plan.

They were unable to show such wisdom. They were unable to follow a sustained plan because they entered the campaign, and particularly Prussia entered the campaign, with a deliberate scorn for the sanctity of a nation. Immorality on that scale is stupid, and stupidity is the main agent of defeat in war.

War's Effect on National Character

Following is a typical extract from an article by May Bateman, a well-known English writer:

By that strangest of all paradoxes, war, itself crude, almost carnally material, has aimed a death blow at the materialism which was sapping national life. Hour upon hour we were becoming more smug, more self-complacent, more willfully blind to the eternal things. We worshipped our own image under a prettier name; we denied the existence of Pain, and now we have had to kill Self, and Pain has leaped upon us and stared us in the eyes and said, "Dare to deny me now—you little clods, who do not even guess my name spells Love!" We are more real now, most of us, than we have been for many a long year. We have been driven out of the city of pleasure into the open immense field of life.

Trade Problems Confronting the Allies

By Luigi Luzzatti

Italian Statesman and Publicist

The following article on the complicated task facing the world of commerce and industry after the war was translated from the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan for *CURRENT HISTORY*.

WHILE discussing with the great Gladstone the artificial rebates by means of which Germany, Austria, and some minor nations were introducing their sugar into England, he answered me, with his fine smile: "All that remains for us to do is to open our mouths nicely and take it." This answer epitomized the tendency of an economic epoch.

In 1913, shortly before the outbreak of the cruel conflict, a syndicate of fourteen German, Austrian, Dutch, and Belgian refineries offered to sell their sweet merchandise to the wholesale dealers in sugar of the United Kingdom at a heavy discount if they would merely agree not to buy sugar of any one else. Gladstone would not only have opened but would have distended the mouth from which issued words sweeter than honey. The Englishmen of 1913 refused the offer, thus indicating the tendencies of a new economic era.

It has been written and has been asserted orally that we are entering upon a period in which political alliances may facilitate tariff unions. We may aspire to this, but an examination of the facts in the case does not allow us to hope for its immediate realization. Germany and Austria-Hungary have been thinking over and studying this question since the beginning of the war, just as they did before hostilities began. Recently meetings of expert delegates were held in Vienna, in Budapest, and in Berlin, but, although military enthusiasm urges them to reach an understanding, they have not yet been able to arrive at an agreement, and the desired league will not be worked out. Dr. Robatsch of Vienna, in a genial essay, advocated an Austro-German tariff union, but Deputy Gothein of Breslau advises the abandonment of this "economic dream," as insisting upon it might

even weaken the political alliance. By means of weighty arguments, Gothein tries to show that today a tariff union requires a common parliament to make customs laws and a common executive power to enforce them, because today, in contradistinction to the past, (the German Zollverein,) the taxes collected at the border are interrelated with all the rest of the financial and economic life of a nation.

The political and constitutional inconveniences of the Zollverein formed one of the factors that promoted the political unity of the German Empire. Renunciation of autonomy in tariff matters weakens political sovereignty. This is observed by the Germans, and especially by the Austro-Hungarians, who are weaker than the former industrially. And it is even noticed by the free and patriotic colonies of Great Britain, which are glad to give a "preferential tariff" to the mother country. But how can you plan out a customs union without a parliamentary union? And here is where all the economic schemes go astray and dissolve into thin air. Belgium and Holland, when they were governed by great men, Frere Orban and Torbeke, tried to arrange a customs union, and the one who is writing these lines was present at those intimate discussions. The patriotic design of these great men was about to succeed when it went to pieces before the difficulty of common legislation on sugar and on alcohol! If the customs union had succeeded it would have paved the way for a military alliance, and perhaps Belgium would have been unscathed today!

But it is useless to try to force the times by means of sighs. The present tendency is to increase duties, and through these to continue the war, transforming the military conflict, when it

may be ended, into an economic one. Something quite different from idealistic hopes for universal peace! Therefore, France, England, Russia, and Italy should prepare themselves, not to dream, (and they do not seem disposed to do this,) but to take some necessary action. The first thing is to improve all their mutual economic relations, principally and especially those pertaining to the tariff. This is also something much easier to say than to do, because of the vast inequalities in the material conditions of these countries.

What a large amount of French capital, for instance, has been sent to Russia in order to found industries there that are highly protected! What would happen in case the Russians should lower the duties or abolish them, in the face of competition by English industries? For the sake of brevity, we shall limit ourselves to this example, but such cases could be multiplied so as to show clearly how difficult an analysis proves the problem to be. Yet a synthesis must be found and formulated. As a defense against the Germanic-Austro-Hungarian "bloc" it is first necessary to arrange the agreement among the Quadruple Entente, and this pact will be less troublesome in proportion, as it is not expected to work miracles.


And we may be allowed another example. It is wished, and rightly so, to create in the territory of the Allies some industries that have been monopolized by the Germans. Among these is the manufacture of coal-tar dyes, that astonishing invention by English and French chemists which has been applied no less astonishingly by the German chemists and industrialists, who have practically forced their output upon the whole world by means of the perfection of their products and the moderation of their prices. If all the States of the Quadruple Entente start to make these dyes, as they now have the intention of doing—and Japan is preparing to follow suit—they will not be able to export them, because of the lack of an extensive market. If every one works on his own account and protects himself with high tariffs, not only against Germany, but also against

friendly and allied States, it will signify the continuous restriction of an industry which in order to flourish and to branch out into its marvelous divisions of labor, needs to serve the entire world. Hence, the first thing for the Allies to do in order really to conquer Germany is to agree among themselves, organizing, for instance, a common financial society which may apportion production according to natural and technical aptitudes. And if this plan is not accepted it is necessary to think out another, as otherwise we are preparing delusions and industrial defeats worse than the criminal inertia of the past.

This example also, to which we shall limit ourselves for the present, might be multiplied many times, and each case would bring out the sharp points of unexpected difficulties. It is easier to write in the form of a soliloquy, unhampered by the contradictions of diverse and conflicting interests, than to take part in a friendly dispute among experts. And if we add to the experts the politicians, (and how are you going to keep them out?) who have the habit and even the necessity of looking after the interests, even the most minor ones, of their own countries, in every discussion, it is clear that every one of these cases will constitute a new fact to be considered in the customs arrangement. Therefore, even in obtaining results much smaller than the presumptuous hopes which frequently deceive thoughtless enthusiasts, discussions and negotiations, even among Allies and friends, or, rather, specially among Allies and friends, will strew the road leading toward agreement with tribulations and obstacles never seen in the negotiations of the past, no matter how hard and complicated they may have been.

And if the Allies neither wish nor are able to renounce the liberty of making commercial treaties with countries outside the Alliance, they must promise each other the benefit of the most favored nation clause, in case their agreements have not already included all possible favors, and border on a preferential tariff, which could never be granted to friends who are not allies. Already the

HOW THE DEFENDERS OF VERDUN LIVE DESPITE SHELL FIRE



French Soldiers at Mouth of Dugout Near Bois d'Avoncourt Getting a Breath of Fresh Air
During a Lull in the German Bombardment.
(Photo © Underwood & Underwood.)

AN ENGLISH ARTIST'S CONCEPTION OF MOURNING BELGIUM



Frank Brangwyn's Noteworthy Painting, "Mater Dolorosa Belgica," a Feature of the Recent Royal Academy Exhibit in London

mere announcement of this hypothesis causes the appearance of puzzles, twists, and renunciations of a new character. The present writer knows something about these things, as he has negotiated with Canada, which, as has been noted, is ready to establish tariffs of various grades, ranging from the preferential rate accorded to England to the extremes of the general tariff against economic adversaries. You may imagine what would happen if the economic adversaries were also enemies on the political field!

But, turning to the kernel of our argument, how are you going to prevent the persons to whom are refused equitable tariffs, who receive no special favors, &c., from emigrating to the favored States with their capital and their technical experts and temporarily assuming, according to their custom, a national appearance? If the inhibition in-

tended to exclude them is not put into effect by wise and powerful methods, you will have the dreaded enemy in your own house, where he might, after a longer or shorter period, become nationalized, but where he might also resist in secret.

These problems appear to us to be of a kind worthy of free, calm discussion, both at home and outside of our kingdom. For after our wars shall have ended gloriously and happily, there will be damages found among the gains, and the nations that might not be able to sell their goods to their former customers, and might not find themselves welcomed by new ones, would complain about this and would suffer from it. Complaints and suffering would injure the solidarity of the friendships that we all wish to preserve intact as a guard against vigilant enemies not disposed to disarm and to forget.

Britain's Trials to Come

By Dr. Arthur Shadwell

[Published by arrangement with The Nineteenth Century]

Dr. Shadwell takes a very serious view of the labor troubles which are likely to follow the war, especially if the British Nation cannot be aroused to the necessity of completely defeating the Central Powers and discrediting the Kaiser's Government in the eyes of the German people. He says in part:

AS to industrial conditions at home, I confess that I regard the prospect with the greatest apprehension; it is full of menace and I can see no way out. Every one in a position to judge with whom I have discussed the subject is of the same opinion.

In the first place, the whole question of industrial relations in Great Britain has a sinister background which seems to be unknown to the cheery optimists who shout for an economic war. It is a background of interrupted strife of the most determined character, which is only waiting the conclusion of the war to be resumed with undiminished ardor. If the war had not

occurred we should before this have witnessed an industrial conflict certainly on a larger scale and probably more violent than any known before. The elements not only remain in full force, but they have been reinforced by circumstances attending the war. The trade unions have been asked to suspend their rules and customs, and to a very considerable extent, though not to the extent commonly believed—they have done so. It is a great sacrifice on their part and it deserves full recognition. One union has been particularly affected, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. A very large proportion of the war work, and especially the new work, falls within its province, and it has been invaded by hosts of unskilled workers, male and female. The engineers have acquiesced with extreme reluctance, in so far as they have acquiesced; and their reluctance is based on definite grounds.

Their society was the first of the great

craft unions to be formed more than half a century ago, and it has always been a high caste, exclusive body, very jealous of its status. It has maintained the art and mystery (*art et métier*) of the trade as something requiring a long and special initiation which raised those who had passed it above other workmen. And for the thoroughly skilled mechanic the claim holds good today. The all-around British engineer is the best man of his class that there is. He is better than the German or the French, and in the United States he is the best American workman. But time and change have so altered the conditions of work that the superiority of the engineer has become fictitious in many departments. It has been artificially maintained, and now the war has exposed the fiction. Many operations once jealously confined to the skilled man have been thrown open, and it has been proved on a large scale that anybody can perform them with a few days' and even a few hours' teaching. It began with turning and other machine processes, and now it has gone on to hand tools and the high mysteries of fitting. The thorough mechanic is still absolutely indispensable—more perhaps than ever—but he has seen whole fields, once his own, captured by amateurs; and this has at the same time revealed the extent to which limitation of output has been regularly practiced.

All this has been a great trial, and it has been accentuated by a glaring inequality. Some of the most highly skilled work cannot be priced because it is too varied and irregular. It is paid by the day, and the men doing it have not shared the enormous increase in earnings made on piecework. Thus the thorough mechanic has been getting his 43 shillings 6 pence a week, and has seen the amateur from the grocer's counter, the office stool, and the cowshed taking twice and three times as much. This is the result of the prices fixed for new war work during the scramble for labor.

The unprecedented earnings in some trades will themselves be another cause of trouble peculiar to this country. They have set a new standard of living which will not be readily relinquished.

It will be impossible to go back altogether to the old conditions. Some industries have been revolutionized and the whole outlook is changed. The readjustment really requires a corresponding revision of ideas on the part both of employer and employed. * * * But what both sides are contemplating is the old rut and a battle royal.

We shall go into peace with this prospect of unprecedented industrial turmoil and strife before us; and on the top of that will be all the political strife—home rule and the rest of it. In other words, the prospect is civil war, and that without any reference to the real war. But the termination and result of the latter will make all the difference. If the war ends with a changed and chastened Germany, less convinced of her superiority, less aggressive, less ambitious, more preoccupied with setting her own house in order than with plans for dominating her neighbors, we may get through our troubles. But if the war ends in a stalemate, and leaves Germany with the military régime intact, animated with the same aims and ambitions, bent on the eventual control of the sea and the downfall of the British Empire, we shall surely go down unless we altogether change our ways. We shall be in no position to meet the commercial competition with which she will immediately proceed to undermine our strength by means of carefully prepared and methodical plans. That is what the Germans intend, and they are eager for peace in order to begin. Other competitors, more formidable than ever, will also have the advantage of us. Our industrial system will be in chaos through the mad conflict between employers and employed, and when we emerge it will be too late. The persons who talk about the economic war and promise themselves the crushing of German commerce and industry are like children playing over a rattlesnake's hole and anticipating the pleasure of pulling it out by the tail.

I think the war will end in an industrial revolution here. The only chance for us is to see that it also ends in a moral and political revolution in Germany.

The German Peril After the War

By Archibald Hurd

[By arrangement with *The Fortnightly Review*]

AFTER the war has closed, Germany will remain in all fundamentals the Germany which existed before the war. She will have lost many thousands of her best manhood, but the population of Germany increases at the rate of 800,000 a year. She will be burdened by a great debt, but the Germans are a frugal people and will bend themselves to the task of adjusting the balance. Germany will be suffering from commercial and industrial congestion, owing to our blockade, but the remedy for the disease will be a policy of "dumping." Germany, it may be, will be badly defeated, but the 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 people will remain a menace to all democracies. They have been revealed as the most exclusive, selfish, and inhumane people on the face of the globe. They form part of a soulless machine.

Is it imagined that Germany, when this war is over, will abandon the economic war upon which her business men had determined when, owing to causes beyond their control, the Emperor and his political and military advisers, in complete confidence that the result would be as in 1864, 1866, and 1870, determined to put to the supreme test the vast German army and the new German fleet? The foundations for the economic struggle which had been laid before the present hostilities broke out are, we need not doubt, even now being strengthened. This war with gun, cannon, and bayonet will leave the German Nation essentially the same in characteristics that it was in the early Summer of 1914, but with its heart blackened and its passions roused—the cruel, soulless, unmoral race which this struggle has revealed. Germany will apply to commerce the same ruthless, creedless principles which have been exhibited on land and on sea during the war—copying in cheap forms other people's designs, imitating other people's trade marks, "spying" in Foreign Offices and factories, "dump-

ing" in distant countries in order to ruin home industries, strangling decent trade as a preliminary to extortion. Germany is organized, from end to end, for this new war. It is the most highly organized empire which has ever existed.

On the other hand, the British Empire, as Sir Robert Borden has said, "is in some respects a mere disorganization." It has no economic coherence; its industries are unrelated to each other.

On the success or failure attending the attempt to solve the economic problem which confronts the British people will depend the future of the British Empire. As "a mere disorganization," it cannot fight successfully a highly organized German Empire with its railways, its canals, its ships, its syndicates, its diplomatists, and its tariff all combined in one effort.

Where, then, do we stand as we confront the future? On moral grounds Germany—the land of the Huns tomorrow as it is today—must be ostracized, otherwise the precedents of this war—the murders by submarines, by Zeppelins and poison gas, and the inhumanities practiced on prisoners—will become established. Punishment must follow such acts—punishment which will be felt in the remotest corners of the German Empire, otherwise the whole human family will be reduced to Germany's level and civilization submerged in barbarism. The German Empire is a house of sickness; we must not permit the infection to reach the British Empire. A period of isolation must be enforced on the enemy. On economic grounds also Germany must be ostracized. We cannot again expose ourselves to the dangers of "peaceful penetration" by an unmoral people, which were so dramatically exposed when war broke out. If we are to save our soul, we must preserve our body.

We have come to the parting of the

ways. As it has been apparent for twenty months past that the existing organization of imperial defense is defective, so it will become increasingly apparent that the present economic disorganization of the empire threatens its very existence. This war concluded we must be prepared to wage successfully the economic war—reforming our system of education, co-ordinating science and industry, reorganizing our trades, readjusting the tariffs of the empire, protecting our merchant navy from un-

scrupulous competition, and regularizing and developing our arrangements for defense by land as by sea. The opportunity offering when the present struggle is at an end will never recur. Our moral sense demands that Germany, having placed herself without the pale, shall be kept there until she has expiated her crimes and regained her sanity. That interval will enable us to complete the task which lies before us of converting the British Empire into a benign civilizing and economic unit.

Helfferrich on Post-Bellum Trade

By Franz Hugo Krebs

Mr. Krebs, an American business man, took occasion, during a recent visit to Berlin, to submit to Dr. Karl Helfferrich, then Imperial Secretary of the Treasury, certain questions which had been suggested by American financiers and members of leading bond houses. The result is the series of interesting answers given below.

THE first question that Dr. Helfferrich took up was the following:

"What does the opening of the way through the Balkans to Constantinople mean to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, and what does it mean to Bulgaria and Turkey?" When a member of the Managing Board of the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Helfferrich devoted his activities especially to Turkish financing, so this question probably made an unusual appeal to him. He said:

"Apart from military value, which every one understands, it brings together the West and the Near East. First, it restores direct communication down the Danube to the Black Sea; that is, from Germany to Bulgaria and Turkey, with no enemy State interfering with the traffic. The cost of carriage by water being cheap, facilities are afforded for German and Austro-Hungarian exports to Bulgaria and Turkey, and, vice versa, from Bulgaria and Turkey to Austria-Hungary and Germany.

"Of course, for Germany it is economically of great importance to get raw material, such as grain and fodder, from Bulgaria, and cotton, fruit, copper, tobacco, and wool from Turkey. Incidentally, the menace of Serbia to traffic on the Danube has now been removed.

"All markets concerned have been brought closer together; also, political relations at a time like this have more or less effect on trade. In many ways Germany will give Turkey the benefit of the most up-to-date advice that scientific research enables us to offer; particularly will this be done regarding agricultural methods. Already Bulgarian and Turkish exports to Austria-Hungary and Germany have increased enormously. The railway carries through Bulgaria high-class goods, but in peace times the sea route would be the cheaper for bulky goods going to Turkey. As for the effect on Bulgaria and Turkey, by increasing their trade and economic strength these countries will also increase their financial strength."

The next question that Dr. Helfferrich answered was:

"What is the condition of German savings banks?" He said:

"The deposits in German savings banks are now as large as they were before the last war loan was paid for and issued. They had a greater number of deposits in 1915 than in 1914. Of course, this condition is wholly due to the patriotic spirit of the German people."

Another question attracted Dr. Helf-

ferich's attention—"Why is Germany coining iron money for its subsidiary coinage?"

"German currency is being used in all the territory that is now occupied by the German troops," he replied, "and this makes a sudden and tremendous demand that it is hard to fill, and, as nickel is used for military purposes, iron has been decided on as a convenient substitute."

Then came the questions, "Why has the price of the mark in the neutral countries fallen? Is it due to inflation?"

"No, it is not due to inflation," said Dr. Helfferich. "Cut off from exporting, we have been obliged to settle almost everything by cash payments. We have preferred to increase, as far as possible, our gold reserves, and have made certain sacrifices in order to maintain the strength of our financial position."

Dr. Helfferich read with apparent interest the following, contained in a letter sent me by a gentleman connected with the largest distributing bond house in the United States:

"It would be of great interest to know the feeling of the German multitude as contrasted with the Prussian aristocrats"; also this question, propounded by the partner of a large Boston bond house:

"Are the masses of the Socialists prepared to support a war of conquest?" He said very earnestly:

"There is no conflicting ambition here, no wide divergence in thought. This war was forced upon us. We have, up to now, as you Americans say, 'made good.' There is no doubt of our ability to continue along the same lines."

"We desired, before the war, to be allowed to develop along our own lines without being menaced by neighbors who

are neither willing to try to understand us nor to emulate our thrift and devotion to our work. In the Reichstag, early in the war, the Emperor said he recognized 'no parties, only Germans,' and every German, regardless of previous political affiliations, has cheerfully forgotten all differences in his loyal desire to serve best the general weal."

"The commercial relations of Germany and the United States have been very close in the past, and will doubtless be even closer after the war is over. Then Germany will be in the market for many things that will at least make us one of your country's best customers, as we always have been."

"Then, no doubt, our relations will be more direct than ever before, since up to now a large part of the business transacted between the United States and Germany was negotiated through Great Britain. Great Britain has lost—certainly with the Central Powers, and, I venture to say, more or less with the whole world—its standing as the world's commercial agent. Who in the future, unless compelled to do so, will intrust goods and securities to Great Britain, which, in violation of international law, began by confiscating privately owned goods and securities? Also, what happened to private individuals of German nationality in Great Britain during this war may be inflicted on the citizens of any other nation in some future war."

"Great Britain itself has done away with the words 'Safe as the Bank of England.' After the war the direct transaction of business between the United States and Germany will, no doubt, be greatly facilitated by the recent American bank reform, built up on the most excellent principles, which will enable your country to finance the world's commerce in a manner worthy of the United States."



The British Protectionists

By Arnold Bennett

Famous English Novelist

NOTHING can be clearer than that before the war Germany was beating us in trade. And she was beating us more and more. And she was beating us, not by reason of any inherent advantages, but by reason of a closer application, a fiercer industry, a keener interest in and appreciation of the commercial value of education—and technical education in particular. We shall, unless sentimentalism gets quite rampant, certainly defeat Germany in war, and the cry naturally and properly came that we must capture Germany's trade. It is true that at present, while instead of capturing foreign trade we are steadily losing our own, such a cry had an odd, wistful sound; but it was a good cry, a cry which rightly appealed to all of us.

Our course, if we had learned the supreme lesson of the war, was evidently to bestir ourselves about education, and especially about technical education, to preach application and close industry and organization and thrift to ourselves. Have we done it? Have we begun to do it? Not at all. On the contrary, we are so far from "realizing" the war (in the deepest sense) that the reactionary and stupid wing of the oligarchy has knocked the other wing all to bits. Education is being starved, and universities which specialized in technical education and organization, instead of being honored and aggrandized, are fighting for their lives while as little money as might keep the war going for twelve hours would suffice to render them the most potent creators of strength for the future. The fact is that we are not only clinging to luxury and relaxation, but doing much to emphasize the pro-

found defects in ourselves which the war has revealed.

The sentimentalist-protectionists assert that we shall not want to have any relations, even commercial relations, with Germany after the war. There is something in this idea. It calls forth sympathy from every one of us. It is not business, but, after all, business is not the highest good.

And yet I wonder whether, after the war, the instinct not to soil themselves by any contact with Germany will be powerful enough to prevent our sentimentalist-protectionists from endeavoring to sell British goods to Germany in exchange for German goods! I wonder! And I wonder whether, anyhow, the fact of war increases the wisdom of the dodge of cutting off your nose to spite your face. I do not wonder whether protection, instituted on the plea of patriotism, will enrich the few rich at the expense of the multitudinous poor. I know positively that it will. And I know that protection will foster instead of stamping out inefficiency. And I know, too, that to attempt to settle international relations in the midst of a war, when passion necessarily blinds reason, and when the future cannot be accurately envisaged, is an extreme kind of folly. But the attempt is being made. The campaign is afoot. Much money is being spent on it. Many dinners are being eaten about it. Hope is high in the bosoms of those astute sentimentalists who see great profit in the too facile exploitation of the baser and more blithering forms of jingoism and chauvinism. For among our sentimentalists are some who know on which side their bread is buttered. The rest do not.



"If I Were Wilson"

Listen, Mankind, to the Message of a Man

By Maximilian Harden

German Publicist, Editor of Die Zukunft, Berlin

The remarkable article, all of whose more significant passages are here translated in full, occupied the entire April 22 issue of *Die Zukunft*. In spite of its criticisms of German policy, it was allowed to appear at the moment when the submarine controversy with the United States was most acute.

[PRESIDENT WILSON IS SUPPOSED TO BE SPEAKING TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT]

WE Americans, who in spite of, or because of, our relationship are always on the lookout against English arrogance—we find England's idea of an "effective blockade" unsatisfactory. But we have much more to complain of than England's action. That she cuts off our trade with Europe and asserts her right of search and seizure is an offense we might have punished long ago if Germany had not been doing us a wrong, for almost a year, that affects us far more deeply—by the murder of American citizens. The sorrow of the widowed, of the orphaned, of mourning parents cries more loudly to heaven than the loss of merchantmen. And yet the manner in which England uses her blockading power is irreconcilable with international law.

This law is not a feeble concatenation of letters, it was not intended for the time when the nations were living at peace among themselves, and it is not invalidated by the discovery of new means of warfare. "In the time of war the laws are silent, but only those of trade and those which might be followed

in peace by foreign courts of justice; not the eternal laws, valid for every age. The possibility of suffering outrage never gives a State the right to use outrage itself." These sentences of the Dutchman, Hugo Grotius, are pillars on which our conviction rests firm.

THE LAW OF NATIONS

We share no guilt for the outbreak of the war, and we can get nothing out of it. We put up with the fact that under its reign of terror our exports and imports are shrinking; we cannot endure that they should be altogether arrested, that our cotton market should be laid desolate, our agriculture deprived of potash, and our textile manufactures arbitrarily deprived of coal-tar dyes. Still less that deadly peril should be

prepared by act of men for our citizens on roads which they have a right to use. Such roads are the great waterways between continents. To cut off principal portions of such roads by a bare one-sided proclamation, and call them "war areas," and to rob and kill any one who ventures in them, is not permitted any one either by the letter or by the spirit



MAXIMILIAN HARDEN

of any international law. It is a legal fiction, a legal pretension, to which we will not bow. And which we may the less expect, in that we have generously given up hitherto to European hands our whole trade with Europe, which supports in opulence a dozen merchant fleets and gives life to tens of thousands of employes, contractors, and actionaries.

Because England is not to receive corn, meat, textile fabrics, copper, steel, explosives, petroleum, and fat, and England's enemy has no means allowed by international law, no means by which she is able to give a warning recognizable at a distance, of cutting off the importation of these goods, because of this fact, is it permitted to a crawler along the bottom of the sea to destroy every ship suspected of carrying such goods, together with crew and its passengers? It would be just as incoherent a law which would allow it to be announced to our world tomorrow that Spain was to be considered as a war area, because France was able to get goods from her, or that Sweden was to be considered such because Russia could get goods from her, and permitted German airships to throw bombs on every railway train which they could see in these countries; because every one is under suspicion of supplying essential materials for French and Russian economic, or even military, needs.

The submarine war does not violate any of the sovereign rights of any State; but day by day it violates the rights of men and nations. It cannot but violate them if it is not confined to warships. For since a usage, unfortunately still valid, allows the carrying of false flags, every ship sailing under a neutral flag may possibly be the property of the enemy; whether a merchantman has two or three guns cannot be recognized from a submarine; and the mines which these boats strew in the sea do not ask whether it is an enemy or a neutral ship which they blow to atoms; for this reason the promise of protecting neutral and unarmed ships, of warning them, or calling to them, or saving crew and passengers before firing into them, is one which with the best will in the world cannot be kept.

CRUX OF THE DISPUTE

Nevertheless, since the horrible end of the *Lusitania*—the anniversary of which is just approaching—the German-American dispute has turned round this question. It has been doubly envenomed. Many factories of our States have provided the British, French, and the Russians with guns, shells, and war material of every kind. They had a right to do this; and it was not their fault that Germany, whose custom would have been equally welcome to them, was unable to buy anything from them on account of the blockade.

In all wars of modern times German industry, in spite of the empire's neutrality, has supplied one party, often both parties, with arms and munitions; if she had not done this—so said the Berlin Government—her industrial capabilities must have shown a swift decline. What was allowed to her to an unlimited extent cannot be prohibited to the industry of America. The statistics as to material delivered have been enormously exaggerated, and everything produced in South America and in the English colony of Canada has been reckoned to us as well. The entirely private contracting business, the extent of which is scarcely worth talking about, could only have been prevented by the State by means of an export prohibition. I have declined to demand this from Congress; and not merely because I was certain that Congress would refuse it. We do not desire that any State should be compelled to accumulate arms in the time of peace; for this very accumulation is a temptation to settle any dispute by war. We do not desire that a power armed to the teeth should be in a position to impose its will on a badly armed one to which neutral countries close their sources of supply; for we earnestly hope to see an extension of arbitration and an organized peace, not industriously and artificially organized force.

We do not desire a condition of law which, should we be compelled to go to war, must prevent us from buying weapons from neutral countries—weapons which we peaceful farmers, traders, professors, and artists lack. For a hundred

years England has not been prepared for a land war of European dimensions; to have left her without arms in the difficult opening stages of a struggle which had no increase of territory for its aim would have gone, we felt, against the nature of free, peaceful America, nay, against the spirit of modern humanity as well. The merchants, manufacturers, and administrators of the United States acted within their sure and incontestable rights. But their doing so drew upon them the bitter anger of the Germans, even of those who had been admitted as friends into our free States.

MUNITION PLOTS

From their error arose the second element of poison. Many of them believed it their duty to avenge on their new home a wrong committed on their Fatherland, and to tear our States asunder. The proofs of such punishable behavior, or of its encouragement, lie in our archives. We had done no wrong to the German Empire, and we demand from each immigrant that he shall carefully respect the laws of the States. Why did he come here? Why, because at some time in his life the laws and the business prospects of our country seemed more favorable than his own. If he wished to remain in every fibre of his being a German or an Irishman, to plunge under all conditions into activities for his native land, he should have stayed at home and endured unfavorable conditions of life and co-operated for the improvement of the political and social system. To pick and choose all the tasty morsels from our country, and at the first storm to behave as a raging German or furious Irishman—that would be an intolerable piece of presumption. To give examples of what has happened would only stir up the flames which I would gladly see die down. For this reason I will only ask, Would Germany, during the Manchurian war, have allowed Japanese agents to work upon the Prussian Poles, to intimidate the German Empire into alienation from Russia by stirring up disturbances, by canvassing, by fiery speeches, by imperiling munition factories? And I would ask, too, Has not our legal contention been all through as good as the Germans'?

TO GERMAN-AMERICANS

I understand that to a nation fighting in peril of its life such cool reflection on real values is difficult, that under pressure of necessity it forgets how often it has itself supplied the enemies of its friends with arms and munitions. Yet I must demand from Germany that she shall break loose from any common action with injudicious patriots, however strongly her sympathies with them may be—for patriots who, as guests, or as admitted citizens of the United States, misuse the law of hospitality to undermine the civil peace; by which action they do not benefit the German Empire, they only greatly injure it.

No serious man blames them for wishing Germany to gain the victory, for helping it by works of charity. But no man favorable to his Fatherland can allow them to hoist their three-colored flag over our Star-Spangled Banner, to make our domestic political institutions an instrument in their campaign for Germanism and to append to their vote, which their second home has given them, the condition that the elected candidate shall pledge himself to help forward their German cause.

I am bound, secondly, to demand from Germany that she shall without circumlocution declare how she proposes henceforward to respect our national law and to protect the life and property of the American citizens. How she can protect; for the question whether there is to be friendship or hostility between two great nations certain of their future can no longer depend upon the eyelashes and nerves of a young submarine commander anxious to serve his Fatherland and cut his name in the German oak, and in whose ear conscience speaks only one command: Sink everything in sight!

U-BOATS AS CORSAIRS

Every one must admire the bold cunning of such men. Their boats, however, have no surer position in international law than the corsair frigates which in the twenty years of the Anglo-French war, especially during the Continental blockade against England, used to creep out

secretly from the small harbors of Flanders, Normandy, and Brittany and rob the Britons of 500 merchant ships every year. Today, 100 years after the Napoleon frigate war, in spite of the conferences at The Hague (1907) and in London, (1909,) we have no valid international maritime law under the protection of an arbitrating authority with executive power. Yet the dictates of recognized morality, which, for example, does not give the right of sacrificing the lives of ten strangers to save one's own child, and the experiences gained hitherto in submarine warfare show the way to an understanding which would leave elbow room for both States.

Compromise would signify weakness on neither side; it would merely give expression to the honest wish to safeguard friendly intercourse between two nations which are not forced into hostility by any insurmountable reason. The hope to frighten by threats a nation so brave and so strong as the German would be absurd and vain. Moreover, it is generally known in Germany, and it is also known to those responsible for her government, what would be the consequences of a rupture. Our whole continent, north and south, would become hostile to Germany, and that not merely for the period of the war. Germany would lose all her ships lying in American ports, and would have to reckon them a considerable addition to enemy tonnage.

From the day of the rupture Germany would have to provision Belgium, which we are now supplying with foodstuffs. Holland and Scandinavia could hardly hope any longer for imports from overseas; for this reason they could not export any more goods, cattle, or grain, since by doing so they would be in danger of suffering scarcity themselves. It is for Germany only to examine, on the basis of what the Napoleonic blockade achieved and what the power of a league may be which America would join with her capital and economic resources, whether it would be wise to pay so high a price for the weakening of England through scarcity of food and tonnage.

It is certain that the conclusion of the war would then be put far out of sight,

because, even if badly weakened, the enemies of Germany could wait until our help made itself felt. And, further, from that moment we, too, should present at home an absolutely united front. The different extractions, German, Irish, Austrian, or Hungarian, would be at once forgotten, and every American would be wedded to the Stars and Stripes; and he who was yesterday disloyal at heart would tomorrow become a zealous, glowing patriot.

We have not let our tongues run furiously about Belgium, because our purse had to secure her food, and this was possible only by an understanding with the German authorities. We have not taken exception to the procrastination in the dispute pending between Germany and ourselves, because in almost all cases facts could not be ascertained beyond dispute; further, because we were restrained by the wish to spare the world the horrors of an unrestrained submarine warfare and spare the neutral States of Western Europe the pain and misery which would be the effects of such a war; because the Berlin Government gave us the clear proofs of an honest will to reach an understanding, and did not hesitate to remove a vigorous statesman, highly esteemed by many, in order that in future only one tendency expressive of will should rule its policy; because we understand the enormous difficulty of her responsible action and could not expect the second Winter of war to give birth to the decision which is to be the goal of the Spring of peace, viz., to put diplomacy above strategy and to establish firmly the higher authority of the council of statesmen over every irruption or interference of those brought up for the work of war.

CONCERNING PEACE

If this higher authority was already secured, we would not have today a war which is the horror, and, in spite of all the virtues which it brings forth every day, the disgrace of the white race. Is it any good to dig for its roots once more in the soil washed by seas of blood and riddled by the worms feeding on corpses? All are guilty; the difference is only in

the weight and time of their sins. This fact is not discerned by him whose eyes are darkened by his own guilt. It is hidden also from him who sees only what gave the last push and judges hastily, without following up or weighing the long chain of causes: "Germany abruptly refused the arbitration which was recommended by all the powers for the settlement of the Austro-Serbian dispute and which was finally accepted by Austria-Hungary itself; she began the war, which, according to the undisputed testimony of San Giuliano and Giolitti, she had wanted as early as 1913; she wantonly violated the neutrality of Belgium, which originally she herself had demanded, carried through, and guaranteed, and, after a rapid and devastating invasion, seized a powerful pledge in the shape of the industrial districts of France. She has, therefore, to be declared guilty without admission of any extenuating circumstances. This is the conclusion formed from a comparison of all the official documents."

FRENCH AND GERMAN AIMS

That this is the conclusion indeed has been proved a thousand times in all languages, even by the men of science with tempers of ice. Only they forgot to turn over the leaves of the book of the history which came before the month of July, 1914. France could not get over the loss of Sedan, Metz, and Strassburg; she did not set the loss to the account of the accursed empire, nor did she decide on a new war, but she irritated by continuous, sometimes noisy, threats of "revanche" the conqueror of 1870, who did not wish to take from her a single straw or a single stone more, and gladly allowed her to acquire the second biggest colonial empire, and she offered her alliance to any one with the help of whose word she could hope to reconquer Alsace and German Lorraine. The wire which unites France to the Russian Empire would have been made fast much earlier if Bismarck had not, even as an old man, climbed again and again untiringly the pole and broken the strands.

After thirty years of grace, Germany is no longer served by an unselfish genius, but she has acquired, through the

unsurpassed and unsurpassable efficiency of her people, undreamed wealth, and has secured for herself an enormous share in the trade of the world. In all zones Germans make themselves snug and work diligently, more diligently than any of their competitors, for the capital and flag of their Fatherland. Germany does not, unfortunately, remember that she can only win forgiveness for so rapid a rise, for so unexampled and flourishing success in every branch of activity, by a dignified and modest self-suppression; and she does not remember that the enemies at whose expense she has grown great are still alive, and some of them are still full of fight. She rattles the sword, and in shining armor she frequently allows to transpire the intention of enlarging her dominion. * * *

OFFENSIVE DEFENSE

A preventive war, then? The classical case. Two groups of powers which do not trust each other across the street. France fears that she may be attacked and treated as a hostage, Russia that she may be cut off from an ice-free sea for another hundred years. England has bound herself to take no share in any aggressive war against Germany, but has not, as was desired in Berlin, promised her neutrality in any war "forced upon" the German Empire; for it could not but apprehend that any war provoked by aggressiveness would appear to be "forced upon" those suffering by it. Germany did not want to be boxed in, nor to give the right of arbitration to a hostile majority, nor to allow herself to be weakened by the dismemberment, attempted from three quarters, of Austria.

It is a libel upon Germany to say that it chose war not as a necessary measure of defense, (Nothwehr,) but as a means of conquest. Only a madman could desire such a war, of issues impossible to forecast, and from which no gain could be garnered in the long run. It is just as false, indeed, to assume that England, France, and Russia, which were not armed at all, or at best only half ready, (and needed a year to obtain the most necessary things,) started with the deliberate intent to attack. They desired a diplomatic, not a military, struggle, and

strained every nerve to avoid immediate war. The outbreak, however, was not to be prevented; because, at the decisive moment, the will of the military chiefs was more powerful than that of the statesmen. To the military authorities Bismarck's advice, "In preparation for war always remain one step behind your adversary," was counted mere talk, with which a cunning drafter of notes wished to thrust his clumsy hand into the rough work of warriors. When Mars rules, think they, only their expert opinion is of consequence, and only they can judge when this crimson régime is to begin. * * *

HOW MILITARISM GROWS

The state of affairs which gives precedence to such thoughts in every higher circle of communal life is called in modern speech "militarism." It does not only press for ever more powerful armaments, but it also accustoms citizens, scholars, merchants, and artists to the idea that for a struggle between peoples the only adequate weapon is armed conflict, and that everything else is unworthy and useless. In this way it permeates every root and every branch and twig of the nation. Militarism is a state of mind and a form of civilization. That without its existence heroism and the warlike virtues can thrive, a single glance at England and France, at the two Serbian States, at Hungary, at Austria, at Australia and Canada, shows. That militarism alone can guarantee constant readiness of every limb of the body politic for the rapid transition to war is proved by Germany's achievement, which is unequaled in the history of the world. That is, in the material sphere; as a spiritual achievement many will place higher the voluntary enlistment of three million island and colonial Englishmen, the heroic endurance and self-sacrifice of the Serbians and the French, fighting in the very face of the enemy. Twenty million heroes are fighting between Antwerp and Trebizond, and the majority grew up in unmilitary countries—yes, in some which seemed to have succumbed to the plague of luxury.

NO ARMED TRUCE

Because militarism facilitates readi-

ness for and temptation to war, and because it can only spread further and further unless weeded out root and branch, the war must endure until it is destroyed. This slogan is proclaimed aloud by all the enemies of the German Empire, and is whispered by all neutrals. How long only by them? After the inconceivably horrible slaughter of which today at least five million corpses and ten million cripples are evidence, the cry for the sure establishing of peace will, even between Hamburg and Bagdad, drown every other.

Is the uprooting of militarism possible? To my mind, yes; an inevitable certainty. Its approach has been merely retarded by the foolish attempt to cut from the body of a State a portion which is indispensable to its vital functions or for its self-respect. From the first day of peace onward this State would be compelled to make every sacrifice in blood and money to attain the re-establishment of its constitution and its prestige. Think, Grey, Briand, Sazonoff, through what thunderclouds and what pressure of misery you would have to pine if this mutilated power were immortal Germany, compelled to gather together all the energies of mind and economic strength for the bursting of the barrier erected before its house, and for the chastisement of impious excess! But, Bethmann and Burian, do not forget that those who pine are more sensitive than giants, and that Serbia itself has once already risen from the moldy tombs in which it seemed to be inclosed!

A peace which, like a war, left crippled peoples behind it, would only mean a truce. And we do not desire a peace that is a truce, but a truce which will give rise to a firm and noble peace, to Europe's Easter. We wish it today because today it is possible and therefore necessary. We: all who are not blinded by irrational rage, whose numbers grow every day in multitude and with whom in both camps, man for man, the dead agree.

NOT LIKE OTHER WARS

Those only stand far off who imagine that this war is essentially like other wars, and might—indeed must, like other wars—end in victory and defeat, treaty and indemnity. Those upon whom

the realization has not yet dawned that this war's most certain consequence—its only certain consequence—will be the most gigantic revolution of all times, a revolution that penetrates the whole of Europe with its flame, that plows up the whole continent, beside which the revolutions of 1789 and 1793 might seem petty child's play, and that every man of goodwill and natural piety must exert himself fervently to keep this revolution clear of blood guilt and confine it to the world of the spirit.

No State, no people, no class, neither man nor woman, will after this war, this cataclysm, be as they were before. Constitutions and laws, prejudices and scruples, will lie prone before the whirlwind, like reeds in a pool. Let us take care that, from the altar of the new league—the league of humanity with divinely inspired nature—a grateful odor shall be wafted heavenward, as from Noah's thank-offering when his second dove had brought him the olive branch in its bill, while the message of "Peace on earth!" was written shimmering across the sky.

FOR AN ARMISTICE

An armistice is possible. Nothing indispensable remains to be conquered; nothing that would sufficiently reward the effort involved. The aim and result of that effort can only be the ventilation, cleansing, disinfecting, the hallowing without priest or dogma, of the Continent; the transformation of swampy, moldy, hate-befogged, envy-poisoned ground into the luminous abode of free men, working on the basis of their own right, and consequently respecting that of others—men who, just because they are strong and proud of their reason, cannot but affirm their will to select in peaceful ways the fittest, whether among individuals or peoples. The wolf will not graze beside the lamb, nor the lion run with the hare. But the form of war and other horrors will be radically altered, as after the first deluge when the curse and condemnation of all living things was lifted from the earth, and the rainbow bridged over the chasm between godhood and beasthood.

This hope does not appeal to you?

You want vengeance, retribution, the chastisement, the annihilation of the enemy? Woe to you if it should be left to the wrath of the people to drive their rulers and governors out of the thorny entanglements of such illusions! Only at the cost of its own enervation can one group so crush the other to earth. And behind the melancholy monument of such a universally destructive victory militarism would rear itself more menacingly aloft. Now it may be rooted out from the field on which honor has been maintained and power demonstrated, but the decisive battle has not been fought. Now the power which received it as an heirloom from the soldier-king Frederick (the Great) then let it rust and only polished it up again under the lash of Bonaparte, that power can now, without inward or outward impoverishment, lay it to rest.

DAWN OF A NEW DAY

The dawn of rejuvenated humanity! It breathes afresh. Let reason at last get in a word again, and shame spread a thick veil over self-deification and enemy bedevilment. Who would bet that, if any of the buds of hope failed of maturity, were nipped of frost, humanity would not again resolve to pass from armistice into a state of war? What profit could war bring? To the French, Alsace-Lorraine and the Cameroons; to the Germans, Courland and Polish and Lithuanian territory; to the Austro-Hungarians, Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Albania! That would mean, instead of establishing peace, sowing the seeds of new wars; to say nothing of disruptive domestic dissensions. To what European State, during the last century, has the incorporation of foreign populations brought any appreciable gain? To Russia, Austria, Prussia, the Netherlands, the German Empire? To none of them! The Savoyards and the people of the Maritime Alps were already half French, and, like most of those living by work for the foreigners, remote from the storms of national feeling. Annexation has long been recognized by the far-sighted as a form of the extension of power not to be reconciled with European custom. Nothing is easier than to proclaim an-

nexation; but if the morsel, once swallowed, proves indigestible, and the swallower would willingly spit it out, yet honor commands him to retain it, and, even at the risk of his life, to protect it against greedy enemies.

LEAGUE FOR PEACE

The eye of my spirit looks forward to the time when States shall league themselves in a community of interests, pass from pooling to fusion, and, to save expenses, merge two official staffs into one. For the present that is only to be thought of as between different sections of one national organism. But the more sterile, in the days of electric trunk lines and international legality, the idea of frontiers becomes, and the more solid the unity of Europe, will it not hold good, too, as between Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, between Spain and Portugal, between the Scandinavian kingdoms, between the Baltic provinces from Riga to Finnish Tornea, between two or three Balkan States? The new form of annexation, which opens to the stronger State the channel of influence, and spares the feelings of the weaker, will certainly be in process of casting tomorrow. And, as (since the war has broken down all dams the flood of democracy is unrestrainable) the hour cannot be very distant in which even great powers shall unite in defensive associations, and, after amalgamating their steamship lines, both for freight and passenger traffic, shall maintain only a fleet of cruisers, a submarine squadron, and a standing army. Why not, since even today they cannot take from each other any possession of enduring worth, and the day after tomorrow, at latest, the unmuzzled populace will forbid them even to wish to do so? Harken to the voice of the fleeting hours! At their bidding, if madness no longer howls them down, greater miracles than this will come to birth.

COUNTING THE COST

Twenty-one months of war have cost from 100,000,000,000 to 120,000,000,000 marks; to that are to be added the costs of restoration and the burden of maintaining disabled soldiers and their dependents. A bare indemnity, which in respect to such sums would look like not

more than the mushroom at the foot of the giant beech tree, even the victor in the height of his triumph cannot hope to obtain. And tribute wrung out by a military occupation protracted beyond the lustrum, the decade, was a possibility in the time of Rome's glory and fall, but to-day is as little a possibility as that forcible deportation of whole tribes and peoples of which many dream. No State that has been involved in the deluge can look for any other indemnification but that which it creates by its own economics.

Any great power which abridges its annual expenditure on land and sea defenses by 1,000,000,000 marks may hope after a generation to see again the first dawn of financial regularity. And what will become of debts and liabilities? Because what is gained by saving suffices at the most to cover to a tolerable extent the new needs which are the legacy of the war. Taxes and customs duties, which brought in were it only an equivalent of the interest of the tenth billion of debt, would cripple industry and commerce in the competition with our continent, with Australia and the yellow world, would break up the idea of property, and drive the moderately well to do, from the fear of confiscations, into neutral States of sound financial constitution, and stamp out the courage for far-reaching enterprises as a horse crushes a rose leaf. Money does not grow like grass. What, then, is to happen?

ATONEMENT BY DEBT

What has never happened before anywhere on earth. Nothing save new thoughts, no sere and yellowing ones, opens the drain vent of the abyss. After the first deluge Noah kept himself by the cultivation of the vine. Just as his son Ham, because he despised the uncovered shame of the drunken vintager and told his brothers, was laid under the curse of being the servant of all servants, so the old continent would come under the curse of servitude to the younger continent if its humanity did not speedily succeed in covering the exposed shame of their racial breeds with the mantle of brotherhood. Let Europe's war debt become a fund of atonement. Let the loan coupons in all the European States which have

participated in the war (and in those ready to recognize the principle of arbitration) be valid money, guaranteed by all the debtors, not a currency which can be rendered worthless by dissoluteness and fraud like the assignats of the Jacobin Convention and the French Directorate. Money which in every country subject to the authority of the court of arbitration must be taken at every counter by every creditor at its full face value. For how long? Till those weakened by the war can redeem the international currency with national

metal or paper. In forty years at the earliest, in sixty years at the longest, after the conclusion of peace. The International Court of Justice administers the fund and sets aside in equal portions from the contributions of all the States what it needs for itself and its militia. It has to punish the party disobedient to its verdict by the infliction of a money penalty, and invalidate, call in, destroy, all the current loan coupons of any State which, without being threatened in life and limb, breaks the peace.

Are Americans Fair to Germany?

By Gottlieb von Jagow

German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

[A protest made through a Berlin correspondent of The New York Times]

EVERY American newspaper representative tells us how anxious the American public is to get the news, the real truth about the war, and yet when the Imperial Government offered to let American newspaper men use the cable in the event of its being reopened, and also to allow the news sent to the American press to go out uncensored, as long as it was not prejudicial to the German military plan of campaign, it hardly made a ripple among your news-loving people.

The Imperial Government offered to pay the entire cost of repairing the cable and putting it into commission, and was willing that President Wilson should appoint censors at the American end of the cable in order to supervise all messages transmitted.

When our Zeppelins attack London, which is a fortified city defended with cannon, full of soldiers and prepared as far as it can be to resist attack by land or air, the American papers teem with the most vitriolic articles about the "Huns." When the airmen of the Allies attack absolutely unprotected German towns and villages without one cannon or one soldier in them and kill old men, women, and children, your papers are

either silent or else they give a carefully expurgated account, without bitter criticism therein, and, much more significant, the letters which appear in the American newspapers, signed by readers of the papers, exhibit (in the main) only horror at our legitimate aerial warfare and none at the entirely unjustifiable conduct of our opponents.

Also by prohibiting absolutely the importation of fodder necessary to enable our cows to furnish milk of a good quality Great Britain is warring on the little children of Germany, and when philanthropic people in the United States, who wish to help the children, desire to ship milk for their use, Great Britain interposes its sea veto. Our children are fully as dear to us as the children of Americans are to them. What do the press and the people of the United States really think of a warfare directed against little children?

Further, what do Americans think of the British practically forcing the Dutch steamers going to and coming from America to make Falmouth a "port of call" and then claiming the right to rifle the first-class mail on the ground that a British port is made a port of call?

We are not unmindful of our good

friends in the United States, millions of whom are not of German descent, neither are we ungrateful for the fair play publicity accorded Germany by certain papers in America, which, however, are unfortunately exceptions to the prevailing tone of your press. All Germany wants is fair

play. Let the American papers give the people all the news; let Americans pass judgment with all facts in their possession, that is all Germany asks, but please try to accord us what you must surely admit we deserve, and that is simple justice.

How About British Militarism?

By Dr. Alfred F. M. Zimmermann

German Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs

[From a statement made to a Berlin correspondent of The Chicago Daily News]

EVER since the beginning of the war our enemies have been shouting about Prussian militarism. Now the reign of terror in Ireland has shown the finest flower of British militarism. England has established conscription, which it professed to hate so bitterly as a German institution, but it did not take conscription to show to what lengths British militarism can go. Sir Edward Grey has dared to repeat again that England wishes to confer the blessings of freedom upon Europe. The bloodstained soil of Ireland shows just what this freedom means. The same British militarism has ground beneath its iron heels the helpless people of India.

The same British militarism has wielded its cruel sway in Egypt and the same militarism killed the helpless women and children of the Boers in South Africa.

That is what British freedom means. For British militarism has not changed. It is the same today as it was a century and a half ago, when it hired the Indians in America to massacre England's helpless colonists because they tried to throw off the yoke.

Balfour also revives the old British tale that German victory will imperil the Monroe Doctrine. He knows that is not so. We have said again and again, and I repeat now, that neither the German Government nor the German people have any intention of infringing upon the Monroe Doctrine. We look upon the Monroe Doctrine as a policy which reserves to the American nations their complete self-sovereignty and the right to

shape their own destinies. Please remember that it is England and not we who have colonial possessions in America.

But these British statesmen, as well as President Poincaré of France, are now talking because they wish to hide the fact that upon them rests the responsibility for their hopeless continuation of this war. How hollow the British pretension to humanity and civilization. These men realize that British violations of American sea rights, the illegal blockade of American commerce and the piracy of American mails are resented by Americans and they fear the reckoning which they know must come.

Germany twice has solemnly announced a willingness to consider peace proposals on a reasonable basis. We, too, want peace in Europe. We want a real and lasting peace—one that will guarantee us and all of Europe against another war. We, too, want the freedom of Europe, but we want real freedom for Europe. Or is Greece Sir Edward's idea of a free nation under the British ideal of freedom?

I do not want you to misunderstand me. A victorious Germany does not need to beg for peace. When I say now that Germany is willing to consider peace proposals it is a sign of our strength. For the people of Germany whose sacrifices and heroic devotion to the Fatherland have, with the blessing of God, preserved us so far against a world of enemies will carry us in triumph to the end.

A Hero Tale of the Red Cross

By G. S. Petroff

War Correspondent of the Russkoye Slovo, Moscow

The following incident is narrated in M. Petroff's account of a battle on the eastern front.

ONE of our soldiers brought with him a German officer, who could hardly stand on his feet. His leg had been pierced by a bayonet, his shoulder was bleeding from a bullet, and his arm had been bruised by the butt end of a rifle. He was losing consciousness from pain and loss of blood. As soon as the soldier led him to our place he dropped with his whole weight to the ground. The doctor bandaged him, exclaiming: "What luck! Three wounds, and in spite of all of them he will be well soon. The wound in the leg is only a flesh wound, his arm is badly bruised but not broken, and only his collarbone at his shoulder is broken. In a month he will be all right again. Just look! what a handsome fellow, and what expensive underwear!"

The bandaged officer came to himself, looked around the yard, and, seeing the farmhouse in the background on fire, he sharply seated himself.

"Now be quiet, calm yourself," said the doctor, speaking in German and taking the man gently by the shoulders.

"My wife, my wife!" cried the German, tearing himself forward.

"Where is the wife?"

"There, in the house, in the fire!" He made an effort to get off the stretcher from under the doctor's hands.

"Is he delirious or what?" muttered the doctor in Russian. "There is no one in the house," he added soothingly in German. "Your German wounded were there, but they were saved in time."

"But my wife? My wife!" cried the captive in terror.

"What wife? How did she come here?"

"She is a nurse. She was here with the wounded. We loved each other, we married only a year ago. She became a nurse. Our regiment happened to be near their hospital. Your offensive was

unexpected. There was no time to remove the hospital. The other nurses left, but she would not leave when I was so near. Where is she? My wife!"

"Did any one see a German nurse in the house or yard?" asked the doctor, turning to the Russian soldiers and telling them briefly what the prisoner had said:

"There was no woman," came the response. "The house was empty. Look at the fire within. Even mice would have run out by now."

At this moment something metallic shrilled through the air above our heads. A heavy German shell flew over us.

"Scoundrels!" cursed the doctor. "They are firing on us—and their own wounded! We must get out of this. Two or three more shells and they will begin dropping in the yard. Carry our wounded first, then theirs. Hurry, or we shall remain here for eternity!"

The captive officer, apparently powerless, could not rise from the stretcher, where he was lying with one of his soldiers who had been wounded before him. He gazed devouringly at the blazing house. Suddenly he shouted savagely: "There, at the window, under the roof! Look, she is breaking the window—where the smoke is pouring out!"

We looked at the roof of the blazing house, and, in truth, there was a woman's figure in white, with a red cross on her breast. The doctor shouted: "Eh, fellows, it is true! A woman was left in the house—a nurse—his wife!"

"What can be done?" asked the stunned soldiers. "The whole house is on fire, and she is not strong enough to break through the window frame. She must be weak from fright. But why did she go up? Why not down?"

"There's no use guessing!" shouted a bearded fellow, evidently from the reserves, throwing off his overcoat.

"Where are you going?" cried the soldiers.

But he was already out of reach of their voices. He rushed into the house. All were stupefied, fearing to breathe. A minute passed, another, a third. Then at the window appeared the bearded face of the Russian soldier. There came the sound of broken glass and wood. Above our heads something was shrilling, but no one paid attention to the German shells. The soldier broke the window, dragged the woman into the open air. She was unconscious.

"Catch!" rang from above, and a big white parcel came down. The soldiers caught it successfully on the hero's outspread overcoat. Only one of them was hurt in the eye by the heel of her shoe.

"How will our chap get back to us now?" asked the soldiers of one another. "It is hell inside."

"Oh, he will get out, all right," said some one. "It is easier to get out than to get in. He knows the way. And if he burns some of his beard, no harm; he has a large one."

"Carry her to her husband!" ordered the doctor, "and get out from here immediately. The Germans are shelling us. Take away the rest, and don't forget the couple," remarked jokingly the doctor, happy over the incident. "I will wait for our hero. He may be burned."

The soldiers caught the remaining stretchers, and nearly ran out of the yard. At that moment a big German shell struck the burning house. A deaf-

ening explosion shook the air. The walls trembled, shook, and fell. The heroic soldier had not had time to get out. He remained buried under the ruins.

When the woman recovered consciousness near her wounded husband she did not understand where she was. She murmured in perplexity: "Dream, death? Otto, is that you? Are we together in Heaven?"

"On earth and both alive," calmed the doctor.

"How did you get to the upper story?" asked the husband.

"I saw Russian soldiers run into the house. I feared violence, so I ran upstairs. I thought I would run down later, but then came the fire. * * * A soldier appeared behind me and I was terrified to death."

"But that soldier saved you!" sighed the doctor.

"How? Where is he?"

"In heaven, if there is such a place for heroes." The doctor then told them all. The German officer and his wife both cried.

"But how was it that your guns were firing at a farm which you were occupying?" suddenly asked the prisoner.

"Our guns?" exclaimed the doctor, who was already bandaging a new victim. "It was your guns that were shelling a house over which flew a German Red Cross flag. Our soldiers were saving the lives of your wounded, and your guns were firing at both ours and yours. They killed the man who saved you. That's the way the Kaiser makes war."

2,500 War Dogs Helping to Save Wounded Germans

Dr. Max Osborn recently devoted an article in the *Vossische Zeitung* to the work of the 2,500 "Sanitätshunde" that are helping the German Hospital Corps to pick up wounded men. A "dress parade" of these dogs was given for his benefit in the Verdun district. There were sheep dogs, Airedale terriers, retrievers, and pointers, each about 2 years old, German sheep dogs being in the majority. They had learned to obey commands, given by word of mouth and pistol shots, "like Prussian infantrymen." The drill consisted of distinguishing the prostrate living from figures representing dead men, passing by men still able to stand by themselves, and indicating not only where men were lying down but leaning in a state of semi-collapse or sitting up. "And, best of all," concludes Dr. Osborn, "they are serving the Fatherland unselfishly, without hopes of either promotion or decorations." France, however, which also is using a few dogs in this way, recently decorated with gold collars fifteen that had seen service at the front.

Magazinists of the World on the War

Condensed From Leading Reviews

In the excerpts printed in this department of CURRENT HISTORY will be found examples of current thought in all the warring countries, as represented by their leading writers and more influential periodicals.

"We Are Not Winning This War"

By Dr. E. J. Dillon

Chief Correspondent of The London Telegraph

[By arrangement with The Fortnightly Review]

THERE is probably no people in Europe more easily deluded than the British, nor any that contents itself more readily with flimsy excuses for the blunders of its chosen leaders. The bulk of the British people are still patient, trustful, and of good cheer. Notwithstanding the most sinister deterrents they still seem willing to go on "playing the game," and follow their leader even though he prove a piper hurrying them to the abyss.

The story of Warsaw may be repeated at Verdun. "Already," the Germans tell us, "we have attained one momentous result; we have broken up the Allies' boasted offensive in the Spring. We have dealt a stunning blow to the French from which they are not likely soon to recover. France is too weak to hold her present line, abridged though it has been by the increased share taken by the British. It is the English whose turn has now come to bear the brunt of the war and supply men as well as money. In words their pitch is high and strenuous, but in deeds it is fitful and low. We have obtained these advantages far more cheaply than the French or British have the courage to avow. Our losses are, as nearly as possible, half the total alleged by our enemy, whereas theirs are not less than ours."

The war is still being waged on our allies' territory. The Central Empires (Germany and Austria) are immune from the hardships of foreign invasion. The discomforts which the blockade is inflicting on them are as nothing com-

pared with these. Belgium is German. The richest departments of France are German. Serbia and Montenegro are German. The mineral wealth, the great metallurgical works and factories and artisans of all these countries have been lost to the Allies, and this loss has been doubled by their employment against us. And as we have not contrived to keep, so we have failed to recover them. Nay, we are still losing ground.

This war will not be terminated by speeches about victory, but by strong blows on the battlefields. And it is for the purpose of having them dealt from the plenitude of the empire's power that a war-waging Ministry should take the place of the well-meaning masters of logical fence who have led the nation to the verge of ruin.

The Germans are still strong, much stronger than is commonly assumed. The story of the melting away of their reserves to 700,000 is a puerile fabrication. They claim that they and their Austrian ally are turning out more high explosives a week than the Allies and the United States combined. For they have no strikers, no slackers, no conscientious objectors, but only selfless patriots and a Government which compels the few unwilling to do their duty.

It is these qualities and the perfect organization based upon them that enable the Central Empires to turn out 460,000 shells a day. The total of our output is wisely kept secret.

We are not winning this war. To convey any other impression to the public

would be cruel and unpatriotic. What is more, we can not and shall not win it unless we change our system and its champions and alter our course at once. The crucial question is whether, before it is too late, the nation will displace the leaders who are wasting instead of utilizing its resources in men, munitions, and money.

It is a mischievous fallacy that time is on our side. The Germans still have between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000 men to draw from, and their quality will be approximately equal to that of the Allies. I go further, and assert that they dispose of nearly 2,000,000 of their best troops, whom they have kept back for the coup de grace. The attempt to exhaust them by attrition appears futile.

On the water we are more fortunate. None the less, even there conditions have changed to our detriment. * * *

An acquaintance of mine sets down the loss of commercial shipping since the beginning of this struggle at over 3,000,000 tons. Our losses continue, with a tendency to increase rather than diminish. Our commercial fleet is being whittled at both ends—by the enemy on the one side and by ourselves and our allies on the other. It has now become possible to determine how long we can stand the strain of this process, which is intensified by the further trouble that the submarines are not only reducing our tonnage below our abnormal requirements, but are rendering it occasionally impossible for us to utilize even the transports available.

Is it right, then, to proclaim that time is on our side?

It is highly probable that after a while the consequences of this naval semi-paralysis will make themselves felt in this country and most acutely among the working classes.

The people of Great Britain, loath to admit that their heroic ally (France) has fared so badly, (as the Germans allege,) cling to the belief that the great Spring offensive will strike the Teuton with dismay and hearten ourselves and our friends. But Senator Humbert in his widely circulated press organ tells us France "has accomplished fully, and more than fully, her share in the common task. Has not the moment come to take this into account?"


On the part of our Russian allies we can rely upon grandiose exploits of heroism, but miracles cannot be expected.

We do not stand a chance of winning if the war continue to be conducted some time longer by the men of routine. To these placid politicians the struggle is hardly yet a reality.

Can inefficiency hope to beat efficiency, chaos triumph over organization, the blind force of the angry bull match the intelligent manoeuvres of the matador? The corollary to the negative answers which these queries must evoke is the displacement of the Government responsible for the lack of plan, the disorganization of the nation's forces, and the dissipation of its substance.

The stereotyped answer to all demands for a change of Government is the impossibility of finding any successor to the Premier. Is that plea admissible? Will it be seriously maintained that there is no strong man in Great or Greater Britain who would not conduct the affairs of the country much more successfully than the men responsible for the Dardanelles fiasco, for the Mesopotamian expedition?

What is needed is not a political but a war Cabinet, not a little parliament of twenty-two theorists, but half a dozen live men. By such a committee the mistakes of the past might possibly be repaired.



The Spirit of German Culture

By Professor Ernst Troeltsch

University of Berlin

At the beginning of last October Germany had already published the amazing total of 6,395 books and pamphlets about the present war. In an article on "German War Literature" in the Contemporary Review Dr. Thomas F. A. Smith singles out as the most important volume "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," ("Germany and the World War,") edited by Professors Hintze, Meinecke, Oncken, and Schumacher, with sixteen other well-known scholars as contributors. A portion of Professor Troeltsch's contribution to that volume, as translated by Dr. Smith, is given below.

THE German is by nature a metaphysician and hypercritic, who strives to understand the world and things, man and fate, from within, from the standpoint of the spiritual inwardness of the universe. It would be idle to attempt an explanation of the origin and spread of this prevailing trait. But it is the innermost life secret of the Germans, one which has caused much dispute among us, the motive inspiring immeasurable sacrifice and suffering, the force which has achieved greatly, and the problem of an ever new adjustment to the practical demands of life and its material demands.

In essentials the German spirit always occupies itself with fundamentals, expression, and motive; not with lines, form, symmetry, or finesse. The deep-lying differences between the German and Latin peoples are based upon this profound antithesis. Among the latter, art stands in much closer relationship to the immediate forms and instincts of life. This finds ample expression in the culture war, and for many it forms the actual reason for the charge of barbarism, just as the French in the classical period declared the Renaissance poet, Shakespeare, to be a drunken barbarian, and the Italians looked upon Northern Gothic as barbaric art. From this source a mass of international verdicts has arisen and been stamped as axioms in the elegant phrases of French journalism. Above all, they have found welcome among the Anglo-Saxons, who have been altogether robbed of any exact artistic traditions by their business instincts and Puritanism. As regards this point further dispute is useless.

It is remarkable that foreigners are

unable to recognize German idealism—which they brandmark as political immaturity, when the latter applies itself to social and political problems and treats them in a manner suitable to German history, instead of acting according to French or English suppositions, which to them appear to be natural laws. By the intimate connection between the State and culture, German social-philosophy cannot be what the French and English democracies wish it to be. In that respect it is purely idealistic. German philosophy and the potato-bread spirit of which Lloyd George speaks belong together, just as English philosophy and the miners' strike. * * *

France's idea of freedom is based upon the principle of equality, but in practice it does not prevent power from falling into the hands of plutocrats and lawyers. The English idea postulates the independence of the individual from the State. Without doubt both of them contain, and have indeed realized, mighty developments in social and political life. But the German idea of liberty is entirely different. Emerging from centuries of subjection, the German found freedom in education (*Bildung*) and in the intellectual or spiritual contents of his individual personality. German freedom will never be purely political; it will always be bound up with the idealistic concept of duty and the Romantic egoistic idea. Parliaments are necessary; but in our eyes they are not the essence of freedom.

The right to vote and the assistance of the people in matters of Government develop political maturity, but this is not freedom as we understand it.

The great national cultures all have

their advantages and disadvantages, but the world has room for them all. The longer the war of weapons has lasted, the bitterer has the culture war become. For our part we know that in the first place it is not a war of principles and ideas, but a fight for our existence. In the next place, we are fighting for the

right to live; but our political existence as a great power means at the same time the spirit of unconquerable belief that the world-principle of liberty does not include English direction of the moral-political order of things in this world, nor that the seas should be under English domination.

High Cost of Living in Germany

By Viscount Georges d'Avenel

That France is standing shoulder to shoulder with Great Britain in the determination to tighten the blockade is clearly indicated in this article from *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, Paris.

MANY Germans of the North," wrote Mr. Theodor Wolff recently in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, "will suffer no detriment from moderating their consumption of butter; for in this country persons whom indigence does not preserve from excess in eating are often afflicted with a monstrous obesity. There are peoples who know how to feed themselves, and who do not see the necessity for adding butter to cheese."

There are, beyond question, M. Wolff, and among these peoples figured the Germans of other days; since the German of 1914 ate twice as much as the German of 1870. Figures prove it beyond contest, and the politicians beyond the Rhine stated it, not without pride, before the war.

It is enough to say that, if the younger generations born in the lap of this recent abundance, if even the elder folk who have gradually accustomed themselves to this growing well-being, experience certain gripings of the stomach when they lose, in a few months, the satisfactions of the palate which they had gained in a half century, it is none the less true that the Germany of today could be weaned from a large part of its edibles without being "starved" or in danger of suffering hunger.

Besides, we all know that material interests no longer count in this war; Germany has sacrificed hers to the dreams of a morbid ambition, and we no longer pay heed to ours, now that the

blood of our sons has been shed in flood. Neither economic difficulties nor the lack of money will put an end to this struggle; nor will it be the deficiency of weapons and of munitions, since on both sides they are being ceaselessly multiplied; but it will be some day the inequality of effectives in the belligerent armies, for men cannot be manufactured and renewed like machines. On that day Germany, which was the first to let loose "numbers" and to triumph through them, will be conquered by "numbers" in her turn.

Up to the present our blockade, which has raised the prices of many commodities among our enemies, only provokes a certain discomfort and arouses a very natural discontent among the German crowds, who cannot understand why the war continues so long, since the Allies, they have been told, have long been beaten.

This blockade, because of modifications in favor of neutrals, was at first ultra-benevolent; from August, 1914, to May, 1915, during the ten first months of the war, the exports of Germany to America had hardly fallen to a half of what they were in the ten corresponding months of 1913-14. But if we consider the month of May alone, it amounted to only 15,000,000 francs in 1915, against 75,000,000 in 1914. As for imports from the United States to Germany, if we heed only statistics, they fell to almost nothing; but cottons, wool, and grain

made a detour and entered by minor Scandinavian and Dutch ports. With a benignity which some members of her Cabinet called folly, England waited until the end of September before declaring that "the flag no longer covered merchandise."

The Germans, on their part, cried out long before they were hurt; the contradiction of the Berlin Government is even piquant; if it desires to protest against the blockade and demand the freedom of the seas, it affirms that the country is starving and lacks everything; but if it is a question of the duration of the war and the chances of victory, it announces that Germany lacks nothing and can hold out indefinitely.

In any case, if bread could be made by laws, Germany would have plenty of it to sell, for there has been no strike in the making of laws touching materials and merchandise in Germany since the outbreak of hostilities; nor has there been any failure of "associations," of "committees," of "offices," of "Kriegswirtschaftsgesellschaften," ("central war supply societies,") for these copious bureaus—perhaps there are over a hundred of them—in which shines what our neighbors complacently call their "genius for organization." These are composed in part of functionaries, in part of willing professionals, charged with making inventories, with buying, requisitioning, transforming, distributing, controlling, taxing, selling, and dividing into rations the bulk of the food supply and raw materials. * * *

The allies of Germany, poorer, less well supplied, suffer more from the perturbation brought by the war. Living in Austria-Hungary, in Turkey, even in Bulgaria, whose indigenous products were utilized while almost nothing was brought to her from without, is today dearer than in Germany. The agents of Austria, until the last few months, paid in Holland for certain articles higher prices than the Germans. The Germans had, because of this, much difficulty in closing their bargains. To obviate this occurrence, the Berlin Commission charged with the control of purchases abroad now centralizes all merchandise entering the empire.

From the time when this was done it has become impossible for Austria to buy supplies in Holland; she must go by way of Berlin and pay a commission to her allies. * * *

It must not be believed that the blockade is ineffective; quite the contrary; and, although the affirmation may seem paradoxical, its action will make itself felt far more by what it keeps from going out than by what it keeps from coming in; much more after peace than during the war.

The result of this pressure upon Germany, which will be more efficacious and durable the longer the struggle lasts, will then appear far more distressing and onerous for the industry and commerce of Germany than the passing privations or dearness of certain commodities and certain materials of prime necessity.

French 75s: The Guns That Defend Verdun

By Stanley Washburn

War Correspondent of The London Times

SO much has been written of the French 75s that it may seem superfluous even to mention them, but I think that no one who has seen these wonderful little guns in action can resist singing their praises. It is extraordinary that a piece of mechanism should play such an enormous part in world history as this has done, and it seems incongruous

that an engine of destruction should be helping to save France and the civilization of the West. Yet every officer with whom I have talked tells me that it was these little guns which saved the battle of the Marne, and the general opinion seems to be that Verdun, too, owes its salvation to the swarms of little stinging bees that stung the German columns to

death on the bloody slopes of that now famous battlefield.

When I asked the General to be shown a battery of 75s every face in the group of officers beamed. Winding through the woods was a tiny trail, and this we followed until we emerged into a little clearing. A look disclosed the hiding place of a battery. I was escorted by the young Captain in charge into the nest of one of these guns. Squatted complacently on its haunches, its alert little nose peered expectantly out of a curtain of brush. If there ever was a weapon which had a personality it is surely this gun. Other field guns seem to me to be cynical and sinister, but this gun, like the French themselves, has nothing malevolent or morose about it. It is serious, to be sure, but its whole atmosphere is one of cheerful readiness to serve. Its killing is a part of its impersonal duty, as indeed one feels to be the case with the clean, gentlemanly soldiers of France. They kill to save France, not because they have the lust of slaughter.

The Captain showed me the details of the wonderful mechanism and explained the system of the recoil, sights, and other features of the gun. Fortunately for me, it was the hour of the day when the battery was accustomed to have a little practice against the enemy, and I have never in war seen anything more inspiring from a military point of view than the working of this gun, with its sharp, defiant little barks.

With a speed of fire of thirty shells to the minute and with a well-trained crew serving it with clockwork regularity, it resembles a machine gun rather than a

field piece in action. So exquisite is the adjustment of the recoil that a coin or even a glass of water can be placed on the wheel while in action without being jarred off.

In one of the Russian battles one of their batteries fired 525 rounds to the gun in a single day, which seemed to me at that time an extraordinary rate of fire. When I mentioned this to the Captain, he laughingly replied, "I have fired from this (four-gun) battery 3,100 rounds of shells in forty-five minutes." I listened to him in amazement. "How long do your guns last at that rate?" I asked him, for the theory before the war was that a field piece did not have a life exceeding 8,000 to 10,000 rounds of fire. The officer placed his hand affectionately on the gun that we were inspecting. "This is a brand-new gun which I have just received," he said. "The one whose place it has taken had fired more than 30,000 shells and still was not entirely finished." Then he added, "You are surprised at my speed of fire, but there have been 75s in this war that have fired 1,600 rounds in a single day." From the guns he took me to his magazine and showed me tier upon tier of brightly polished, high-explosive and shrapnel shells lying ready for use.

When the war is over there will no doubt be a great building of monuments to commemorate the dead who have fallen and the heroes who have played their part. There might perhaps also be erected in the capital city of every ally a shaft in honor and appreciation of the French 75, which is doing wonders to save Europe and the world.

Flemish Culture Is Not German

By L. Dumont-Wilden

Staff Contributor to Le Figaro, Paris

THE exhibition of Belgian artists at the Salon in the Rue de Sèze is the timeliest answer that could be made to certain propositions laid down by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in the Reichstag, namely, that Flanders is a dependency of Germany and that its

population, "Germanic by blood, speech, and culture," ought logically to re-enter the empire. How false and lying this assertion is these paintings show. If this profoundly original art owes anything to other schools, it is only to the French.

The great landscape painters of the

Fontainebleau school, the Impressionists and the Neo-Impressionists, have had disciples in Belgium, and particularly in Flanders, who have often been the equals of their masters. The whole history of Flemish painting shows that there was from the first a constant reciprocity between Flemish and French art. The magnificent Flemish school of the fifteenth century owes the first elements of a style, which nevertheless is its own, to the colorists of the Paris school. In return, the Flemings founded the Burgundian school of sculpture; and in the sixteenth century the Valois attracted to their Courts as many Flemish as Italian artists. Many Franco-Flemish painters it is impossible to assign to either school.

It is especially since the beginning of the nineteenth century that the relations between Belgian and French art have become intimate and the influence on one another constant. David had a studio in Brussels; Nicaise de Keyser, the Wappers, and the Gallaits were influenced by Delacroix and Delaroche. Finally Impressionism, which is purely French in origin, immediately exercised a decisive influence in Belgium, as can be seen in the work of Claus, Van Rysselberghe, and Ensor. It would scarcely be possible to find two or three contemporary Belgian painters, even among the less interesting

artists, who owe anything to German taste.

In Belgian literature it is not only the Walloons who are French writers. It is sufficient to mention the names of Maeterlinck, Verhaeren, Georges Ekhoude, Albert Giraud, and Van Lerberghe—all of pure Flemish origin and all pure French as writers. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg can say what he likes about Flanders being a Germanic country, joined by its culture to "kultur," but in reply the French artists have only to show their pictures and the Flemish writers their books—written in French. Flanders, like Alsace, is a border province where formerly the blood of the Gallic tribes has been mingled with that of German invaders. In consequence, a German idiom has become the vernacular of the country, but both have been for centuries illumined by French enlightenment, and for centuries all the manifestations of the higher civilization are French.

In the face of these facts, German violence, intrigue, threats, and imposture are impotent. One only needs an exhibition of paintings or the publication of a poem by Verhaeren or an essay by Maeterlinck to upset—as far as Flanders is concerned—the whole of the Chancellor's arguments.

Within What Limits the Pope Can Be Admitted to the Peace Congress

By Eugenio Valli

Member of the Italian Senate

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from the Nuova Antologia, Rome]

A SIMPLE and glib answer to the question of the Pope's participation in the Peace Congress can be given with certainty only by clerical doctrinists or by anti-clerical doctrinists. The latter must reply negatively, because they do not take account of the situations produced in a long historical development and want to regulate the social life of men in the State, and the life

of States in humanity, without reference to religious ideas and institutions. If States are to ignore the existence of these manifestations, except as they may at some time act as a brake for the safeguarding of public order, it necessarily follows that it is impossible for men of these views to admit the representation of such institutions at a congress.

Vice versa, clerical doctrinists must answer such a question affirmatively and with no less certainty. Rather must their affirmation be the more exuberant as it is impossible, in the eyes of your clerical doctrinist, to pay any attention to the distant historical development that gave life to the international personality of the Church and to the more recent historical development that has modified it. The Catholic Church, while resisting rigidly in the field of principle, feels and is influenced by the surrounding atmosphere, and always ends by changing and accommodating itself to that atmosphere without loss of any of its great splendor.

Clerical doctrinism, which is to some extent a deformity marring the greatness of the Church, has made itself as rigid as a fossil in the results of mediaeval concessions. The Pope is not only in matters of religion the head of the Catholic Church and the Vicar of God on earth, he is also the head of the Society of the States. He is invested by immutable and Divine right with that suzerainty which, in the interests of the faith, exclusively protected by his prudent government, gave him the prerogative in the Middle Ages and at the beginning of modern times of absolving subjects of a heretical sovereign, or one rebellious to the Church, from their oath of allegiance, and to divide among two Catholic powers the sovereignty over discovered countries, or even those to be discovered eventually in the New World.

In conformity with this doctrine, which I recently heard defended with more courage than success, the Pope should not only participate in the congress—he should have the first right to initiate it, to preside over it, and to moderate it. His right and his capacity to protect international order should be considered superior to that of the single States.

* * *

It is apparent, then, that there is but one conclusion to be drawn from this—the answer of extreme clericalism and extreme anti-clericalism may be considered practically negative. Here is the simple reason: In the matter of participation at the congress by a repre-

sentative of the Pontificate, under exactly the same title as that of the individual States, we see that such Papal representation is as incompatible with the negative solution of the one party as with the overaffirmative solution of the other—according to which the Pope should be seated as the overlord and arbiter among the representatives of the various States.

THE TEMPORAL POWER

But Papal representation at the congress may be, and is in fact, asked for now on the basis of another title, and is defended from different points of view and maintained by various arguments that should be examined one by one.

The Pope could be invited or admitted to the congress as the pretendent of the State of the Church, or a partial restoration of this State. It is under this title especially that full diplomatic rights are asked for the Pontificate by one of the most authoritative representatives of the uncompromising clerical school of public policy.*

The Pope could propose himself (a) to claim the rights of the States of the Church, (b) or that part of the States of the Church in regard to which he has not yet tacitly admitted the territorial condition created in Italy by popular vote; (c) or to ask, without any preventive rules beyond the recognition of his sovereign personal prerogatives which are universally admitted, a territorial sovereignty, to be conceded him under restrictions, at the will of the powers.

Evidently this demand—whatever be its extension or attenuation—is flagrantly at variance not only with our interests, but with public rights. This demand, whether for much or little, or even a speck of land, would bring into question the integrity of our territory. The demand or proposal would be gravely offensive to us, because Italian territory would be subjected, even if only in the abstract, to the revision or the limitation of the other powers. Italy must therefore exact the absolute exclusion of these discussions from the congress. The pres-

*De Luise, in "De iure publico seu diplomatico Ecclesiae Catholicae."

ence of a representative of the Pope, if these questions are left untouched, would not mean an offense to our rights and interests.

INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE

Even independently of a claim or demand for temporal power, the Pope could aspire to admission to the congress as the highest religious authority of a universal character. Under this title, he could seek to obtain guarantees for the absolute security, as also for the independence and the continuity of his work.

This international guarantee could, as a sort of "garrison" of the Pontiff's authority and functions, form an equivalent—according to certain Catholics—to the territorial sovereignty lost in 1870. According to other Catholics, the independence of the Holy See would be, as a result, gravely menaced, because the Pontiff, instead of being personally a sovereign in the sight of Italy—which did not create but recognized his exceptional juridical condition as history developed a little at a time—instead of this he would find himself in a new legal position, one created by the powers and dependent on their collective guarantee. On this head we must again speak most clearly.

Our Government must exact the exclusion of this argument from the congress just as completely as the other one about territory. That is not enough. To exclude it, even in the form of subtle and astute presentation, the Italian Government must put forth if possible an even more unshakable tenacity. The absolute integrity of the territory of our State should be sacred to every Italian. Even more sacred, if I may so express myself, should be the absolute independence of the State and the fullness of its sovereignty. It would be interesting to see, to know, to read what all the other countries would think or do if they were in our position. They would do neither more nor less than what I am thinking and writing, and I say this in all modesty, but

unchangeably. The creation of a Pontifical San Marino would be a break in the territorial integrity of Italy. * * * The most essential parts of our legislation would as a result be exposed to future interference, positive or negative, from the Pope and the powers from whom he had his guarantee. And as, in the course of time, the Italian Government should tend to get away from such interference, which is clearly intolerable, so for those even who in good faith had not foreseen this degree of pressure and suffering there would result finally the danger of a resurrection of temporal power. * * *

THE POPE'S REPRESENTATIVE

If an invitation were extended to the Pope to attend the congress as a sovereign, considered, so to speak, as the head of a first-class State, there would be no contradiction with the existing precedents of international law. The Pope is in fact considered a sovereign, and his representatives as diplomatic agents. Even now there is in operation a regulation as to grades and precedents among diplomatic agents which was signed at Vienna on March 19, 1815, and completed by the Protocol of Acquisgrana on Nov. 21, 1818.

According to that regulation, the first class is composed of Ambassadors, Legates, or Nunciates. Article IV. of the Regulation of Vienna establishes the rule that diplomatic agents should have their precedence in every class based on the date of the official notification of their arrival. Then it adds: "The present regulation shall not carry with it any innovation as to the representatives of the Pope." All the powers, then, implicitly recognized that precedence of the representative of the Pontiff outside of the question of seniority which was and is in effect in the Catholic capitals, and as an effect of which all the accredited diplomatic agents, at Vienna or at Madrid, e. g., recognize in the Papal Nunciate the head of the Diplomatic Corps.

The Trend of Events in Asia Minor

By Colonel K. Shumski

Russian Military Critic

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from the Niva, Petrograd]

ONE of the most considerable events that closed the preparatory operations of the Winter was the capture, by our gallant Caucasus armies, of Trebizond, an important port and a valuable strategical and political centre. This new success of the Army of the Caucasus is the immediate result of two of our chief victories in the Caucasus war zone—the battle of Sarikamysh, in December, 1914, and the storming of Erzerum, on Feb. 16, 1916.

In this last contest was finally broken the power of resistance of the Turkish Third Army, and therefore after the fall of Erzerum it was logical to expect the gradual, almost automatic fall of a series of very important points in Armenia. The only question was, how far conditions of weather and locality would enable us to seize all these points more or less rapidly; but the fall of Mush, of Bitlis, of the Port of Rizeh, of the Port of Trebizond, was evidently predetermined.

Erzerum fell on Feb. 16, 1916, and we have more than once insisted upon the great and ever-growing importance of that event, as almost week by week our capture of one point after another was announced. At the same time, it might have been predicated that the conquest of Mush, Bitlis, and Port Rizeh should be explained by the disruption of the Turkish forces resulting immediately from the fall of Erzerum, but that, when the Turks had had time to draw breath, a more serious opposition might be expected from them.

For this reason, therefore, apart from all other considerations, the fall of Trebizond is important; because it shows that our armies were able to capture a series of points in Asia Minor, not because the Turks had been shaken by the loss of Erzerum, but because the Turks are in fact incapable of offering any serious

resistance to the victorious advance of our armies. At Mush and Bitlis, it might have been argued that our armies were profiting directly by the results of a panic which took possession of the Turks after Erzerum. But when two months passed, and when Trebizond was taken, the Turks had had every opportunity to reorganize their resistance, in order to hold that important point; and, if they did not do this, then it was solely because it was beyond their power to do it; because the Turkish Army was broken, and, for the Turks on the Caucasus front, the war was irretrievably lost.

The one thing that has saved the Turks from a final catastrophe is the enormous expanse of the theatre of war in Armenia; spaces of many hundreds of miles leading, on the one hand, to Constantinople, and, on the other, to the Persian Gulf. All the calculations of Turkish strategy are based on the fact that a great deal of time and very extensive preparations will be needed to drive them back on Constantinople; and, while this time is passing, the Turks hope for German victories on the main fronts, in Europe.

Under these conditions it is perfectly idle to think that the Turks can ever win back any of the territory they have lost. It might be reasonable to think of this, if the Turks could expect any effective aid from Germany; but, as we know, the entire resources of the Germans are absorbed by their problems on the French and Russian fronts, and it is wholly beyond their power to detach any forces whatever to be sent to the aid of the weakening Turkish defensive. Without question the Germans knew that Trebizond must fall, since the Turks were under the necessity of defending three directions of operations at once—the line against Trebizond; the line against Erzerum, (the direction of Constantinople,)

and the line against Mesopotamia—and a defensive on such an extended front is an insoluble problem, especially where there are no supply roads from the rear. So the Germans must have known that it would be necessary to sacrifice at least one of these lines, and Teuton-Turkish strategy had to decide on which line the largest forces should be concentrated, and which should be abandoned.

First, the Teuton-Turkish strategists unquestionably determined that all possible forces must be concentrated on the Erzinjian line, because this line leads to Constantinople, and, further, because the success of the Russian armies at this point would mean the smashing in of the whole front of the Turkish Third Army; and after such a smash, the sea coast division of the army would be wholly cut off, as would also be the southern, Mesopotamian, division. Through Erzinjian leads the important road to Sivas and Angora, from which reinforcements from Constantinople were expected, and through which the Bagdad railroad passes.

Further, of the two other directions, the Trebizond line and the Mesopotamia line, the enemy evidently considered the latter the more important; consequently the smaller forces were concentrated on the Trebizond line. This is probably to be explained by the fact that the Germans, for whom Mesopotamia and the Bagdad railway possess a more important interest, were able to coerce the Turks into giving up the serious defense of the Trebizond zone, for the purpose of concentrating their forces on the Mesopotamia line.

The Russians, attacking Trebizond from behind, were energetically supported by the Black Sea fleet, and Trebizond was quickly cleared of Turks, who fled to the southwest—that is, in the direction of Erzinjian, which is now the staff headquarters of the Turkish Third Army. It thus happens that the two termini of the road from Erzerum to Trebizond are in our hands, while Baiburt, the central point of the road, is still in the possession of the Turks, and is being obstinately defended.

This last circumstance has high importance, as the road to Erzinjian also leads through the Baiburt Pass, and the whole defensive power of the Turks is now evidently concentrated in the Baiburt-Erzinjian region. The mastery of the whole of the road between Trebizond and Erzerum is, therefore, of the greatest importance to us, because this is one of the best roads in Asia Minor; because it runs parallel to our front, and would unite our forces at Trebizond with our forces at Erzerum, and likewise with the southern group, which is operating in the region of Bitlis and Mush, in the direction of Kharput.

In the region of Baiburt, or, as it is called in our bulletins, "the region of the Upper Chorokh," the mountains are exceedingly chaotic in character, and the Turks are evidently counting on making a protracted defensive there. As at the same time the mastery of the Trebizond-Erzerum road is very important to us, it is natural to expect the development of a great battle on the road to Trebizond, and also on the road to Erzinjian.



England's Seizure of Mails

By H. Wittmaack

German Writer on International Law

Since the Washington Administration has put extra pressure on the British Government touching the question of mails in transit between neutral ports, the subjoined article is of interest in showing the German viewpoint.

THE English Government stops all neutral mail steamers in transit between neutral points, takes them into English ports, and, after searching, retains the parcels sent in the post. How can such a procedure be reconciled with the rights of nations?

Article 1 of The Hague agreement relative to certain limitations respecting seizures at sea during war reads: "Whether belonging to neutrals or belligerents, mail (correspondance postale) found on neutral or enemy ships, be this of an official or private character, must be held inviolable. In case of seizure, it is incumbent on those responsible for such seizures to forward the mail as quickly as possible." In case a blockade is in effect, this clause becomes inoperative where mail is coming from or going to blockaded ports.

In Article 2 it reads further: "The inviolability of the mails does not exempt neutral mail steamers from being subject to regulations and usages due to naval warfare; such as govern merchantmen in general. However, the search should be undertaken only in case of necessity, with all due care and the utmost dispatch." This agreement was ratified by all the nations concerned in the present discussion.

The Declaration of London, Article 30, decrees that even though carried in neutral ships between neutral ports, absolute contraband—that is, such articles as are for war purposes—is to be seized when the destination is an enemy country or such territory as may be in the possession of the enemy. For that reason it is rather difficult to make objection to the British Government's stopping mail steamers with a view of ascertaining whether they carry any absolute contraband in the parcel post destined for

enemy territory. If subsequently it is necessary to take the steamer into an English port, the owners of the ship and of the parcels simply have to consent. That absolute contraband, assigned to the enemy country, is on board need not necessarily be suspected, and the circumstance that such contraband goes by the parcel post is insignificant by itself. As a matter of fact, such merchandise is exposed to the same fate as is contraband shipped in any other manner. But the so-called conditional contraband—that is, such materials as may be employed for both war and peace purposes—can, according to Article 35 of the Declaration of London, be subject to seizure only when the ship in question is bound to or from territory of the enemy. Neutral mail steamers plying between neutral ports do not come within these regulations.

The English Government never ratified this declaration, but accepted it in the present war with some modifications. Under this modification comes the decision that conditional contraband, even on neutral ships bound for neutral ports, can be seized when the party to whom it is actually assigned lives in enemy country. It is for this reason that the English Government takes to itself the right to examine conditional contraband found on neutral ships with a view to learning whether in fact the parcels are not ultimately to come into possession of some one in an enemy country. This goes quite contrary to the rights of nations, but the English Government acts according to its own convictions. However, in the matter of conditional contraband the principle was accepted even by England that the question of seizure can arise only when the goods are to be used by the opposing power.

Whatever regulations are in effect, they do not fully explain the procedure of the English Government. The attempt has been made to obtain permission for the importation of condensed milk from the United States into Germany in order to save German children from starvation. It is said that the French Government objected to this, and that in consequence no shipments were made. It is to be taken for granted that the French Government would not have taken this stand without making sure that the English Government would act likewise. It is presumed that the French were given the preference in entering objections so as to give the Democrats and Socialists now in control of affairs a chance to prove that even while some of them may proclaim the universal brotherhood on the whole, no less than the English Government, they are determined to conduct the battle for civilization, culture, and humanity by inhuman means.

We know by this time that whatever the contents of the mail which England seizes she keeps it for an indefinite period. Even if no enemy character attaches, examination has to be made to see whether or not it comes within the blockade regulations. In this way, securities sent from Holland on neutral ships and destined for America were seized by the English because they carried a German seal, and the incorrect conclusion was drawn that for this reason they were German property.

Since the Scandinavian countries were not signatories to the London Conference they would be justified in holding to the regulations of 1900, also agreed to by England, that goods in transit on neutral ships between neutral ports at no time can be considered contraband. Denmark and Norway, whose trade has been enormously increased during the war, rather inclined to fall in with England's wishes all around. Sweden, on the other hand, recalling its own glorious past, did not relish the manner in which the English are treating the rights of nations. Sweden took recourse to reprisals in that she held back the mail bags that crossed the country on their way to Russia. It is, however, doubtful whether this measure

will be of any service. England is bent on crushing Germany, and if this cannot be accomplished on the battlefield she will use every means in her possession to starve us into submission. When once Germany is conquered, the argument runs, a short shrift can be made of the small nations.

According to The Hague agreement, only direct mail—"correspondance postale"—is held inviolable. All other articles besides letters, whether included with letters, or sent separately in envelopes, cannot claim exemption.

The question has arisen what is meant by the open sea. It is generally conceded that within a certain distance from shore the ocean comes under the jurisdiction of the adjoining country. For instance, in respect to fishing and the gathering of other products of the sea, such jurisdiction is commonly acknowledged. It is also the duty of such countries as border on the water to see to it that warring nations do not violate the neutrality of this zone in case it belongs to a neutral.

As for the width of this neutral zone, in times past there has been a deal of dispute. In the beginning of the eighteenth century the Dutch jurist, Bynkershoek, laid down the rule that the jurisdiction over the adjoining ocean reached just as far as a cannon shot would be effective. At that time a cannon ball carried about three sea miles. To this is due the fact that the coastal waters of a country have been marked off as covering three miles from shore, measuring from low-water mark. But as a matter of fact there has never been any exact agreement as to these territorial waters of any country. But there has been no diversity of opinion on the point that ships of all nations can pass through these waters, providing they do not do any damage to the territory; nor on this other point, that in case they do not make any stops while passing through, they do not come within the jurisdiction of the country bordering on the water.

In the year 1876, a collision took place within the three-mile limit from the English coast to Dover, between the Hamburg steamer *Frankonia* and the English ship *Strathclyde*. A passenger on the

latter ship lost his life. In England a criminal charge was lodged against the Captain of the Frankonia. But the courts decided that there was no precedent on which to rest the case. To remedy this shortcoming, a law was passed in 1878 whereby the English courts assumed jurisdiction in English coastal waters. This was the "Territorial Waters Jurisdiction act." As a consequence the British Government took to itself the right to proceed against any ship acting contrary to the law of the land, even though the act was committed aboard a foreign ship. While the matter was yet under discussion in Parliament the Lord Chancellor expressly declared that the passage through territorial waters of any foreign vessel was a concession on the part of England, and that, consequently, those taking advantage of

the privilege were bound by what the coastal country decreed.

The Hague agreement, Article 1, declares clearly enough that it covers the high seas and that territorial waters are not considered in the premises. But the seizure of mail on neutral ships within English territorial waters is exactly what caused a discussion between the British and Dutch Governments. England takes the position that she can act toward ships passing through her territorial waters as if they were passing over her own soil. At the time of The Hague peace conference the English point of view was accepted in general in so far as it concerned the unimpeded passage of ships through territorial waters. As the issue stands today England has gone directly counter to the rights of nations.

"Too Proud to Fight"

President Wilson's celebrated words about being too proud to fight are so often quoted and misquoted that the facts about them should be a matter of record:

The phrase was used in an address delivered by the President in Convention Hall, Philadelphia, May 10, 1915, before 4,000 newly naturalized citizens. It was the President's first public address after the sinking of the Lusitania, May 7. He did not in the course of his speech directly mention the Lusitania or submarine warfare, but the address has been grouped with two others, delivered at about the same time, as setting forth "the principles on which he would meet the crises of the European war as they affect the United States." After speaking of the ideals of America, in special reference to the coming of aliens to be American citizens, the President said: "The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world, and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."




A REALITY THAT RIVALS THE ROMANCES OF JULES VERNE



"In the Night of April 15-16," Says a Bulletin of the French War Office, "One of Our Armed Aeroplanes, Flying Over the North Sea at an Altitude of 300 Feet, Fired at an Enemy Warship Sixteen Shells, Most of Which Struck It."

(From a Painting by Messrs. Leven and Lemonier.)

A HISTORIC EVENT OF THE WAR IN FRANCE



Passage of the First Battalion of Russian Troops in Front of the Arc de Triomphe in Marseilles,
After Their Long Voyage From Vladivostok

Freedom of the Seas

By Arthur James Balfour

First Lord of the British Admiralty

This important official utterance was given to the American public about the middle of May through Edward Marshall and *The Saturday Evening Post*. Mr. Balfour's lifelong friendliness toward the United States enhances its interest. The full text of his statement follows.

THE phrase "freedom of the seas" is naturally attractive to British and American ears. For the extension of freedom into all departments of life and over the whole world has been one of the chief aspirations of the English-speaking peoples, and efforts toward that end have formed no small part of their contribution to civilization. But freedom is a word of many meanings, and we shall do well to consider in what meaning the Germans use it when they ask for it, not (it may be safely said) because they love freedom but because they hate Britain.

About the "freedom of the seas," in one sense, we are all agreed. England and Holland fought for it in times gone by. To their success the United States may be said to owe its very existence.

For if, three hundred years ago, the maritime claims of Spain and Portugal had been admitted, whatever else North America might have been, it would not have been English-speaking. It neither would have employed the language, nor obeyed the laws, nor enjoyed the institutions, which, in the last analysis, are of British origin.

But the "freedom of the seas" desired by the modern German is a very different thing from the freedom for which our forefathers fought in days of old. How, indeed, can it be otherwise? The most simple-minded must feel suspicious when they find that these missionaries of maritime freedom are the very same persons who preach and who practice upon the land the extremest doctrines of military absolutism.

GERMANY'S AMBITIONS

Ever since the genius of Bismarck created the German Empire by Prussian rifles, welding the German people into a

great unity by military means, on a military basis, German ambitions have been a cause of unrest to the entire world. Commercial and political domination, depending upon a gigantic army autocratically governed, has been and is the German ideal.

If, then, Germany wants what she calls the freedom of the seas, it is solely as a means whereby this ideal may receive worldwide extension. The power of Napoleon never extended beyond the coast line of Europe. Further progress was barred by the British fleets and by them alone. Germany is determined to endure no such limitations; and if she cannot defeat her enemies at sea, at least she will paralyze their sea power.

There is a characteristic simplicity in the methods by which she sets about attaining this object. She poses as a reformer of international law, though international law has never bound her for an hour. She objects to "economic pressure" when it is exercised by a fleet, though she sets no limit to the brutal completeness with which economic pressure may be imposed by an army. She sighs over the suffering which war imposes upon peaceful commerce, though her own methods of dealing with peaceful commerce would have wrung the conscience of Captain Kidd. She denounces the maritime methods of the Allies, though in her efforts to defeat them she is deterred neither by the rules of war, the appeal of humanity, nor the rights of neutrals.

It must be admitted, therefore, that it is not the cause of peace, of progress, or of liberty which preoccupies her when, in the name of freedom, she urges fundamental changes in maritime practice. Her manifest object is to shatter an ob-

stacle which now stands in her way, as more than a hundred years ago it stood in the way of the masterful genius who was her oppressor and is her model.

Not along this path are peace and liberty to be obtained. To paralyze naval power and leave military power uncontrolled is surely the worst injury which international law can inflict upon mankind.

A FORGOTTEN ASPECT

Let me confirm this truth by dwelling for a moment on an aspect of it which is, I think, too often forgotten. It should be observed that even if the German proposal were carried out in its entirety it would do nothing to relieve the world from the burden of armaments.

Fleets would still be indispensable. But their relative value would suffer change. They could no longer be used to exercise pressure upon an enemy except in conjunction with an army. The gainers by the change would therefore be the nations who possessed armies—the military monarchies. Interference with trade would be stopped, but oversea invasion would be permitted. The proposed change would therefore not merely diminish the importance of sea power, but it would diminish it most in the case of nonmilitary States, like America and Britain.

Suppose, for example, that Germany, in her desire to appropriate some Germanized portions of South America, came into conflict with the United States over the Monroe Doctrine. The United States, bound by the doctrine of "freedom of the seas," could aim no blow at her enemy until she herself had created a large army and become for the time being a military community. Her sea power would be useless, or nearly so. Her land power would not exist.

IF GERMANY RULED THE SEA

But more than this might happen. Let us suppose the desired change had been effected. Let us suppose that the maritime nations, accepting the new situation, thought themselves relieved from all necessity of protecting their sea-borne commerce and arranged their program of naval shipbuilding accordingly. For some time it would probably proceed on legal

lines. Commerce, even hostile commerce, would be unhampered. But a change might happen. Some unforeseen circumstance might make the German General Staff think it to be to the interest of its nation to cast to the winds the "freedom of the seas" and, in defiance of the new law, to destroy the trade of its enemies.

Could anybody suggest after our experience in this war, after reading German histories and German theories of politics, that Germany would be prevented from taking such a step by the mere fact that it was a breach of international treaties to which she was a party? She would never hesitate—and the only result of the cession by the pacific powers of their maritime rights would be that the military powers would seize the weapon for their own purpose and turn it against those who had too hastily abandoned it.

Thus we are forced to the sorrowful recognition of the weakness of international law so long as it is unsupported by international authority.

While this state of things is permitted to endure, drastic changes in international law well may do more harm than good; for if the new rules should involve serious limitations of belligerent powers, they would be broken as soon as it suited the interests of the aggressor; and his victim would be helpless. Nothing could be more disastrous. It is bad that law should be defied. It is far worse that it should injure the well-disposed. Yet this is what would inevitably happen, since law unsupported by authority will hamper everybody but the criminal.

THE ULTIMATE PROBLEM

Here we come face to face with the great problem which lies behind all the changing aspects of this tremendous war. When it is brought to an end, how is civilized mankind so to reorganize itself that similar catastrophes shall not be permitted to recur?

The problem is insistent, though its full solution may be beyond our powers at this stage of our development.

But, surely, even now, it is fairly clear that if substantial progress is to be made toward securing the peace of the world and a free development of its constituent

nations, the United States of America and the British Empire should explicitly recognize, what all instinctively know, that on these great subjects they share a common ideal.

I am well aware that in even hinting at the possibility of co-operation between these two countries I am treading on delicate ground. The fact that American independence was wrested by force from Great Britain colors the whole view which some Americans take of the "natural" relations between the two countries. Others are impatient of anything which they regard as a sentimental appeal to community of race; holding that in respect of important sections of the American people this community of race does not in fact exist. Others, again, think that any argument based on a similarity of laws and institutions belittles the greatness of America's contribution to the political development of the modern world.

IDEALS IN COMMON

Rightly understood, however, what I have to say is quite independent of individual views on any of these subjects. It is based on the unquestioned fact that the growth of British laws, British forms of government, British literature and modes of thought was the slow work of centuries; that among the co-heirs of these agelong labors were the great men who founded the United States; and that the two branches of the English-speaking peoples, after the political separation, developed along parallel lines. So it has come about that, whether they be friendly or quarrelsome, whether they rejoice in their agreements or cultivate their differences, they can no more get rid of a certain fundamental similarity of outlook than children born of the same parents and brought up in the same home. Whether, therefore, you study political thought in Great Britain or America, in Canada or in Australia, you will find it presents the sharpest and most irreconcilable contrast to political thought in the Prussian Kingdom, or in that German Empire into which, with no modification of aims or spirit, the Prussian Kingdom has developed. Holding, as I

do, that this war is essentially a struggle between these two ideals of ancient growth I cannot doubt that in the result of that struggle America is no less concerned than the British Empire.

PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS

Now, if this statement, which represents the most unchanging element in my political creed, has in it any element of truth, how does it bear upon the narrower issues upon which I dwelt in the earlier portions of this interview?

My own conclusions are these: If in our time any substantial effort is to be made toward insuring the permanent triumph of the Anglo-Saxon ideal, the great communities which accept it must work together. And in working together they must bear in mind that law is not enough. Behind law there must be power. It is good that arbitration should be encouraged. It is good that the accepted practices of warfare should become ever more humane. It is good that before peace is broken the would-be belligerents should be compelled to discuss their differences in some congress of the nations. It is good that the security of the smaller States should be fenced round with peculiar care. But all the precautions are mere scraps of paper unless they can be enforced. We delude ourselves if we think we are doing God service merely by passing good resolutions. What is needed now, and will be needed so long as militarism is unconquered, is the machinery for enforcing them, and the contrivance of such a machinery will tax to its utmost the world's statesmanship.

I have no contribution to make to the solution of the problem. Yet this much seems clear. If there is to be any effective sanction behind the desire of the English-speaking peoples to preserve the world's peace and the free development of the nations, that sanction must consist largely in the potential use of sea power. For two generations and more after the last great war Britain was without a rival on the sea. During this period Belgium became a State, Greece secured her independence, the unity of Italy was achieved, the South American republics were established, the Monroe Doctrine

came into being. To me it seems that the lesson to be drawn from history by those who love peace, freedom, and security is not that Britain and America should be deprived, or should deprive themselves, of the maritime powers they

now possess, but that, if possible, those powers should be organized in the interests of an ideal common to the two States, an ideal upon whose realization the happiness and peace of the world must largely depend.

Text of American Note to Great Britain on Seizures of Mail

[Delivered in duplicate to the Governments of Great Britain and France]

Department of State,
Washington, May 24, 1916.

Excellency:

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of April 3 last, transmitting a memorandum dated Feb. 15, 1916, and communicated in substance to the American Ambassador in London on Feb. 28, in which are stated the contentions of the British and French Governments in regard to the right to detain and examine parcel and letter mails en route by sea between the United States and Europe.

After a discussion of the use of the mails for the transmission of parcels and of the limitations to be placed on "inviolable mail," the joint memorandum of Feb. 15 closes with the following assertions:

"1. That from the standpoint of their right of visitation and eventual arrest and seizure, merchandise shipped in post parcels need not and shall not be treated otherwise than merchandise shipped in any other manner.

"2. That the inviolability of postal correspondence stipulated by the eleventh convention of The Hague of 1907 does not in any way affect the right of the allied Governments to visit and, if occasion arise, arrest and seize merchandise hidden in the wrappers, envelopes, or letters contained in the mail bags.

"3. That true to their engagements and respectful of genuine 'correspondence' the allied Governments will continue, for the present, to refrain on the high seas from seizing and confiscating such correspondence, letters, or dispatches, and will insure their speediest possible transmission as soon as the sincerity of their character shall have been ascertained."

In reply the Government of the United States desires to state that it does not consider that the Postal Union Convention of 1906 necessarily applies to the interferences by the British and French Governments with the oversea transportation of mails of which the Government of the United States complains. Furthermore, the allied powers appear to have overlooked the admission of the Government of the United States that post parcels may be treated as merchandise sub-

ject to the exercise of belligerent rights as recognized by international law. But the Government of the United States does not admit that such parcels are subject to the "exercise of the rights of police supervision, visitation, and eventual seizure which belongs to belligerents as to all cargoes on the high seas," as asserted in the joint note under acknowledgment.

It is noted with satisfaction that the British and French Governments do not claim, and, in the opinion of this Government, properly do not claim, that their so-called "blockade" measures are sufficient grounds upon which to base a right to interfere with all classes of mail matter in transit to or from the Central Powers. On the contrary, their contention appears to be that, as "genuine correspondence" is under conventional stipulation "inviolable," mail matter of other classes is subject to detention and examination. While the Government of the United States agrees that "genuine correspondence" mail is inviolable, it does not admit that belligerents may search other private sea-borne mails for any other purpose than to discover whether they contain articles of enemy ownership carried on belligerent vessels or articles of contraband transmitted under sealed covers as letter mail, though they may intercept at sea all mails coming out of and going into ports of the enemy's coasts which are effectively blockaded. The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, however, appear to be in substantial agreement as to principle. The method of applying the principle is the chief cause of difference.

Though giving assurances that they consider "genuine correspondence" to be "inviolable," and that they will, "true to their engagements," refrain "on the high seas" from seizing and confiscating such correspondence, the allied Governments proceed to deprive neutral Governments of the benefits of these assurances by seizing and confiscating mail from vessels in port instead of at sea. They compel neutral ships without just cause to enter their own ports, or they induce shipping lines, through some form of

duress, to send their mail ships via British ports, or they detain all vessels merely calling at British ports, thus acquiring by force or unjustifiable means an illegal jurisdiction. Acting upon this enforced jurisdiction, the authorities remove all mail, genuine correspondence as well as post parcels, take them to London, where every piece, even though of neutral origin and destination, is opened and critically examined to determine the "sincerity of their character," in accordance with the interpretation given that undefined phrase by the British and French censors. Finally the expurgated remainder is forwarded, frequently after irreparable delay, to its destination. Ships are detained en route to or from the United States or to and from other neutral countries, and mails are held and delayed for several days, and, in some cases, for weeks and even months, even though not routed to ports of North Europe via British ports. This has been the procedure which has been practiced since the announcement of Feb. 15, 1916. To some extent the same practice was followed before that date, calling forth the protest of this Government on Jan. 4, 1916. But to that protest the memorandum under acknowledgment makes no reference and is entirely unresponsive.

The Government of the United States must again insist with emphasis that the British and French Governments do not obtain rightful jurisdiction of ships by forcing or inducing them to visit their ports for the purpose of seizing their mails, or thereby obtain greater belligerent rights as to such ships than they could exercise on the high seas, for there is, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, no legal distinction between the seizure of mails at sea, which is announced as abandoned, and their seizure from vessels voluntarily or involuntarily in port.

The British and French practice amounts to an unwarranted limitation on the use by neutrals of the world's highway for the transmission of correspondence. The practice actually followed by the allied powers must be said to justify the conclusion, therefore, that the announcement of Feb. 15 was merely notice that one illegal practice had been abandoned to make place for the development of another more onerous and vexatious in character.

The present practice is a violation not only of the spirit of the announcement of Feb. 15 but of the rule of The Hague Convention upon which it is concededly based. Aside from this it is a violation of the prior practice of nations which Great Britain and her allies have in the past insisted to establish and maintain, notwithstanding the statement in the memorandum "that as late as 1907 the letters and dispatches themselves could be seized and confiscated."

During the war between the United States and Mexico the United States forces allowed

British steamers to enter and depart from the port of Vera Cruz without molesting the mails intended for inland points. During the American civil war Lord Russell endeavored to induce the United States to concede that "her Majesty's mails on board a private vessel should be exempted from visitation or detention." This exemption of mails was urged in October, 1862, in the case of British mails on board the *Adela*. On Oct. 31 Secretary Seward announced that "public mails of any friendly or neutral power duly certified or authenticated as such shall not be searched or opened, but be put as speedily as may be convenient on the way to their designated destination." In accordance with this announcement the Government of the United States in the case of the British steamship *Peterhoff*, which had been seized with her mails against the protest of her Majesty's Government, had her mails forwarded to destination unopened.

The same rule was followed by France, as I am advised, in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870; by the United States in the Spanish-American war of 1898; by Great Britain in the South African war, in the case of the German mail steamers *Bundesrath* and *General*; by Japan, and substantially by Russia, in the Russo-Japanese war of 1914. And even in the present war, as the memorandum of Great Britain and France states, their enemy, Germany, has desisted from the practice of interfering with neutral mails, even on board belligerent steamers. This is illustrated by the case of the French steamer *Floride*, captured by the auxiliary cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, cited by the British and French Governments in support of their argument regarding parcel mails. In this case the letter mails of the *Floride*, amounting to 144 sacks, were forwarded to their destination by the commander at the first opportunity upon arriving in the United States. It would seem, therefore, to be conclusively established that the interferences with mails of which this Government justly complains are wrong in principle and in practice.

The arbitrary methods employed by the British and French Governments have resulted most disastrously to citizens of the United States. Important papers which can never be duplicated, or can be duplicated only with great difficulty, such as United States patents for inventions, rare documents, legal papers relating to the settlement of estates, powers of attorney, fire insurance claims, income tax returns, and similar matters, have been lost.

Delays in receiving shipping documents have caused great loss and inconvenience by preventing prompt delivery of goods.

In the case of the *Macniff Horticultural Company* of New York large shipments of plants and bulbs from Holland were, I am informed, frozen on the wharves because possession could not be obtained in the absence of documents relating to them which

had been removed from the Nieuw Amsterdam, Costerdyk, and Rotterdam.

Business opportunities are lost by failure to transmit promptly bids, specifications, and contracts.

The Standard Underground Cable Company of Pittsburgh, for example, sent by mail a tender and specifications for certain proposed electrical works to be constructed in Christiania; after several weeks of waiting the papers have failed to arrive. The American company was told that the bids could not be longer held open and the contract was awarded to a British competitor.

Checks, drafts, money orders, securities, and similar property are lost or detained for weeks and months.

Business correspondence relating to legitimate and bona fide trade between neutral countries, correspondence of a personal nature, and also certain official correspondence, such as money order lists and other matter forwarded by Government departments, are detained, lost, or possibly destroyed. For instance, the Postmaster General informs me that certain international money order lists from the United States to Germany, Greece, and other countries, and from Germany to the United States, sent through the mails, have not reached their destination, though dispatched several months ago. It was necessary to have some of these lists duplicated and again dispatched by the steamship *Frederick VIII.*, which sailed from New York on April 19, and from which all the mails intended for Germany have been taken and held in British jurisdiction.

As a further example of the delay and loss consequent upon the British practice, the Postmaster General also sends me a copy of a letter from the British Postal Administration admitting that the mails were removed from the steamer *Medan* in the Downs on Jan. 30 last and not forwarded until some time "between the 2d of February and the 2d of March," and that 182 bags of these mails "were lost during transmission to Holland on the 26th day of February by the Dutch steamship *Mecklenburg*." The *Medan* arrived safely at Rotterdam a day or two after she left the Downs.

Numerous complaints similar to the foregoing have been received by this Government, the details of which are available, but I believe I have cited sufficient facts to show the unprecedented and vexatious nature of the interference with mails persisted in by British and French authorities.

Not only are American commercial interests injured but rights of property are violated, and the rules of international law and custom are palpably disregarded. I can only add that this continuing offense has led to such losses to American citizens and to a possible responsibility of the United States to repair them that this Government will be compelled in the near future to press claims for full reclamation upon the attention of his

Majesty's Government and that of the French Republic.

The principle being plain and definite, and the present practice of the Governments of Great Britain and France being clearly in contravention of the principle, I will state more in detail the position of the Government of the United States in regard to the treatment of certain classes of sealed mails under a strict application of the principle upon which our Governments seem to be in general accord.

The Government of the United States is inclined to the opinion that the class of mail matter which includes stocks, bonds, coupons, and similar securities is to be regarded as of the same nature as merchandise or other articles of property and subject to the same exercise of belligerent rights. Money orders, checks, drafts, notes, and other negotiable instruments which may pass as the equivalent of money are, it is considered, also to be classed as merchandise. Correspondence, including shipping documents, money order lists, and papers of that character, even though relating to "enemy supplies or exports," unless carried on the same ship as the property referred to, are, in the opinion of this Government, to be regarded as "genuine correspondence," and entitled to unmolested passage.

The Government of the United States, in view of the improper methods employed by the British and French authorities in interrupting mails passing between the United States and other neutral countries and between the United States and the enemies of Great Britain, can no longer tolerate the wrongs which citizens of the United States have suffered and continue to suffer through these methods. To submit to a lawless practice of this character would open the door to repeated violations of international law by the belligerent powers on the ground of military necessity of which the violator would be the sole judge. Manifestly a neutral nation cannot permit its rights on the high seas to be determined by belligerents or the exercise of those rights to be permitted or denied arbitrarily by the Government of a warring nation. The rights of neutrals are as sacred as the rights of belligerents and must be as strictly observed.

The Government of the United States, confident in the regard for international law and the rights of neutrals which the British and French Governments have so often proclaimed, and the disregard of which they have urged so vigorously against their enemies in the present war, expects the present practice of the British and French authorities in the treatment of mails from or to the United States to cease, and belligerent rights, as exercised, to conform to the principle governing the passage of mail matter and to the recognized practice of nations. Only a radical change in the present British and French policy, restoring to the United States its full rights as a neutral power, will satisfy this Government.

ROBERT LANSING.

Cabinet Ministers on Peace Terms

Official Views on Both Sides

CURRENT HISTORY published last month an important statement by Sir Edward Grey on the causes of the war and the Allies' terms of peace. This has elicited a direct reply from the German Chancellor, which is presented herewith, along with a symposium of similar utterances. The second one from the German Chancellor, delivered after the naval battle in the North Sea, reflects the result of that battle in its more defiant tone. In general it will be seen that Germany desires peace on the basis of "the war map" as it stands, and lays upon the Allies the blame for continuing hostilities.

Sir Edward Grey, on the other hand, told the House of Commons on May 24 that all peace talk was idle because the German people were being "fed with lies." In substance he said: "The Allies are not going to be beaten. The first step toward peace will come when the German Government begins to recognize that fact." Premier Briand of France, like President Poincaré, says that lasting peace can come only through Entente victory. Mr. Lloyd George, stating the case in a different way, says that a crushing military defeat of Germany alone can insure lasting peace.

President Wilson's tentative proffer of American mediation, made in his address before the League to Enforce Peace, attracted far more attention abroad than it did at home. The speech was printed in full throughout Europe, and called forth a storm of comment, both favorable and unfavorable. Strong objections to the United States as a medium for peace negotiations came alike from British and from German leaders—an indication that this country has succeeded fairly well in being neutral in its official acts. The whole exhibit is an interesting proof of the degree to which the American press is becoming a forum for peace discussions between the belligerents.

Peace on a Basis of the Real Facts

By Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg

German Imperial Chancellor

[A statement made to the Berlin representative of The New York World, May 22, and republished in *CURRENT HISTORY* by special permission. Copyrighted, 1916]

AFTER twenty-two months of terrible war, after sacrifices of millions of men, dead, wounded, or disabled for life, after forcing a heavy debt in blood and treasure that places a mortgage upon the brow and shoulders of the present and future generations, it is beginning to dawn upon England that the German people are not to be crushed, that the German Nation cannot be destroyed.

Having learned also the terrible cost to Europe and the world, Sir Edward Grey now declares that British statesmen never did want to crush and destroy Germany, notwithstanding the utterances of his confrères in the British Cabinet and the English press to the contrary, and in face of the inducement held out to the French people by President Poincaré in his speech of a few days ago that if they only will endure to

the end England and France will "dictate peace to Germany."

Sir Edward Grey speaks of the future, of peace, but adds that Prussian militarism must first be crushed. I must say that I am astonished and wonder how a statesman like Sir Edward Grey can still talk of any distinction and difference between Prussia and the rest of Germany. I am well aware of the ignorance about Germany and German conditions that prevailed before the war in England as well as in France, and that the English and French war parties had speculated heavily upon internal dissensions in Germany. But I had thought that the magnificent and heroic unity of the entire German peoples in defense of their home and Fatherland had opened the eyes of the gentleman.

As to "militarism," let us see. Who was it that made and followed the policy

of militarism in the last twenty years, England or Germany?

Just think back of Egypt. Recall Fashoda. Ask the French people which nation at that time, through its warlike threats and attitude, forced upon France the humiliation long known to them as "the shame of Fashoda," so keenly and bitterly felt by the French. Recall the Boer war, with the conquest and destruction of the liberties of free peoples and small and weak nations. Remember Algeciras, where England, according to Sir Edward Grey's own statement, had given France to understand that in the event of war she could reckon upon England's assistance, and the General Staffs of the two countries began to confer upon plans in that sense.

Then came the Bosnia crisis. It was Germany, not England, who averted war at that time. It was Germany who moved Russia to accept her mediation proposal.

England, on the other hand, let her displeasure be known in St. Petersburg over this peaceful solution. Sir Edward Grey, as reliably known to me, even stated upon this occasion that he believed that English public opinion would have approved England's participation on the side of Russia if it had come to war.

We were in a fair way of adjusting our differences with France through peaceful negotiations when England intervened (in the Agadir crisis) with the well-known warlike speech and threats of Lloyd George which brought up the black warclouds.

Sir Edward Grey has declared that England never had any evil intentions toward Germany and that there was no coalition against Germany. That statement of the British Foreign Secretary requires but a one-word answer, and that word is "einkreisungspolitik"—that is, England's "isolation policy."

[This refers to the supposed policy of King Edward VII. of isolating Germany.]

The entire world knows through the published documents from the Belgian secret archives that neutral statesmen, as well as Belgian diplomats, not only in Berlin but in Paris and London, saw in the isolation policy of England nothing but an imminent danger of war.

What I could do to meet this danger and to avert the threatening and imminent developments I did. The neutrality agreement which I proposed to Lord Haldane would not only have insured peace for Europe, but for the entire world. England rejected it.

[When reminded of Grey's statement that Germany had demanded the unconditional neutrality of England, even in case Germany provoked a war on the Continent, the Chancellor continued]:

I made public in the Reichstag Aug. 19, 1915, the exact text of the formula I suggested to the English Cabinet in the negotiations at that time. The last formula read: "England will maintain this friendly neutrality should a war be forced upon Germany." Mind you, "forced!"

I dislike to come back to these things which have been thoroughly discussed before the entire world, but since you interrogate me as to Sir Edward Grey's remarks, I am compelled to establish that they are not in accordance with the facts.

Let me make one more and a last remark about the past. Again and again, Sir Edward Grey renews his assertion that Germany could have averted this war had it accepted England's proposal for a conference. How could I accept this proposal in the face of the mobilization measures of Russia's vast army in full headway?

Despite Russia's official denial, notwithstanding the fact that the formal mobilization orders were not issued until the night of July 30, it was definitely known to us, and has since been confirmed, that the Russian Government already on July 25 began mobilizing in accordance with a decision arrived at when Sir Edward Grey's proposal was made.

Assuming that I had accepted this proposal, and after negotiations of two or three weeks—during which Russia steadily and rapidly continued to assemble her armies, vastly superior numerically, on our borders—the conference had failed. Would England perhaps have saved us from a Russian invasion or come to our assistance with her fleet and army? In view of the subsequent events I doubt that very much.

With two frontiers to defend, Germany could not engage in debates the outcome of which was extremely problematical while possible foes were utilizing the time to mobilize armies with which to invade us.

In the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey himself admitted that my counterproposal of a direct exchange of views between the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and Vienna was better calculated to adjust the Austro-Serbian conflict than his conference proposal. This direct exchange of views, suggested by me after no small difficulties had been overcome, was in a fair way of being carried out when Russia's formal mobilization of her entire army, notwithstanding her explicit assurances to the contrary, made war unavoidable.

Had England spoken an earnest word at St. Petersburg at that juncture the war would have been averted. From a confidential report of the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg the world knows that the Russian war party obtained the upper hand from the moment it knew it could count upon English help in the war. Why did England deal in that manner? Let me recapitulate briefly what English statesmen have said on this point. On Aug. 3, 1914, Sir Edward Grey declared that England would suffer hardly less if it participated in the war than if it kept out. At the same time he dwelt upon the great and vital interests England had in Belgium. Therefore not for the sake of Belgium, but for the sake of England Sir Edward Grey considered it advisable that England should enter the war. * * *

Sir Edward Grey wants permanent peace. I, too, want permanent peace. I have repeatedly expressed myself in that sense since the beginning of the war. But I fear we will not come nearer to the peace desired, I believe, by all peoples so long as the responsible statesmen of the Entente Powers indulge in and confine themselves to observations about Prussian militarism and to pathetic declamations about their own superiority and

perfection, or, even as Sir Edward Grey did in this interview, desire to favor Germany without a change in her internal political affairs and conditions.

In answer to the English Minister—who, I should think, would be rather reserved and careful on that point in view of conditions in Ireland—I only want to say that Germany has home rule which it independently administers. Incidentally, let me add one thing. Did the democratic Constitution of England hinder English statesmen from making and concluding secret arrangements and agreements with Russia and France, which were one of the essential causes of this war?

But, as I have already said to you, a general press polemic and public speeches will only tend still more to intensify the hatred among peoples. And that is not a way that leads to the ideal conditions of Sir Edward Grey, when free peoples and nations, with equality of rights and privileges, will limit their armaments and solve their differences and disputes through arbitration's decisions instead of war.

I have twice publicly stated that Germany has been and is prepared to discuss the termination of the war upon a basis that offers guarantee against further attack from a coalition of her enemies and insures peace to Europe. You have read President Poincaré's answer to that.

One thing I do know—only when statesmen of the warring nations come down to a basis of real facts, when they take the war situation as every war map shows it to be, when, with honest and sincere will they are prepared to terminate this terrible bloodshed and are ready to discuss the war and peace problems with one another in a practical manner, only then will we be nearing peace.

Whoever is not prepared to do that has the responsibility for it if Europe continues to bleed and tear itself to pieces. I cast that responsibility far from myself.

German Chancellor's Reichstag Speech of June 5, 1916

FIVE days after the great naval battle in the North Sea the Imperial Chancellor again discussed peace in the Reichstag in a more defiant tone, declaring that any further suggestions of peace by Germany would be "futile and evil." His address is said to have stirred the German Nation deeply. It was applauded in the Reichstag, except by the Conservatives and the Socialists who had seceded with Dr. Liebknecht.

"Six months ago, on Dec. 9," said Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, "discussing our military situation, I spoke here for the first time of our readiness for peace. I could do so in entire confidence that our war situation would continue to improve. Developments have confirmed this confidence. We have made further progress on all fronts. We are stronger than we were before.

"If, with this development before my eyes, I declared that we were ready for peace, I need have no regret for my statement, even if our offer evoked no response from our enemies.

"In the critical times of July, 1914, it was the duty of every responsible statesman before God, his country, and his conscience to leave nothing untried that could preserve peace with honor. We also desired after the successful repulse of our enemies to neglect nothing that was calculated to shorten the terrible sufferings experienced by the people of Europe in such a conflagration.

"I told an American journalist that peace negotiations could only reach a settlement if they were conducted by statesmen of the belligerent powers on the basis of the real war situation as shown by the war map. This proposition was rejected by the other side. They will not recognize the war map, as they hope to improve it in their own favor. But it has constantly changed in our favor. We have added to it since that remark was made. The surrender of the British

Army at Kut-el-Amara, defeats with tremendous losses of the French at Verdun, the collapse of the Russian offensive in March, the mighty thrust forward of our allies against Italy, the strengthening of our lines before Saloniki, and just now we have received news of the naval battle off Jutland with jubilant and grateful hearts.

"This is how the war map looks now. If our various enemies desire to shut their eyes to it, then we must and shall fight on until final victory.

"We did what we could to pave the way to peace, but our enemies repelled us with scorn. Consequently all further talk of peace initiated by us becomes futile and evil.

"Some statesmen in England and elsewhere have made attempts to feel the pulse of our people, and, while making contrasts between our different States as political units, have tried to console themselves into the belief that our striking force was near the breaking point. These gentlemen are indulging in strange notions. If they do not desire to deceive themselves they will notice only how firmly beats the heart of the German people. There is no external influence that can shake our unity even in the slightest degree.

"Certainly we have had our differences of opinion on such matters as the U-boat question and the question of our relations with America, but I declare emphatically that each side in these controversies has respected the convictions of the other and that we have remained always one on the great national question.

"We discussed these matters in committee and decided it was impossible to satisfy the demands for a public announcement. We were, I believe, absolutely agreed that in these cases exhaustive public discussion would damage the country. Nevertheless, I want to say that I, too, long for the time when the administration of the censorship can

abandon the restrictions and inconveniences which are at present inseparable from it.

"I in no way desire to resurrect the censorship of debates. Let me say this much to remove any doubt. Each political measure, without exception, in this time of war, has had only one object in view, namely, to bring the war to a glorious end. The censorship should be carried on from the same point of view, whether it be military or political.

"I shall endeavor to see that where the connection of political matters with the war is only slight the pencil of the censor shall be employed as lightly as possible.

"As far as I am concerned the newspapers will find as few shackles as possible and a just and impartial appreciation of their aims. The existence of the press censorship has recently given rise to a new nuisance, namely, the circulation of numerous private pamphlets, some without names attached, as if the confidence of the people could be thus destroyed, although this was the very purpose of these pamphlets. As an example of this class I take a pamphlet which was recently widely circulated. The writer, under the guise of an anxious patriot, has collected from the political history preceding the war a chain of gross untruths and distortions."

The Chancellor proceeded to give illustrations of the alleged falsehoods in the pamphlet. One of the typical statements was that the Chancellor nearly collapsed when the English Ambassador announced the breach of relations between Great Britain and Germany. The speaker declared that this was absolutely false.

"As a matter of fact," he said, "Sir William Goschen, at his farewell visit, was personally so deeply affected that I have, from a natural feeling of propriety, avoided speaking about it."

The Chancellor replied to a pamphleteer's charge that in the opening days of the war he had believed England would have remained Germany's friend or at least neutral, and that he had wasted three days parleying with England, three days which meant an enor-

mous prolongation of the war because the first blow was not struck promptly enough.

"I know that my attempts at an understanding with England," he said, "are my capital offense, but what was Germany's position in the period prior to the war? France and Russia were united in an indissoluble alliance. There was a strong anti-German party in Russia and an influential and growing section in France which was urging revenge and war. Russia could only be held in check if the hope of English aid was successfully taken from them. They would then have never ventured on war. If I wished to work against war I had to attempt to enter into relationships with England.

"I made this attempt in the face of the development of an English policy which was hostile to Germany and of which I was entirely cognizant. I am not ashamed of my conduct, even though it proved abortive. He who on that account charges me with being the cause of the world catastrophe, with its hecatombs of human sacrifices, may make his accusation before God. I shall await God's judgment calmly."

The Chancellor appealed for the unity of all parties, declaring that political lines ought to be obliterated during the prosecution of the war. In conclusion, he said:

"I see the entire nation in heroic stature fighting for its future, our sons and brothers fighting and dying side by side. There we see the equal love for home in all. The sacred flame of love of home steels every heart, so that they defy death and suffer death in thousands. Only a heart completely dried up can escape the affecting impression of the great primitive strength of this people.

"My belief in my people and my love for my people gives me a conviction firm as a rock that we shall fight and conquer, as we have fought and conquered hitherto. Our enemies wish to let it go to the end. We fear neither death nor devil, not even the hunger devil which they wish to send into our country. The men who fight out there around Verdun,

who fight under Hindenburg, our proud bluejackets, who showed Albion that rats bite, are fashioned from a breed that knows how to bear privations also. These privations are here. I admit it calmly and openly, even to foreign countries, but we will bear them.

"In this fight against hunger we will also make progress. Gracious heaven allowed a good harvest this year. It will not be worse, but better, than in the previous hard year. The calculation of our

enemies on our economic difficulties will prove deceptive.

"Another of their calculations was sharply corrected by our young navy last week. This victory will not make us boastful. We know that it does not mean that England is beaten. But it is a token of our future wherein Germany will win for herself, and also for smaller peoples, full equality of rights and lasting freedom of sea routes, now closed by England's sole domination."

Why Peace Talk at Present Is Idle

By Sir Edward Grey

British Minister of Foreign Affairs

In an impromptu speech in the House of Commons on May 24 Sir Edward Grey answered the German Chancellor—likewise certain home critics. Arthur Ponsonby, Liberal member from Stirling, Scotland, had criticised Sir Edward for "employing the American press as a platform" and slighting the House of Commons. The essential portions of his pithy reply are here printed in full.

MEMBERS of the German Government have given interviews from the beginning of the war over and over again to the people of the United States, and now, when one of us tries to defend his own country in a neutral country against statements made by the German Government, the honorable member reproaches me with want of respect. These are no days for pedantry of that kind.

I care not how often I say it—this war might have been avoided by accepting the conference we proposed. Why was not that conference accepted? Because there was not good-will.

It had been preceded by a conference on the Balkan question only shortly before. I wish the German and Austrian Governments would publish the reports of their Ambassadors with regard to the part we played in that conference. I have never seen them, but I am quite sure that nobody went through that conference without being prepared to bear testimony to the fact that the attitude of the British Government was one of entire good faith all through—and when the German Chancellor says that another conference would have been used against

Germany, that advantage would have been taken to prepare for war, and so forth—things which he did not say at the time—I say that the attitude we had observed through the conference which had just closed entitles us to say that a conference as it was proposed on the eve of this war was one which those who had experience of the previous one ought to have accepted with confidence and good-will.

If there was a diplomatic failure, that accounts for how it came about. It was not our failure.

I cannot agree with the honorable member (Mr. Ponsonby) that the interview published with the German Chancellor, or the speech made by the German Chancellor last month shows that disposition for peace which he seemed to find in it. If Germany is prepared for all the terms which the honorable member says, why does she not say so? He reproaches us with letting etiquette stand in the way.

Is it etiquette that stands in the way of the German Government making the statements which the honorable member suggests on their behalf? I really think that, in a time of war, the Gov-

ernment of the enemy might be allowed to speak for itself.

I find only one thing new in this interview with the German Chancellor—the charge that our attitude was bellicose in the negotiations with regard to Bosnia when Austria annexed Bosnia. That is new. It is a first-class lie. The idea that we attempted to urge Russia to war, that we said this country would be ready to go to war about Bosnia, that that was our attitude, is the direct contrary of the truth.

When you talk about appealing to reason, about getting reason to triumph over might, and so forth, and about reasoning with the German people, you cannot reason with the German people so long as they are fed with lies and know nothing of the truth.

So long as these lies are multiplied—I suppose this new one has been supplied to the German Chancellor out of that laboratory which is always at work in some diplomatic quarter in Germany producing these things—as long as you have that sort of thing going on you cannot possibly reason with your enemy, and your enemy does not want to be reasoned with.

What do we find in the German Chancellor's interview? As I read it, it means that those people are responsible for the continuance of the war who will not accept Germany's terms. We are to look at the map of the military situation as it is today to see what those terms should be; and we have had the German Chancellor's preceding speech as to what those terms should be. They are terms victorious to Germany, safeguarding Germany's interests, taking no account of other people's interests, and leaving, if they were accepted, the other States of Europe at her mercy whenever she chose to pursue an aggressive policy toward them again.

It is childish to say that because Germany's enemies will not accept the terms of peace that suit Germany without regard to their own interests, therefore they are responsible for prolonging the war.

The real thing responsible more than anything else for prolonging the war at this moment is that the German Government goes on telling its people that they have won the war, or that if they have not won it they are going to win it next week, and that we, the Allies, are beaten.

The facts are that the Allies are not beaten, and they are not going to be beaten. The first step toward peace will be when the German Government begins to recognize that fact.

If any of the Allies have a special right at this moment to speak with regard to peace it is the Government of France, on whom for some weeks past the concentrated fury of the German attack has been falling. The prowess of the French Army during the long battle of Verdun is saving France and saving her allies, too.

Is this a moment for us to do anything but concentrate on expressing our determination to give the fullest support in our power to those allies? If any one has a right to speak on behalf of peace at this moment it is the Government of France. The Prime Minister of France has spoken, and if the report in today's paper be accurate, as I believe it to be, he has said: "What will the generations to come say if we let escape the occasion to establish firmly a durable peace, a peace which must be based on international right?"

That is what we feel, too, and, with our allies, deeply as we desire to see the fruits of peace established, as the honorable member for Leicester described them—in a peace that shall endure and save the world from such a catastrophe as this war in future ever again—I believe the duty of diplomacy at the present moment is to maintain, as it has completely maintained, the solidarity of the Allies and to give the utmost support it can to the military and naval measures which are necessary, and taken by the Allies in common, to bring this war to a stage, which it has not reached yet, at which that prospect of a secure and durable peace will be made a reality.

"Britain Will Fight It Out"

By David Lloyd George

Minister of Munitions

[Part of an address to his constituents in Wales]

WE have accomplished enormous results in the raising of armies and in their equipment when you consider that we began with about the tiniest army in Europe, a smaller army than the Serbian Army, and we have now got one of the greatest and best equipped armies in the world. Still, I agree that in conducting a war a Government should not only be resolute, but appear resolute.

War is a terrible business. But men will face all its horrors if they have confidence in their leaders. But if there is hesitation, if there is timidity, if there is the appearance of irresolution, the bravest hearts will fail, and the spirit of the nation is the propellant of its armies. Therefore it is important, whatever happens, that you should have confidence that the Government is doing its best in the firmest and most resolute manner to conduct the war.

That is why I have had no sympathy with those who seem to think that because war is hateful you ought to fight it with a sort of savor of regret in your actions. Doubting hand never yet struck a firm blow.

In any action which I have taken since the war I am not conscious of having departed from any principle which I ever enunciated to you on this platform. I came into politics to fight for the under dog, and it has been all the same to me whether he was an underpaid agricultural laborer, a sick workman, an infirm and broken old man or woman, who had given their lives to the country, a poor slum dweller, or a small nation harried by voracious empires. In fighting this war I have simply, in my judgment, been carrying out the principles which I have advocated on this platform now for thirty years of my life.

I have always felt that the life of this empire was at stake. And I know how

much depends on that life. With all its faults, the British Empire, here and across the seas, stands for freer, better, nobler conditions of life for man.

I believed that in this war freedom was at stake. So I have thrown myself with all my heart, my soul, and my strength into working for victory. Nor have I ever had any doubts about the result if we fought with intelligence and with resolution. The fundamental facts are in our favor. We have command of the seas. We have got it now more completely than we ever had. The resources for the raw materials of arms in men and equipment are ours.

But I want to say one thing: Time is not an ally. It is a doubtful neutral at the present moment, and has not yet settled on our side. But time can be won over by effort, by preparation, by determination, by organization.

We must reckon fearlessly the forces of the enemy. We must impartially, intelligently reckon our own. There is no greater stupidity in a war than to underestimate the forces with which you have to contend. Calculate them to the last man, add them up to the last man, add them up to the last shilling, see what you have to face, and then face it. Then I have no doubt of victory.

We must have unity among the Allies, design and co-ordination. Unity we undoubtedly possess. No alliance that ever existed has worked in more perfect unison and harmony than the present one. Design and co-ordination leave yet a good deal to be desired; strategy must come before geography.

The Central Powers are pooling their forces, all their intelligence, all their brains, all their efforts. We have the means; they, too, often have the methods. Let us apply their methods to our means and we win. Then we shall come to the reckoning for the long, dreary, cruel tale

of wrong—the outrages on Belgium, the atrocities in Poland, the barbarities of Wittenberg, the inhumanities of the Lusitania. The long account must be settled to the last farthing.

I have no fear of the people. Britain will fight it out. We are a sluggish people, but no one ever made the mistake, without suffering for it, that we were faint-hearted, for I believe in the old motto, "Trust the people." Tell them what is happening—there is nothing to conceal. Have all the facts before them. They are courageous people, but they never put forward their best effort in this land until they face the alternative of disaster. Tell them what they are confronted with, and they will rise to every occasion.

Look at the way they are doing it. The people are capable of rising to greater heights than even their truest leaders ever believed. Look at the way, the cheerful way—it is the amazement of every man who has been at the front—they are enduring hardships, wounds, facing danger and death on the battlefield; look at the calm, quiet courage with which the men and women at home are enduring grief. You can trust the people.

I read a story the other day—I am glad after a very tiring day to take up a little tale of adventure as a counter-irritant to the excitements of the House—I read a tale the other day about a mining camp at the foot of a mountain in the great West. The diggers had been toiling long and hard, with but scant encouragement for their labors, and one night a terrible storm swept over the mountain. An earthquake shattered its hard surface, and hurled its rocks about, and in the morning in the rents and fissures they found a rich deposit of gold.

This is a great storm that is sweeping over the favored lands of Europe, but in this night of terror you will find selfishness, the hard crust of selfishness and greed, has been shattered, and in the rent hearts of the people you will find treasures, golden treasures of courage,

steadfastness, endurance, devotion, and of the faith that endureth forever.

THE ONLY LASTING PEACE

In a letter to Robert Donald, dated June 8, Mr. Lloyd George wrote:

No nation has reached the heights of the moral grandeur of France during the war. I set her as England's constant model. Soldiers and Generals show qualities of endurance, courage, and military skill worthy of the highest deeds of Napoleon's army.

We are now too close properly to judge the immortal pages written by France in the book of history, but historians of the future will write of the splendid deeds of her sons in letters of gold.

At the name of Verdun I bow before such proofs of superhuman courage. The French Army met a shock, backed by the most barbarous methods, such as no army ever had to meet. It will be one of the decisive battles of the war because it represents the enemy's supreme military effort.

Its lesson for the Allies is that heavy artillery and the most violent explosives will play the preponderating rôle in the battles to come. We will profit thereby, for it comes at a moment when the fabrication of munitions increases prodigiously and the allied strength daily augments.

I have never despaired of victory. The task will be hard, but the end is sure. It is Germany's military force that we must beat. It is not enough to force her to submission by economic pressure. A peace imposed on Germany exhausted in food and materials only would not be durable. It would be a moral defeat for the Allies. The Germans could say they had beaten us in battle and made peace only because we had starved their women and children. That peace we don't want. Only a crushing military victory will bring the peace for which the Allies are fighting, and of which Germany will understand the meaning. That victory we shall have; it will be complete and final.

Peace Through Victory Alone

By Aristide Briand

Premier of France

[An address to members of the Russian Duma during their recent visit to Paris]

VICTORY is in the heroism of our soldiers. It is in them, provided we give them all the means needed by them to conquer. It is for that that we have to use all our energies and will. And if we receive you with so much fraternal eagerness, it is because we know what resolution and tenacity have been shown in your country by the two assemblies of which you are the delegates. You will find here the same desire of Parliament and Government to attain the same end. * * *

This morning I brought before you the beauty of our cause, and I added that what gives us our strength in this war is that we have not wished it. We hold our heads up; our conscience is clear. There is no stain on our alliance. Nevertheless we have always exerted ourselves to settle all rivalries amicably and peacefully. Remember all the provocations which have come to pass in the world during the last twenty-five years. Not one has come from us. To these provocations we have replied with the persevering pursuit of peaceful solutions.

It is not because there was fear in us. Our nations are too fine, too noble, too strong not to be above such suspicions. We took care to save the world from the horrors of a war of which we foresaw the extent and the ravages. Yet we French had a very painful wound in the side. If we have shown so much patience, it is because we expected the necessary reparation only through right. But a people drunk with pride and fascinated by the desire of achieving the domination of the world has unexpectedly thrown itself on us and unchained war at the very moment when we were endeavoring to find an amicable solution. Now we are fighting. We mean to win. We will win.


Germany, using in turn force when

she believes herself strongest and craft when she feels herself growing feebler, is today resorting to craft. She is spreading abroad the illusive word "peace." Where does this word come from? To whom has it been spoken? And on what conditions? And to what end? By her ambiguous manoeuvres Germany reckons on dividing the allied countries. No one among us will fall into such a sorry trap. I have said, and I repeat, that when blood flows in streams, when our troops with so much self-sacrifice are giving up their lives, the word "peace" is a sacrilege if it means that the aggressor will not be punished and if tomorrow Europe runs the risk of again being delivered up to the despotism, fantasy, and caprice of a military caste athirst for pride and domination. It would be the dishonor of the Allies! What should our reply be if tomorrow, after having concluded such a peace, our countries were dragged anew into the frenzy of armaments? What would future generations say if we committed such an act of folly and if we missed the opportunity which is offered us of establishing on solid foundations a lasting peace?

Peace will come out of the victory of the Allies; it can come only out of our victory. Peace must not be an empty formula; it must be based upon international law, guaranteed by sanctions, against which no country will be able to take its stand. That peace will shine on humanity and bring security to the peoples who will be able to work and evolve according to their genius. Blood will no longer be upon them.


It is this ideal which gives our task its greatness. It is in the name of this ideal that our soldiers are fighting and exposing themselves so light-heartedly to death; it is in the name of this ideal that mothers, wives, daughters, and sis-

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES



Former Justice of the Supreme Court, Nominated for President at the Republican Convention, Chicago, June 10. (The Portrait of President Wilson, the Democratic Nominee, Has Already Appeared in These Pages)
(Photo © Underwood & Underwood.)

GENERAL LI YUAN HUNG



The New President of China, Who, as Vice President, Succeeded to the Office Upon the Death of Yuan Shih-kai, June 6

(Photo © Underwood & Underwood.)

ters in mourning are keeping back their tears, knowing that the sacrifice of a son, husband, father, or brother will not have been useless to their native land and to humanity. That is the only peace for which we must strive. It is by that peace that our countries will grow nobler and finer. We shall obtain the victory of our arms, which will assure us this peace, by united action and by a ceaselessly active and increasingly intimate fraternization. We owe this victory to humanity—and it is coming.

Although she has ravaged Belgium and Serbia, although she still occupies several of our départements, although she

has penetrated into Russian territory, Germany today is not triumphant. More and more she appears sinking in the world. Germany is living in anguish, anxiety, and remorse. This is the power of the ideal which is at work. This is the beginning of the end. This is the certainty that the hour of our victory will soon be striking. We are today one vast country, fighting for the same cause—the Allies using in common their blood, their men, and their resources.

And now, gentlemen, let us turn our hearts and minds toward those who are fighting out there, and on whom glory is already shining brightly.

An Empire Day Message

By Rudyard Kipling

On May 24, known as Empire Day throughout the British dominions, Mr. Kipling published the following:

WHEN Germany challenged us nearly two years ago to uphold with our lives the ideals by which we professed to live, we accepted the challenge, not out of madness, nor for glory or for gain, but to make good those professions. Since then the Allies and our empire have fought that they may be free and all earth may be free from the intolerable domination of German ideals. We did not foresee the size of the task when it opened. We do not flinch from it now that the long months have schooled us to full knowledge and have tempered us nationally and individually

to meet it. The nations within the empire have created, maintained, and reinforced from their best the great armies they devote without question to this issue. They have emerged, one by one, as powers clothed with power through discipline and sacrifice, strong for good by their bitter knowledge of the evil they are meeting, and wise in the unpurchasable wisdom of actual achievement. Knowing as nations what it is we fight for, realizing as men and women the resolve that has been added to us by what each has endured, we go forward now under the proud banner of our griefs and losses to greater effort, greater endurance, and, if need be, heavier sacrifice, equal sponsors for the deliverance of mankind.



America's Creed of War and Peace

By Woodrow Wilson

President of the United States

This important address, which has elicited mixed comments from all the belligerent powers of Europe, was delivered in Washington on May 27 at a banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, an influential pacifist organization of which ex-President Taft is the head and leader. The utterance is a tentative intimation that the United States is willing to serve the present belligerents in the matter of peace negotiations if and when they so desire. Incidentally Mr. Wilson gave his indorsement to the fundamental principle of the League to Enforce Peace.

THIS great war that broke so suddenly upon the world two years ago, and which has swept within its flame so great a part of the civilized world, has affected us very profoundly, and we are not only at liberty, it is perhaps our duty, to speak very frankly of it and of the great interests of civilization which it affects.

With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore. But so great a flood, spread far and wide to every quarter of the globe, has of necessity engulfed many a fair province of right that lies very near to us. Our own rights as a nation, the liberties, the privileges, and the property of our people have been profoundly affected.

We are not mere disconnected lookers-on. The longer the war lasts the more deeply do we become concerned that it should be brought to an end and the world be permitted to resume its normal life and course again. And when it does come to an end we shall be as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence, give promise of days from which the anxiety of uncertainty shall be lifted, bring some assurance that peace and war shall always hereafter be reckoned part of the common interest of mankind.

We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair

as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.

One observation on the causes of the present war we are at liberty to make, and to make it may throw some light forward upon the future as well as backward upon the past. It is plain that this war could have come only as it did, suddenly and out of secret counsels, without warning to the world, without discussion, without any of the deliberate movements of counsel with which it would seem natural to approach so stupendous a contest. It is probable that if it had been foreseen just what would happen, just what alliances would be formed, just what forces arrayed against one another, those who brought the great contest on would have been glad to substitute conference for force.

If we ourselves had been afforded some opportunity to apprise the belligerents of the attitude which it would be our duty to take, of the policies and practices against which we would feel bound to use all our moral and economic strength, and in certain circumstances even our physical strength also, our own contribution to the counsel which might have averted the struggle would have been considered worth weighing and regarding.

And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear is that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be

fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established. It is clear that nations must in the future be governed by the same high code of honor that we demand of individuals. * * *

If this war has accomplished nothing else for the benefit of the world, it has at least disclosed a great moral necessity and set forward the thinking of the statesmen of the world by a whole age. Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this: That the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set up against alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind.

The nations of the world have become each other's neighbors. It is to their interest that they should understand each other. In order that they may understand each other it is imperative that they should agree to co-operate in a common cause and that they should so act that the guiding principle of that common cause shall be even-handed and impartial justice.

This is undoubtedly the thought of America. This is what we ourselves will say when there comes proper occasion to say it. In the dealings of nations with one another arbitrary force must be rejected and we must move forward to the thought of the modern world, the thought of which peace is the very atmosphere. That thought constitutes a chief part of the passionate conviction of America.

We believe these fundamental things:

First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which it shall live. Like other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended against that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as our franker historians have been honorable enough to admit; but it has become more and more our rule of life and action.

Second, that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon.

And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.

So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation.

There is nothing that the United States wants for itself that any other nation has. We are willing, on the contrary, to limit ourselves along with them to a prescribed course of duty and respect for the rights of others, which will check any selfish passion of our own, as it will check any aggressive impulse of theirs.

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their Government to move along these lines:

First—Such a settlement with regard to their own immediate interests as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our interest is only in peace and its future guarantees.

Second—A universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any

war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning, and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.

But I did not come here to discuss a program. I came only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into ex-

istence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all Governments, when coercion shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common peace.

God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and co-operation may be near at hand!

Wilson's Mediation Not Acceptable

By Lord Cromer

Former British Ruler of Egypt

In a letter to The London Times Lord Cromer expressed himself thus frankly on the subject of American peace mediation:

BOTH the politicians and the press of this country so far exercise very praiseworthy restraint in discussing the attitude adopted during the present war by the Government of the United States.

It would, however, appear advisable that President Wilson and those associated with him should be left under no doubt as to the views on the subject of his most recent utterance held by many who, as in my own case, have throughout their lives persistently entertained and still entertain most friendly feelings toward America and Americans.

I can, of course, only state my personal opinions, but I believe that those opinions are shared by many of my countrymen. In the first place, President Wilson cannot too clearly understand that, desirous as the people of this country are to bring this terrible war to a close and willing as they would eventually be to listen to any rational and practical proposals having for their object the diminution of the risk of future wars, they would altogether reject the idea of concluding peace save on terms wholly acceptable to themselves and their allies.

We know nothing very definite as to the terms which Germany is prepared to propose or to accept, but from the feelers put forward by the inspired German press we can come to no other conclusion than that they are not worthy of a moment's consideration or discussion.

In the second place, it is well that President Wilson should fully realize the fact that the meaningless and misleading phrase, invented in Berlin, about the freedom of the seas is generally regarded in this country as a mere euphemism for the destruction of that naval supremacy on the part of Great Britain which has in the past been of such infinite benefit, not only to Englishmen, but to the rest of the civilized world.

Without in any way wishing to disparage the valuable assistance rendered by the gallant land forces of the empire, it seems certain that if as will, I feel assured, be the case we emerge victoriously from the present contest, the victory will be mainly due to the British Navy.

It is inconceivable that any responsible British Government would be disposed to listen or that the nation would be prepared to accept any proposals having for their object the diminution of the relative naval strength of this country.

A third point is deserving of notice. We may all recognize President Wilson's

good intentions and his lofty aims, we may assume he is impartial, but it is more than doubtful in spite of the very friendly feelings entertained toward America and Americans generally that the people of this country would under any circumstances welcome the idea that President Wilson should assume the rôle of mediator.

As note has succeeded note and speech followed speech, the conviction has been steadily gaining ground that President Wilson has wholly failed to grasp the view entertained by the vast majority of Englishmen on the cause for which we

and our allies are fighting. This opinion will certainly be confirmed by the amazing statement that America is not concerned with the causes and objects of the war.

Confidence in President Wilson's statesmanship has been rudely shaken. Neither for the moment does it appear likely to be restored to the extent of acquiescence in the proposal that he should be in any way vested with the power of exercising any decisive influence on the terms of peace, upon which the future destinies of this country and of the civilized world will greatly depend.

Our Foreign Policy in This War

By Robert J. Lansing

United States Secretary of State

[Address delivered on June 3 before a Bar Association at Watertown, N. Y.]

THE great war has caused so many conditions which are entirely new and presented so many questions which were never before raised or even thought of that it has been no easy task to meet and answer them. The relations between neutrals and belligerents were never more difficult of adjustment. It was never harder to preserve neutral rights from invasion by the desperate opponents in the titanic conflict in which the power, if not the life, of the great empires of the earth is at stake.

The peoples and Governments at war are blinded by passion; their opinions are unavoidably biased; their conduct frequently influenced by hysterical impulses which approach to madness. Patience and forbearance are essential to a neutral in dealing with such nations. Acts, which, under normal conditions, would be most offensive, must be considered calmly and without temper.

In a nutshell, the situation of our relations with Great Britain and Germany, the two powers with which we have had our principal controversies, is this:

Germany, having developed the submarine as an offensive engine of destruction, asserts that she cannot, on account of

the resulting conditions, conform to the established rules of naval warfare, and we should not, therefore, insist on strict compliance. Great Britain has no sympathy with the German point of view, and demands that the submarines observe the rules of visit and search without exception.

On the other hand, Great Britain declares that, on account of the new conditions resulting from submarine activity and the use of mines and from the geographical position of Germany, she cannot conform to the established rules of blockade and contraband, and we should not therefore hold her to strict compliance with those rules. Germany insists, nevertheless, that Great Britain be made to follow the existing law.

Both Governments have adopted the same arguments, based primarily on military necessity, and offer the same excuses for their illegal acts, but neither will admit that the other is in any way justified for its conduct. Now, what is the United States to do in these circumstances?

The only alternative is for this Government to hold firmly to those neutral rights which international law has clearly

defined and to insist vigorously on their observance by all belligerents.

This has been the position of the United States from the beginning of the war. It has twice sought to obtain mutual consent from the belligerents to certain changes in the rules, but in both cases it failed and the suggestions were withdrawn.

A Government which places life and property on an equality would be generally condemned and justly condemned. This seems to be axiomatic, and yet, I regret to say, there are some Americans who do not recognize this difference. How many take this view it is impossible to say, but the number is large, judging by the letters and telegrams received in Washington. Indeed, it is held by some who sit in the halls of Congress. These people openly complain that the Government does not exert as much pressure to protect American property as it does to protect American lives—property which can be restored to the owners or an indemnity paid; lives which can never be restored or adequately indemnified.

This mental attitude makes one wonder if the sensibilities of the American people have become so blunted by materialism that they think as much of the loss of their property as they do of the loss of the lives of their fellow-countrymen.

Such an idea is repugnant to a liberty-loving American; it is utterly wanting in the nobler impulses of a great people; it is hostile to the spirit of true Americanism. Yet it exists and is widespread, and must be reckoned with. The great heart of the Republic is threatened with fatty degeneracy through those who have lost their patriotic vigor; many Americans have become lovers of ease rather than lovers of national honor.


When you disapprove of some course

of action taken by this Government be lenient in your judgment, for often the action is the result of conditions which cannot be made public and which may never be made public. It is always my wish, and I know that it is the wish of the President, to take the people into our confidence, to tell them frankly what the situation is; but you must realize that it cannot be done in every case. They must try to be patient and to trust the Government to do the very best it can in upholding the national honor and dignity.

Let me add just a word: When the foreign policies of the Government are criticised by honest critics—I mean by "honest" critics those who are not influenced solely by political considerations or personal ambitions—I often wonder what the critics would do if they had the responsibility.

Would they be so bellicose? Would they make demands when it was questionable whether they would compel compliance? Would they count the full cost of their action? I wonder whether they would be radical or conservative. Responsibility makes a world of difference in a man's point of view. When a few words may plunge this country into war the man who has the power to utter those words will think a long, long time before he exercises that power. He will submit to a deal of criticism and endure abuse and ridicule rather than see the young men of America sent forth to die on the battlefield.

Only the supreme necessity of maintaining the honor of the United States or of defending its independence and the liberties of its people will induce him to speak the fateful words which may bring death to thousands of his fellow-countrymen and change the destinies of the Republic.



"When the Chancellor Speaks"

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By Gilbert Hirsch

THE German Imperial Chancellor has addressed the representatives of the German people on the state of the nation six times since the outbreak of the war.

"When the Chancellor speaks, it is always a great day for us," says a Berlin newspaper. "But, to remain a great day in history, it must bring us nearer to peace."

Far from peaceful appears that other Chancellor, who stands, twice life-size, on the steps of the Reichstag, like its guardian spirit. His brow is wrinkled under his helmet, and his fist is clenched as he looks across the Koenigsplatz toward the white marble figure of von Moltke, who drove back the French in his own day; toward the "Iron Hindenburg," who has driven back the Russians in ours.

Two common soldiers in mud-gray uniforms stand in front of Bismarck and stare up into his face. Their knapsacks are full and more than full; for they go to the front today.

After a moment they pass on as if satisfied. Have they been able to read in those set features the secret of why they are going to die?

A taxi-auto rolls up to the side of the big gray building and its occupant disappears through the door. He is followed by two men who have come on foot. The blare of a military auto horn announces a low, open automobile, slender and dark gray, like a submarine, that shoots around the corner. An officer of high rank steps out; he, too, is swallowed up by the big building.

The two soldiers have stopped again to watch.

"What is it that's going on today?" one of them asks of the policeman on duty.

"The Imperial Chancellor speaks on peace." Then, in the tone of a superior officer giving an order, he tells them

not to block up the doorway. Meekly they cross the street, and watch the stream of Reichstag members with a look of increasing wonder.

You can tell from the look of them that they have learned what war is; have been at the front before; have perhaps seen buildings larger than this one cracked like eggshells by a single shot from a mortar. Can anything that is said inside this box of a building, with its gilt dome, really put a stop to the colossal struggle that rages clear across Europe, from Arras to Bagdad? Do these self-important little "Reichstagsabgeordneten," with their high hats and their black leather portfolios full of papers, think that they can stop it—with words?

The two men in mud-gray lose interest; their faces again become impassive; they turn and trudge across the asphalt as doggedly as if it were the end of a day's march across the plains of Poland.

On the opposite side of the building a long line of porters and messenger boys has been waiting since 7 o'clock for the few tickets that are left. For all Germany wants to hear the Chancellor, convinced that he can give the answer to that question which touches them most deeply. It is no longer, "Which will win—England or Germany?" but, "Which will win—War or Peace?"

As yet the forces of peace have won not a single victory in any country. Last fall the Italian Socialists were expected to form a powerful battalion against war. Yet Italy has joined France and Russia in signing that agreement not to make a separate peace—"done in quintuplicate at London"—which puts the peace of Europe, as far as the Allies are concerned, into the hands of England.

Of the English cabinet? Or of the English people? Snowden, the Socialist,

puts that question to the English Premier in the House of Commons; "demands" a reply favorable to democracy and to peace. If the German Imperial Chancellor gets up in the Reichstag and announces peace terms—peace terms that seem "reasonable" to the common people of England—what then? May they be rejected, in secret meetings behind locked doors, by Ministers and diplomats who have staked their whole careers on a smashing victory?

No, declares the Socialist, and demands that "no proposal for peace negotiations based upon an evacuation of conquered territory be rejected without the knowledge of Parliament."

The Premier listens gravely. Refuses the demand so suavely that one hardly knows that it is refused. Peace proposals made to the British Government must first of all be laid before the allied Governments.

The British Government, however, should regard it as "desirable" that Parliament be taken into its confidence "as early as possible."

Little hope of peace in that quarter. As to France, that same militant temper that made Briand only a few years ago the most revolutionary of Socialists now makes him proof against socialist demands for peace. From Russia rumors of desire for a separate peace have been recurrent since the third month of war; yet the temper today is more warlike than ever.

And Germany's allies? Bulgaria is flushed with victory in the Balkans. "The Sick Man of Europe" still insists that his recuperation is permanent, and is ready to prove it. Austria will stand by Germany, and Hungary shows no sign of drawing away. Count Tisza, whose words are listened to more respectfully than those of any other statesman in the whole Dual Empire; Count Tisza, whose single personality is shifting the political centre of gravity from Vienna to Budapest; Count Tisza has replied as follows to those in the Hungarian Parliament who clamor for peace:

"When shall peace return? That rests entirely with our enemies. But the greater the sacrifices that this war de-

mands, the harder will be the conditions of peace for our enemies."

And the neutral nations? In the Parliament that sits under the shadow of the empty Peace Palace at The Hague there has been talk of interceding. But now the conflagration is spreading, and Holland herself is in danger of being involved. Switzerland is a breeding place of peace rumors. But the war itself has made clear the impotence of small States, in diplomacy as well as in war.

The United States? Officially she has as yet made no move to intervene; and the one unofficial attempt turns out a fiasco. The "Peace Dreadnought" runs into an Atlantic storm; and then into worse storms. England sneers at it. Germany distrusts it. America is sneakily ashamed of it.

Little prospect, then, of peace from without.

"But why cannot we take the first step? We have won. Everywhere our armies stand deep in the enemies' country. In 1871 we dictated the terms of peace from Paris. Why cannot we today dictate terms of peace from Brussels or Belgrade? If our terms are generous enough, surely they will be accepted. Did not Bismarck himself, after delivering Austria a crushing blow, make an early and magnanimous peace, leaving her territory intact? Did not that magnanimity—since it allayed the antagonisms of centuries—prove a great blessing to Prussia? Why, then, shall Germany not deal in the same spirit with her enemies of today?"

Such are the questions which those men are asking themselves who, long before the hour set, fill up the extreme left of the Reichstag floor. These ninety members of the Social-Democracy are not proletarians. By conviction—yes. By birth—perhaps. In spirit?—Never. Most of them have the look of the bourgeois, of what the Germans call the "Philister"; are men with a certain small position in the world, of which they are proud; with a bank account, of which they are certainly not ashamed. They are militant politically; but socially respectable.

Here and there among them is an un-

mistakable laborer type. And you catch rare glimpses of fanatic intensity, inheritance from an earlier generation of Socialists. But here appearances are deceiving. Rebellion has its conventions, just as obedience has; conventions that express themselves not merely in the cut of a man's clothes, but of his beard and of his features. That powerfully built man, for example, with the forked red beard and the angry features, who looks more anarchist than socialist, will, when he gets up to speak, roar as gently as any sucking dove.

There is a sparse sprinkling of uniforms among them. And one of their leaders wears the epaulets and sword of an officer. There is nothing in those regular features, red cheeks, snow-white hair and mustache to make his uniform seem an incongruity. You can see from his bearing that Albert Sudekum, Doctor of Philosophy, author, and member of the party of the Social Revolution, is as proud of his share of the battle of Lorette Heights last Spring as of those scores of battles between capital and labor, between socialism and the Government, which used to be his one reason for living.

Not far from him sit the Liberals—National Liberals and the Progressive People's Party. And to their right, directly in front of the Speaker's stand, sit the Catholics. Here the officers grow more plentiful. And the benches of the Imperial Party and of the Conservatives at the extreme right look like a council of war—Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, in gray campaign uniforms, one behind the other.

An old-fashioned town crier's bell calls the meeting to order. And the man who swings it looks like the town crier himself. A weazened, little old man, bald, spectacled, white-bearded, President Kaempf is as fantastic as a figure from a child's story book. The more so by contrast to the men who cluster about him and behind him, in the doorways and in the two rows of benches to either side of him on the raised "tribune"—Princes and Excellencies, Generals and Admirals, Ministers of the German Empire and envoys from the individual States that

compose it—two hundred leaders of the German State, facing the four hundred representatives of the German people there in the hall below them.

Is there danger of a chasm opening up between the tribune and the hall, in which all German hopes of victory shall be swallowed up? Is there a possibility that the representatives of the people will refuse to support the rulers of the State in carrying on the war any longer? Or, on the other hand, can it be true that the rulers are tired of war, but dare not admit it, and have secretly prompted the representatives to ask them to make peace?

Each of these possibilities has, at one time or another, been predicted by Germany's enemies; who, through the eyes of some of the "neutrals" in the galleries, are watching eagerly what is about to take place.

If the eyes of the whole hostile world were upon them those 200 on the tribune could not bear themselves more defiantly. The officers stand as if on a battlefield with the shells crashing about them. Some of them wear the blue parade uniform of peace, others field gray, with the crimson stripe of the General Staff.

Next to a former Military Attaché at Washington stands a young naval officer, short and supple, with dark, highbred features of a Spanish type. The short knife he wears at his belt looks, in its gilt sheath, like a toy. But appearances are deceptive—particularly at sea. Did not a certain lamented King of England once speak of the whole German Navy as—a toy?

Those who crowd the balconies to the doors have come here to see, not uniforms, but men. They point out statesmen and diplomats by name. Over there is the Minister of Railways. That bald man with the white mustache is Delbrück of the Interior. Over there is Jagow, head of the Foreign Office, suave, subtle. Now he bends his head politely to listen to something whispered to him by that man at his right who holds the attention by the unmistakable, cold magnetism of the great practical statesman. He looks strangely like Elihu Root—a Prussian Elihu Root. Is

it imagination—or does everything about him—his figure, the lines of his coat, the cut of his hair, suggest the black eagle of Prussia?

He is Karl Helfferich, Minister of the Treasury and the strongest man in the German Government. Von Havenstein, head of the Imperial Bank, may be the greater financial engineer; Helfferich is the greater financial soldier and financial diplomat. He it is who raised the second great war loan in the Spring of 1915, the third still greater one the next Fall—"the greatest financial feat in history," he himself called it—and who has again procured ten "milliards" from the pockets of Germany's citizens. If, in the speech the Chancellor makes to-day, we hear one word of weakness, we may know that it is because this "Hindenburg of finance" confesses defeat. But he stands there cool, quietly confident, with the look of a General in the middle of a successful campaign.

His figure dominates the tribune. It is upon him that the American Ambassador, sitting in the first row of the Royal Balcony, directly in front of a Chinese attaché and a Venezuelan chargé d'affaires, first fixes his black opera glasses. Then he focuses them upon the head of Germany's Foreign Office; studying that polite enigmatical face as an astronomer studies a distant star; as if trying to read the soul of the man who will be his antagonist in the next "regrettable misunderstanding" to arise between the two countries.

Von Tirpitz next claims the Ambassador's attention. Bald, with forked white beard, pale with the pallor of fishes at the bottom of the sea—the old sea-fighter looks like Father Neptune himself. If he has been shorn of his power in the bitter fight over those deadly deep-sea fishes of which he was so proud, he does not show it. He sits alone, motionless as a statue, the hand that rests on the table in front of him white and slender as a woman's.

A stir at the doorway. The Chancellor stalks in and takes the seat to the President's right. He wears the gray field uniform of a Major General, and carries his tall, slim figure with conscious

military stiffness; yet cannot quite overcome that slight stoop of the shoulders which proclaims the scholar, close to sixty. The suns of many battlefields have bronzed his long, thin face, but his features are refined, sensitive, and sad. His friends say that to him this war is a godsend, since it has pulled him, by main force, out of deep despondency. His wife died just before the war broke out. She was said to be one of the most remarkable women in Germany.

When the house is quite still he rises to speak.

"Gentlemen: I take this first opportunity to give you a brief survey of the situation. Shortly after the Reichstag last adjourned"—

His voice is low, his manner matter of fact, his delivery a little halting. He even seems, in spite of his long public career as a Prussian official, slightly embarrassed by the knowledge that he is addressing all Germany and the world. But when he describes Germany's recent military successes the scholar expands and fills out the Major General's uniform. And his voice becomes almost vibrant as he speaks hopefully of the period that shall follow this war, when that "firm bridge" which has been built by German arms between Germany and the Near East "shall no longer echo to the tramp of marching battalions but shall serve the works of peace, of culture"—

"—Of the German capitalists!"

The interruption comes from the back of the hall—from the left—the very left. No need to ask to whom that high, shrill voice belongs. Those in the balcony crane their necks; but, for the most part cannot see as the voice comes from directly below them.

In the hall itself, murmurs, laughter. Some one shouts: "Put him out!"

The Chancellor flushes, waits. The hall quiets down.

The Chancellor begins again as if nothing has happened. For a time he turns a little toward the right of the hall as if looking in that direction for support. Then he turns squarely toward the Social Democrats, and points out to them how all the predictions made by their late leader, Bebel, about a Ger-

many involved in a great war, are now refuted by the facts.

His tone becomes hard and challenging. The whole Social-Democratic theory of war is being tried in his balance, and found wanting. And none of those in the left of the hall seem inclined to lift a finger in its defense.

"He predicted universal unemployment," continues the Chancellor, his voice mounting; "he predicted universal hunger"—

"—and the Revolution!"

That defiant voice from the rear of the hall is higher, shriller than before; has a slightly hysterical quaver; rises almost to a shriek.

A moment of silence, in which his "comrades" to the right and left turn to stare, in shocked silence, apparently more deeply affected by this breach of the discipline of the party than the other representatives are by the breach of the discipline of the Parliament. There are shouts and laughter from the right of the hall, smiles and murmurs from the tribune. Finally the fantastic little figure in the President's chair rises and, with the help of that town crier's bell of his, suppresses the "revolution" and restores quiet.

Twice at least, during each of the Chancellor's speeches to the Reichstag, that one voice is raised in shrill protest. The first impulse of the neutrals in the gallery to sympathize with a man who has chosen to fight singlehanded against a whole Parliament, against a whole nation, is somewhat checked by the sight of the man himself. He is short, dark, slight; wears thick eye-glasses for short-sightedness; wears the ugly, beltless, ill-fitting gray uniform of the "Schipper," as the trench-digging, road-building brigade of the regular army is somewhat contemptuously called. He is over forty but looks ten years younger, and has somewhat the manner of a precocious schoolboy.

There is nothing of the politician about his appearance; nor yet of the revolutionist—rather of the theorist, whose theories have built walls between him and reality, walls quite as thick as those which kept his father imprisoned during

thirteen of the last thirty years of his life. Wilhelm Liebknecht was a great political thinker and organizer. But he bequeathed to his son little besides his theories—and his courage.

These interruptions of Dr. Karl Liebknecht in the Reichstag, sharp and effective as some of them are, lay him open to even sharper rejoinders.

"I speak," he cries, "for the common men, the men out there in the trenches, at the front—"

"Where you have never been," dryly adds a man sitting at the right in officer's uniform—for the "Schippers" are chosen from among those whom a weak heart or some other physical defect unfits for the first line of battle.

And once, when his diatribe against the Government becomes particularly violent, a member of his own party calls him to order in the tone of a mother reproving a naughty child:

"Haven't you learned that a politician must consider the effect of his words? You are simply putting weapons in the hands of the enemy."

And Karl Liebknecht does not interrupt again during that session.

Six times since the outbreak of the war has the German Imperial Chancellor addressed the representatives of the German people on the state of the nation. And each time he speaks, this question, coming from the heart of the common people in Germany, and audible to him alone, becomes more insistent.

"Is the Imperial Chancellor ready to declare under what conditions he is willing to make peace?"

All his speeches are in response to this unspoken question. And each succeeding speech gives a clearer and fuller response to it. Germany's peace terms are like a picture thrown on a screen—at first dim and all but indiscernible, but slowly, very slowly, brought to focus. The Chancellor seems to be feeling his way, from speech to speech, toward those ultimate demands which, at the Peace Conference, will have to be clear, hard, definite, and unchangeable.

In delivering his first war speech, on the historic 4th of August, his mind was too full of the peace that had just

been broken to have room for the peace that must later be patched up.

Four months later, Turkey's decision to fight on Germany's side encourages him to declare that Germany will not stop fighting "until we have the certainty that no one will again dare disturb that peace in which we intend to develop, as a free people, the being and the power of Germany."

That word "certainty" gives way to the much stronger phrase—"all possible guarantees and pledges," in his speech of the following Spring, in which he pays his respects to Austria's new enemy, Italy.

"The more fiercely the storm rages about us," he adds, "the firmer must we build our house."

The fall of Warsaw early in August makes him even more confident that Germany can get what she wants. Visions of "a new Germany," rise before him; of a Germany which is not merely to be "guaranteed" and "pledged" against actual attack, but which is to "build out her position" in such a way "that other powers will never again be seized by the inclination" even to intrigue against her diplomatically. There is not only to be a new Germany, but a whole "new Europe," in which a new Poland, "freed from the Russian yoke," will be led toward "a happy future in which it can lead its own peculiar national life."

All this sounds promising, to German ears. But finally the time comes when the people of Germany are tired of promises of peace, and would like to look upon the face of peace itself.

"Is the Imperial Chancellor ready to declare under what conditions he is willing to make peace?"

Again that question from the heart of the German people, as he enters the Reichstag hall. But this time, not only he, but the whole Parliament hears it. For at last, after sixteen months of bitter war, the burning question has got itself uttered aloud. And all Germany, all the world, awaits an answer.

It is a man of fifty who asks it—bald, precise, neatly dressed; slightly pedantic, with the peculiar, obstinate pedantry of the socialist; yet typically German, typically middle class.

Originally a printer by trade, Phillip Scheidemann has for the past twenty years been a socialist editor, for the past twelve years member of the Reichstag, for the past four years a recognized leader of the Social Democratic faction there, for the past year the man who, more than any other, has held together the powerful party that represents the common people of Germany.

Will he be able to hold it together longer? That depends on the answer to the great question which he, the spokesman of the people, is now putting, with the unconscious dignity of an average man on whose shoulders rests a responsibility far from average, to von Bethmann Hollweg, spokesman of the Kaiser.

He speaks of the daily increase of death, of want, of misery; of how "Europe is deliberately bringing on its own ruin through this war, and the United States of America"—here he glances toward the balcony, where Mr. Gerard can be seen in the front row, listening eagerly—"the United States of America is making brilliant profits out of it all."

He tells of how all countries long for peace, yet none dare admit it.

"Upon you, Mr. Chancellor, rests a great responsibility. The whole world will stand with those who make the first offer of peace. Accursed throughout all history be they who shove it aside, to keep up the fighting till Europe bleeds to death!"

But the words are drowned out in the Chancellor's ears by those mocking, hostile voices which seem to penetrate to him even here, predicting a defeated Germany suing for mercy. Although he asserts, with great emphasis, his readiness "to declare at once" under what conditions he is "willing to enter into peace negotiations"—yet he does not declare it; declares, instead, that any offer of peace made by him now would be misconstrued by that enemy which still dares talk of "throwing Germany back across the Rhine."

It is only at the very end of his speech that he throws out a hint, heavily veiled, of the peace terms which Germany will demand. The Reichstag hears once more of "material guarantees," and this time

in a specific connection—Belgium. And it is allowed to extract what meaning it can from the important but vague declaration that:

"Neither in the east nor in the west may our enemies remain in control of gates of entry, through which they can again threaten us more seriously than before."

To judge by their applause, those uninformed men to the right of the hall believe themselves to know exactly what that declaration means, and approve of it. Most of them have learned, from the most intensely personal experience, where those "gates of entry" lie. Some of them have helped drive back the enemy after he has passed through these gates. Others have helped storm the gates themselves—Liège, Kovno, Novo Georgievsk, and the rest; or have fought desperately, as yet unsuccessfully to drive the enemy back from those few square miles of German territory that he holds, thanks to the great gate of Belfort; or have held the trenches around that still greater gate of Verdun—not yet dreaming of storming it—for that attempt still lies two months in the dim future.

But the Social Democrats are not satisfied with the Chancellor's answer. Some of them do not think that the Chancellor has made his peace terms clear; others think he has made them all too clear; as they prove clearly enough, a week later, when a score of them break party discipline in order to vote against the fourth war loan appropriation, requested of them by the shrewd and persuasive Helfferich, who appears before the Reichstag in person to demand it.

But when, on April 5 of this year, the Chancellor once more faces the people's Deputies, something gives him the courage to speak more plainly. Is it the failure of the Allies' Dardanelles expedition? Or is it the German successes around Verdun? Or the series of thunderbolts cast down upon England almost nightly by the German air pilots? Or is it, perhaps, some secret assurance as to the attitude of the factions within Germany itself?

Some assurance given by Liberal and

Socialist leaders that, if he avoids the use of that dangerous word "annexation," he may speak as plainly as he likes without fear of changing the dissenting minority into a majority?

Certainly something very definite must have happened to give him the courage to talk like a twentieth century Bismarck about redrawing the map of Europe on a large scale; the courage bluntly to inform the Reichstag that "in many respects the new Europe cannot resemble the old."

"Can he really believe," says the Chancellor, "that Germany will ever, of her own free will, deliver back into the hands of reactionary Russia the nations between the Baltic and the Volhynian swamps?"

And as to Belgium: "Here, also, Germany cannot sacrifice the oppressed Flemish race, but must assure them the sound evolution which follows the lines of their national character."

That speech marks not merely a turning point in the Chancellor's policy of dealing with the Reichstag; it marks a turning point in Germany's policy of dealing with her neighbors. It is a program for a third stage in the career of the German Nation.

In the first stage, Germany was a thing of fragments and splinters, of principalities turned against one another by the intrigues of neighboring States.

Bismarck brought about the second stage, in which Germany was united, yet was much too busy learning to hold itself together to have the surplus energy to extend itself through "spheres of influence" or "peaceful penetrations."

This speech of von Bethmann Hollweg's announces a third stage, in which Germany will insist on having neighbors "with whom we can collaborate, and who will collaborate with us"; in which "Germany and Austria must and will solve the Polish question"; in which, in short, Germany shall announce that it has attained its diplomatic majority, just as it attained some time ago its military and economic majority, and that now it is prepared to play a man's part in the affairs of Europe.

The Horrors of Trench Fighting

By Roméo Houle

CURRENT HISTORY received the original manuscript of this remarkable narrative and can vouch for its authenticity. It is undeniably one of the most thrilling human documents of real warfare that the great struggle has thus far produced. The editor has investigated the standing of the author in his home community and obtained official confirmation of his military record. Romeo Houle was born in New Bedford, Mass., Oct. 29, 1893, at 36 Hicks Street, the son of a local barber, Zacharie Houle, and Xeline Begnoche. He has a common school education. In 1912 he moved to Montreal, where he was a barber. When war was declared he enlisted in the Sixty-fifth Regiment, First Canadian Division, Aug. 10, 1914. He was discharged Feb. 10, 1916, and arrived in America Feb. 23, on the steamship Tuscania. His father secured the young soldier's discharge through Congressman Walsh of Massachusetts on the ground that he was an American citizen and was not of age when he enlisted. He lives at present at Oxford, Fairhaven, Mass., and is pursuing his vocation as barber at Lamothe's shop, 1,335 Purchase Street, New Bedford. He made notes of his experiences while in the trenches, and the subjoined production was written by him from those notes in collaboration with his friend Arthur L. Bouvier, editor of a local French newspaper at New Haven.—[Editor CURRENT HISTORY.

THE true story of the trenches has never been told. I know, because for many months I have lived in trenches. I have slept daily in dread of bullet, shrapnel, mine, and deadly gas; and nightly in fear of mine and gas—and the man-eating rats.

I am one of the few soldiers living who entered the front trenches at the opening of the war and who lived to fight the Germans in the front trenches in February, 1916. Of my original company, (the Fourth of the Fourteenth Battalion, Third Brigade, First Canadian Division,) which marched away to that hell at Laventie and Ypres so gayly—500 brave boys—I am one of the sixteen who survive. And returning unexpectedly, snatched by the American Government out of the very jaws of death, with the mud of the trenches still upon my clothing, I discovered how much American people have been talking of the trenches and how little, after all, they really know.

Who has seen hell? Who has experienced the horrors of Milton's terrible vision or the slow tortures of Dante's inferno? God! If Dante's dream madness were truth, and those seven circles were seven encircling battle lines in Northern France or the torn fringe of brave little Belgium, I could stand up and say there is no agony of body or mind which I have not seen, which I have not experienced. I thank God and

give Him the glory that I still am sane. Gas? What do you know of it, you people who never heard earth and heaven rock with the frantic turmoil of the ceaseless bombardment? A crawling yellow cloud that pours in upon you, that gets you by the throat and shakes you as a huge mastiff might shake a kitten, and leaves you burning in every nerve and vein of your body with pain unthinkable; your eyes starting from their sockets; your face turned yellow-green.

Rats? What did you ever read of the rats in the trenches? Next to gas, they still slide on their fat bellies through my dreams. Poe could have got new inspiration from their dirty hordes. Rats, rats, rats—I see them still, slinking from new meals on corpses, from Belgium to the Swiss Alps. Rats, rats, rats, tens of thousands of rats, crunching between battle lines while the rapid-firing guns mow the trench edge—crunching their hellish feasts. Full fed, slipping and sliding down into the wet trenches they swarm at night—and more than one poor wretch has had his face eaten off by them while he slept.

Stench? Did you ever breathe air foul with the gases arising from a thousand rotting corpses? Dirt? Have you ever fought half madly through days and nights and weeks unwashed, with feverish rests between long hours of agony, while the guns boom their awful symphony of death, and the bullets zip-zip-

zip ceaselessly along the trench edge that is your skyline—and your deathline, too, if you stretch and stand upright?

Yes, I Roméo Houle, know the trench. And but for Congressman Walsh and the American Ambassador to England, and the fact that I was under age when I enlisted in Montreal—but for those men and this fact I should still be fighting, bleeding, and perhaps dying in some dirty wet trench in Northern France. I longed for big adventures, you see, and now, ah, God! I am sick of adventure, for the adventures I have had will plague my sleep until I die.

You wouldn't believe all I have seen, all I have left. Ah, no; you would say, "Roméo Houle, you are lying," were I to tell you some unbelievable things that I have really lived through. Men go mad over there. When you know what life in the first-line trenches is like you will wonder that I have returned, and that, having returned, I am still in my right mind. Sometimes, at night, I find myself again carrying the wounded back after the charge, and listening to dying soldiers telling me to look into blood-soaked pockets for last letters to their sweethearts or mothers back home. "Tell mother that I received the Blessed Sacrament before the battle began." I hear their breaking voices whisper, "Tell mother," while the thundering artillery pours its curtain of fire upon us, and our boys throw back from their rude, hand-made sling shots their deadly "jam-pots." "Tell mother!" I think all the battle front is crying now those words. O Mother of God, hear them and end this needless butchery!

I fought at Ypres. I fought at St. Julien. I fought at Lacouture and Festubert. I fought at Cuinchy. I fought at Givenchy and La Bassée, and in the first-line trenches at Messines. And before all these I fought in the first line at Richebourg and Laventie, and I live, one of 16 alive out of 500.

I am an American by birth and a barber by occupation. I have shaved

men for my living in New Bedford, Mass., and have shaved soldiers of necessity in time to the cracking of rifles in Northern France. I chanced to be in Montreal when England declared war. That was on Aug. 4, 1914. On Aug. 10 I enlisted in the Sixty-fifth Regiment of French Canadians commanded by Major Barre of Montreal. There were two New England boys with me in the regiment—Henri Bertrand of Attleboro and a fellow named Collette from New Bedford. There were 500 French Canadians—then—between the ages of 18 and 28. I left most of them buried in unmarked graves.

We left Montreal on Aug. 25 for Val-

cartier, where they made out of a fair barber a good soldier, I think. The Duke and Duchess of Connaught inspected us at Valcartier, and a brave sight we were in our new uniforms and our full and gallant ranks. But the Duke and Duchess would have shuddered could they have inspected us, say at Cuinchy or Messines. Our 500 got thinner the older the war grew. Our 500 will be gone, I think, all gone but me, before the war is over. I'd be gone, too, but for Congressman Walsh and the American Government, which, after all, is mine, and the one



ROMEO HOULE

I'd best die for, if die I must for any. It was on Sept. 25 that I sailed with my regiment for Plymouth, England, on board the Cunarder *Alunia*. There were 1,000 men on board, half English, half French.

Thirty-three vessels sailed together in three rows of eleven boats each, with three cruisers to left and three to right of us, and one before and one behind to guard us. So great was our dread of German torpedoes and mines, it took us twenty-one days to cross.

I was in the Seventh and Eighth Companies of this French Canadian regiment, the Sixty-fifth, but at the front my company was known as the Fourth of the Fourteenth Battalion, Third Brigade, First Canadian Division. The *Alunia* was the second to land at Plymouth, and the whole town turned out to give us a reception, with houses decorated and flags flying—for 484 of us a death bridal, indeed! Three days later we were reviewed by Lord Roberts on Salisbury Plain, and the King also inspected us. Thence we marched to Larkhill, where we remained until Feb. 12, 1915. Then we left for France.

First came St. Nazaire; then Hazebrouck, and a twelve-mile hike to Fletre, a village in the north. We had a two days' rest, and marched twenty-four miles to Armentières. At Armentières I first entered a trench. We trained there with English troops. And we lay shivering in the rain for forty-eight hours, and then gladly left for Richebourg, three miles away.

At Richebourg we entered trenches of our own. There Charles Lapointe of Montreal, the first of our company to die, looked over the edge of the trench. That is death. Machine guns all day sweep the trench edges. If you raise your hand, your fingers will be cut off as by a knife. And once I saw a poor wretch, weary almost to death of the trench, raise his right arm at full length. He was sent home, maimed and in agony, as he had wished. And who can say that his act was cowardly? He who has lived in the trenches for weeks and months knows. The soldier had courage to raise his hand. Perhaps some who clung to

the mud at the trench bottom were greater cowards than he.

Well, Lapointe looked over the trench edge; and nobody knows what he saw. His brother was there to lay him down. He buried him (as we ever must the dead at the front) in a shallow pit in our trench. And the brother had for a time the agony of having to fight and feel the earth give over Charley's breast.

Two miles from there, at Laventie, we fought in the first line again. A German shell exploded over a pile of brush in a field near where I was shooting toward the German line. And we, weary of the monotony of the fighting, were overjoyed to see the ground covered far and wide with potatoes, which some farmer had hidden under hay. Potatoes! We blessed our periscope for the toothsome vision. And, marvelous to relate, we noted that the German fire slackened. Our officers could not restrain the French Canadians. On our bellies, over the death line we crawled unscathed, and, flat on the ground, wriggled to the potatoes, braving death for what we deem so common in America.

I got my share. Nor did the flaming sky pour upon us the leaden hail we feared, for the Germans held their fire while we gathered the crop we did not plant.

Toward night, in the dusk, we discovered by our spectroscope that the German boys, who were cold in their trenches, were demolishing a house for firewood, an old cottage, the property, perhaps, of that very peasant who had hidden our potatoes under the hay. We had their lives in our hands. We remembered our Irish feast—and word went down the line to hold our fire. Nor did one German die.

That was the Golden Rule of the battle front.

I slept in my blanket, my first night under fire, with a lump of cheese at my feet, as a bribe to the rats to spare my face. Not that I slept much. The night rocked with sound. The night is the true time for fighting, and the wire-cutters were creeping about on their dangerous errands between the trenches. The rocks now and then hissed skyward, throw-

ing their powerful flares of light over the darkened world. Wounded men groaned. And rats, like flies in Summer, scuttled about, making queer noises, which we could hear in momentary lulls. I had not lain there long before an officer called for volunteers to examine the land between our trench and the enemy's and repair our broken barbed wire entanglements. The wires are destroyed every day by the bombardment, and must be repaired every night. It is a most dangerous duty. Yet, I gladly volunteer, with Aurele, Auguste, and other friends.

While we were at work upon the wires the Germans threw up some flares and turned our protecting darkness into the glare of midday. They poured upon us a deadly fire. We dropped among the dead bodies which littered the ground. And long I lay, sprawled across the corpse of some brave German lad killed there many days before—constrained to feign death to save my life. But we did not all escape. Martin of Montreal was killed and many of our little party were wounded. But, as usual, I came back at last, moving painfully on my stomach, uninjured. I reported to Captain Desserre and told him all that I had heard and seen. And then I went back to sleep upon empty sandbags; and a cold, cold night it was.

I awoke at 7 o'clock, sore and stiff. I soon had kindled a little fire and cooked a slice of bacon and steeped a little tea for my chum, Aurele Roy of Montreal, and myself.

"I can lick the whole German Army alone this morning!" I exclaimed in French, warmed by the tea.

"Not alone!" cried Roy, reviving also under the influence of our breakfast, "for if you begin to lick 'em, I'll be beside you." And we laughed together, little dreaming how soon our brave words would be put to the test.

I did my turn at guard duty almost cheerfully. I cleaned my rifle and bayonet, shaved myself, and washed up a little, and then thought I would get a little more rest while I could. But, alas, some one had stolen my two empty sandbags! So I took off my overcoat and spread it on the ground and covered myself with a blanket. The sun mean-

while was shining hotly on the heaps of dead bodies which lay not far away outside the trench. I was glad to cover my head with a blanket to shut out some of the awful stench. And that is how the smell of decaying bodies saved my life.

Arthur Robillard, a car conductor back in Montreal, was on guard duty. I was roused when he fell over me. As I sat up something got me by the throat and began to strangle out my life. The air was rent with awful cries. Many of my comrades lay dying and dead about me. I hurled myself in semi-madness into a huge crater near by, made by a bursting shell. There was a little muddy water at the bottom, and I fell in it, face down.

The water relieved me a little, and I wet my handkerchief in it and covered my face. The green, stinking air was thus shut out, and I began to breathe easier. I crawled out, and half blindly sought my unconscious chum, dragging him back ten yards into the crater where the water was. I laid him face downward there, and he, too, revived a little, and there we lay, waiting for death.

Ten minutes later, I heard a shouting, and knew that the Germans were coming fast. Then I ran back into my trench, got my gun, and began firing as fast as I could. The rifle soon became so hot that it burned my hands. I threw it down and began throwing bombs. The order to retreat to the next trench came. My half-strangled comrade was with me. We ran together and, looking back, saw the big, strapping gray fellows of the Teuton army leaping down into our trench.

I forgot the rheumatism from which I had been suffering for several days when I saw them come, (we all suffer from rheumatism, it is one of the curses of the trenches.) Meanwhile, the French had retired to their fourth line, and we were left, almost surrounded, with our left flank exposed and annihilation threatening us.

Somehow we got hold of two machine guns, and placed them where they would do the most good. One of these was running 560 shots a minute, and the other—blessed French destroyer!—was pouring

out death at the rate of 700 shots a minute.

I shall never forget those Germans. When our guns suddenly spoke their front line melted; their second crumpled before this destruction; but on, on, on they came, unflinching, marching with even steps into certain death. We were like lions at bay. It was our lives or the Germans'. Then, as fourteen of us fought together, a bomb dropped amid us, and killed eleven. I came to consciousness, lying in the bottom of a trench, with Roy leaning over me.

"Are you living, Roméo!" he exclaimed in amazement. I rose dizzily. He and I and one other stood alone among our eleven dead friends.

Then Roy told me that I had been blown clear of the trench, twenty feet from where I stood, and that he had braved death to secure, as he supposed, my dead body. A careful examination showed that my only injury was a terrible bruise on the calf of my leg, where the round surface of a flying shard had struck me, but without breaking the skin. Miracles are but small matters when you fight in the presence of death.

"I'm not afraid now," I told Roy. And from then on I and all my soldier friends believed my life was charmed and that the Germans could not kill me.

We were driven back before their heavy guns to the fourth line, and were almost immediately told in haste to leave it as quickly as we could. Our engineers had mined the place, and as we fled the Germans poured down a gray horde of men. So we blew them up.

Have you ever seen a thousand men hurled to atoms by a giant blast? I cannot forget that awful sight. The whole earth seemed to leap skyward, and through and through the black mountain of earth and stones shot heads and arms and legs, torn fragments of what were once heroic men. Next to the gas which they gave us, I think our blowing them up like this was surely the worst thing men could do to men.

Perhaps you have heard of the friendship which often springs up between the Allies and their foes. I know something about it. It was at Laventie that the

Germans began to amuse themselves by putting a bullseye on a biscuit box and letting us use it for a target. We then returned the compliment and set up a similar bullseye for the Teuton boys. For between Germans and Allies as individuals, there is no hate, though I must except the treacherous German prisoner I had to kill to save my life.

Every time the Germans made a bullseye, I would raise a shovel. If they missed, I put up a handkerchief. They did the same for us. And so we who sought each other's lives played together, and death spoke sharply all around.

Sergeant Pichette was a wag. He put an old derby on a stick and ran along the trench as if it were a man, and the Germans fired at it. He would pull the hat down occasionally to make the enemy believe that the man under it had been shot, but soon afterward he would raise it again, thereby causing much amusement.

We used to talk back and forth—those German boys and we Canadians. They were the 157th and most friendly. "Hi! Where do you come from?" a voice in French once called over to us.

"We are French Canadians," we replied with pride.

"Well, we're Canadians, too," came the astonishing answer. "We come from Ontario."

There came a pause. There was no firing. Then the German shouted, "Let me see one of your group; let him stand above the trench, and on my word of honor we shall not fire."

One of us sprang out of the trench and stood up. There fell a deep silence upon the two armies. Then many stood up, and finally the Germans, too, were rising. We talked for hours so, when the officers were not looking. When they looked we did a deal of firing—but our aim was much too high.

One day the Germans threw over a bit of paper wrapped around a stone. "If you don't fire on us, we won't fire on you," some one had written. We kept that strange pact for days, until the officers, discovering this pact of peace, moved us to another part of the trenches.

Some months later, curiously enough,

we found ourselves opposite the same regiment. Neither side forgot we were both Canadian, and steadfastly kept our treaty of peace. They did not consider that rough note a "scrap of paper." Not a single shot was fired and only one man was killed, and he by a stray bullet.

Because friendships started easily between hostile bodies, they kept moving a regiment from one part of the trenches to another, that we might not get too friendly with our enemies. We had no heart in the butchery, Germans or we French Canadians.

A big part of trench warfare is the mining operations. I feared the mines more than anything, I think. It was more terrible than gas poisoning to think that at any moment the earth would be rent and you would be thrown a thousand ways at once. The mining operations were carried on by trained miners, who burrow along under ground about fifteen feet below the surface. The engineers in charge figure out just how far they must dig to reach positions under the German lines, and when they have done so a fuse is run in—and Fritz and Hans and their friends jump fifty feet toward heaven.

We do this; the Germans do it. It is bad work. And on both sides, we have to keep men listening all the time for the digging. When it is discovered that a mine is coming our way, we sink a tunnel deeper still and blow up their tunnel. And the Germans do the same thing with our mines. The soldier in the trench never knows when he may be blown into small pieces—and that is why we always preferred to risk uncertain dangers between the lines at night, instead of lying down in the wet trench, helplessly waiting for death.

I never felt so secure, indeed, as when I was on guard between the trenches, through all the night I could hear the bullets go over me. Men go crazy there. And the insane are sent to England. But sometimes men go mad and become a menace to their own comrades and officers. They sometimes have to be killed. And there have been times when I have crouched in some first-line trench, where no communication trench joined us

to the second or third line, when no doctor could reach us. And I have seen men so terribly wounded, enduring such agonies, and screaming so heart-breakingly for somebody to kill them, that our boys have done what they asked, to save them the unnecessary horror of living dismembered.

And I have seen men of good health grow so weary of the trenches that they have simply stood up at noonday. Some machine guns swiftly ended them. And others, as I have written, simply stick up their hands above the trench top and bullets trim off their fingers.

I was twenty days at Laventie. We only had the regular rifle shooting there, and were fortunate in losing not a single man of our 500 by bombs. We then marched to a point about one mile to the right of the now famous Neuve Chapelle, where we caught the Germans by surprise and took nearly 3,000 prisoners.

For two days and two nights I was firing continuously. My rifle became so hot that I had to fill my hands with dirt before firing. The fighting became so fierce that we had to employ men to do nothing else but carry ammunition to us from 200 yards in the rear. We were two and one-half miles to the left of the British. The Germans, but for us, could have got reinforcements, but we Canadians were in the way. We expected, at first, to attack them, as they were only sixty yards away. We had constructed special bridges to cross a ten-yard stream near by. Our work was to fire upon the German reserves in the rear, and this we easily did, because our guns carried for two miles. The Germans were defeated largely because they supposed the British had plenty of reinforcements.

The whole thing began suddenly at 2:30 in the morning, after a quiet day. It was an earthquake. Our company until then had fought in no real battle and had lost only five men. Other companies used to declare that we had some guardian angel to protect us. Anyhow, many say that I had some guardian angel to protect me—and I am sure that I did.

Three men volunteered to go and cut the wire entanglements. Bullets were humming through the air. They crawled

forth—to their deaths, we thought—but succeeded in cutting nearly all. So the Germans thought we were about to attack them. As soon as the Germans discovered what our men had done, we poured a withering fire over the broken wires, so that no man could live to reach and repair them.

The English bombarded the Germans for two whole days. Then we heard cries, and fast by us went the Black Watch, a Scotch regiment, and the Coldstream Guards. It was between 4 and 5 in the morning that they passed us, and within ten minutes they had captured the three first lines of the Germans.

The Germans lost 25,000 men and 3,000 prisoners. Our loss was between 10,000 and 12,000. Two days later troops came to relieve us, and in time, for we were well-nigh exhausted. We marched at night to Estaire, a pretty village eight miles away. Our men were so worn out that they dropped from weariness on the way. We spent eight days in this town and were royally treated by the French.

At midnight of the eighth day we were warned to get ready for marching again. We walked twenty-seven kilometers to Cassel, where General Dorrien, who was in charge of the battle when the English retreated from Mons in France, in the early part of the war, told us that he was going to take charge of the whole Canadian division, and that our regiment would be transferred to another army corps. He gave us three days' rest, and told us we were to occupy French trenches at Ypres.

THE BATTLE OF YPRES

Ypres is the graveyard of the old Sixty-fifth. We were carried to within six miles of the place in London buses, twenty-five men in a bus. Ypres was forty miles away. We met there the Canadian Scottish Third Brigade of 5,000 men. From the end of the bus line we tramped six miles and encamped outside the village of St. Julien, one mile away. Two battalions were in reserve at St. Jean and two were in the front line, mine being one of the two at the front.

It was at Ypres that we first met the gallant French troops. My company was

on the left of the English line, so that we acted as interpreters between the French and the English. A roadway ten yards wide separated the two lines and a tunnel ran from the English to the French lines.

We found the trenches here to be forty yards from the German line and in bad condition. Firing was continuous, by day and by night. The communication trenches were in bad shape, too, and the Germans, who were on a height, raked us terribly with their machine guns. I looked through my periscope and saw between 400 and 500 unburied German dead lying between the lines. I counted 25 dead Frenchmen among them. Three months before, I was told, the Germans had tried to carry the line and neither side had given the other a chance to bury its dead.

Our French neighbors were Zouaves, between 19 and 30 years of age, and the gayest soldiers I have ever fought beside. They sang gay ditties and called us French Canadians "*Frères*." We spent our nights in throwing grenades at the Boches and our days in the slow monotony of every-day trench life.

I rose at noon, the day after our arrival, and took the time to shave, a rare event. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at one mile from us, we saw yellow smoke rising from the ground. This smoke was the deadly gas being thrown upon the French and upon the Scotch regiment that had taken our places while we were resting, for, of course, we were resting when I shaved. We formed at once in light marching order and went to help the Scotch.

We entered the reserve trench, and at midnight the first-line trench. The Scotch had lost half of their effectives and were returning with the French, the blood streaming from their mouths and noses, and their faces all yellow-green. The French had lost nearly all their regiment. The Germans within five minutes had occupied our first and second lines.

In half an hour the Boches began a great bombardment. At 7 o'clock they tried to take our line, repeating their attacks all the night, but we rolled them back. They came even to within ten

yards of us, a flood of human waves. But our machine guns, our "coffee grinders," as we called them, mowed them down like hay, and we lost not many men.

Our artillery had plenty of ammunition. Our light guns were placed at 400 yards from the front line and the heavy artillery at one and a half miles, and some pieces as far as four miles away. The famous French Africans, called Senegalese, were fighting here with us. The Boches set fire to the City of Ypres in the night, and I watched its sullen glare against the sky. The civilian populace went running by, in dreadful condition. That night, of my friends, died Vaillant, Poitras, and Bond, all of Montreal, and two others. Poirer and Lefebvre of Montreal and O. Wiseman, also my friends, had been killed during the day. Yet I lived!

Ypres was a famous battle, one of the greatest of the war, I think, till this terrible onslaught at Verdun. Our division (Canadian) reached from Ypres (Belgium) to Poelcappelle Road. At 2 A. M., before the gas overtook me, I was sent out between the lines with another man to examine the wire entanglements. We heard a sound as of some one handling pipes, but discovered nothing more. Then the Boches sent up their flares (skyrockets whose bursting bombs turned night into daylight) and we lay on the ground motionless. In the darkness which followed, we crept back over the heaps of dead toward our line. When I had almost reached the trench, another great flare burst right over us, and I had to lie still for several long moments until the welcome darkness gave me an opportunity to drop into the trench again.

Men were dying from the gas, their eyes popping, their faces green, and crying: "Water! Water! I'm choking! Air! Air! Air!" It is a frightful thing to hear your friends crying like that. I saw one die right before my eyes, rolling upon the ground as if mad, tearing at his chest. His fingers were crooked after his death, his body full of blue spots and his mouth white. Another poor wretch fell two or three feet from me, dying from the gas. He was sucking water from a dirty handkerchief.

Listen! Suppose you were fighting in a trench. The wind comes toward you, foul with odors from nameless, twisted, torn bodies unburied between you and the Boches. Near you are your brave comrades. Some lie wounded and dying in agony on the trench bottom. The bullets zing-zing eternally over your head. There is a mighty swelling from an organ more sonorous than ever human organist played. The rockets are bursting; the flares shedding white glares over the torn ground. Your coffee grinders are mowing them down.

Then, rising from somewhere near by, comes the gas, yellow or green. Then comes a sudden stinging in your nose. Your eyes water and run. You breathe fire. You suffocate. You burn alive. There are razors and needles in your throat. It is as if you drank boiling hot tea. Your lungs flame. You want to scratch and tear your body. You become half blind, half wild. Your head aches beyond description, you vomit, you drop exhausted, you die quickly.

Every other man seemed to fall. As I fought I marveled that I was spared. And again came to me the belief that my life was charmed; that the bullet had not been melted, the shrapnel not been loaded, the gas not mixed which would cause my death. An ecstatic confidence buoyed me up. I was brave, because I was so sure of life, while all my comrades seemed groveling in death.

My platoon was under a withering fire, before which we crumpled and melted away. We left the trench, pressing forward. All hell seemed to rise suddenly from the bowels of the earth and pour over us flame and molten lead. The ground seethed from the exploding shells. The mitrailleuses vomited death.

Our thinned lines gave a yell. I saw a black hole in the ground. Sergeant Albert Pichette shouted, "Into their trench!" I leaped in. Four Germans were trying to escape on the further side. I did not fire, intending to make them prisoners. But the only thing I took was a great blow on the side of my head, and away went my prisoners.

I crawled up the trench a few feet and came upon two men trying to strangle

each other. I thought, then, of motion pictures I had watched back home. Here was a more terrible drama than ever the movie camera showed.

A bayonet charge is a street fight magnified and made ten thousand times more fierce. It becomes on close range almost impossible to use your bayonets. So we fought with fists and feet, and used our guns, when possible, as clubs. We lay in our prize trench for about four hours. The boys, excited because they still lived, sang and jested, and told of queer experiences and narrow escapes they had had.

By 10 o'clock came the story that the British had lost four field guns and asked our help to recapture them. I was one of twenty-one from my company who volunteered to go. So we joined men from the Tenth and Sixteenth Battalions, and at 11 o'clock prepared to storm the wood where the cannons were.

We had only forty yards of open ground to cover, but the German artillery and machine guns worked havoc among us. It did not take us long to run those forty yards.

We were soon in the wood, where it was so dark that we could hardly distinguish friend from foe.

I ran in and out among the trees and asked every one I met who he was. I came upon one big fellow. My mouth opened to ask him who he was, when his fist shot out and took me between the eyes. I went down for the count, but I knew who he was—he was a German. I got up as quickly as I could, you may be sure, and swung my rifle to hit him in the head, but the stock struck a tree and splintered. I thought I had broken all my fingers.

I found three wounded men, French, I thought they were, in that gloom. So I carried them into our trench. As I brought in the last one, the officer said, "You are doing good work, Houle." I asked him why he thought so, and he answered: "You have brought in three wounded men and when we put the light on them we found they were Germans." Well, I am glad I saved them. I would have done so anyhow, had I known their nationality. For we were all trained to

give a wounded man help, whether he were friend or foe.

Yet it is dangerous work, helping a wounded German. I never helped another, after the experience I had. It was one of the two occasions when I knew with certainty that I killed a man. He was a wounded German soldier. We found him suffering and weak. But we knew we could save his life and were dressing his wound. My back was turned. He took a revolver out of his tunic pocket and fired pointblank at me.

I do not know how I escaped death. Perhaps it was because his hand shook from weakness; perhaps my guardian saint turned aside that death bullet. Anyhow, he had his revolver in his hand. We had to act quickly. My officer spoke a quick word, and I made sure that he would never fire another shot.

Well, we got our machine guns. But the Germans had blown them up, and all our sacrifice of men was in vain.

We were relieved by a British regiment before morning and marched back to our billets to have a rest. I slept all the rest of the night until 11 o'clock the next morning. It was the first rest I had had in forty-eight hours, with only a slice of raw bacon and a piece of bread to eat.

These were little incidents of the bloody battle at Ypres. That afternoon some of the boys brought out tables from a house and placed them in the sun. The civilian populace, in their flight, had left behind their live stock. We caught some hens and rabbits and cooked them in wine we found in a cellar. Ah, that was a feast. I never had a better one.

Yet we were strange feasters. Had some artist been able to paint us he would have had a strong canvas. Some of the boys had their heads bandaged, and nearly all of us were covered with dirt and blood. Some sang for us, though others were downhearted. It surprised me that a few hours after we had faced death and had been suffering untold hardships we could now gather like college boys at a beer night feast and sing.

During the rest of that battle we lived in the reserve trenches, bombarded day

and night. The battle lasted twenty-one days. When it was over they called a roll of our regiment. There were 500 of us when we left Montreal. As the commander called the roll, name after name was met with no response. At Ypres 480 out of 500 of us were left dead on the field. And in reality our loss had been greater than that, for our 500 had been thinned out in other actions and filled with a full roster again. Twenty of us out of 500 survived at Ypres.

We fought madly at St. Jean, after Ypres, and retreated. We rested eight days at Bailleul, marched through Steevwerck and rested eight more days there; we also rested at Estaires for eight days, then through Vieille Chapelle, and then had another eight days' rest. We reached Lacouture at night and went into battle again at Richebourg.

We arrived there in May, 1915. Richebourg is in France, eight miles from the Belgian border, on the English front. A very small agricultural village we found it, coming to it after a hard twelve-hour hike from Bailleul. We got into the Richebourg trenches in the evening.

I found myself in a German trench, captured by the British. Five hours before the battle had raged, and the place was still full of wounded and dead, both German and British. Trench by trench we worked our way into the British front line. We had been reinforced by the Twelfth Battalion of reserves, which was made up of French Canadians and Englishmen; thus our decimated regiment was swelled to 365 men.

The battle was going on. Relieving the front line proved a dangerous task. We had to proceed cautiously to avoid bullets, and it took us three hours to reach the front line, which we did at midnight. Ten of our men were killed by shrapnel or stray bullets on the way.

Then came the report from our left that the Germans were trying to counter-attack. Our officers called for volunteers for a bomb and hand grenade throwing party. We were gone twenty minutes, fifteen of us in all; three of us were wounded, and Carrier of Montreal was killed. We were able to report on our re-

turn that we had done effective work. After that things quieted down and gave us a breathing spell.

The next morning we were ordered to take the German first-line trenches. Our cannon began to clear the way first at 2 o'clock in the morning. The famous French 75—the French 75 which is always helping the English at difficult times—blasted out the pathway over which we were to charge. We had thirty-two of these 75s—four guns to each of the eight batteries. When worked hard, these guns can fire twenty shots a minute.

We were all Catholics. At 5:30 o'clock we began to say our prayers, and soon after we were charging with fixed bayonets. We had no great difficulty in taking two lines of trenches. But when we reached the third, they rallied and drove us out. There the Germans made a counterattack, raking our flanks with their machine guns as soon as we reached their third trench. They killed 75 of us, wounded over 100, and took 20 prisoners. We were obliged to leave our wounded in their trench with the dead.

I lay until night in the German second-line trench, among the dead and wounded. There was, of course, no communication and we could not clear the place we had taken or get medical help for the men who writhed in agony all around us. A company of Highlanders from the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Battalions came to our relief at night. The Highlanders and my company were given orders to capture an orchard on our left. Through this orchard ran the German trench. German snipers were concealed in the old apple trees, and the place seemed one huge shrapnel, which burst and never ceased bursting. Three-quarters of our men were killed. And I, as usual, was among the unwounded survivors.

We took the orchard trench, but were glad enough to retire at the counter-attack, and unfortunately lost our orchard and our third trench. Listen! Out of 250 Highlanders, only forty came back. Of my own company, (which you will remember had been reinforced to 365 men,) only seventy came back. And Roméo Houle, with the charmed life, was again

among the few who returned, and had not a single wound.

About one and one-half miles on the right of Richebourg, we took up a new position, after three days' rest in a village next to Lacouture. The Scots Greys and the Coldstream Guards were in the trenches. To our surprise, they greeted us with shouts and cheers. We asked them why they cheered us so. They answered that they thought so well of the Canadians that, helped by them, they would encounter any odds. The shooting was then going on; the Scotch had tried to advance and had been pushed back. When our company came, we all tried to advance together. Again our company had been reinforced, this time to 420 men.

The Germans occupied a hilly place. Although they were only sixty yards away, we fought back and forth for an hour. Our first two charges were stopped by their entanglements. The wires in many places were not down at all and we could not pass. Then our artillery began to mow among the wires. In thirty minutes our way was clear, and on the third tussle we got into the German trench. It was a close fight. We used even our fists. My bayonet was broken, and I used my gun as a club. There we remained until we got reinforcements. Out of 420 men, my company was reduced to eighty. No, I could not be killed.

We were at Cuinchy only two days, but we took three lines of trenches there, and retreated. The dead we left on the field covered the barbed wire entanglements. The Germans in their counterattack came at us in serried ranks. Our coffee grinders smashed their first, their second, their third lines, but they came on and on, irresistible as a flood. We could not but give way and withdraw before that awful advance. They cared not for the lives of men, but thought only of the ground they gained. Every foot they advanced cost them many, many lives. But those trenches from which we retreated are now occupied by the British. All their silly outlay of men was in vain.

To the south of Cuinchy, we fought at Givenchy. Five days we were in the third line, and four in the first. German

mortars opposite us were belching forth thunderous volumes of flame and death. Chaos was at Givenchy. Lightning lashed us—the swift lightning of 10,000 rifles and great batteries of field guns. Yet we destroyed their mortars and took fifty prisoners. Do you wonder that I am still proud that I fought there—proud of the French Canadians? What soldiers ever fought more valiantly? Who ever gave their lives in a noble cause more gladly? Who ever met certain death more steadfastly and unafraid? Whatever I think of war—and before I am done, I shall tell—whatever I think of war, I say that braver soldiers never lived or died than the gallant French Canadians. But oh! I am sorry to think how their handsome lines have been thinned—thinned more than most people know.

Two of our men cared for ten prisoners. A Sergeant led them away. I suppose that they are in England now, spectacles for the curious. They were brave men. I am sorry for their captivity, on their account; but glad to see their terrible martial strength thus ebbing. When we took a trench, the Germans would throw up their hands and cry "Comrade." The Saxon Germans always surrender the quickest, because they are so nearly akin to the English. The Bavarian Germans and the Prussian Guards are different propositions.

At Béthune, a town of 50,000 population, we had a ten-day rest. They shifted us to Oblingham—and then another rest. And then three more weeks of fighting at La Bassée. It was the same story!

I had fought in the first line of the battle front until all the bed I knew was wet earth, and all the rest I knew were snatches of sleep obtained during lulls in the rocking tumult. From almost the very opening of the war I had fought. And long since I had had my fill of the fighting.

The American Consul at London wrote me a letter. It came, I remember well, in October, 1915. It brought me my first ray of hope—my first real hope of life. For I knew that that strange chance which had spared me so many months, when so many of my comrades had died,

would not always be mine. I knew that death fought by my side in the day and slept with me in the night. I saw him grinning at me from the twisted features of those shot in the battle. I heard him gibbering on the horrible field at night!

The Ambassador gave me the hope that, having been under age and an American by birth when I enlisted, my Government might secure my discharge. Influential friends were working for me.

On Jan. 10, 1916, in the forenoon, I was notified to report to headquarters, 300 yards behind our firing line. I laid low in the front trench all day, fearful lest at the last moment I should be shot. For a friend, who had obtained a long furlough for rest in England, on the very eve of his departure, had been killed by my side a few days before. It seemed so pitiful an ending, just when he was going home.

So eager was I to leave, that I planned the best I could how to escape. But I knew that if I yielded and went, I should forfeit my life. By a great effort, I restrained myself. But at 4:30 o'clock I could stand it no longer. My friends wept at the parting—for joy for my sake that I was going back to life; for grief that they were left, to die probably, so far from their fair Canada.

At 4:30 o'clock, then, with last hand-grips and the well-wishes of all, I jumped a little ditch and crept on hands and knees in a circuitous way to the headquarters.

I walked seven miles to the railroad. The firing sank away. The trenches and their fevers, their wounded and dead, their noxious odors and their deadly gases, and the man-eating rats—all became a memory. I was free, going home to my wife and child, my parents, my friends, unwounded.

I take no credit for any special courage in the field. If I was brave, it was because I had to be so. We were all brave, who kept our senses. We became accustomed to a large degree to the incessant intimacy with dangers and death. We could look without wincing at frightful things. And yet—I have promised to write what I think of war.

I know not what word could adequately describe war. Man's poets have never

imagined any description terrible enough. "Hell" is too weak a word, after Ypres and Richebourg. It is all a great slaughter house, legalized by Princes and Kings. And it is more horrible than the slaughter house, because the forms of death planned are more cruel, more mad, more devilish.

I was not altogether free from hurts. There is a dent in my skull from a spent bullet, which failed to kill me. And I got a terrible bruise on the leg from a shard that did not break the skin. But I live, thank God, one out of the 16 of those 500 men, most of whom we left behind at Ypres.

If you Americans have the choice, never vote for war. You do not know what war is, who have not seen it. I did not know. I could not know. It is not like the sanguinary conflicts of the civil war—they were little fisticuff battles compared to this gigantic slaughter of heroes. Now calm science, cruel, unutterably cruel, calculating a hundred deaths with the precision of the crazed murderer, lays out the battle schemes, and goes seeking through science for new forms of death more horrible than the old. We fight underground and under-sea, on the land and in the air. We fight with fire, with steel, with lead, with poisons, with gases, with burning oil. We are lower than the brutes, lower than the lowest and most degraded forms of life.

I do not know why we fought. No Archduke's little life was worth the titanic butchery of the world war. The beginning was petty and small. And I, looking back at horror, horror, horror, cannot forget the extraordinary friendships we made with the men in the enemy's trenches. We were both only human beings, after all, Fritz and I. We had no wish to kill each other. We had much rather sit at the same table, with our wives and children around us, and talk of gardens, of fair pictures, and of great books. But for our officers and the nations which they represented peace would have been declared right there in the trenches—and that by the soldiers themselves.

I am only Roméo Houle, a barber. But I have lived—God, I have lived! All the

slaughter of heroes by the Meuse and on the Belgian border and in Northern France has passed before my eyes. And I, Roméo Houle, am forced to write this:

Man is given life to enjoy it, not to destroy it. We cannot make ourselves better or the world we live in more worth

while by killing each other like beasts gone mad.

I thank God that the nightmare is over. Only in my dreams do the cannon roar over the line at Ypres. And such dreams are quite terrible and real enough. I hope never to fight again.

In the Hospital

By SERGEANT ROBERT BEARNS

The author of this poem, now recovering from a severe wound, was an English miner before he joined the army.

He 'adn't no shinin' 'elmet on,
Nor 'E 'adn't no bloomin' sword,
But somehow the pains o' my wound was gone
When the King come into the ward;
There wasn't a 'aporth o' frill or fuss,
Just a' officer smart an' trim,
An' I couldn't 'elp turning and saying to nurse,
"Do you think as it's really 'Im?"

'E come up and stood by the side o' my bed,
And 'eld out his 'and to me;
"Where was you peppered, my son?" 'E said,
Or that's what 'E meant it to be.
We chatted away in no make-pretend—
That wasn't his royal plan.
'E was a King and a soldier's friend,
So we chinwagged man to man.

'E knew all about where the boys 'ad been,
And what the battalion had done;
An' when 'E had gone, then up come the
Queen,
Who spoke to us one by one.
'Er smile 'ad a kind o' a wit o' tears,
A something that seemed to say,
"I know how you suffer, you poor old dear,
Don't I wish I could help you today."

An' I've been thinking things out a bit
As to what we are fighting for,
And why the best of our British grit
Must go to this 'Ell of a war.
And talking away to King and Queen
So 'omely, has give me the clue,
An' this seems to be the 'ang o' the thing,
I fancy I've got it true.

All us as is under the Union Jack
We works on a family plan;
We are all expected to do our whack,
But a man may be a man.
'E may earn less than a quid a week,
An' 'is notions may be queer,
But what 'e thinks 'e's allowed to speak,
And the slop won't interfere.

There's something that binds us that isn't
force,
Which means that we're jolly well free;
An' that's the thing that brought, o' course,
Our chaps from beyond the sea.
Now the Kaiser considers like this, perhaps,
"Men! You! D'ye see any green?
We'll do the thinkin', we top-notched chaps,
You are bits of a bloomin' machine."


An' more'n ever I know today,
As I'm going back to fight
For 'ome, an' freedom, an' kids at play,
And things as is true and right.
And whether I live or chance to die,
As the fates of war may bring,
Above us the same old flag shall fly,
And so—God save the King!



THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[Spanish Cartoon]


A Peace Overture



—From the *Campana de Gracia*, Barcelona.

"May I have the pleasure of your company?"
"Thanks! First go and wash your hands."

[French Cartoon]
Modern War



—Jean Veber in *L'Esprit Satirique en France*.
The Brute Let Loose.



—By Steinlen, French Cartoonist.

[English Cartoon]

A Case of Injustice



—From *The Sketch*, London.

TOMMY: "They takes me from 'ome, an' bungs me into barricks. They takes away my clothes an' puts me inter khaki. They takes away my name an' gives me a number—005. They sends me ter church, an' after a forty-minutes sermon, the Parson says: 'Number 005: "Art thou weary?"' I jumps up an' ses 'Yus!' an' gets fourteen days C. D. for givin' a civil answer! How'd I know he meant the hymn and not me?"

[German Cartoon]

At the Close of the Entente Conference



—© Kladderadatch, Berlin.

“And now, gentlemen, in order to get at least one cheerful picture of the conference, please—look pleasant!”

[English Cartoon]

Peas and Plenty




—From *The Bystander*, London.

A magnificent suggestion for the future in all the warring countries.

[French Cartoon]

Spring



—By Abel Truchet, French Artist.

“How black the nightingales are, this year!”



—Forain in *L'Opinion*, France.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE FRONT: “What’s the odds? It’s life!”

[American Cartoon]

Kitchener's Grave



—From The New York Times.

Disappointment After Disappointment



—From The Calgary News-Telegram.

Another Bomb That Failed to Explode.

[German Cartoon]

Military Courtesies



—© *Fliegende Blätter*, Munich.

"Well, General, what is your son doing on the eastern front?"

"The same as yours—taking prisoners."

[French Cartoon]

The Mystery of the Blockade—




—© Le Rire, Paris.

—Or, The Hand That Grips.

[English Cartoon]

A Fragment From Germany




—From *The Bystander*, London.

“Look here, Frau H., if you want to stick nails into anything there’s my statue outside.”


[English Cartoons]

The Schwein-Hun and the Moslem



GERMANY TO TURKEY: "You must get over your prejudice against pork—you've just got to love me."

The Wolf's Explanation



"What proof had I that it would not attack me?"

[French Cartoon]

Hands Across the Sea

[In the submarine crisis]



—© *Le Rire*, Paris.

"President Wilson has grasped the hand that Germany extended to him."—
Frankfort Gazette.

[Italian Cartoon]
An Untimely Plea



—From the Numero, Turin.

DEATH: "I am weary of work—don't send me any more victims."

CROWN PRINCE: "Are you mad? I have just got papa's permission to make 20,000 corpses."

[French Cartoon]
The War in German Style




—From the Paris Matin.

MEXICAN INSURGENT: "Down with the United States!"

THE SINN FEINERS: "Long live the Irish Republic!"

BOTH TOGETHER: "Deutschland über alles!"

[Italian Cartoon]
Holland's Precarious Position



—From Fischietto, Turin.

"And the mill begins to turn."

"But who knows for whom it is grinding?"

[French Cartoon]
The Modern Don Quixote



—With Apologies to Gustave Dore.

"We love Don Quixote, and sometimes recognize ourselves in him."—Professor von Wieze.

[English Cartoon]

The Biter Bit



—From *The Sketch*, London.

THE COCK: "Hullo, Billy! What's the matter?"

THE GOAT: "Matter? I've eaten a lot of recruiting posters and a packet of peace pamphlets, and the row going on inside is something awful!"

[French Cartoon]

M. Poilu Visits His Godmother



—© *Le Rire*, Paris.

"Yes, I killed fifty-six; they all had an iron cross."

"Was it in Artois?"

"No, in my flannels."

[German Cartoon]

A Guilty Conscience



—© Jugend, Munich.

NORTHERN NEUTRAL: "My dear Jorgensen, I feel like a criminal. Yesterday my wife presented me with twins, and England at present allows us only one."

[English Cartoon]

More Than He Bargained For



—From *The Bystander*, London.

ATLAS: "Well, really this is getting a bit *too* hot for me."

THE EMPIRE NEEDS MEN!



All answer the call.
Helped by the **YOUNG LIONS**
The **OLD LION** defies his Foes.
ENLIST NOW.

Another striking call that helped to make a record for voluntary enlistment in England.

[English War Poster]



One of the historic posters that helped to recruit England's millions now in the trenches.

Progress of the War

Recording Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events
From May 12 Up to and Including
June 11, 1916

CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE

- May 12—Germans carry 500 yards of British trenches near Hulluch, but lose part of the ground in counterattack.
- May 16—British occupy 250 yards of German trenches on Vimy Ridge.
- May 18—Germans fail in heavy attacks on French positions in Avocourt Woods and on Hill 304.
- May 20—Germans win part of French trenches on northern slope of Dead Man Hill.
- May 22-23—French regain offensive at Verdun and take Fort Douaumont.
- May 24—Germans retake Fort Douaumont and drive French out of Cumières.
- May 25—Germans take trenches west of Douaumont.
- May 27—French force themselves back into Cumières and advance near Dead Man Hill and Douaumont.
- May 29-31—Germans gain ground on the west bank of the Meuse; French capture strong German position southwest of Dead Man Hill.
- June 1-3—Germans penetrate advance trenches between Douaumont and Vaux.
- June 4—Germans bombard Fort Vaux.
- June 6—British first line broken at Hooge, east of Ypres.
- June 7—Vaux garrison surrenders to Germans.
- June 9-11—French repulse attacks at Hill 304; Ypres bombarded.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

- May 12—Germans resume offensive in sector north of Selburg station near Jacobstadt.
- May 17—Russians defeat Germans near Lake Sventen and advance in the Olyka region.
- May 24—Germans drive Russians out of trench near Pulkarn.
- June 5—Russians start sudden offensive along the entire line from the Pripet marches to the Rumanian frontier.
- June 6-7—Russian advance continues; over 40,000 Austrians taken prisoner.
- June 8—Russians recapture fortress of Lutsk.
- June 10—Russians advance five miles beyond Lutsk and push on between Buczacz and Potok.
- June 11—Fortress of Dubno captured by Russians; 409 officers and 35,000 men taken prisoner.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

- May 12—Intense artillery action along the Trentino, particularly in the Col di Lana zone.
- May 16-17—Austro-Hungarian troops begin successful offensive on entire front, capturing many positions in Southern Tyrol, and reporting 141 officers and 6,200 men taken prisoner.
- May 18—Austrians extend gains on the Dobersdo Plateau.
- May 19—Italians evacuate the line between Monte Maggio and the upper Astico Valley, and Zugnatorta in the Lagarina Valley.
- May 20—Italians abandon Col Santo.
- May 21—Italians check offensive in the Lagarina Valley and retake Astico defenses.
- May 22—Austrians carry Armentara Peak and clear Italian forces out of Lavarone Plateau.
- May 23—Austrians gain in the Sugana Valley and take fortification of Monte Veina; Bulgars are aiding Austrians on the Isonzo front.
- May 27—Italians driven from positions west of Bacarola; Austrians occupy peak of Monte Cimone and Batalo in the upper Posina Valley.
- May 31—Austro-Hungarian troops force a passage across the Posina River to the west of Arsiero and take fortified works of Punta Cordin, but are repulsed in the Lagarina Valley.
- June 3—Italians halt Austrian attacks along the entire front in the Trentino and reconquer Belmonte position northeast of Monte Cengio.
- June 4—Austrians checked on the Arsiero front.
- June 5—Italians fall back in the Cengio zone; Austrian attacks on position at Coni Zugna, in the Lagarina Valley, repulsed.
- June 7—Italians make successful counter-attack on Austrians near Campo Mulo.
- June 8—Italians advance in the upper Tellina Valley.
- June 9—Italians give ground in Sette Comuni battle.
- June 11—Italians repulse attacks on Monte Lemerle.

IN ASIA MINOR AND EGYPT

- May 14—Russians repulse Turks in the region of Baiburt.

May 19—Russian cavalry joins British on the Tigris; Turks vacate Bethalessa advanced position; British move north; new advance on Kutel-Amara begun.

May 20—South bank of the Tigris practically clear of Turks as far as the Shatt-el-Hai River.

May 27—Russians defeat Turks and Kurds near Serbrecht.

June 1—Turks check Russian advance in Mesopotamia and retake Mamakhtum.

June 5—Reinforced Turkish army drives Russians back twenty-five miles on the Caucasus front.

June 7—Russians take Turkish positions at Khanikin.

June 12—Turks drive Russians back from Khanikin and reoccupy Kasr-i-Shirin.

AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

May 13—General Smuts reports defeat of Germans at Irangi in German East Africa.

May 30—British occupy New Langenberg.

June 2—British drive Germans toward Pan-gani on the coast.

AERIAL RECORD

There has been unprecedented aerial activity on the western front. On May 18 sixty air fights had been reported within a few days. Georges Boillot was killed in an encounter with five German aeroplanes. American aviators brought down three German machines near Verdun. On June 1 German aviators bombarded the open town of Bar-le-duc, killing eighteen civilians.

Three German seaplanes raided the east coast of England on May 20, dropping bombs on Kentish towns. No casualties were reported.

The Greek village of Majadagh, near the Serbian frontier, was raided by German aviators. Fourteen civilians were killed.

Allied airmen dropped bombs on El Arisch, on the coast of Syria, and on El Hamma. Austrian aviators raided Bari, on the Italian Adriatic coast, killing eighteen civilians.

NAVAL RECORD

The greatest naval battle in history was fought on May 31 when the German high sea fleet emerged from Kiel into the North Sea and engaged the main part of the British fleet off the coast of Jutland. The British reported the loss of three battle cruisers, Queen Mary, Indefatigable, and Invincible; three armored cruisers, Defense, Warrior, and Black Prince, and eight destroyers. The Germans reported the loss of the battle cruiser Lützow, the battleship Pommern, the cruisers Frauenlob, Elbing, and Rostock, and six destroyers. These lists, however, are believed to be incomplete.

In the war zone the activities of German submarines have abated somewhat. Within a month about fifteen neutral, four

Italian, three French, and five British ships have been sunk.

In the Mediterranean ten belligerent vessels were sunk by Teutonic submarines and by mines. One Greek ship was lost.

In the Adriatic Sea the Italian transport Principe Umberto was torpedoed and sunk and a large number sailors perished. An Austrian transport was sunk in the Harbor of Trieste.

The British cruiser Hampshire struck a mine off the Orkney Islands on June 5 and Lord Kitchener was lost with his entire staff.

MISCELLANEOUS

Greece was invaded by Bulgar forces which pushed on to Demir-Hassar after occupying the forts commanding the Struma Valley. The country's coal supply was cut off by England and Greek ships were held in British ports. King Constantine published a demobilizing decree disbanding the twelve senior classes. The Allies notified the Government that they would take all measures necessary to enforce treaties safeguarding Greek unity and the Greek Constitution.

In Germany the food situation became so serious that on May 13 Clemens Delbrueck, Minister of the Interior, resigned, and Tordlowitz von Batoeki was appointed food dictator by the Kaiser. Other important changes in the Cabinet followed.

The British Parliament passed a compulsory military service bill, which was signed by the King on May 25. Ireland was excluded from the provisions of the bill.

James Connolly and John McDermott, the last two signers of the Irish Republic proclamation, were executed in Dublin, and John MacNeill, President of the Sinn Fein volunteers, was found guilty of conspiracy and sentenced to life imprisonment. Sir Roger Casement was put on trial for high treason; also Daniel Julian Bailey, an Irishman who was captured with him.

Preliminary hearings have been held. Premier Asquith visited Ireland in a vain attempt to bring about an agreement on the home rule question, and the task of pacifying the island was intrusted to Lloyd George.

Germany has issued a general warning that a neutral vessel may be attacked by a German submarine if, when challenged to halt, it fails to obey.

On May 24 Secretary Lansing sent a vigorous note to France and England protesting against interference with neutral mails, but since that time several vessels have been detained and the mail searched and seized.

The Italian Cabinet resigned, June 11, after the failure of the Chamber of Deputies to pass a vote of confidence, following the presentation of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior.

BOUND VOLUMES CURRENT HISTORY

(Three Volumes, 1,325 pages each, illustrated.)

Volumes I., II., and III. of **CURRENT HISTORY** cover the European War in three periods from the beginning to March, 1916. Each volume contains the official correspondence and comments of the leading statesmen of the world on the causes leading to the war and its phases; also the diplomatic interchanges between the various warring nations and neutrals; also the official reports of military operations; also a large number of very interesting maps, charts, diagrams, and portraits, and all the essential literature, data, and judgment reflecting the trend of public opinion as voiced by the leading writers of the nations of the world.

CURRENT HISTORY is

UNIQUE in the variety and scope of its contents.

UNUSUAL in the amount of authentic official matter it contains.

INDISPENSABLE to the student and historian as a source of original information.

INVALUABLE to all as a work of reference on the facts of the European War.

INTERESTING as the depository of the best literature of the chief writers of all the nations involved.

It is a complete compendium of facts, combined with a chronological record of events and a treasury of annals contained nowhere else.

*Bound in Full Leather,
\$4.00 per volume, delivered.*

*Bound in $\frac{3}{4}$ Leather,
\$3.50 per volume, delivered.*

*Bound in Cloth,
\$2.25 per volume, delivered.*

*Postpaid in the United States;
foreign postage extra.*

CURRENT HISTORY

**TIMES SQUARE
NEW YORK CITY**

11 + 8 17 + 2
No 22

No 4 27
11 - 2 17 + 2

*Small Grand
Style M
Mahogany Case
\$750*



STEINWAY

THE ideal of the Steinway Piano is a beautiful voice. The work of the Steinway family is to create a sensitive but permanent vehicle for its expression.

"The Steinway realization means the elevation and furtherance of the great art of music. Their field is the world and mankind is the beneficiary. Rarely have men had such inspiration and more rarely have they risen to the heights or possessed such unobscured and prophetic vision of the intellectual needs."

Style "V" Upright, Mahogany, \$500

Style "M" Grand, Mahogany, \$750

Sold on easy monthly payments when so desired. Old pianos taken in exchange. Also pianos for rent at reasonable rates for town or country.

STEINWAY & SONS

STEINWAY HALL

107-109 East 14th Street, New York

Subway Express Station at the Door

Represented by the Foremost Dealers Everywhere.
Pianos Tuned